by Denis Smith
Returning to the subject after this hectic interval, Diefenbaker told cabinet that he was annoyed by Macmillan’s confusing comments on South Africa. The UK parliament had passed a unanimous resolution, in Macmillan’s absence, condemning the policies of the South African government. Now Macmillan told Diefenbaker that he was inclined to present the parliamentary resolution to the Commonwealth conference, but to say that “it was not necessarily the view of the government of the United Kingdom.” Diefenbaker speculated to cabinet that South Africa would make trouble at the conference.
In the face of what had been said about South Africa, Louw (the foreign minister) could quite conceivably move for the free admission of all peoples within the Commonwealth to other Commonwealth countries. If this issue was brought out so starkly the white nations would be acutely embarrassed; it would mean the beginning of the break-up of the Commonwealth. Was Canada willing to open its doors wide to coloured immigrants?
“Altogether,” Diefenbaker judged, “the situation could only be described as a mess.”99
On April 27 Diefenbaker spoke in a House debate on South Africa with comments again patched together from “a mess of press clippings, diplomatic reports, and fragments of once pristine prose.”100 Several days earlier the situation had grown more critical when Prime Minister Verwoerd was wounded in an assassination attempt, “suffering himself,” as Diefenbaker’s notes said, “from the fearful tragedy that has engulfed that country.”101 Once again the prime minister condemned apartheid, but he left less certain the issue of South Africa’s continuing membership in the Commonwealth.
In the few moments remaining I am going to deal with some of the suggestions, “Throw them out of the commonwealth.” I reiterate the views I have expressed before that there is no merit in such action. Such a course may have some superficial attractions but what of its objections? It would respond to natural feelings of distaste for racial policy; it may commend itself for its purgatory effect. What would it solve? Would it bring relief to the 10 million blacks in that country? Would it share the views on discrimination? You are going to throw the 10 million blacks out. The whites who do not hold the same views as the government of the day you are going to throw out into outer darkness. That is what some say.
There is no machinery provided in the commonwealth to do so, as there are no qualifications as to beliefs required for membership in the commonwealth. One of the greatest hopes I have for an ultimate settlement is that South Africa has not withdrawn itself from the commonwealth and the fact that it will be represented in London at the prime ministers’ conference assures that the channels of informal communication have not been closed.102
At the end of the month Diefenbaker flew to London for the conference with Bryce, Robinson, and Fulton. His intention, he told Robinson, was “to test the South African reaction, to feel them out.” If they responded favourably, he would be able to justify his caution; if they did not, he could report at home that all reasonable efforts at persuasion had failed.103
In London the press emphasized the dangers of an irreconcilable split among the prime ministers, pitting Nkrumah and Tunku Abdul Rahman against Diefenbaker and Menzies on the South African question.104 The reality was more subtle. Under Macmillan’s sensitive guidance, the meeting steered through the shoals to a unanimous communiqué containing two paragraphs on South Africa. Diefenbaker “played a quiet role” that encouraged informal discussion and gave South Africa generous opportunity to show signs of flexibility in its racial policies. But South Africa offered no concessions. The communiqué asserted that “the Commonwealth itself is a multi-racial association” that sought “to ensure good relations between all member States and peoples.” More crucially, the meeting found an appropriate means both to delay, and allow for, a collective judgment on South Africa’s future relations with the Commonwealth:
The meeting noted a statement by the South African Minister of External Affairs that the Union Government intended to hold a referendum on the subject of South Africa becoming a republic. The Meeting affirmed the view that the choice between a monarchy and a republic was entirely the responsibility of the country concerned. In the event of South Africa deciding to become a republic and if the desire was subsequently expressed to remain a member of the Commonwealth, the Meeting suggested that the South African Government should then ask for the consent of the other Commonwealth Governments, either at a Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers or, if this were not practicable, by correspondence.105
Following the referendum, the initiative would lie with South Africa to seek renewal of its membership if it wished to do so. But since Commonwealth conferences worked by consensus rather than formal voting, the meaning of “consent” to such a request remained intentionally vague. On his own copy of the communiqué, Diefenbaker scribbled in the margin: “Implies unanimity.” Diefenbaker told parliament on his return that “these significant words … require no interpretation,” and proceeded to give it: “This established clearly that membership in the commonwealth is not a formality. These words … make clear that the prime ministers were not prepared to give an advance assurance that South Africa might remain a member of the commonwealth in the event that a decision was made to adopt the status of a republic.”106
The next steps were South Africa’s. Diefenbaker was satisfied with the delay. He had shifted prudently with the circumstances, and foresaw that a choice was coming. But he was not yet ready to go as far as Robert Bryce, who had supplied him with draft remarks for the House which he did not use. They indicated Bryce’s own convictions and his understanding of the prime minister’s mind, and they were prescient.
I think I can claim without immodesty to have been the strongest and most consistent advocate of racial and personal equality.
In keeping with that belief I shall be introducing within a few days a Bill of Rights which is intended to express in legislation the fundamental principle upon which in my opinion our own social relationship is based and upon which alone the Commonwealth can survive.
Surely if there is one common principle, above all others, which unites us within the Commonwealth, with all its races, religions, colours and creeds, it is our belief in racial and personal equality…
One thing I wish to make emphatically clear. We did not temporize on this vitally important subject. We shall not temporize. By persuasion, by argument in personal contact, we shall seek to gain acceptance throughout the whole Commonwealth of the supreme principle of our society that every man is equal before God and that appropriate laws should state that belief.107
That would mean a Commonwealth without South Africa. Diefenbaker might reach that point, but his first object was to preserve the Commonwealth association as a whole and to avoid any open confrontation between white and non-white leaders on the South African issue. A confrontation would, in effect, mean a shift to decisions by majority vote, and the prospect prompted Diefenbaker to repeat to cabinet his fear about migration policy in another form. “If Commonwealth Conferences should once adopt the majority vote as a means of reaching its [sic] decisions, the non-white majority at the next conference would probably support free migration of peoples. Such an immigration policy was clearly unacceptable to the Canadian people.”108 Privately, Diefenbaker had turned the issue into something more complex than South Africa’s continuing membership in the Commonwealth. How could the subject be dealt with in a way that would not divide the Commonwealth along racial lines and open the white countries to justified accusations of racism and hypocrisy?
South Africa scheduled its constitutional referendum for October 1960. In early August, Verwoerd announced that if the vote favoured a republic, his government would request continuing membership in the Commonwealth. Macmillan wrote to Diefenbaker and other leaders predicting that “very difficult issues may arise for us all.” He suggested “that it would be in the general Commonwealth interest if we could all say as little as possible at this stage.” In a covering note to Diefenbaker, he as
ked for advice on how to respond to a republican vote in October. “It will need,” he warned, “very careful handling.”109
The whites-only referendum, as anticipated, delivered a narrow verdict in favour of republican status. Diefenbaker worried that, because “public opinion in Canada was so strong … he could not possibly afford to adopt at the next meeting an attitude as tolerant of South Africa as he had before and during the last meeting.”110 That view disturbed the UK high commissioner to Canada, Joe Garner, and Macmillan, who noted on a letter from Diefenbaker in mid-November: “John Diefenbaker is going to be troublesome about South Africa. He is taking a ‘holier than thou’ attitude, which may cause us infinite trouble. For if the ‘Whites’ take an anti-South African line, how can we expect the Browns and the Blacks to be more tolerant?”111
Macmillan cabled Diefenbaker at length, appealing to him not to commit himself against South African membership before the next Commonwealth conference, which had been arranged for March 1961. Diefenbaker was annoyed by a sense that Macmillan was ignoring Canadian advice on the issue in favour of Menzies, and that he was badgering Canada. But Diefenbaker’s indecision was as marked as that of Macmillan. He “fretted about how to play his cards, his political instincts telling him to keep his own counsel until the moment for decision was at hand.”112 And he was getting no help from External Affairs. A long memo from Howard Green in late December offered no clear recommendations, while another one in mid-January tried to square the circle. It could find no principle for barring South Africa from membership which did not raise problems of consistency for other members. Instead, the department suggested that the conference might renew South Africa’s membership while issuing some kind of comment on racial policies. The statement “would be neither a clarion call for the ending of racial discrimination nor a heated denunciation of South Africa.” It would take “a firm stand” on race relations, but “without splitting the members into white and non-white camps.” Altogether, “It would deplore the present unwillingness of South Africa to move toward a moderation of its racial policies; emphasize the strength of opposition in the Commonwealth to racial discrimination; deprecate a radical solution such as the exclusion of South Africa in a Commonwealth accustomed to mutual tolerance and understanding; but make it clear that tolerance alone cannot be stretched indefinitely to bridge a wide gap in fundamental principles.” That seemed like an elaborate recipe for continuing indecision. Diefenbaker marked his copy of those words with a question mark - a sign of indecision squared.113
According to Robinson, the paper took into account Diefenbaker’s growing instinct for further postponement, but “he was clearly drifting in response to the pressures of the moment.”114 He had received a paper from Professor Donald Creighton arguing for exclusion, and both the Toronto Telegram and the Globe and Mail called for an initiative from Diefenbaker, “the author of a new Bill of Rights and a life-long advocate of constitutional and individual liberty.” The new members of the Commonwealth, according to the Telegram, expected Canada “to speak out and to save the Commonwealth in its new form as a multi-racial family of nations.”115 Robert Bryce, who had consulted widely with Commonwealth colleagues since the 1960 conference, added his discreet voice for exclusion in a handwritten note to Diefenbaker. “The main reason for excluding South Africa is to strengthen the Commonwealth. Keeping S.A. in will really weaken it - and more and more people will simply pay lip-service to it. The chief value of the Commonwealth in the next decade, as you have said publicly I think, is to be a bridge between the rich white peoples and the poor coloured peoples. Endorsing S.A. now will seriously harm its value for this purpose. R.B.B.”116
When Diefenbaker sought the advice of cabinet on February 11, he found them hopelessly confused and divided. A stream of advice from George Drew in London suggested the attractions of postponement. By the end of the month Diefenbaker still had no fixed position and no public commitments. He flew to London in early March in the same state of indecision as in 1960, fearful of failure, hoping for postponement, and with no desire to take to the barricades.117 In his first press conference on arrival at London airport, he baffled reporters with his polished Diefenbakerisms.
The question of continued membership within the Commonwealth is one … for discussion and consideration by this Conference among other things and I am sure that each will give to the consideration of this trying problem that same spirit that in the past has characterized the members of this Commonwealth and that in the passing years has brought about changes, based on experience, not always immediately accepted but ultimately achieved through the process of consideration, discussion and the realization of the need that the Commonwealth shall be maintained in strength and in power for peace everywhere in the world.118
For ever and ever, amen.
The conference began on March 8, 1961, with three days of general discussion on international policy, as delegations probed and manoeuvred cautiously on the South African question. Diefenbaker had with him Davie Fulton and Noel Dorion from cabinet; George Drew; and Robert Bryce, Basil Robinson, and Geoffrey Murray from External Affairs. During the preliminaries - and despite his own preferences - Bryce was delegated to search informally for some means of avoiding a direct rejection of South Africa’s request for renewed membership.119 On March 9 he presented Diefenbaker with his proposal, suggesting that the prime minister should discuss it with Macmillan during the weekend at Chequers.
The alternative course … appears to be to couple together consent to South Africa remaining a member with some announcement, which should be made at the same time as the news about South Africa comes out, that the Prime Ministers decided to proceed at their next meeting to consideration of a statement of principles to which members of the Commonwealth might be expected to subscribe. It could be said, though perhaps not in the agreed statement, that the action in regard to South Africa made necessary a declaration of principles to ensure that the views of the members of the Commonwealth were not misinterpreted as an implication of their granting consent to the continued membership of South Africa.120
Bryce urged Diefenbaker to discuss the proposal with no one until he knew Macmillan’s views. Only if Macmillan thought the approach feasible should he mention it to other prime ministers, since “any overtures along these lines on Canada’s part are almost certain to leak out because Canada’s attitude on this question is the biggest news of the whole Conference.”121
The next day, Bryce wrote privately to Diefenbaker to advise against the proposal he had made in his formal memorandum.
I hope you will excuse my writing to you this personal note. I may not have a chance to speak to you before you go to Chequers.
I am impelled to urge you to consider again carefully the main decision on South Africa before committing yourself finally to “consent plus a declaration.” As you know I have felt all along that it would be in the best interests of the Commonwealth and Canada to refuse consent. I want to repeat the arguments.
What does concern me at this time is the damage this decision may do to your own reputation both at home in Canada and in other countries. If you consent, I believe people will think and say that you have not lived up to the high ideals which you have stated so eloquently and so often. No words will be able to make up for the lack of action.
On the other hand if you are known to have taken the lead in refusing consent you will be hailed, here in London, at home in Canada, and throughout much of the world as a man who has courage as well as convictions. It will be unpleasant for a few days here, but I think you would be happier in the end.
I have refrained from putting forward the point in meetings with Mr Drew and the Ministers, as it is such a personal matter, but I wanted you to be aware of my thoughts on it.122
Diefenbaker carried this troubling appeal to conscience and political interest with him to Chequers, along with more baggage. Earlier in the day he had met with a South African United Front delegation led by Oliver Tambo of the Afr
ican National Congress, who also urged rejection of South African membership. That meeting was known to the press - which probably narrowed Diefenbaker’s moral options.123 He could still not find a satisfactory position.
Diefenbaker spent a weekend of nervous consultation on the “consent plus” option, including a long telephone conversation with Howard Green, who told him that the cabinet favoured an “uncompromising denunciation of apartheid” and was concerned for Diefenbaker’s reputation, but opposed a Commonwealth declaration of principles. That wasn’t much help. On Sunday, March 12, the Canadian delegation thrashed about in its efforts to draft the prime minister’s statement for next day’s Commonwealth meeting. Diefenbaker took with him to the meeting a heavily rewritten text which declared apartheid “repugnant to most of the world,” insisted that “the positive act of consent which South Africa is asking us to take at this meeting” could not be a formality, and ended by proposing to defer any decision on South African membership until after agreement on a declaration of Commonwealth principles at a future meeting. Diefenbaker told his Canadian colleagues that this approach would probably result in a South African withdrawal - which seemed the least divisive possibility. Diefenbaker had thus reversed the proposed order of events from “consent plus a declaration” to “a declaration plus consent,” requiring South Africa to endorse a statement on racial equality before it was considered for readmission. But other prime ministers could not understand his appeal for delay. At the end of the day it was clear that the “consent plus” option, as well as Diefenbaker’s scheme for delay, were dead, but the substance of his position remained. Macmillan told the meeting that it could not avoid a declaration of principles. The issue had narrowed to its content, and the possibility of South African agreement to the wording.124