According to Cushing, Stanton was “a duplex character.” And perhaps he was. But James E. Harvey, who recorded Cushing’s allegations, noted that “I think he [Cushing] is even a triplex,” and that everyone knew of the long-standing personal, professional, and political enmities which had marred Stanton’s relationship with Cushing.20
But neither Blair nor Cushing ever advanced more than their own recollections or assertions concerning Stanton as an advocate of secession. Indeed, when Blair in 1865 searched for proof that Stanton had pressured Robert Tyler toward secession, knowing that evidence from Tyler would be believed above other accusers of Stanton, he had to admit that his quest was unsuccessful. Stanton may have been all that Black, Blair, Cushing, and others claimed. The fact remains that they did not prove it, and Stanton’s actions as a Unionist give the lie to the claims.
Assuming, however, that any or all of these accusations of two-faced action are true, the question arises: Was he looking out for himself, as Blair claimed and Gideon Welles believed, so that he would benefit no matter which way the cards might fall, or was he acting deceitfully and unselfishly to promote the Union cause? In the law as well as in politics he had resorted to trickery to gain his ends. Playing now for the survival of the Union, Stanton would not have scrupled to employ deceit. He shared with many other men during the last, wearying months of Buchanan’s incumbency, a genuine fear and conviction that secessionists were plotting to gain control of Washington. To learn the details of such a plot, Edwin Stanton would have posed as the devil himself.21
To most of Stanton’s contemporaries of 1861, he was clearly a nationalist “of the same school of politics with Judge Black,” as Benjamin Butler later recalled. Though Black was shocked when he learned years later of Stanton’s liaison with the Republicans, the members of that party who knew about Stanton’s actions regarded him as a man who put patriotism above party, and Lincoln even considered a suggestion that he take Stanton, as well as Holt and Dix, into his cabinet, notwithstanding Stanton’s rudeness to him in the Reaper case.
News that Lincoln was toying with the idea of keeping some of Buchanan’s cabinet in his own administration soon spread over Washington. Stanton must have gloried that his exertions of recent weeks would receive public approbation.
But Lincoln, although willing to forget the rudeness he had formerly suffered at Stanton’s hands, had to choose other men than these for his official family. In addition to his continuing contempt for the gawky Illinoisan, Stanton now added anger born of disappointment at the cessation of his chances for continued official recognition and, in his own mind, for further opportunities to forward policies he felt were desirable for the country.
On February 25, two days after Lincoln entered Washington in partial disguise because of a rumored plot to assassinate him, the “Public Man,” an anonymous writer whose identity has never been discovered, recorded in his diary that Stanton had stopped him to ask if he had seen the President-elect since he had “crept” into Washington. “It is impossible to be more bitter and malignant than he is,” wrote the diarist; “every word was a suppressed and a very ill-suppressed sneer, and it cost me something to keep my temper in talking with him even for a few moments. When he found that I had only met Mr. Lincoln once, to my recollection, he launched out into a downright tirade about him, saying he ‘had met him at the bar, and found him a low, cunning clown.’ ”22 The new President would have to accomplish great things to gain Stanton’s respect.
Stanton was now too busy to pay more than passing attention to political surmise. He was simultaneously working with Holt, Black, and Dix to sustain Anderson at Sumter, to maintain the uneasy “truce” which existed at Fort Pickens in Florida, and almost incidentally to keep up the schedule of his own department. In this last, he failed. On March 2, he had to assemble a list of “references which could not be considered by Attorney General Stanton in consequence of the want of time and the pressure of business, and which were therefore returned without opinions.”
March 4 came, and while crowds gathered in the streets, waiting for the inaugural procession, Buchanan and his cabinet assembled in the President’s room at the Capitol for the consideration of any last-minute bills that Congress might send to the President. Stanton had hoped that one bill that he had drawn to expedite the operations of the federal courts, and which Seward had forwarded in Congress, might come in time, but it failed to pass in the closing rush of legislation.23
Outside an artillery battery wheeled into place on Capitol Hill. The city was well guarded, owing to the alertness of Stanton and his cabinet colleagues and the loyalty of General Scott. Shortly before noon, Buchanan left to accompany Lincoln to the inaugural ceremonies, and the group broke up.
Stanton listened with gratification not unmixed with personal disdain as Lincoln, standing on a platform erected in front of the Capitol and speaking in a high-pitched voice with a Kentucky accent that sounded inelegant to Easterners, enunciated the same sort of policy that Stanton, Black, and Holt had been instrumental in persuading Buchanan to adopt. He had no intention of interfering with slavery where it existed, the new President declared. He would enforce the fugitive slave law and even support a proposed constitutional amendment guaranteeing slavery in the states against federal interference. But he denied the right of secession, and expressed a determination to enforce the laws in all the states, “unless my rightful masters, the American people, shall withhold the requisite means, or, in some authoritative manner, direct the contrary.” Like Buchanan, he deplored the use of force. And yet, unlike Buchanan, Lincoln asserted that he would meet force with force.
Stanton left the inauguration scene buoyed up in his hope, but reluctant to place his trust in the hands of the new President. “The inauguration is over and whether for good or evil Abraham Lincoln is President of the United States,” Stanton wrote that afternoon. “Who will form the Cabinet is yet uncertain in respect to some officers—others are known.”
He grew pessimistic even as he wrote—“The inaugural will do no good towards settling difficulties—probably aggravate them.” But he would keep alert and for at least two days more would stay on in his office to introduce whoever would succeed him.
That evening Buchanan and the members of his cabinet gathered at a private residence to say farewell to one another. A few days later Stanton dined with Seward, now Lincoln’s Secretary of State, at Seward’s home. Thurlow Weed, Seward’s inseparable political confidant, recorded that “it was then and there that I learned how large a debt we owed him [Stanton] before the Rebellion began.”
Indeed, Stanton had done his full share to keep the national government in existence. He returned to private life still certain that Buchanan had never fully wakened to the implications of the crisis with which Lincoln now must deal.24
1 Stanton to Wolcott, ca. Dec. 27, 1860, owned by Edward S. Corwin; Russell F. Weigley, Quartermaster General of the Union Army; A Biography of M. C. Meigs (New York, 1959), 104–12 (hereafter cited as Weigley, Meigs); Kenneth P. Stampp, And the War Came (Baton Rouge, 1950), 75–7.
2 Wolcott MS, 169; Gaillard Hunt (ed.), “Narrative and Letter of William Henry Trescott,” AHR, XIII, 531–4; Auchampaugh, op. cit., 160. Gorham, Stanton, I, 158–9; Ropes’s memo of a conversation with Stanton in Sept. 1869, Horatio Woodman Papers, MHS; and Morse, Welles Diary, II, 273–4, offer three instances in which Stanton described this scene in these terms; and see the analysis of the conflicting evidence as to what took place at this and subsequent cabinet sessions in Pratt, op. cit., 461–6. Thompson, on the other hand, recalled ten years later that he did not remember Stanton’s doing anything at all, and that no remarks reflecting on individuals were passed; to Black, Oct. 10, 1870, Black Papers, LC.
3 Hunt, “Narrative … of Trescott,” loc. cit., 552–3; John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln, A History (New York, 1890), III, 73–4 (cited henceforth as Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln); Helen Nicolay, Lincoln’s Secretary, A Biography of John G. Nicolay (
New York, 1949), 129–30 (hereafter cited as Nicolay, Lincoln’s Secretary). See also W. A. Swanberg, First Blood, the Story of Fort Sumter (New York, 1957), 102–15; Stampp, op. cit., 75.
4 Flower, Stanton, 88; Morse, Welles Diary, II, 273–4. For an opposite view of Floyd, see Robert M. Hughes, “John B. Floyd and his Traducers,” VMHB, XLIII, 316–29. The text of Buchanan’s Dec. 29 reply has disappeared from the records.
5 Wilson, “Jeremiah S. Black and Edwin M. Stanton,” loc. cit., 465–8; Frederick W. Seward, Seward at Washington, 1846–1861 (New York, 1891), 492 (cited hereafter as Seward, Seward); Ewing’s reminiscence in Cincinnati Commercial, Nov. 3, 1864; Muriel Burnit (ed.), “Two MSS of Gideon Welles,” NEQ, XI, 589; Sickles, “Address …,” loc. cit., 331. See also Burton J. Hendrick, Lincoln’s War Cabinet (Boston, 1946), 254. On the ethicality of Stanton’s action, see Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The President’s Cabinet (Cambridge, 1959), 139.
6 Undated memo No. 56426, Black Papers, LC; Wolcott MS, 169; No. 3761, undated, Holt Papers, LC; Black’s reminiscence in Philadelphia Press, Sept. 10, 1883.
7 Undated memo, “To the Public,” Black Papers, LC; Black’s reminiscence in Philadelphia Press, Sept. 10, 1883; Flower, Stanton, 90–3; Stampp, op. cit., 77–8; Roy Franklin Nichols, The Disruption of the American Democracy (New York, 1948), 432.
8 Wolcott MS, 170–1; U. B. Phillips (ed.), “Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb,” AHA Annual Report (1911), II, 352; Gorham, Stanton, I, 151–8; and Morse, Welles Diary, I, 60. Other data in Nichols, op. cit., 432–3; George Ticknor Curtis, Life of James Buchanan (New York, 1883), II, 52–3 (hereafter cited as Curtis, Buchanan); August Schell to Black, July 28, Black to Schell, Aug. 6, Buchanan to Black, Sept. 25, 1863, Black Papers, LC; David Davis to William W. Orme, Jan. 19, 1862, copy owned by Willard L. King.
9 Gorham, Stanton, I, 148–64; Bernard C. Steiner, Life of Henry Winter Davis (Baltimore, 1916), 171–7; Sickles in New York Times, Sept. 13, 1865; Clarence E. Macartney, “Some Prominent Pittsburghers of 1840–1850,” WPHM, XXVIII, 44; Auchampaugh, op. cit., 91–2; Curtis, op. cit., II, 416–17.
10 Wolcott, MS, 170; Brigance, op. cit., 105–6.
11 King, Turning on the Light (Philadelphia, 1895), 189; Seward, Seward, 492; Frederick W. Seward, Reminiscences of a War-Time Statesman and Diplomat, 1830–1915 (New York, 1916), 166 (hereafter cited as Seward, Reminiscences). See also Morgan Dix (ed.), Memoirs of John A. Dix (New York, 1883), I, 372; Martha J. Lamb, “Major-General John A. Dix,” MAH, XIV, 167. Black later claimed that there had never been any thought of making Dix War Secretary or any possibility that King would lose his position; Stanton had deceived them all. See undated memo, box labeled “Legal Briefs,” Black Papers, LC. Black’s charge is controverted by all other evidence.
12 Stanton to William Stanton, Feb. 26, 1861, owned by William Stanton Picher; undated clippings in Montgomery Meigs scrapbook, LC; Weed’s letter in David C. Mearns (ed.), The Lincoln Papers (New York, 1948), II, 399.
13 Wilson, “Jeremiah S. Black and Edwin M. Stanton,” loc. cit., 467, for Howard’s letter, and see Hendrick, op. cit., 255–6. Richardson, Messages and Papers, V, 655–9, has Buchanan’s message.
14 Stanton to Chase, Jan. 23, 1861, Chase Papers, HSP; Black to Buchanan, Jan. 22, 1861, Black Papers, LC.
15 Jan. 26, 28, 1861, Andrew Papers, MHS; Wilson, “Jeremiah S. Black and Edwin M. Stanton,” loc. cit., 466. The latest scholarship on this meeting is in Robert G. Gunderson, Old Gentlemen’s Convention: The Washington Peace Conference of 1861 (Madison, 1961).
16 Doyle, op. cit., 67–9; Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln (New York, 1950), II, 431.
17 Philips to Horace Gray, Jan. 31, 1861, Gray Papers (photostat), LC; Clifford to Andrew, Jan. 30, 1861, NYHS; Charles Francis Adams to Andrew, Jan. 4, 1861, Andrew Papers, MHS.
18 To McCook, Feb. 4, 1861, McCook Family Papers, LC; Harrison Ritchie to Andrew, Feb. 6, 1861, Andrew Papers, MHS; Henry G. Pearson, Life of John A. Andrew (Boston, 1904), I, 159–60 (hereafter cited as Pearson, Andrew).
19 Benjamin Stanton to Holt, Sept. 19, 1865, Holt Papers, LC; Wilson, “Jeremiah S. Black and Edwin M. Stanton,” loc. cit., 463–75; Black, “Senator Wilson and Edwin M. Stanton,” Galaxy, IX, 817–31; same, “Mr. Black and Mr. Wilson,” loc. cit., 257–76. Thompson (to Black, June 7, 1870, Black Papers, LC) wrote that he would have believed Holt rather than Stanton capable of such duplicity.
20 Blair, op. cit., 15, and Brown in New York Herald, Feb. 4, 1865; Harvey to Black, Oct. 2, 1870, Black Papers, LC; Phillips, ms, “Summary of the Principal Events of My Life,” UNC; Albert E. H. Johnson, “Reminiscences of the Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War,” ColHS Records, XIII, 69.
21 Blair to Tyler, undated, ca. Aug. 1865, in “Original Letters,” WMQ, 1st ser., XX, 123; Buchanan to Horatio King, April 21, 1866, King Papers, LC; Morse, Welles Diary, I, 355–60; Samuel Sullivan Cox, Three Decades of Federal Legislation, 1855 to 1885 (Providence, 1885), 200.
22 T. J. Coffey and others to Cameron, Feb. 22, 23, 1861, Cameron Papers, LC; Butler to Dwight Roberts, Butler Letterbook, LC; F. Lauriston Bullard (ed.), The Diary of a Public Man (New Brunswick, 1946), 55–6; and see F. M. Anderson, The Mystery of ‘A Public Man’ (Minneapolis, 1948).
23 Stanton to Seward, Feb. 23, 1861, Seward Papers, UR; Stanton’s report is in Miscellaneous Collection No. 2133, LC; Holt’s report, in Robert Anderson Papers, LC, surveys the Sumter crisis and the roles of Buchanan’s cabinet personnel in preventing the abandonment of the fort.
24 Stanton to P. D. Lowe, March 4, 1861, BU; Thurlow Weed Barnes, Memoir of Thurlow Weed (Boston, 1884), 331–2; Weed in New York Times, Sept. 7, 1865; Stanton’s comments to Weed on Buchanan in Steubenville Herald, May 10, 1867; Brigance, op. cit., 116. The inaugural speech is in Richardson, Messages and Papers, VI, 5–12.
CHAPTER VI
FROM CRITIC TO COLLEAGUE
ALONE of Buchanan’s former cabinet, Stanton remained in Washington. Little Eleanor had fallen dangerously ill, and so he kept close to the center of events, although he and his family mingled little in the crisis-torn society of the capital.
On March 5, Lincoln submitted his cabinet choices to the Senate, and all of them were speedily confirmed: Stanton’s friend Seward, Secretary of State; his old Ohio confidant, Chase, Secretary of the Treasury; Simon Cameron, Secretary of War; Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy; Caleb B. Smith, a supposedly influential Indiana politician, Secretary of the Interior; Edward Bates, a prominent Missouri lawyer, Attorney General; and Montgomery Blair, of Maryland, scion of a family whose power in politics dated back to Jackson’s time, Postmaster General.
Stanton watched the beginnings of the new administration with a suspicious and critical eye, for like Buchanan he anticipated a spate of Republican investigations into their official conduct and had no confidence whatever in Lincoln. The progress of events during the first weeks of his administration confirmed the worst forebodings. It appeared that some members of Lincoln’s cabinet intended to abandon the Southern forts that Stanton and his colleagues in Buchanan’s council had striven so desperately to hold. Having presumed that Lincoln, with no Southern entanglements, would act decisively for the Union, he was angrier with the new President than he had ever been with Buchanan or Buchanan’s secession advisers.
A horde of office seekers had descended on Washington, paralyzing government business. “Every department is overrun,” he informed Buchanan, “and by the time that all the patronage is distributed the Republican party will be dissolved.” Stanton advised Seward to “fill all the places as soon as possible so as to get at the real work before you.” But Stanton, too, sought office for some of his friends, and he himself was pushed forward so insistently by Seward and Chase that he could scarcely have been ignorant of their efforts in his behalf.1
In cabinet, Seward and Chase several times proposed Stanton for federal attorney of the District of Columbia. Lincoln, from no love for Stanton but out of his desire to g
ain Northern Democratic support, was willing to try him, but decided that the disposition of this office properly belonged to Attorney General Bates. Stanton, meanwhile, busy with private affairs, told Chase that he wanted no official post, and thus the matter was decided.
Seward and Chase still felt that Stanton deserved to be rewarded, and Weed, who watched closely over patronage, suggested that Stanton get the diplomatic post at Constantinople. Nothing came of this proposal, however, and if Stanton prompted these efforts in his behalf, resentment and disappointment may have inspired the criticisms he was leveling at the Lincoln administration as it fumbled for a policy regarding Sumter. The critical situation had worsened in Charleston Harbor. Word had come from Anderson that his supplies would be exhausted in four or five weeks.2
Dispirited, Stanton asked Dix, in New York City, to sell his government bonds for him on the market. “My reason for selling so soon is, that every sign here is discouraging,” he explained. “There is no settled principle or line of action—no token of any intelligent understanding by Lincoln, or the crew that govern him, of the state of the country, or the exigencies of the times. Bluster & bravado alternates with timosity & despair—recklessness and helplessness by turns rule the hour. What but disgrace and disaster can happen?”
However, Stanton did not believe that the war, if it came, would last long. “Nor indeed do I think hostilities will be so great an evil as many apprehend,” he confided to Dix. “A round or two often serves to restore harmony; and the vast consumption required by a state of hostilities, will enrich rather than impoverish the North.”3
On April 10, Stanton heard that the District militia had been called to arms and soldiers were guarding the departments. A midnight rumor said that Sumter had already been fired on. Washington woke to a tense dawn, and Stanton again relieved his feelings in a letter to Buchanan. No one knew what to believe about Sumter, he declared, but it seemed likely that an expedition had been sent. Virginia was expected momentarily to secede, and disloyalists in Washington had become extremely bold. Few persons respected Lincoln or the administration. Of the cabinet members, only Seward had rented a house in Washington; none of them had brought his family to the city, and Stanton thought that all of them were ready to “cut and run.”
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