by Denis Smith
In 1958 the prime minister pursued his interest - partly stimulated by citizens eager to offer homage - in promoting the record of his Bannerman ancestors. “Tomorrow,” he wrote to his mother in September, “I will be in the Scotch settlement district of Simcoe County and will have pictures taken of your grandparents’ (the Bannermans) graves, both of whom lived to be very old … I will have a restoration job done on the stones.”53
Faced with his killing schedule, Diefenbaker welcomed the prospect of occasional retreat to a country home at Harrington Lake. The house, lake, and surrounding forests - about fifteen miles from Ottawa in Gatineau Park - had been purchased in 1951 by the Federal District Commission. After a few years of summer rentals that failed to cover the costs of maintenance, the house had been offered by the commission in 1957 as an official residence or government guest house. Bryce conducted informal soundings among his senior colleagues in Finance and External Affairs, and eventually guided the proposal for a prime ministerial country residence through cabinet.54 On the assurance that the costs of reconditioning and refurnishing would be minimal, Diefenbaker had accepted the idea - though with a briefly lingering sense of guilt at the thought of such luxury enjoyed at public expense. “I suppose there will be some criticisms but as it is not being used to any extent and was to be the Prime Minister’s summer home I cannot see how there can be any objection … The only reason it was not used by Mr. St. Laurent was that he preferred to be close to his home in Quebec City.”55
Olive and John spent their first weekend at Harrington Lake in mid-May, “the most restful day and a half that I have spent in over a year and a half.” The fishing made it perfect for Diefenbaker. “I went fishing and caught four speckled trout,” he told his mother. “I have never tasted anything better than those trout. They weighed from 1 1/4 to well over 2 lbs. and you may be sure I will be out fishing a great deal during the summer.” Harrington, he decided, was “a wonderful place,” despite the black fly bites “which I didn’t feel because I was so interested in the fish!”56 He was there again for weekends in July and August, and for more interludes of fishing through the rest of his term. Sometimes that meant only an hour or two at “the country place,” to cast his line in the silence.
THE PRIME MINISTER’S DECISION TO JOIN THE UNITED STATES IN AN INTEGRATED North American air defence system, taken hurriedly in the summer of 1957 without cabinet discussion, became the first major source of controversy for the new government. During the autumn of 1957 questions in the press and from the leader of the opposition alerted Diefenbaker to the political implications of the oral agreement. During his visit to Washington in October he sought and obtained President Eisenhower’s confirmation that the use of NORAD forces would require prior consultation with both governments. Soon afterwards, he directed George Pearkes to discuss a joint statement with the United States that would confirm such political control.57
In November 1957 Diefenbaker made a statement to the House on Canadian-American defence cooperation. It revealed little beyond claiming that the NORAD agreement had been made within NATO and that it simply fulfilled arrangements made by the previous Liberal government.58 He did nothing to explain its nature beyond describing NORAD as a “comprehensive air defence system … against the manned bomber.”59 Critics remained ignorant about the chain of command, the extent of civil control, the Canadian units assigned to the joint command, and the potential loss of Canadian sovereignty involved. Privately, Diefenbaker suspected that Pearson’s questions on the subject had been based on leaks from the Department of External Affairs - and his suspicion remained, despite the doubts of his advisers Robert Bryce and Basil Robinson, and the absence of any evidence to sustain it.60
At the NATO heads of government meeting in December, Diefenbaker - to the surprise of his aides - described NORAD as “an integral part of our NATO military structure” that would report to the NATO Council “in a manner similar to that followed by other NATO military commands.” A few days later he seemed to tell the House of Commons that NORAD would simply inform NATO routinely of its activities. “Diefenbaker was not above being deliberately ambiguous,” wrote Robinson, “and it seems quite likely that he was aiming to work both sides of the equation, using fuzzy language as a bridge between opposing aims.”61 A link with NATO might reassure Canadians that the government was not dealing bilaterally with the Americans; but the vagueness of his claim would not discomfort Washington, which opposed any intrusion of multilateral military planning into North America.
The scholar Jon McLin noted later that Diefenbaker’s November statement “was an early example of a Diefenbaker trait which was to show itself on later occasions: he found it easier and/or more congenial to attack the former government … than to explain what his own government was doing.”62 Comments by George Pearkes and Sidney Smith compounded the initial confusion and suggested, accurately, that there was little coordination between their departments on the subject. In January 1958 Pearkes promised an opportunity for debate once a detailed exchange of notes had occurred between the two governments; but when Smith tabled the exchange in May he denied debate on the ground that NORAD was no more than “an amplification of and extension under” the NATO treaty.63 The next day, in response to widespread criticism, Diefenbaker reversed the government’s position and offered debate on a resolution of support for the agreement.
The government’s initial reluctance slighted parliament in a way inconsistent with Diefenbaker’s previous claims. The approach seemed to arise from the prime minister’s own uncertainty about the undertaking and from his confusion about its meaning - a confusion he could never escape. The debate on NORAD, when it finally came in June 1958, only deepened the muddle.
The agreement itself offered this rationale for integrated air defences:
The advent of nuclear weapons, the great improvements in the means of effecting their delivery, and the requirements of the air defence control systems demand rapid decisions to keep pace with the speed and tempo of technological development. To counter the threat and to achieve maximum effectiveness of the air defence system, defensive operations must commence as early as possible and enemy forces must be kept constantly engaged. Arrangements for the coordination of national plans requiring consultation between national commanders before implementation had become inadequate in the face of a possible sudden attack with little or no warning. It was essential, therefore, to have in existence in peacetime an organization, including the weapons, facilities and command structure which could operate at the outset of hostilities in accordance with a single air defence plan approved in advance by the national authorities.64
The governments agreed that the integration of forces “increases the importance of the fullest possible consultation between the two governments on all matters affecting the joint defence of North America, and that defence co-operation between them can be worked out on a mutually satisfactory basis only if such consultation is regularly and consistently undertaken.” Air defence plans were to be jointly approved in advance; the NORAD command would be responsible to both the Canadian and the American chiefs of staff, and through them to the two governments. Planning was intended to allow for “rapid implementation in an emergency,” which might include “temporary reinforcement from one area to another, including the crossing of the international boundary, to meet operational requirements.”65
When he moved acceptance of the agreement, Diefenbaker insisted that he wished to avoid controversy. His party had supported Liberal defence policy in opposition, and he expected the Liberal opposition to do the same. But he cloaked his words in obscurity. He insisted that NORAD was an outgrowth of the NATO chain of command involving no loss of sovereignty - and in the same breath recalled that no one had complained of a loss of sovereignty when Canadian forces were placed under NATO’s authority in Europe. “Survival,” he said, “knows none of the fineries of a nationalism that used to exist.”66 The country, it seemed, had both given up and not given up sovereig
n authority.
Canadian air officers, Diefenbaker explained, would act in NORAD under Canadian rules of engagement adopted by the previous government in 1951. If Canada and the United States were attacked, the prime minister assured the House that there would be “close and frequent consultation” at the political level. “That is taking place, and I will go no further than to say that the present provision for consultation makes consultation almost instantaneous.” Henceforth it would occur both in peacetime and in wartime. He recognized that “the time available for consultation in an emergency may be very short.” That put a premium on earlier discussion between the two nations about the circumstances “which could conceivably lead to this country being committed to war.” But here his language once more grew tangled: consultation was meant “to ensure the maintenance and preservation of our joint co-operation to the end that we shall, as a result of the achievement of this agreement - again, as I said a moment ago, without the loss of the sovereignty in our country - be joined together for our preservation and the maintenance of those things which are our common heritage in this country.”67 If the agreement seemed relatively straightforward, Diefenbaker’s defence of it was not. The Globe and Mail described it as “an ambiguously worded excursion into the maze.”68
Pearson followed Diefenbaker in debate. He agreed that continental defence should not be a subject of dispute, nor should Canada regret a loss of sovereignty that was intended to pool Canada’s strength with that of her friends. For the Liberal Party, the issues were “the doubts, ambiguities, confusions and contradictions in regard to the meaning of what has been done.” The government’s handling of the affair had been “a comedy of confusion and contradiction” from the beginning.69
Pearson charged that the arrangement had emerged backwards. It should have been discussed in the cabinet defence committee and cabinet, negotiated with the United States and signed, discussed and approved by the House of Commons, and only then put into operation. Instead, it was “brought hastily into existence” without cabinet discussion, and announced without the completion of any agreement. If, as the prime minister claimed, NORAD had simply taken over Canada’s previously existing role in North American defence, then “there was no justification for the kind of haste, the kind of sloppy procedures” that had occurred. He denied that the Liberal government had been on the point of agreement when it lost power. Although there had been military discussions, no consideration had ever taken place in the defence committee or in cabinet. The issue was deferred before the election because it could not have been examined responsibly by ministers during a campaign. Pearson - as the only minister aside from the defence minister who had seen any of the documents - realized that it needed extreme care. “Indeed, there had been developments in the field of air defence, arising out of ballistic missiles, which counselled caution and counselled the most careful kind of consideration. I suggest to my right hon. friend that this agreement did not get that kind of consideration.”70 He pointed out, correctly, that NORAD “has no organic connection with NATO at all.” Its commanders were not appointed by and did not report to NATO, and the secretary general of NATO, Paul-Henri Spaak, had himself denied the connection.
Pearson could find no answer in the prime minister’s statement to questions about the authority of NORAD and its relation to the two governments. Who would be consulted in emergencies? Who would control Canadian squadrons? Could information from NORAD launch US Strategic Air Command bombers towards Russia’s borders? The leader of the opposition focused widespread press and public concern about the agreement, and about Diefenbaker’s competence in entering into it. His questions remained unanswered.
When debate ended, the Liberal opposition joined the government in support of the resolution, and the issue died. Its legacy was dual. On the one hand, Diefenbaker’s handling of the affair had permitted gratuitous conflict between two ministries and unease in parliament. And when the criticism he faced had bruised him unexpectedly, his response had been to blame his opponents rather than to clarify the new relationship. On the other hand, Canada had made its commitment to partnership in North American air defence “in a big way,” with military, political, and economic consequences that no one could yet foresee.71 Nine Canadian fighter squadrons were assigned to the NORAD command. In July the prime minister announced the creation of a joint Canada-US cabinet committee on defence policy to carry forward consultation at the political level.72
DURING THE SHORT TERM OF HIS FIRST PARLIAMENT, DIEFENBAKER HAD FOUND little time for concentration on foreign policy. Yet his interest in an international role was intense. He believed in the value of personal diplomacy, and looked forward to new occasions for travel and meetings with other leaders. In June and July 1958 Diefenbaker welcomed the British prime minister, Harold Macmillan, and the American president, Dwight Eisenhower, to Ottawa and reinforced his friendly relations with both leaders. Once he had his parliamentary majority, Diefenbaker also decided on a round-the-world tour to Europe and the Asian Commonwealth, modelled closely on that of Louis St Laurent in 1955. Diefenbaker would be joined by Olive; his brother, Elmer; his new private secretary, Gowan Guest; his foreign policy adviser, Basil Robinson; his Ottawa doctor and fellow Conservative MP, P.B. Rynard; and his press officer, James Nelson.73
Summer and fall 1958 was a time of international tension. The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union continued their nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere and their development of long- and medium-range missiles. In September the Soviet Union renewed its intermittent pressure to end four-power occupation of Berlin and to absorb the divided city wholly into the German Democratic Republic. In the West, Berlin was seen as the most likely flashpoint for war. In July a military coup in Iraq and Syrian-sponsored challenges to Lebanon and Jordan had brought intervention by American forces in Lebanon and British forces in Jordan in support of their beleaguered governments. Those interventions had prompted the expected Soviet bluster, as well as complaints from France that its traditional role in the Mideast had been ignored. The possibility of a great-power summit to discuss nuclear tests, arms inspection, and other points of tension was being promoted by both the British and the Soviet leaders. The new French prime minister, Charles de Gaulle, had written to Macmillan and Eisenhower expressing unsettling thoughts about a NATO triumvirate of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France which would diminish the influence of other members of the alliance. In a period of continuing Cold War, the international balance seemed particularly uncertain as new weapons proliferated, regimes changed, and leaders tested one another’s intentions.
Diefenbaker hoped to learn more about the state of the world in consultations with Harold Macmillan, Charles de Gaulle, and Konrad Adenauer, as well as to establish his own presence in the wider world. In London, the prime minister wished to cement his personal links with Macmillan, to promote Commonwealth trade, and to reassure himself about the protection of Canadian interests as the United Kingdom moved closer to Europe. In Paris, he sought to discourage de Gaulle’s NATO initiative, with the support, especially, of Britain and Germany. In Asia, Diefenbaker looked for personal education - about Commonwealth aid and trade, the new military regime in Pakistan, Indo-Pakistani relations, and Asian attitudes to Communist China. Everywhere, he wanted to gather fresh impressions and make new friendships.
Robinson wrote to External Affairs several weeks before departure that “the atmosphere in the prime minister’s office was like that of a family preparing for a tourist excursion around the world.” Believing that “there was still an ad hoc character to much of his participation in the process of reaching decisions” about foreign policy, Robinson worried that Diefenbaker would pay insufficient attention to his briefing papers - which, according to External’s habit, were voluminous.74 He also had warnings for Canadian diplomats on Diefenbaker’s path: “The Prime Minister is an early riser and is generally in particularly good form early in the morning. That is the time when we … try to get dec
isions from him and this becomes less easy as the day wears on … It is a cast-iron rule that he likes to go to bed as early as possible and from all points of view this is desirable since if he tires he tends to be difficult.” Olive, he reported, was “quite militant about rest and relaxation time for him.” Since Diefenbaker was “a little bit harder of hearing than he will admit,” he preferred meeting in small groups, and speaking to the person sitting on his right side.75
Diefenbaker departed from Ottawa airport on October 28 with ceremonial good wishes from members of his cabinet and the diplomatic corps. In New York he spoke to the Pilgrims Society and met with the secretary general of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld. Afterwards, Diefenbaker told Robinson that he was particularly concerned to see the summary of his conversation with Hammarskjöld before its dispatch to the Department of External Affairs; he did not want anything “political” to be reported. During the flight to London, Robinson was told that the prime minister was “agitated” on the subject. Robinson knew that Diefenbaker’s mistrust of the department was again the issue.