English infantry, like the French, had thirteen companies to a battalion, twelve of foot and one of grenadiers, each company numbering 60 men at full strength. They also carried the flintlock, which had a maximum range of about 250 yards though only a 50–60 yard effective range. They too used the socket bayonet and thus had relegated the pike to a ceremonial weapon for officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Unlike the French, they deployed in an extended line only three ranks deep, all of which fired. The major difference in tactics was that the battalion was arranged into platoons. When the battalion was deployed (with half the grenadier company on either flank) it was divided into eighteen equal sections, or “platoons.” As the enemy came into range, instead of firing by ranks, six of the platoons spaced through the battalion fired their muskets and then began reloading. The second set of six platoons would then fire and begin the reloading process, followed by the third firing of platoons.22 Having one-third of the battalion firing at a time meant a round of gunfire would normally take about thirty seconds, at which time the first platoon was ready to begin the process again; thus, an almost constant fire was maintained. This allowed the NCOs to keep their platoon under control, and one-third of the force was always loaded and ready for unexpected developments. In most battles, however, this was more theory than reality. Once combat started the excitement began to outweigh the discipline, and the platoon fire broke down into individuals shooting their muskets as soon as reloaded rather than waiting for the command.23 Although Marlborough did not institute this practice—it had grown out of Gustavus’s army—he insisted on year-round drills and practices with live ammunition, both in season and out, and thus helped create the most devastating infantry in Europe. Usually no more than a few minutes of this kind of firing was sufficient to break the morale or formation of most opponents. The following bayonet charge then tended to be decisive. This constant practice and maintenance of unit cohesion was one of Marlborough’s keys to victory.24
His cavalry tactics, like those of the Dutch, also grew out of Gustavus’s philosophy. The English cavalry were divided into horse and dragoon units, light cavalry not coming into play until later. The horse soldiers were organized into troops of 40–60 troopers (three troops to a squadron) and armed with straight sword, pistol, and sometimes carbine. As the Swedes had done, Marlborough rejected the caracole tactic; instead he trained his Anglo-Dutch cavalry in the true cavalry charge with cold steel, but delivered at a fast trot with his squadrons knee-to-knee in two ranks. The momentum of the charge was sustained by the reserve squadrons. He had so little faith in the firepower of cavalry (and so much in the shock value) that his troopers were allowed no more than three pistol balls each.25 Marlborough tended to keep a fairly large cavalry reserve and use them for the breakthrough assault and pursuit.
Like the French dragoons, the English were mounted infantry with a variety of roles. Described in the field manuals of the day as “mounted musketeers,” they were to assist wherever needed. Like the French they were used both on the battlefield and for detached duty as well as some engineer duty, clearing obstacles and such.26 At the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession, the English had fifteen regiments of horse and nine of dragoons. The Austrian imperial army also employed hussars, light horsemen for reconnaissance and harassment.
While the English artillery was little different from that of any other nation of the time, Marlborough gave it special attention. The siege guns were still too large to be hauled around with the army on campaign, so the largest guns on the battlefield would be 6- or 9-pounders. Marlborough spent time situating his cannons and developed the tactic of moving them forward after the opening volleys of an engagement. He also added smaller guns, 1.5-pounders and 3-pounders, to increase battalion firepower.27 The 3-pounder could fire solid cannon balls to a range of about 450 yards and grapeshot to about 300 yards, though it was usually reserved for close-in fighting. Getting the increased firepower onto the field, and siting the guns himself at times, meant that Marlborough could readily assist his infantry and cavalry operations. He had an average of 100 guns at each of his four great victories, Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde, and Malplaquet. This meant usually 1.34 guns per thousand men.28
While Marlborough was commander of Dutch forces only when they were serving alongside the English forces, he also had Austrian troops. Austria had come out of the Thirty Years War politically strong, and the emperor had maintained a standing army after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Austria had been busy, however, with regular offensives against the Ottoman Empire as well as acquiring, then trying to hold on to, Hungary. This meant that the imperial army was spread thin, having to operate in the Balkans and Italy as well as trying to stymie Louis’s aspirations toward empire. Thus, it was a veteran army but one stretched to the limit by enemies and the time committed to various wars. The cavalry became the best arm of the Austrian army. It was that army that introduced the modern light cavalry, the hussars, which were of Magyar origin and used for skirmishing and reconnaissance.29 Luckily for the Austrians, and for Marlborough, they had the services of a general who was virtually Marlborough’s equal, and some think his tactical superior: Prince Eugene of Savoy.
Although the Savoy territory was under French authority and Eugene’s mother had been mistress to Louis XIV, he had been rejected from French military service. A slim boy, described by Spencer as “effeminate,” he just did not look like a soldier, and Louis quite brusquely told him so. Instead, Eugene offered his services as an eighteen-year-old with no experience to the Austrian government and from his first combat showed remarkable bravery. He also developed into as good a strategist and tactician as was active in the era. He and Marlborough became fast friends and fought together at Blenheim and Oudenarde.
The Austrians suffered a serious disadvantage in matters like supply, equipment, and above all numbers. While not particularly innovative, however, the army had marvelous commanders and an emperor who trusted them.30 During the War of the League of Augsburg, Eugene fought the French in Italy and handled them severely. Finally realizing his mistake in dismissing the young Eugene, King Louis is said to have offered him a marshal’s position, the principality of Champagne, and a huge pension, all of which Eugene rejected. From 1697 to 1699 he fought the Turks and defeated them decisively at Zenta in September 1697.31
As for French generals, the great ones by this time had passed on. Marshal Count Turenne was the class of his era and certainly Marlborough was glad to have served under his command and picked up some lessons. His immediate predecessor (and rival during the French civil wars) was Louis de Bourbon, the Prince de Condé, also known as “The Great Condé.” Both had risen to high command near the end of the Thirty Years War and had also fought in the various conflicts with the Dutch. The master of siege warfare, both offensive and defensive, was Sebastian Vauban, but he was far more an engineer and master of siegecraft than a combat commander. Still, Louis’s army was not without some talent, although his generals tend to be overshadowed by Marlborough and Eugene. Some, like the dukes of Tallard, Villeroi, and Bourgogne were political appointees with little to recommend them, but some, the duc de Villars and duc de Vendôme in particular, had real talent.32
The Opponents
IN SPITE OF THE GROWING HOSTILITY, peace negotiations began in May 1701, but with little serious hope of a positive outcome. A large proportion of Englishmen thought that a land war was unnecessarily costly and that the navy should be depended on to protect English commercial interests.33 (One can easily see parallels to some twentieth-century arguments about air power.) On 7 September, England, the United Provinces of the Netherlands, and the Austrian Empire signed the treaty of the Grand Alliance of the Hague: Holland promised to contribute 100,000 soldiers, the English 40,000, and the empire 82,000. Over time, several Germanic states also joined. Marlborough had signed the treaty for England; after finding William’s favor again after Queen Mary’s death, Marlborough had favorably impressed the king with his c
ommand in Ireland; William appreciated talent when he saw it. Luckily for England and Holland, William was able to put aside personal feelings in order to resist France.34 On that, both men were in agreement.
Fighting alongside Louis were Spain and a number of Italian states (Savoy, Piedmont, Mantua, and Milan). Most importantly, Louis signed an alliance with Elector Maximilian II Emanuel of Bavaria, whose young son had been recently in the running for Spain’s throne. Max, as he was known, was upset with the Austrians for not paying him for his support against the Turks and because Louis promised him the viceroyalty of the Spanish Netherlands, as long as he could keep the alliance forces at bay. He started in his new role by forcing Dutch garrisons from some of their frontier fortresses.35 A hero of the wars against the Turks and intimate with the strengths and weaknesses of the Austrian military, Max assumed the war would be short and France would win. If he could defeat the Austrian forces, he could have a throne in Vienna if not a son on the throne in Madrid.
Even before war was declared in May 1702, fighting had been taking place in Italy, where Austria and Spain had long struggled against each other. The Austrians committed a 30,000-man army under Prince Eugene. He fooled the Franco-Spanish generals by marching his force through less commonly used mountain passes to surprise and defeat them at Carpi in July 1701. He then took a strong defensive position and beat back a force of 100,000, inflicting 2,000–3,000 casualties with a loss of just over 100. The defeated armies went into winter quarters, Eugene laid siege to Mantua, and some Italian nobles began changing sides.
In 1702 the Dutch forces opened the fighting in April. Skirmishes along the frontier between the Spanish Netherlands (modern Belgium) and the United Provinces (modern Holland) remained limited. Along both sides were large numbers of fortresses, the slow taking or retaking of which had dominated the last war. This dependence on fortresses for defense effectively limited thoughts of offense. It was this clash of philosophies that was to dominate the relations between the Dutch government and generals on the one hand and Marlborough and Eugene on the other. At the end of June 1702 the Dutch government (without a strong candidate for commander in chief) had ordered its generals to follow Marlborough when in joint operations.
The offensive-minded Englishman struggled with the defensive-minded Dutch, both the government and the generals. After almost constant warfare for more than twenty years, the Dutch were not anxious to lose manpower in big battles. Also, they doubted Marlborough’s abilities. After all, who was he but some political appointee who had never had large-unit command experience? Thus, although he technically commanded in joint operations, getting the operations approved by the Dutch government proved close to impossible. Siege warfare was what they knew, and that was what they intended to practice.36 When Marlborough commanded a joint operation into the Spanish Netherlands and threatened the lines of communication of the primary force along the French front under Marshal Louis François, duc de Boufflers, his subordinate Dutch generals could not convince themselves to follow orders to attack, even though the French force was exposed in the open on three occasions. He failed to inflict a major defeat on a French army, but he did accomplish what the Dutch wanted: Boufflers’s retreat led to the capture of a number of fortresses. Frustrated on the battlefield, he was rewarded off it by receiving a new title, Duke (rather than Earl) of Marlborough.
The following year proved indecisive as well. It got off to a good start with the Dutch capture of Bonn, but during the summer French forces under Villars linked up with those of Max of Bavaria. With more than 70,000 troops on hand, Villars argued for an advance on Vienna. Max, however, wanted to link up with French forces in Italy before a Vienna campaign. King Louis sided with Max, who led 16,000 men in a disastrous campaign. In the Brenner Pass between Austria and Italy, the peasants harassed the Bavarians unmercifully, driving them back and costing Max half his force. Meanwhile, Louis of Baden aided the allied cause by capturing Augsburg, but was forced out of the city late in the year. Both sides did gain strategic victories: Savoy changed sides and joined the Grand Alliance, blocking French access to the Alps and Italy, but a rebellion in Hungary against the policies of Emperor Leopold diverted troops from the Grand Alliance to a new eastern front. Inconclusive sieges on the western front accomplished little for either side; Marlborough was unable to force French forces in the Netherlands into an open battle.
The 1704 campaign marked the first serious victories for the Alliance and for Marlborough’s view that the enemy army was the center of gravity. With the large Franco-Bavarian force still in a position to threaten Vienna, Marlborough devised a plan for saving the city by defeating the enemy in the open, rather than in a siege. He was aided in this campaign by the fact that King Louis had removed Villars as the French commander working with Max. Villars was not one to suffer fools gladly, and he viewed Max as such when the elector would not cooperate in any move toward Vienna. After a loud confrontation, both men appealed to Louis, Villars offering to give up his command, and denouncing his ally and his supporters as “swindlers, traitors, and falsehearted fools.” Max responded that he would not work with someone so rudely outspoken. Louis accepted Villars’s resignation and replaced him with the incompetent duc de Marsin.37
The Blenheim Campaign and Battle
MARLBOROUGH’S ORIGINAL INTENT for the 1704 campaign was to march up the Rhine, turn right, and advance up the Moselle, threatening Villeroi’s position north and west of the Meuse River and, he hoped, drawing French forces away from Max and the Vienna offensive. Urgent appeals from the emperor for more direct action swayed him, though they certainly did not sit well with the Dutch. After conferring with Queen Anne and advisors in London, Marlborough decided to bypass the Moselle and march to the Danube in order to alleviate the threat to Vienna and hopefully fight a decisive battle. In order to make this a successful campaign, secrecy was vital. Marlborough therefore made open plans to fight along the Moselle, telling no more than a few close associates of his true intent. He had a difficult time convincing the Dutch Estates-General to allow him to campaign as far as the Moselle; had he revealed to them his real goal they never would have cooperated. He conceded to their demand that 60,000 men under Field Marshal Hendrik Overkirk stay on the northern frontier to guard against a French advance. The rest he prepared for campaign, also planning on picking up German reinforcements along the way and joining Prince Eugene at the Danube. He ordered that regularly placed supply depots be established along his route in order to maintain constant supply: this would keep the local population happy by their profiting from the passing army without being harassed by it.
On 19 May Marlborough led 21,000 men out of the town of Bedburg, marching southeast along the left bank of the Rhine. He led the way with cavalry, while his brother, Charles Churchill (a newly appointed general), led the infantry and artillery. The supply depots were three to four days march apart, and Marlborough planned to never have his cavalry and infantry more than two days apart. Sure enough, the northernmost French army under Tallard began to shadow Marlborough at a distance, ignoring the Dutch frontier. Marlborough’s first stop was Bonn, a logical base for an advance up the Moselle. There he received unfortunate news that a body of French reinforcements had evaded Louis of Baden’s covering force on the upper Rhine and had attached themselves to Marsin and Max, bringing their numbers to 70,000.
Forty miles further up the river, the Moselle empties into the Rhine at Coblenz. When Marlborough and his cavalry arrived they did not turn to proceed up the Moselle, but crossed a pontoon bridge onto the far bank and rode directly east to Mainz. When the rest of the army arrived and followed suit, the French realized the Moselle offensive was a ruse. Villeroi passed the shadowing on to Tallard, who also paralleled the English force, staying on the western side of the Rhine. Not until several days up the Rhine did the allied soldiers themselves begin to grasp their ultimate destination. A British officer commented, “It was so much a secret, that General Churchill (the Duke’s brother) knew
nothing of the matter till this time; and Villeroi’s constant attendance on our marches, shewed that the court of France was as much in the dark as we were.”38
By the end of June Marlborough’s army, supplemented by German units along the line of march, joined with those of Louis of Baden and Prince Eugene. The march to the Danube was a magnificent example of military deception, and also of a major feat of logistics. The French plans toward Vienna were thwarted and the allies took the initiative.39 Indeed, the French marshals took counsel of their fears and turned to King Louis for direction, all bemoaning their respective fates. Marsin’s letter warned that Elector Maximilian might take his family and treasure and flee for Hungary. Louis in response divided the army in France into three segments. Tallard would cross the Rhine from Strasburg into the southern Black Forest and lead 35,000 men to join with Marsin. Villeroi would hold the defensive lines at Stollhofen to the west of the Black Forest, where he would keep Eugene pinned down, the French hoped, and then be prepared to support Tallard if necessary. A third force under Marshal Robert de Coignies would guard the west bank of the Rhine between Philippsburg and Mainz.
While Eugene remained for a time in the Black Forest, Margrave Louis of Baden marched his men to meet Marlborough’s army at Launsheim on 22 June, making the combined force some 80,000 men. Louis had a significant numerical advantage at this time, so Marlborough wanted to draw the Franco-Bavarian forces out into the open. Many of his heavy guns had not arrived, so an attack on the primary Bavarian camp at Ulm was ruled out. The combined force marched down the left bank of the Danube, past Lauingen, and on 2 July appeared outside the Schellenberg fortress at Donauwörth. This proved a major surprise to the fortress commander, Jean Baptist, the Comte d’Arco, who with his 11,000 men was working to upgrade the defenses.40 It was late in the day and the margrave’s political position outranked Marlborough’s military one, though it had been decided that they could exercise command on alternate days. Margrave Louis was not a stellar general, being dedicated to siege warfare and so slow some imperial leaders suspected his loyalty. Indeed, he had fought alongside Elector Max against the Turks and they were related by marriage. Marlborough had to convince Margrave Louis to take advantage of the unprepared garrison. They had neither the time nor the artillery to besiege the city, and the longer the delay in attacking the more time d’Arco would have to strengthen the walls. Unfortunately, the troops had been marching since dawn down muddy roads. A quick assault would of necessity be somewhat piecemeal, but D’Arco would not expect it and Marlborough had great faith in the abilities of his troops.41
Masters of the Battlefield Page 38