by Denis Smith
112 Mallaby to Laithwaite, CRO, January 8, 1959; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 82
113 OC 2, 119-20
114 The source and precise nature of these reports is not clear: perhaps it was Howard Green, perhaps William Brunt, who briefed Diefenbaker regularly by telephone. Patrick Nicholson to JGD, December 3, 1958, JGDP, XII/117/F/331
115 Globe and Mail, January 13, 1959
116 McLin, Canada’s Changing Defense Policy, 60-67. The saga of the Arrow from inspiration to demise has spawned an unusual mythology, sustained over forty years by an endless flow of newspaper and television features, a cult literature, and a play featuring an on-stage model of the aircraft. Thirty years after its destruction, tales were still told of phantom sightings of the doomed prototypes. The Arrow seems as deeply lodged in English Canadian memory as the Canadian Pacific Railway or the Calgary Stampede. See, for example, Dow, The Arrow, Shaw, There Never Was an Arrow, Stewart, Shutting Down the National Dream; and Campagna, Storms.
117 Debates, June 28, 1955, 5380
118 McLin, Canada’s Changing Defense Policy, 68
119 CC, 67-57, September 20, 1957
120 CC, 82-57, October 24, 1957. Diefenbaker himself did not participate in this meeting with company officials.
121 CC, 83-57, October 25, 1957
122 CC, 85-57, October 29, 1957. These development costs would be added to the $226 million committed by the end of the 1957-58 fiscal year.
123 CC, 85-57, October 29, 1957. The prime minister mentioned the need “to deal appropriately, and in time, with the question of the money supply”; others called for added funding for low-cost housing, beyond the $150 million already committed.
124 George Pearkes to JGD, January 27, 1958, JGDP, VI/94/304-1958.2, 80913-14
125 McLin, Canada’s Changing Defense Policy, 73-74; Campagna, Storms, 93. The prospect of foreign purchases would mean a longer production run and substantial reductions in unit costs, which might make the Arrow a reasonable gamble. But apparently Pearkes was already too late with his request. Campagna quotes a Department of Defence Production memo suggesting that “by April 1958 it was accepted in Canada that, in the interests both of technical interworking and economy, the only sensible thing to do was to extend” the semi-automatic ground environment (SAGE), its communications systems, and the Bomarc sites north of the border. Campagna, Storms, 87
126 The relevant documents are “Minister’s memorandum,” August 22, 1958 (Cab. Doc. 247-58); CC, 86-58, August 22, 1958; CC, 92-58, September 3, 1958; CC, 94-58, September 7, 1958; CC, 95-58, September 8, 1958; CC, 96-58, September 21, 1958; CC, 97-58, September 22, 1958.
127 CC, 89-58, August 28, 1958
128 CC, 89-58, August 28, 1958
129 CC, 89-58, August 28, 1958
130 CC, 92-58, September 3, 1958. The comparative figures were:
Arrow with Astra-Sparrow $1,261.5 million
Arrow with US missiles $ 896.0 million
US F-106 substitute $ 559.0 million
Bomarc (240 missiles) $ 520.3 million
The Arrow estimates excluded development costs of approximately $400 million before September 1, 1958.
131 CC, 94-58, 95-58, September 7 and September 8, 1958
132 CC, 89-58, August 28, 1958
133 CC, 92-58, September 3, 1958
134 Bryce acknowledged the point of David Golden, the deputy minister of defence production, that the purchase of American aircraft would be “a slap in the face to the Canadian industry,” but responded: “I think that can be answered best if the numbers to be bought are so small that the cost of the Canadian planes are [sic] obviously out of all proportion to the U.S. planes even if the 105 is a somewhat better plane.” Confidential information. American development of the F-106 was cancelled a few months later.
135 CC, 94-58, September 7, 1958
136 CC, 95-58, September 8, 1958. At this meeting Pearkes suggested that employment might be maintained for two years at Avro if twenty pre-production and forty-eight production aircraft were built, all of them to go into service in five squadrons.
137 The interview was requested by Crawford Gordon. Diefenbaker apparently did not tell cabinet that his meeting with Gordon on September 17 had been belligerent, but he later insisted that it began that way. “Crawford Gordon was a noisy fellow, who thought when I saw his physical dimensions that fear should overwhelm me,” Diefenbaker said in 1970. But “it was really nothing … he swept in and was blatantly noisy and he swept out.” In the memoirs, Diefenbaker denies rumours of “a nasty personal confrontation.” Gordon, he suggests, began the meeting “in a blustering fashion” by pounding his fist on the prime minister’s desk, but was calmed by Diefenbaker’s warning of possible injury. Nevertheless, Diefenbaker writes that the company’s reaction was “extreme,” “strongly worded,” and intransigent. Since the issue before cabinet at this point was immediate cancellation, another way of reading the interview is to see it as an interim triumph for Gordon. At the next cabinet meeting, Diefenbaker proposed six months more life support for A.V. Roe. JGDI, May 27, 1970; OC 3, 37-38
138 CC, 96-58, September 21, 1958
139 CC, 96-58, 97-58, September 21 and September 22, 1958
140 In the memoirs, he calls the September decision “what amounted to a six-month formal notice so that they might adjust gradually to their new situation.” OC 3, 37
141 Press release, “Revision of the Canadian Air Defence Programme,” Office of the Prime Minister, September 23, 1958. JGDP, XII/29/B/9
142 Ibid.
143 M.W. Menzies, “Memorandum for the Prime Minister: The Arrow Program,” September 23, 1958, JGDP, VI/55/171
144 Blair Fraser, “Backstage at Ottawa: What Led Canada to Junk the Arrow,” Maclean’s, October 25, 1958
145 Globe and Mail, September 25, 1958
146 Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, September 25, 1958
147 “Avro Chief Still Expects Green Light,” Globe and Mail, September 25, 1958; Crawford Gordon, “… statement to avert misinterpretation of the new defence policy,” September 24, 1958, appended to J.N. Kelly to Leslie M. Frost, January 13, 1967, Frost Papers
148 “Statement by Crawford Gordon … to Annual Meeting of Shareholders, October 27, 1958: The Arrow and Iroquois Programs,” JGDP, VI/55/171, 47089-93. Gordon quoted a recent speech by Air Marshal C.R. Slemon, the Canadian deputy commander of NORAD, on the continuing need for manned interceptors “for as long as the manned bomber is part of the threat.” He reported that three Arrows were then being test flown, and a fourth was about to fly. Gordon wrote to Diefenbaker enclosing a copy of the statement, but received no reply.
149 See, for example, Dorothy J. Westlake to JGD, September 26, 1958; F.E. Hyde to JGD, October 10, 1958; Keith Spicer to JGD, December 15, 1958, JGDP, VI/54,55/168. On December 15 the Globe repeated its editorial view that “the brilliant team of scientists” at A.V. Roe “must not … be broken up.”
150 CC, 129-58, December 22, 1958. Diefenbaker warned publicly of the effects of Avro’s lobbying when he told the House on January 19, 1959: “Let me make this matter perfectly clear. Lobbies will have no effect on the decision that this government makes on the question of defence.” Debates, January 19, 1959, 57. This seems, in retrospect, not so much an admonition to avoid lobbying as a warning that Avro’s fate had already been sealed.
151 CC, 22-59, February 14, 1959; Fleming, Near 2, 13-16. The preparations leading to February 17 included further meetings of the military chiefs of staff-who indicated their preference for an American aircraft to replace the Arrow - and the cabinet defence committee, production of additional summary documents for ministers, and continuously changing estimates of cost prepared in the Departments of Defence and Finance. Confidential information
152 CC, 23-59, February 17, 1959. The draft seems to have been written by Robert Bryce. Two days later, on February 19, Diefenbaker said he was still considering his statement, and sought ministerial advice. He asked that a committee consisting
of Donald Fleming, George Pearkes, Davie Fulton, Sidney Smith, and Raymond O’Hurley meet that afternoon to prepare a final revision. CC, 24-59, February 19, 1959
153 Diefenbaker’s statement included no analysis of the Arrow’s costs, beyond the assertion that they were too high when considered as part of a larger defensive package that now included Bomarc-SAGE. Ministers’ estimates of costs fluctuated according to what items were included in the calculation. In September 1958 Pearkes quoted a figure of $12.6 million per aircraft to cabinet. By January 1959, with less expensive armament, he used a figure of $7.8 million per aircraft, and a few weeks later the Department of Defence Production suggested a cost of $7.7 million per plane. But these two estimates included $300 million to complete the development phase of twenty aircraft - most of it already committed - which almost doubled Avro’s figures for production of ninety-two operational aircraft. In October 1958 Avro offered Pearkes a fixed-price contract for delivery of these ninety-two planes at $3.75 million each - which meant savings of several hundred million dollars over estimates of the previous August, and annual production costs that would never come close to the figure cited in cabinet in September of $400 million. Avro also proposed an advanced schedule that would commence delivery of operational aircraft in September 1960 rather than spring 1961. Diefenbaker later used figures of $9 million or $7 million per plane, but never argued that cost alone was the decisive factor in the cancellation.
154 Debates, February 20, 1959, 1221-24. Diefenbaker may have been unaware at this time that the Bomarc B planned for use in Canada could not be fitted with non-nuclear warheads. In the memoirs he suggests that “no information was given us that the United States would abandon, or had abandoned, its plans to manufacture a conventional warhead for the missile.” His statement that “the full potential” of the weapons required arming with nuclear warheads was worthy of Monty Python: without the warheads they had no potential. In any case, his commitment to acquiring warheads seemed unambiguous in the February 20 statement; and he reiterated his position in a CBC interview with Tom Earle that evening. OC 3, 44; see also Fleming, Near 2, 18-19.
155 The notes are filed in JGDP, XII/29/B/9.
156 Telegram, Crawford Gordon to JGD, February 20, 1959, JGDP, XII/1/A/11
157 OC 3, 41
158 Globe and Mail, February 21, 1959. There were further editorials on February 23 and 25 emphasizing the need to salvage Avro’s technical capacities and to reach “a genuine sharing of defense production” with the United States - without which the Globe foresaw that “we stand to lose our economic independence, our political independence, without the Communists so much as striking a blow.” John Bassett’s Toronto Telegram gave the prime minister’s decision unequivocal support, while other papers widely praised Diefenbaker for a courageous and wise choice and, like the Globe, urged him to pursue a substantial Canadian role in an integrated system of defence production. One of the rare dissenting voices was that of Tim Creery on the CBC’s “Capital Report,” who suggested that the preoccupation with jobs and production sharing avoided discussion of the government’s policy. “I believe,” he said, “we are going headlong into a type of defense integration with the United States which, besides its damaging effects on our own independence, may not even be the most effective role which Canada can play in working for a peaceful world.” Telegram, February 21, 1959; “Press Views on the Arrow and Defense,” Globe and Mail, February 25, 1959; transcript, “Capital Report,” February 22, 1959
159 Telegram, Leslie Frost to JGD, February 21, 1959, JGDP, XII/1/A/11. Frost’s report that he learned of the decision in the legislature is contained in his personal memorandum, “The Diefenbaker Days,” nd, 9, Frost Papers
160 The pilot was J.A. McCurdy, who later served as lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia from 1947 to 1952. He received the McKee Trophy for 1959 in commemoration of that flight. Pearkes told the House that “a replica of the Silver Dart flew a short distance this afternoon before it met with a slight accident.” Debates, February 23, 1959, 1278
161 CC, 25-59, February 23, 1959
162 The minister of defence production, Raymond O’Hurley, opened the House that day with a general statement on negotiations for defence production sharing. His statement was vetted in advance by the prime minister, who deleted the opening paragraph from the draft. It read: “The growing integration of the defence of North America and the cost and complexity of modern defence equipment is making it more and more difficult for Canada to develop and produce major weapon systems on a strictly independent basis. Accordingly, Canadian work in the design, development and production of defence equipment will have to be closely integrated with the major programs of the United States. It is gratifying to report that the United States Government recognizes this and is working out with us, design, development and production sharing agreements.” Debates, February 23, 1959, 1269-70; confidential information
163 Debates, February 23, 1959, 1271-78, esp. 1278
164 Ibid., February 23, 1959, 1288
165 Ibid., 1295
166 Ibid., 1296
167 Ibid., 1306. Leslie Frost believed, on the contrary, that the order to stop work left “really no option but for the company to immediately post notices in their plants telling the workers to go home.” His advice, from J. Grant Glassco of Clarkson, Gordon, was that the government’s contract with Avro “permitted the orderly termination of the contract over a period of some six months or so, allowing the workers to make their arrangements for new employment and indeed permitting government forces and agencies to come into play … It would have meant that the workers would have time and opportunity to adjust their lives instead of being given a lump sum of money and turned out on the street.” Leslie M. Frost, “The Diefenbaker Days,” 9-10, Frost Papers
168 It is not clear whether Diefenbaker participated in or was aware of this decision, which seems to have been taken in the defence and defence production departments, perhaps for security reasons related to the high performance of the aircraft. There is no evidence, as some critics have suggested, of a vengeful plot to blot out the physical and historical record of the plane. But Diefenbaker did hold a grudge against Avro. Later in the year he asked O’Hurley to investigate rumours about Avro’s financial practices, and in August he wanted Sir Roy Dobson, the managing director of Avro’s British parent, Hawker Siddeley, to declare that the CF-105 had been inadequate and deserved cancellation. Confidential information
169 Frost, “The Diefenbaker Days,” 10
Chapter 10 “History Is a Hanging Judge”
1 JGD to Elmer Diefenbaker, February 27, 1959, JGDP, V/3, 1809
2 JGD to Mary F. Diefenbaker, February 16, 1959, ibid., V/1, 815
3 JGD to Mary F. Diefenbaker, March 12, 1959, ibid., 828
4 JGD to Mary F. Diefenbaker, April 29, 1959, ibid., 847-48
5 JGD to Mary F. Diefenbaker, June 7, 13, 1959, ibid., 856, 874
6 Fleming, Near 2, 39-49
7 Blair Fraser, Maclean’s, March 14, 1959, reprinted in Fraser, “Blair Fraser Reports”, 62-72
8 Roy Faibish, quoted in Stursberg, Leadership Gained, 177-78. Faibish was Alvin Hamilton’s executive assistant.
9 George Hees, quoted ibid., 180; see also Newman, Renegade, 140-41.
10 Many of his brief handwritten notes on cabinet discussions are preserved in the Diefenbaker Papers. See also Alvin Hamilton’s comment in Stursberg, Leadership Gained, 179-80.
11 See the comments of Alvin Hamilton and Davie Fulton in Stursberg, Leadership Gained, 176, 178-79. Hamilton commented: “I can honestly say that, during the five and a half years that I spent as a minister, I don’t recall a single instance of him interfering with any of my departmental responsibilities.” But when Hamilton made thoughtless public comments, as he sometimes did, Diefenbaker showed his rage.
12 Interview with E.D. Fulton, September 24, 1993
13 Interview with Gowan Guest, August 6, 1994; Stursberg, Leadership Gained, 181-82. The only specifi
c directive that Guest could recall was that anyone who had been a pallbearer at Edna’s funeral should have automatic and instant access to the prime minister. Guest circulated a memo to staff on the organization of the office into seven sections in January 1959, “in order that better service can be provided to all concerned.” It urged them to refer matters directly to those responsible, “rather than through other persons.” This seems to have been the first document to inform the two dozen staff members what their respective duties were. Gowan T. Guest, “Re: Organization of the Prime Minister’s Office,” January 28, 1959, JGDP, XII/70/C/340
14 Gowan T. Guest, “Memorandum to: The Prime Minister, Subject: Office Organization,” July 10, 1959, JGDP, XII/38/B/263; Stursberg, Leadership Gained, 181-82. Guest’s proposal was that George Hees’s executive assistant, Mel Jack, should become the permanent executive assistant to Diefenbaker, but he remained the indispensable éminence grise behind George Hees.
15 Gowan T. Guest to JGD, August 4, 1960, JGDP, XII/5/A/98; interview with Gowan Guest, August 6, 1994. Guest and his wife remained friends of the Diefenbakers. Soon afterwards, when visiting Vancouver, Diefenbaker, still the debt-fearing prairie lawyer, expressed fatherly shock that Guest had taken a $12,000 mortgage as partial payment for a house.
16 See Newman’s Renegade, 273-75; M.W. Menzies, “Memorandum for the Prime Minister,” April 15, 1958; “Memorandum for the Prime Minister,” May 10, 1959, JGDP, XII/37/B/214. Diefenbaker abruptly recalled Menzies from his civil service position to assist him in the 1962 election campaign. Menzies unhappily resigned his career job to satisfy Diefenbaker, and after the election joined a Winnipeg economic consulting firm.