The quick Prussian movement had not gone unobserved by French lookouts on a rise overlooking the village of Almdorf, about a mile west of Rossbach. Hildburghausen and Soubise jumped to the conclusion that their movement had accomplished its goal of forcing Frederick into a retreat. Not wanting to let him get across the Saale, the cavalry picked up their pace to get ahead of the “retreat.”
Within an hour of the Prussian move eighteen artillery pieces were atop Janus Hill. Showalter describes the initial action: “At 3:15 the process of [allied] disillusion began when the Prussian heavy guns opened fire. They did some damage, but not enough to halt the allied advance. Instead, the allied horsemen quickened their forward pace, accepting some disorganization as a fair price for getting out of the artillery’s killing zone.”76 The gunfire was the signal for Seydlitz to attack. While the allied cavalry hurried forward in line of march, Seydlitz came around the corner of Janus Hill with his cavalry spread out in attack formation. Frederick’s main biographer, Thomas Carlyle, observes: “‘Got the flank of them, sure enough!’—and without waiting signal or further orders, every instant being precious, rapidly forms himself; and plunges down on these poor people. ‘Compact as a wall, and with an incredible velocity,’ says one of them.”77 Although outnumbered by the allies 57 squadrons to 38, the Prussian cavalry’s initiative carried the day. The Austrian units in the lead slowed the charge only momentarily. Soubise joined the fray with another 16 squadrons of French cavalry to try to halt the retreat. However, it made little difference as Seydlitz committed the 18 squadrons of his second line. These units crashed into the allies in an attack around both flanks. Within half an hour the allied cavalry were being forced back and ultimately off the field of action.78 Seydlitz, wounded, led a hot pursuit as the allied cavalry fled at top speed.
Meanwhile, the lagging allied infantry advanced toward the Prussian artillery’s kill zone. As Seydlitz had mounted his charge the Prussian infantry had emerged from the woods. The Prussians had had time to deploy in oblique order with the mass of troops on the left flank to swing around the head of the French column.79 The units in echelon marched across the allied front, but then deployed in an unusual manner, which Showalter describes: “Instead of the familiar two straight lines of battalions, Frederick used his second line to extend the left flank of the first, forming an obtuse angle. This was done at a certain risk, since the final Prussian formation provided no significant reserves to plug gaps or cope with surprise tactical threats.”80
Indeed, there was a potential tactical threat from the French, who were experimenting with the concept of attacking in column, foreshadowing the tactics of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic armies. Two things kept the French from success: the typical Prussian fire discipline and the surprising reemergence of Seydlitz. In too many battles throughout history pursuing cavalry have taken themselves out of a battle in the thrill of the chase. Seydlitz broke with that unfortunate tradition and rallied his horsemen once the allied cavalry were safely out of the way. The returning cavalry struck as the Prussian infantry was delivering its normal devastating fire. Joined with the artillery barrage from on high and the sight of their cavalry broken and in flight, the allied infantry could stand no more demoralization. Carlyle comments: “French and Imperials throw weapons to the ground, run south from battle. Only two Swiss regiments retire in order. The Prussians pursue to Obschütz, taking numerous prisoners and most of the baggage. Darkness alone saves the enemy, who are in frantic flight south to Freiberg and beyond. The Prussians continue the pursuit, but it is dark and the men are tired. Frederick halts the infantry just east of Obschütz.”81
Allied casualties were 3,000 killed and wounded, with 3,000 to 5,000 taken prisoner. The Prussians lost around 550, mostly among the cavalry since no more than seven Prussian battalions had actually been able to fire their guns before the allies broke. Carlyle ranks the battle high in military history: “Seldom, almost never, not even at Crecy or Poictiers, was any Army better beaten. And truly, we must say, seldom did any better deserve it, so far as the Chief Parties went.”82
Since both armies were on the offensive; the allies used an approach march to stop what they assumed was a Prussian withdrawal, while the Prussians launched an attack that could be described both as hasty (“minimal preparations to destroy the enemy”) and as a spoiling attack (to disrupt an expected enemy attack, striking while the enemy is most vulnerable). Frederick benefited from the allies’ shortcomings: disagreement between commanders, lack of reconnaissance, disorganization on the march, and failure to coordinate infantry and cavalry. This should not, however, take away from his brilliance in grasping the value of the terrain while creating a plan and deploying his troops virtually on the fly. He exercised all the characteristics of the offense: surprise from all three arms; concentrating his cavalry to scatter superior numbers while his infantry did the same; dictating the tempo, though the battle was so short there was no real opportunity to alter it; and audacity, by attacking an army twice his size and not deploying in standard fashion but inventing his single-line infantry deployment on the spot. Seydlitz was the key to both the beginning and ending of the victory, arriving just in time to throw into headlong flight an army that was wavering from concentrated artillery and infantry fire. Like the Prussians, most of the allied army saw no action since only the lead elements engaged. Seydlitz successfully exploited the break but Frederick stopped any serious pursuit, as was his general practice. “Rossbach was an odd encounter. The standard patterns did not hold true. It was a contest between an agile army with brains and a clumsy army without any.”83
Although virtual destruction could have resulted from a hard pursuit, Frederick needed his army whole. One threat was negated, but the Austrians were still active, and he needed to shift both his focus and his troops as quickly as possible. “Rossbach was at least as much an Imperial as a French defeat,” Weigley notes, “but the lost battle proved to abate considerably such enthusiasm as the French had been able to generate for their unaccustomed alliance with the Habsburgs. Frederick had by no means swum out from his sea of troubles, but he could comfort himself that the shore might be in sight.”84 First, however, he had to swim to the opposite shore to salvage the situation in Silesia.
The Battle of Leuthen
WHILE FREDERICK WAS CAMPAIGNING against the allies, the Austrians under von Daun had finally begun to show the energy they failed to display after Kolin. The 38,000 men Frederick left under Bevern to defend Silesia were miserably failing in their task. “The Duke of Bevern, left to hold in Frederick’s absence, had been outfought and outgeneralled at every turn,” Showalter asserts. “Bevern was out of his depth in independent command against heavy odds. The Austrians took full advantage of superior numbers to hold him in check while overrunning Silesia’s fortresses.”85 Still, it was not as successful for the Austrians as it might have been. Von Daun was joined in command by Charles of Lorraine, Maria Theresa’s brother-in-law. He was even less aggressive than his co-commander (Simon Millar recounts how “Kaunitz, the great Austrian Chancellor at this time, expressed the frustrations of the court when he remarked that the only way to get the campaign moving again would be to recall Prince Charles”86). Had Frederick been in their place, Silesia and most if not all of Prussia would have been subdued by early November. Thus, the slow and steady Austrians overwhelmed Bevern but not the enemy country. By 13 November the town of Schweidnitz had surrendered; a week later the Austrians approached Breslau, where Bevern stood with 28,000. After a brief fight on the 23rd Bevern was in retreat across the Oder, leaving behind a garrison of just ten battalions of disaffected Silesians. They surrendered the city quickly. For a late-season campaign it was enough for the Austrians to be satisfied with their progress and sanguine about the next year’s possibilities.
In Saxony, Frederick had spent ten days gathering men and supplies while allowing his men to recuperate. By mid-November, though, he was on the move toward Silesia. He left behind a small holding f
orce and sent 6,000 men on a diversionary raid into Bohemia; that had the effect of drawing off some Austrian forces that might have stood in his way. Frederick took some 13,000 men on a march that covered 180 miles in fifteen days. He sent cavalry general H. J. von Ziethen to gather up the remains of Bevern’s force and meet him on the march; Bevern had been captured after the rout at Breslau, perhaps purposely in order to avoid facing Frederick. On 2 December Ziethen met Frederick at Parchwitz with 25,000 men, a remarkable feat given the fleeing army’s total disorganization after Breslau. With a combined 38,000 men Frederick was determined to do or die. He did not chastise the defeated soldiers, but welcomed them with food and drink and stories of the massive victory at Rossbach. Frederick himself walked through the camp and engaged the soldiers in man-to-man banter. “Orderlies carried casks of wine and baskets of bread and meat, and by the campfires he ate and drank with his soldiers, listened to their tales, heard their complaints,” recounts Robert Asprey. “It was drunken talk in part, certainly coarse talk, often humorous, decidedly human. He was a soldier among soldiers.”87 The old Prussian pride began to reemerge. Frederick gathered his generals around him and gave an impressive pep talk, made all the more so by its calm presentation. The exhausted Frederick all but whispered to his commanders that this was an all-or-nothing proposition, win or die. Three to one odds against us. The future of Prussia at stake. Bravery would be rewarded, cowardice punished. I’ll look after your families if you die. Showalter likens the speech to theater or modern locker-room inspiration: “Like all great performances, Frederick’s blended sincerity and artifice in a way impossible for anyone to separate. … His ‘Parchwitz speech’ became the eighteenth century equivalent of an important contemporary sporting event: even people who were not there could remember every detail of what they saw or heard.”88
After giving the officers and men a day to ponder his words and actions, he began moving the troops on 4 December. The Austrians had learned of his approach and were shocked at the speed of his movement. They then proceeded to make a terrible mistake: they marched out of Breslau and the prepared defenses they had overcome a few weeks earlier in order to meet Frederick in the open. Still, with the confidence they had gained after defeating Frederick at Kolin, Daun and Charles apparently thought an open battle would, indeed, decide the fate of Prussia in their favor. While not known for their aggressiveness, they were both veterans with victories under their belt and command of an experienced army with initiative. Plus, they outnumbered Frederick almost two to one: Frederick’s roughly 38,000 against their own 66,000 (though some sources place their numbers as high as 80,000). They also had 210 guns to his 170 and deployed on ground of their own choosing. Unfortunately, it was the wrong choice. The position they selected, stretching north-south either side of the town of Leuthen, was well known to the Prussians from their annual maneuvers. They may as well have contacted Frederick and asked him where he would like to fight.
Early on the morning of 4 December the Prussians were advancing on the town of Neumarkt when the townspeople told them of a contingent of Croats in the town, laying out a new camp and baking bread for the advancing Austrian army. Frederick sent cavalry behind the town, then into it, scattering the enemy and capturing an army’s worth of fresh bread, along with killing or capturing two-thirds of the 1,000 Croats. Basing himself at Neumarkt for the remainder of the day, Frederick learned of the Austrian deployment. He decided on a quick strike before they could dig in.
The Austrian position stretched over almost five miles, the right flank anchored to the north by the village of Nippern, then Frobelwitz almost two miles to the south, and Leuthen a mile further, and the left flank by Sagschütz. The deployment was typical: infantry flanked on both ends by cavalry, with the artillery arrayed front and center. A mixed infantry-cavalry force was held in reserve behind Leuthen. The right flank was covered by the Zettel-Busch, the only serious patch of woods on the entire battlefield. The left flank did not reach to the marshy area of the Schweidnitzer-Wasser, which could have prevented a sweep around that end. On the other hand, the Austrians did have time to throw up some quick defensive obstacles on the southern end of their lines. Daun and Charles intentionally lengthened the line in order to hamper Frederick’s ability to use his oblique order attack. Or so they thought.
At 4:00 a.m. the Prussians arose and within two hours were marching eastward in four columns, infantry to the inside and cavalry on the outside. Frederick rode with an advance guard consisting of his few light infantry and all his hussars. At dawn they approached the village of Borne, held by an advanced force of hussars and Pandours, the same units that had performed well against the Prussians at Kolin. Not this day. The Austrians were unprepared for the size and speed of the attacking force charging out of the darkness. A few hussar regiments managed to escape, but eleven officers and 600 troopers were taken prisoner. They were paraded past the advancing infantry to buck up morale. The fleeing hussars alerted the Austrians of the Prussian arrival, and Daun and Charles ordered their men out of bivouac and a thousand yards forward into position. Frederick rode through Borne to the small village of Gross-Heidau then on to the Schönberg, where the battlefield panorama spread before him. The oblique attack, which he had designed and implemented with mixed success since Hohenfriedburg, would be perfectly executed on this day.
He kept his advance guard cavalry in a position plainly visible to his enemy. He was determined to convince the Austrians that he would indeed try his oblique attack, but on their northern flank. With his cavalry, and the appearance and disappearance of various infantry units, the enemy took his bait. Commanding the Austrian right was an Italian, General J. Lucchese, who called for reinforcements as soon as the feint was made. A second call for aid convinced Daun that the attack probably was going to strike that end of the line, so he sent the eight battalions in reserve north. Daun himself decided to look over the threatened section; while he was gone Prince Charles sent General J. B. Serbelloni’s cavalry reserve from the south to reinforce Lucchese. All of this played perfectly into Frederick’s hand, for as his feint was demonstrating in the north, the bulk of his army took a right turn at Borne. They converged their four columns into two and marched south in the dead (unobservable) ground behind a series of low hills that ran parallel to the Austrian lines. It was Rossbach again, but this time the enemy was not on the march while the Prussians positioned themselves to strike. Even when an occasional Prussian unit appeared through a gap in the hills, the Austrians dismissed them as deserters, or perhaps a retreating army protected by what could be a covering force to the north. After all, Frederick was well known for attacking only when he had a numerical advantage.
By early afternoon the Austrian right was strengthened, and the Prussians began to emerge opposite their left flank. The lead infantry units were six battalions led by Prince Karl von Bevern (not to be confused with the Duke of Brunswick-Bevern captured after the Breslau battle) supported by Ziethen’s fifty-three cavalry squadrons and some 12-pounders placed atop the Glanzberg overlooking the village of Sagschütz. The Austrian commander on the southern flank, General Franz Nadasti, quickly grasped what was about to happen and sent an urgent call for reinforcements, which was initially ignored. Frederick had ridden south to direct the battle and rode along the line, making sure the proper intervals for the oblique attack were maintained between the battalions, which finally numbered twenty in the front line and eleven in the second line.
At 1:00 the cannons fired, the fifes and drums began playing, and the attack started. “Starting from the right, the assault began, each battalion standing still until its right-hand neighbor had covered 50 paces,” Britt and colleagues write. “In this manner, an oblique advance commenced at the moment when the advance guard rammed into the strong point at Sagschütz. … Ten battalions under Maurice [to whom Frederick had given command of the infantry] overpowered the Württembergers while a battery of 12-pounders enfiladed the Austrian forward line and poured a world of devastat
ion on frightened men.”89 The troops stationed around Sagschütz were Württembergers and Bavarians, not the highest-quality troops in the Austrian force. They soon began to buckle, but Nadasti counterattacked with his cavalry. That slowed the advance somewhat, but Ziethen’s horsemen soon gained the upper hand, routing the Austrian cavalry and capturing fifteen guns. With the Austrian line breaking Frederick sent his artillery into the gap and onto the Judenberg and then the Kirchberg, from where it raked the retreating troops and the second line.
Charles and Daun, who had stationed themselves on the northern wing with the reinforcements, were slow to grasp the reality of the situation. “In earlier battles the Austrians had been understandably reluctant to abandon strong positions, natural or artificial, to risk a tactical counterattack against the formidable Prussians,” Showalter asserts. “Here nothing stopped them but high-level inertia reinforced by misapplied experience.”90 They finally realized what was happening and tried to salvage the situation by establishing a new line, perpendicular to the first, at Leuthen. Troops to the north were ordered to wheel left and face the Prussians, while the retreating troops were rallying to extend the line eastward from the town. Although the Austrians were able to reposition themselves, the battalions were not able to fully deploy and in some places were massed thirty deep instead of the standard three ranks. This made them an easy target for the rapidly advancing Prussian artillery; guns placed on the Butterberg could not miss.
Masters of the Battlefield Page 46