Ultimately, Marlborough was the commander of the British army. He had loyal subordinates such as Cadogan and his own brother, Charles Churchill, on whom he depended greatly, but whether in planning or in execution Marlborough made the calls. He was able to enhance this ability to command by employing extremely effective aides-de-camp who made sure nothing happened on the battlefield that he was not immediately aware of. According to Chandler, “The Duke also took more than usual care in choosing his aides. … They served as Marlborough’s eyes—a truly vital function on days of battle for any one man to keep full control over every sector. Marlborough’s much noticed knack of appearing at points of the greatest crisis and danger were frequently due to information brought back by his aides.”93 Thus, he was always able to respond to enemy movements and could be on hand to rally his men when they were hard pressed or to launch the final attack when the time came. As battlefields grew larger along with the armies, such intelligence gathering became more and more vital. Jeremy Black comments, “Marlborough’s battles were fought on a more extended front than those of the 1690s, let alone the 1650s, and thus placed a premium on mobility, planning and the ability of commanders to respond rapidly to developments over a wide front and to integrate and influence what might otherwise have been in practice a number of separate conflicts. Marlborough was particularly good at this and anticipated Napoleon’s skilful and determined generalship in this respect.”94
Such was the trust from his subordinates that they responded when needed, as did a hard-pressed Eugene by dispatching a cavalry unit to aid in beating back a French thrust at Oberglau during the battle at Blenheim. Cadogan’s withdrawal from Autre-Église was not done willingly, but in the end he trusted Marlborough to see the big picture even when localized success seemed assured.
The trust exhibited by his immediate subordinates was reflected as well by the rank and file, a tribute to Marlborough’s mastery of the principle of morale. Although Marlborough was one of the first modern commanders to run up high casualty counts, his men loved him anyway. Primarily this was because he paid particular attention to logistics. The French had in Louis XIV’s time begun to implement the arsenal system of storing all manner of supplies for an entire army. Marlborough did one better by having consistent supplies on campaign. In the rapid march to the Danube in 1704, he showed this to its greatest benefit. The marches started at 3:00 a.m. but were always completed before noon brought the heat of the day. Every third or fourth day the column would stop to gather another few days’ worth of rations, so they were never without food and did not have to forage. New shoes for the entire army awaited them during their stop in the Heidelberg-Frankfurt area. This had an amazing effect not just on morale but on character. Black observes that Marlborough “secured the affection of his soldiers by his good nature, care for their provisions and vigilance not to expose them to unnecessary dangers, and gained [that] of his officers by his affability. … The poor soldiers who were (too many of them) the refuse and dregs of the nation, became tractable, civil, orderly, and clean, and had an air and spirit above the vulgar.”95
Marlborough also differed from almost all the generals of his time by not traveling in style. He ate at junior officers’ mess and oftentimes slept on the ground. He also walked the battlefield and endangered himself, and few things are as important to a common soldier as seeing such action. By sharing fully in the experiences and dangers facing his troops, Marlborough motivated the soldiers to do their best. Black again observes, “The trust he engendered enabled him to make calls on their endurance that few others would dare contemplate. … Marlborough’s characteristics as both man and soldier provided him with the charisma that caused him to never forfeit the confidence, loyalty or affection of his rank and file. … Above all, as Wellington noted, ‘He was remarkable for his clear, cool, steady understanding.’”96 He was one of the first to maintain a medical corps on campaign. The care of the sick and wounded tended to be very basic, but soldiering was always a rough pastime. Regiments had surgeons and surgeon’s mates, and Marlborough had the army camp followers deputed to act as nurses after major battles. Starting in 1705 a commissioner for sick and sounded was an established post at Marlborough’s headquarters.97 Again, attention to the common soldier’s welfare paid overwhelming returns in the field.
One rarely sees this type of devotion from the troops. Alexander and Caesar received it, as would Napoleon and Lee in the future. It contrasts with Wellington’s virtual disdain for his soldiers and their lack of devotion in return. Marlborough’s soldiers, however, affectionately referred to him as “Corporal John,” and their devotion to him was based on more than basic material concern. Philip Haythornthwaite notes, “As one of his officers, Robert Parker, remarked, it was impossible to appreciate the joy with which a glimpse of Marlborough was greeted unless one was actually part of the army, every man of which realized that no lives would be risked unless he was confident of success.”98
IN COMPARING MARLBOROUGH AND NAPOLEON, J. F. C. Fuller writes, “The one was the forerunner of the other, as well as heir of Gustavus Adolphus; for by breaking down the formalities of late seventeenth-century warfare and returning to the ways of the great Swede, Marlborough opened the road for Frederick and Napoleon. Marlborough broke away from this type of [siege] warfare and returned to the offensive strategy of Gustavus and the attack tactics of Conde and Cromwell. He did so because he was imaginative enough to see into the military changes of his day and appreciate their meaning.”99 Marlborough, perhaps even more so than Gustavus, was the first modern general in that he had not only a national army with which to fight but national armies to fight against, making his task more difficult than that which Gustavus faced. He had the same disappointments as the Swedish king as well, in that he could never make his battlefield triumphs translate into long-term political gains. As Russell Weigley observes, “Marlborough, ably seconded by Prince Eugene of Savoy, restored decisiveness to the battlefield. At Blenheim and Oudenarde he well-nigh attained the goal that over the centuries has been a will-o’-the-wisp pursued by all resolute commanders, the practical destruction of the enemy army that confronted him on the field. … Nevertheless, a brilliant generalship’s restoration of decisiveness to battle proved insufficient to restore decisiveness to war.”100 Frederick and Napoleon would restore, and be the last gasp of, the warrior kings who controlled battle, war, and peace.
13
Frederick II (the Great) (1712–1786)
King of Prussia
That was the tremendous respect which the king gained in the eyes of the opposing commanders. Why did they so seldom take advantage of the favorable opportunities that he offered them frequently enough? They did not dare. They believed him capable of everything.
—Hans Delbruck
THE TERRITORY OF BRANDENBURG, around the city of Berlin, was the birthplace of what would become the mighty Prussian state and, eventually, modern Germany. In 1415, the Holy Roman emperor Sigismund defaulted on a loan to Frederick Hohenzollern. Collateral for the loan was the electorate of Brandenburg. In the wake of the defeat of the Teutonic Knights at the Battle of Tannenberg in 1410, the order fell into decline, and in 1466 the Knights named a Hohenzollern as their new grand master. In 1525, the grand master converted to Protestantism and privatized the Knights’ land for himself and his heirs. Two lines of the Hohenzollern family agreed to merge the territories in the event of one line having no heir; such an event occurred in 1618, and Brandenburg-Prussia came into official being.
Late in the Thirty Years War Frederick William, also known as the Great Elector, became leader of the province. He suppressed local governments and built up an army of 30,000 men with which he sought to curry favor with the Holy Roman emperor. Building on Dutch and then French military models, the Brandenburg-Prussian army became respected, if not dominating. His son Frederick became elector in 1688 and remained subservient to the empire. Under his leadership the army grew to 40,000 and during the War of the Spanish Successio
n, Prussian officers learned warfare from the master commanders Marlborough and Eugene. In return, they gained international respect as well as power and prestige. Bavaria, by backing the losing side in the war, was on a downward slide while Brandenburg-Prussia became the preeminent German state. In 1701 Frederick took the title king of Prussia, as Brandenburg was still under imperial authority. Upon his death in 1713 his son became King Frederick William I.
King Frederick William continued transforming the army into a force as dominant as its state. Prussia became a military state; 83,000 men served out of a population of 2.25 million (although many of the recruits were foreigners). By the time of his death in 1740, Frederick William’s territory was tenth largest in Europe, his population thirteenth largest, but his army stood at fourth largest. To accomplish that feat took more than military manpower; it needed the efforts of the entire population. For Frederick William, this meant bringing the entire population into a semimilitary lifestyle. Everyone from noble to peasant acted like soldiers, and the economic and social life of Prussia revolved around the army. Discipline for the entire population was the order of the day.1
Aided by Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau (a veteran of service under Marlborough), the army became a model of discipline and precision. Leopold developed the cadenced step and introduced the iron ramrod, while Frederick William introduced the plain dark blue uniform, which broke from the tradition of more decorated and fashion-conscious uniforms. Christopher Duffy points out that “[t]he new style accorded well with the movement of Pietism which was abroad among the Lutheran people and nobility, and which stressed the virtues of service, honesty and industry.”2 Frederick William created not only a large army but the best-drilled and most disciplined one in Europe. Nothing to him was as important. “He transformed the royal parks of Berlin and Potsdam into parade grounds,” Duffy notes. “In his creative work for the Prussian army Frederick William’s achievement far surpassed the activity of his more famous son, Frederick the Great. Stout, bad-tempered Frederick William was the man who regularised the recruiting of the army at home and abroad, who cemented the peculiar bond between the King of Prussia and his officer corps.”3
Personally, Frederick William was a hard taskmaster with his family as well as with his troops. He preferred the company of rowdy friends (known as the “Tobacco College”4), though he spent sufficient time with his wife to father fourteen children. His disdain was saved particularly for Crown Prince Frederick, born in 1712. The young man was his mother’s son: quiet, studious, artistic, and (worst of all in his father’s eyes) Francophile. His father harassed him at every possible turn, in public and private. Pushed to the breaking point, Frederick at age eighteen made the foolish mistake of running away to France with a close friend, Lieutenant Hans von Katte. As a result Frederick was imprisoned for fifteen months while von Katte was beheaded.
All of this harsh treatment was not without its long-term positive effects. Early on Frederick learned to still his temper and tongue, and he developed a cold and calculating nature, which he used against his father. He could stand expressionless before his father’s tirades, knowing that such passivity angered the older man even more. “The less Frederick William was able to hide his emotion from others, the more the crown prince learned to do so,” writes Gerhard Ritter. “If we ask what character traits first became recognizable in the behavior of the adolescent boy, we discover above all an amazingly stubborn self-assurance, ambition which could not be deflected by any humiliation, the power to mask his feelings from others, and … great cunning in getting his way.”5 The intellectualism he developed under his mother’s tutelage served him well after his release from prison. Frederick acted as though he had learned the lesson his father had intended, and he became an untiring student of military history and the nuts and bolts of operating Prussia’s army. He also seemed to cooperate in the political marriage his father arranged for him in 1733. Although there was a wedding, one can hardly say there was a marriage; Frederick barely acknowledged his wife, Princess Elizabeth Christine of Brunswick, and they never had children.
Frederick received a colonelcy upon his release from prison and devoted his public life from that point forward to his army and his nation. In 1734 he saw his first combat. He served with a Prussian contingent fighting under the command of Eugene of Savoy in a campaign against France. Philip Haythornthwaite writes, “Eugene affirmed that Frederick showed all the intelligence, courage, and skill to become the greatest soldier of his time, and this recommendation so impressed Frederick William that he appointed Frederick as Major-General. … By the closing months of the life of Frederick William, Frederick had so rehabilitated his reputation that the King accepted him as a worthy successor.”6
After his death, Frederick William’s Political Testament showed him to be a much deeper intellect than he portrayed. He had seemed a caricature to much of Europe, rejecting the trappings of monarchy for the company of soldiers; even odder was his apparent fascination with overly tall soldiers. He formed a grenadier regiment of 3,000 men all more than six feet tall and had some tall cavalry troopers as well, though they were rarely good horsemen. The surest way to curry favor with him was to send him some tall men for the regiment.7 The Testament disclosed, however, that much if not all of this public image was a false front: Duffy quotes the Testament: “Only under the guise of these spectacular eccentricities was I allowed to gather a large treasury and assemble a powerful army. Now this money and these troops lie at the disposal of my successor, who requires no such mask,” he wrote in Political Testament.8 If indeed Frederick William’s public persona was a fraud to ensure the successful future of his country, as the opening of his Political Testament indicates, he ranks as a great actor and brilliant political mind. It is his son who takes on the sobriquet “the Great,” however. With his calculating personality and his military inheritance of three generations dedicated to building an army, Frederick on becoming king in 1740 was poised to earn his nickname.
Warfare of the Time
ON THE SURFACE, armies and warfare of the mid-eighteenth century differed little from half a century earlier when Marlborough dominated European battlefields. Indeed, outside Prussia such was the case. Inside the country, however, the future of warfare was being created. The Prussian kings had been as dedicated to making a national army as Gustavus Adolphus had been in Sweden. Although as king and commander Gustavus had earned the loyalty of the Swedish army, in Prussia the state became the object of loyalty, more so than the monarch. Much of that devotion results from the national focus on military production mentioned earlier. The soldiers were recruited by geographic region (the cantonment system) and quartered in private homes in their neighborhood when not in fighting season. This created a bond between civilian and soldier. Barracks became a more common sight in Berlin as Frederick’s reign progressed, but in the early days the practice of local garrisoning meant “the troops could be kept together under close supervision, and assembled quickly and quietly in the event of mobilisation.”9 The “close supervision” would be exercised by the local noble, whose military service was not optional.
“Although a new man made a passable soldier inside twelve months, it took six years to mould a really steady, reliable infantryman,” notes John Childs.10 Underlying all the Prussian military before and after Frederick was discipline, such as had not been seen since Sparta. In 1747 Frederick wrote, “The discipline and the organization of Prussian troops demand more care and more application from those who command them than is demanded from a general in any other service. If our discipline aids the most audacious enterprises, the composition of our troops requires attentions and precautions that sometimes are troublesome.”11 Although the use of the cantonment system aided somewhat in maintaining unit cohesion, the large-scale use of foreign troops led to an almost constant problem with desertion. This was addressed in many ways: “night marches were avoided, and men detailed to forage or bathe had to be accompanied by officers so that they could no
t run away. Even pursuits of the enemy were strictly controlled ‘lest in the confusion our own men escape.’”12 Everything was done, especially when on campaign, to make sure officers always had eyes on their men. Haythornthwaite describes how: “measures taken to enforce this discipline were draconian: physical beatings by NCOs, branding, running the gauntlet (under which the prisoner could die) and execution—barbaric treatment resulting from Frederick’s belief that a soldier must fear his superiors more than the enemy.”13 Minor punishments were left to officers’ discretion, primarily beatings with sticks or fists. Worse offenses could be punished in a variety of ways, including “chaining to bedsteads, the Eselsreiten (riding a sharp-backed wooden horse), and the painful process of Krummschliessen by which alternate arms and legs were bound tightly together by leather straps. Incorrigible thieves were branded deep on the hand … while men involved in desertion plots sometimes had their noses or ears cut off in addition to the other punishments that came their way.”14
As mentioned previously, the key individual in developing the theories of Prussian military doctrine was Leopold I, nicknamed “the Old Dessauer.” After his service with Eugene in the War of the Spanish Succession, Leopold became field marshal and chief of staff. While the kings employed the army and even trained with it, Leopold was the potter who molded the clay. Under his command, “the officers discovered that they were expected to make military duties their first concern in life, even in peacetime, which was something of a novelty in contemporary Europe.” And it was not only the officers who were influenced by him: “The Old Dessauer was an expert in the formation of crown princes, and for the instruction of Frederick he compiled a Clear and Detailed Description, which was based on the orders of the day which were issued in the campaigns against the Swedes between 1715 and 1720.”15
Masters of the Battlefield Page 42