All accounts of the battle praise Marlborough, but many are quick to point out he did not accomplish the victory alone. Dodge notes the centrality of Eugene’s presence on the battlefield: “Had Eugene not contained nearly half the enemy, Marlborough would scarcely have been able to break the centre. … [W]e must cheerfully allow him full half the credit for this great and decisive victory.”61 A more recent biographer notes that Eugene’s holding operations had been as crucial to the whole battle as had his preparation for action in the days leading up to it. Marlborough and Eugene highly praised each other.62 Eugene not only fought superbly, but he faced the superior opposition, outnumbered by some 10,000 men on his wing of the battle. This was a tribute to his talent and courage, that he could keep a much larger force occupied, detach men to help Marlborough in his time of need, and still be advancing when the French troops began to break.63
The Battle of Ramillies
UNFORTUNATELY, THE SUCCESS AT BLENHEIM did not translate into larger dividends. Although the allies did occupy Trier in November 1704 and had a strong position for an offensive up the Moselle, neither that avenue nor an assault against Strasbourg would open a road to Paris, the surest way to bring King Louis to the peace table on terms favorable to the allies. Any advance west from the Rhine faced the need for sieges of major cities; any advance through Flanders meant besieging an even larger number of fortresses. To further trouble the allies, King Louis managed to refit his army quickly. Thus, 1705 negated the initiative gained in 1704. Some successes were still achieved: Marlborough managed to break through the seemingly impregnable lines of the Brabant, a string of defenses stretching from Antwerp to Namur. This gained a few fortresses but there were no major battles to inflict serious harm on the French. One flagrant missed opportunity on the Ijssche River led to the resignation of a major Dutch general and a promise from the Dutch that they would, indeed, take his orders on the battlefield rather than continually argue as they had been doing. The positive effect of this offensive was not only breaching the lines of Brabant but destroying a section of the defensive front about twenty miles wide.
At the beginning of 1706 it seemed that the focus of the war was going to shift to Italy, where Eugene was fighting. The Dutch government told Marlborough he could go if he did not take any Dutch troops with him, but a defeat of his ally Louis of Baden convinced them that he needed to stay and conduct a campaign in Flanders. At the opening of the fighting season in early spring, Marlborough was at Maastricht, preparing for what he expected would be another year of maneuver without much fighting. He was wrong.64 King Louis, buoyed by the early success, became a bit more aggressive in northern France. He ordered Villeroi, stationed in Flanders with 60,000 men, not to avoid battle. Louis’s more talented general, Villars, was stationed on the upper Rhine with 40,000 men. Marlborough did not expect Villeroi to go on to the offensive right at the start of the campaign season, without even waiting for Villars to bring reinforcements. Recent successes by the French had made Blenheim a distant memory, and a general underestimation of Marlborough’s capabilities proliferated.65 After he had pierced the lines of the Brabant the previous year, Villeroi assumed Marlborough would try a movement toward Namur. This was perhaps the only thing he got right that month, for although he was confident that he could handle the British, historians have described him as “inept” and “the worst of the French chiefs.”66
Marlborough led his forces out of Maastricht on 22 May, lacking many of the promised reinforcements from some of the German states. He marched his army through the destroyed section of the Brabant lines with the intent, as Villeroi assumed, of threatening Namur. The allied forces moved westward through Merdorp as Villeroi led 74 battalions and 128 squadrons (60,000 men) southward from Louvain. Marlborough could barely believe scouting reports that the French were on the move toward him. He called up his Danish mercenaries at the double quick, bringing his forces up to 74 battalions and 122 squadrons (62,000 men). Both commanders were surprised by their proximity to each other. As Chandler comments, “The tactical intelligence of both sides thus left something to be desired; the ‘fog of war’ was very evident. Yet both sides knew the site for the forthcoming battle well enough, for it was a location of some strategic importance.”67
About dawn on a very foggy 23 May, 600 dragoons stumbled into a French foraging party and exchanged a few shots. Word immediately went back to Marlborough, who arrived with his staff before the town of Ramillies about 10:00, when he observed Villeroi’s army marching north to south across a gently rolling plain. The battlefield and the French deployment were reminiscent of Blenheim, except the northern flank curved toward rather than away from the oncoming allies. On the left (northern) flank was the town of Autre-Église with the Petit Gheet stream flowing south. It was swollen from rains over the previous few days and in some places was 200 yards across (though shallow) with marshy terrain on both sides. Next was the smaller town of Offus, then Ramillies, then on the far right flank was the town of Taviers, sitting on the Mehaigne River. Most sources have the town anchoring the French right, but contemporary sources imply the French troops were actually behind a tributary of the Mehaigne just to the west of the village. As Tallard had at Blenheim, Villeroi believed himself to be in a strong defensive position. His infantry occupied the villages and were in a solid line from Ramillies to Autre-Église, with cavalry deployed behind them. In the southern part, between Taviers and Ramillies, the ground was open, gently rolling farmland that offered excellent fields of view. Though still somewhat muddy, it was good cavalry country.68 Indeed, the majority of the French right wing was cavalry, 82 squadrons including the elite Maison du Roi.
Marlborough had some major advantages as his army came up. First, Villeroi, by using the villages as anchors, had his men arrayed in a convex line. This would make it much more difficult for units from either flank to reposition themselves if needed. Conversely, Marlborough’s line would be concave, bringing his flanks closer together and thus having much shorter interior lines. Second, the British right wing, deployed along the Petit Gheet, was backed by a hill. Marlborough would use the reverse slope to move men without the French being able to observe. Third, the Anglo-Dutch army had the advantage of superior artillery in this battle. The proportions were the opposite of Blenheim: 90–100 guns for Marlborough to only 60 for the French. The allied deployment placed the bulk of the British infantry and cavalry on the right wing with the Dutch infantry and cavalry and Danish cavalry covering the left, opposite the massed French cavalry.
The allies went into action first, about 1:00 p.m. Dutch infantry quickly occupied Taviers on the south flank, causing the French to move fourteen squadrons of dragoons and a number of Bavarian infantry battalions to hold the line. They failed. Just as the dragoons dismounted Danish cavalry units arrived and drove them from the scene, with the infantry soon in retreat with them. This removed some of the infantry units stationed on the French right wing.
As this was happening, Marlborough ordered his British infantry under General George Orkney forward toward the Petit Gheet. Given the width of the stream, this was probably a feint, but contemporary records are not clear. They did go forward with pontoons to throw bridges across the stream. Whether it was a feint or real attack did not matter, for it had the desired result of drawing Villeroi’s attention. Whether Marlborough knew it or not, Villeroi had been given orders from King Louis for this engagement, not only to engage but how to do so, with the king telling him, “Pay particular attention to that part of the line which will endure the first shock of the English troops.” Given a command by the king meant that no matter what actually happened during the ebb and flow of the battle, the orders must be obeyed.69 (Changing rules of engagement ordered periodically from the Pentagon in the Vietnam War come to mind.) When the redcoats started approaching the stream, Villeroi followed his monarch’s instructions and brought both infantry and cavalry units from south of Ramillies to reinforce his left wing.
At the same time, t
welve allied battalions assaulted Ramillies, four from the front and eight from the south, with the intent of neutralizing the French artillery situated to support the cavalry in case of attack. They got off to a good start, but the Maison du Roi cavalry counterattacked. A back-and-forth battle ensued as Overkirk’s Dutch cavalry came into play. Given the sheer intensity of the attacks against Offus and Autre-Église, and the massing of the Dutch and German brigades against Ramillies, Villeroi was happy to follow his monarch’s decree, pulling more reserves from the French right flank.70 With infantry support (which the French cavalry now lacked) the allies to the south were able to hold off the French and allow the Dutch to re-form. Still, they had lost ground, and the infantry assaulting Ramillies was now exposed. Stationed on higher ground behind the lines, Marlborough saw the potential for disaster and made two decisions. First, he recalled Orkney’s assault across the Petit Gheet. Second, he followed that withdrawal with an order to the British cavalry to withdraw behind the hill mentioned earlier.
If the British attack across the Petit Gheet had been a feint, Marlborough must have intentionally not mentioned that to the commander, General Orkney. The attack had actually been succeeding, with infantry across the stream and assaulting both Autre-Église and Offus. With the former almost in his possession, Orkney was not happy with the recall order. Ultimately, it took the arrival of General William Cadogan, Marlborough’s second in command, to convince him to disengage. The battalions grudgingly withdrew, but easily handled some French formations that tried to follow.71 As the British units re-formed on the east side of the stream they lined up on the hillside, threatening a second assault. Though the retreat was not a popular order with the troops who had been so close to capturing the two villages, it was the wise one, for they could not have known that the massed reserves were lined up just beyond the villages, waiting for them to emerge.72 Colonel Robert Parker, a participant in the battle, described it thus: “But the front line halted on the summit of the hill in full view of them, and there stood, ready to march down and attack them. As soon as our rear line had retired out of sight of the enemy, they immediately faced left, and both horse and foot, with a good many squadrons, that slunk out of the front line, marched down to the plain, as fast as they could; by this time the greater part of our horse of the left wing had arrived there also.”73
As this shift of units from the allied right to their left was taking place, Marlborough was massing his infantry reserve in the center to follow up on the Ramillies assault. He led the attack himself, having one horse shot out from under him and seeing an aide killed by a cannon ball as he ceded his horse to his commander. Chandler observes, “Some commentators assert that Marlborough was wrong to expose himself so rashly. … But the Duke was a skillful assessor of a difficult situation, and was probably aware that his personal intervention would play an important part in rallying the horse.” This assessment was correct; time was won for the arrival of the transferring squadrons, and the allies gained an advantage in numbers.74
It was now approaching 6:00 and time for the killing blow. Across the open plain south of Ramillies came masses of allied cavalry. Immediately following came the Danish cavalry from the far southern flank where they had earlier driven the Bavarians from the Taviers area. At the battle’s height, 25,000 cavalry from both armies were engaged and the struggle lasted two hours. Although the Maison du Roi acquitted themselves admirably, they could not withstand the superior numbers on front and flank. Neither did they have the infantry support necessary to repel the cavalry, as the allied side possessed. The French began to withdraw to the northwest. Villeroi saw what was happening too late; with his entire right wing in flight, the allied cavalry could now fall on his flank. As the French right wing collapsed, Marlborough swung his southern units into a line perpendicular to the French and began advancing north into their now exposed flank. That, coupled with the intense pressure coming onto Ramillies, was more than they could stand.75
Ramillies soon fell and the assault on the remainder of the French line began. Unable to turn and face the onslaught, unable to move forward toward the marshy stream, Villeroi tried to react, ordering his unused cavalry to turn and face the new threat. As Corelli Barnett vividly describes, “But as the spark of fear leaped from man to man all fifty squadrons rode in panic through the fleeing French infantry. … The fugitives took to the fields and woods like wild creatures, and all that evening and night the English cavalry … hunted them down with remorseless pleasure.”76 Unlike the aftermath of Blenheim, there was still enough daylight and fresh horses to completely exploit the retreat, which became a rout.
In fact, it was a British victory to outshine Blenheim. Of Villeroi’s original 60,000 men, he withdrew into the defenses at Louvain with but 15,000; all the rest were killed, wounded, captured, or missing. Allied losses were just over 1,000 dead and some 2,500 wounded. The French lost all their artillery and supplies. They soon lost even more, as the allies swept the French from the Spanish Netherlands. In less than a month, Louvain, Brussels, Gavre, and Bruges fell, while a dozen other major fortresses capitulated without resistance, so demoralized were their garrisons. Ramillies thus proved to be a perfect illustration of exploiting a victory both tactically and strategically.77 Within six weeks almost all of the Spanish Netherlands was in allied hands. Almost every fortress the French had occupied before the war in order to assist the Spanish garrisons was retaken, many without a fight.
The Battle of Ramillies was a classic meeting engagement, since both armies had stumbled into each other at the site. In Marlborough’s movement to contact he had certainly hoped for an open battle, but he had expected it later and in a different location. In spite of the relative haste of the deployment, Marlborough was familiar with the ground and quickly grasped the weaknesses in the French deployment. As at Blenheim he started with a demonstration on both flanks, though the assault on the southern flank at Taviers proved successful and became the initial move that began to roll up the French right wing. On the French left, the demonstration also proved initially successful, although it was not intended as a breakthrough but to draw in reserves. Chandler comments, “Marlborough’s skill for sizing up a position, his skill at controlling the form and detail of a major conflict, had been once again amply demonstrated.”78 Once the French cavalry retreat began, the exploitation was immediate; both the cavalry on the plain and the infantry at Ramillies pushed the exposed flank. The immediate exploitation was followed by both a tactical pursuit that broke the French force and a strategic pursuit that pushed French forces almost completely out of the Spanish Netherlands.
The Battle of Oudenarde
SOON AFTER RAMILLIES came more good news. In Italy, Eugene had captured the city of Milan after the French commander there, the duc de Vendôme, was recalled to assist the crumbling situation in France. This effectively took France out of the picture in Italy; the French still occupied some cities but had no field army in-country. With two major losses, one would think that Louis XIV would be in a good mood to negotiate, but military success bred allied political failure. Once again the Dutch let Marlborough down, happy to have accomplished what they had in 1706. Marlborough was ready to go for the French throat, but was overruled by political complacency.79 The new emperor in Vienna, Leopold I, spent too much of his time focused on the Hungarian revolution and establishing Austrian power in Italy, which (according to the original alliance agreement) should have been ceded to Spain. The Dutch government, now in charge of the lower Netherlands, quickly lost its initial goodwill by imposing heavy taxes on the Catholic residents. The Dutch also were not happy to learn that Britain was planning on keeping Gibraltar as well as Port Mahon on Minorca. So with all the new infighting among the allies, the French had a year’s respite to regroup. In 1707 they fielded a strong army on the Netherlands frontier, staged a destructive raid into German territory, and gained power and prestige in Spain. Further, Eugene led an attack on Toulon, but it was poorly organized and failed to seize t
he French Mediterranean port city.
In 1708 both sides were ready to get back into the game. Vendôme was ready to take his large force of 110,000 back into the Spanish Netherlands and recover some lost fortresses. Marlborough was stationed in Holland, Eugene was on the Moselle, and the elector of Hanover (the future George I of England) was on the upper Rhine. Eugene and Marlborough decided to join forces and look for a battle. Coupling Eugene’s 45,000 imperial troops with 90,000 British and Dutch troops would overwhelm any enemy in the neighborhood.
Vendôme was a good general, but he was saddled with the Louis, duc de Bourgnogne (Duke of Burgundy), Louis XIV’s grandson and no great military mind. Burgundy did, however, have rank and the willingness to exercise it. In late May 1708 the French crossed the frontier, moving in the direction of Brussels. Marlborough moved to block their path, and the French started marching farther east toward Louvain. Again Marlborough headed them off. At this time he got bad news: Eugene was having trouble getting everything prepared and was arguing with the elector. Thus, in order to arrive at all, he had to leave manpower behind. Not until 29 June did he start his march, and with only 15,000 men. The French commander, the duc de Berwick, was three days behind him in pursuit with 27,000. Eugene and Marlborough had to join forces and strike against Vendôme’s army before Berwick could either catch up to Eugene or alter his march to join Vendôme.
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