On February 3 a joint congressional resolution asked for the correspondence between Grant and the President on the return of the war office, and Stanton sent along copies supplied to him by the commanding general.36 Replying to the resolution, Stanton contented himself with informing Congress that he had had no communications with the White House since the past August 12; he was content to let the Grant-Johnson exchange speak for itself.
It spoke loudly enough to initiate a second attempt to impeach the President, which failed to get out of committee but which might have warned Johnson to practice self-restraint. There was a measure pending in the Senate reorganizing the entire South into a single military district under Grant’s command, and the day after the vexed correspondence was published, John Binney advised Fessenden that “after the hot and irritable correspondence … it would be imprudent to press this measure through the Senate in present circumstances, and besides, it may not be necessary.”
The President made it unnecessary. Congress, instead, over Johnson’s veto, passed another law, which put into Grant’s hands all the executive authority that the reconstruction acts had heretofore entrusted to the White House. The Republicans now were confident of Grant, and Stanton, though he was still unsure of the general’s reliability, made no protest.37
Unable to let bad enough alone, Johnson approved Hancock’s dismissal of Negro aldermen in New Orleans whom Sheridan had earlier placed in office. Grant ignored the President’s wishes in this matter and ordered Hancock to restore the Negroes. Over Sherman’s protests the President pushed ahead with a plan to establish an eastern army command with headquarters in Washington and to give Sherman, as its commander, rank equal to Grant’s. It was an obvious gambit to pit Sherman against Grant and to groom him for the post of Secretary of War.
Each of these egregious moves further antagonized Grant and pushed him and Stanton back into rapport. This had the effect of making Stanton, day after day, postpone resigning. He could not desert his post under fire from the White House. Johnson was succeeding only in isolating himself.38
The President’s inability to sense the fact of his weakness is best evidenced by his determination to rid himself of Stanton once and for all, not caring that this must unleash another impeachment attempt and was precisely what the radicals were hoping for. Johnson seemed to court impeachment. He was going to pit himself against Congress and the Army, at a time when the White House had been discredited, against the institutions that enjoyed the strongest possible evidence of popular support and wielded the real weapons of governmental power.
Like the President, Stanton held an exalted view of his office and of his influence as Secretary. Actually, Stanton was out of touch with what was going on and was utterly powerless to control the actions of the men who were deciding his official fate. He held an office with power only to obstruct policies, earned an inadequate salary, lived in a region that worsened his health, and was involved in a situation that rasped at his strained nerves. It would be difficult to imagine a set of circumstances more poorly calculated to serve his self-interest. All he could do was wait. Merely standing on the side lines as he was doing required a full share of dogged, unyielding courage.
It was not easy for him to hold on to a cabinet post in defiance of a President’s wishes. Only the most imperative convictions could have kept him at his post now that the Senate had sustained his right to it. Stanton agreed with John Hay that it was to be regretted that the fight against Johnson was pushing Congress into dependence on the Army. But Stanton pointed out that the issue facing the nation was not the theoretical trustworthiness of the Army in general, but rather the specific convictions of the Army’s generals. He was confident that Congress and the country were in no danger from the military class. The threat to stability emanated from the White House, and Stanton feared that if Johnson gained control of the war office and the Army, then political democracy was in peril.39
Clearly, Grant alone could not prevent the President from frustrating the purposes of the reconstruction laws. Events during Stanton’s suspension from the war office had proved the need for a stronger checkrein on the White House than army headquarters provided. Grant could stand firm against pressure from Johnson only if supported by a strong War Secretary. Therefore, Stanton reasoned, it was his responsibility to hold the war office against anyone the President might send to take it, until Congress and Grant indicated that the replacement was satisfactory.
There can be no doubt that Stanton saw himself as the savior of the nation’s best, most patriotic interests. This man of unheroic mold was now, in his own mind, a knight engaged in struggle with a despised dragon of reaction. A man of Stanton’s temperament, warmed by this self-image and flattered at the numerous messages of support he received, was capable of bravery transcending the physical. To be admired as a hero he found even more gratifying than the popular respect accorded him during the war as the organizer of victory.
So Stanton, day after day, kept postponing his moment of resignation although Ellen nagged at him to realize that the imbroglio must lead to disaster for him. She begged him to give up, and to repair his health and attend to their financial wants. Instead of resigning, he wrote to Pamphila and told her that his contribution to her welfare and their mother’s support this year must be nothing at all.
The materialism that had dominated Stanton in prewar years had gone into a complete decline during his six years of public service. He was now ruled by an idealism capable of denying to his wife and to his beloved mother and sister a minimal standard of living. Few who knew him would have guessed that he placed anything ahead of his family. Yet he was unable to pay the tutors who instructed the younger children and he had to borrow again to meet Ellen’s medical expenses and other personal obligations.
He still wanted wealth and was cold to political ambitions. But he believed that he must preserve the sacrifices which he and the nation had invested since 1861 in remaking the Southern society. Stanton saw himself as an indispensable warrior blocking the perverted policies of the White House.40 Andrew Johnson thought him a scarecrow, leagued in an unholy conspiracy with Grant.
Despite Johnson’s fulminations, Stanton had not been part of a conspiracy. He and Grant had stumbled along separate but roughly parallel paths, wanting the Johnson administration to finish its remaining year without a crisis, so long as the White House showed restraint concerning the Army’s work in the South.
The best advice that the President received was Sherman’s—to let things alone, and by doing nothing, so to embarrass Stanton as to force him to resign from his ridiculous and personally ruinous situation. Stanton had intended to do just that, and still planned to resign when matters had settled down.
In ordering Stanton returned to the war office, the Republican senators had set as the price of peace that Johnson must accept the fact of the Army’s insulation from the White House, and leave Stanton alone until a mutually satisfactory replacement could be named. Congress and the press focused unwavering spotlights of attention on the war office. The failure of earlier attempts at impeachment indicated clearly that short of reaching out again for control of the Army, the President was safe on that score. “Congress has stiffened up very much,” young Storey wrote, “and if Johnson issues any proclamations about Stanton,… he will be impeached instantly. He knows it, unfortunately, and he is too cautious to take any such step.”
But Johnson was not cautious at all. Still casting about for a man whom he could dominate as War Secretary, yet who would be acceptable to the Senate, and who had the courage to take the chance, the President now resorted to a ridiculous possibility. On February 13 he had his secretary approach the chief clerk of the War Department, John Potts, to sound out this functionary on his willingness to become Secretary of War ad interim “until Genl. McClellan or some other suitable person could be nominated and confirmed by the Senate,” as Colonel Moore recorded the President’s plan.
Potts begged off. He wanted no part o
f a plot to bypass the tenure law in order to get Stanton out of the war office. Johnson, therefore, had to continue looking for the man to stand up to Stanton.41 That the President could even contemplate nominating the obscure Potts as a man adequate to force Stanton out of office so that the spectacular McClellan might become his replacement, is the measure of Johnson’s unreasoning partisanship.
1 Hooper to Woodman, Aug. 23, 29, Sept. 2, 1867, Woodman Papers, MHS; Flower, Stanton, 324–5.
2 To Edwin L. Stanton, in Gorham, Stanton, II, 410; on nostrums, Stanton to Henry Wilson, Sept. 11, 1867, Wilson Papers, LC; E. L. Stanton to Lieber, Sept. 4, 1867, HL; Morse, Welles Diary, III, 173; Flower, Stanton, 325–6.
3 Conkling to Stanton, Aug. 14, 1867, owned by Gideon Townsend Stanton; Bigelow to Stanton, Aug. 16, 1867, in Bigelow ms diary, NYPL, and see his Retrospections, IV, 94.
4 Forsyth to Sheridan, Aug. 12, 14, 1867, Sheridan Papers, LC; Badeau, Grant, 104; Morse, Welles Diary, III, 169–73; Browning, Diary, II, 158.
5 F. Blair, Jr., to M. Blair, Aug. 22, 1867, Box XXVI, Blair-Lee Papers, PU; Lieber to Sumner, Aug. 28, 1867, HL; Grant to Sickles, Aug. 24, 1867, CG Letter-book C, 29607, RG 107, NA; Hesseltine, Grant, 93–4.
6 J. D. Andrews to Butler, Aug. 26, 1867, Butler Papers, LC; Lieber to Sumner, Aug. 25, 1867, HL.
7 Stanton to son, Sept. 4, 1867, Pratt Collection, CU; William Conant Church, Ulysses S. Grant (New York, 1897), 97, 355; Hesseltine, Grant, 97; Lamon to Butler, Aug. 12, 1867, Butler Papers, LC; Charles Benjamin to Horace White, June 1, 1914, ISHL.
8 Hooper to Sumner, Sept. 2, 1867, Sumner Papers, HU; same to Woodman, Aug. 29, 1867, Woodman Papers, MHS; E. J. Sherman to Butler, Sept. 9, 1867, Butler Papers, LC, on the Wilson quote; Hesseltine, Grant, 96; Morse, Welles Diary, III, 186–90.
9 Grant to Pope, Sept. 9, 1867, CG Letterbook C, 298; on Griffin, M. H. Royston to Johnson, Sept. 19, 1867, Sec. War Correspondence File, Box 329, RG 107, NA; F. Ballard to Holt, Aug. 29, 1867, Holt Papers, LC; Lieber to Sumner, Aug. 30, 1867, HL; Ord to Chandler, Sept. 16, 1867, Chandler Papers, LC; Grant to Chase, Oct. 21, 1867, Chase Papers, LC; Morse, Welles Diary, III, 193.
10 Ellen to?, ca. Aug. 30, 1867, owned by Mrs. Van Swearingen; Pierrepont to Marble, Oct. 1, 1867, Marble Papers, LC; Hooper to Sumner, Oct. 8, 1867, Sumner Papers, HU; same to Lieber, Oct. 13, 1867, HL; Sumner to Stanton, ca. Oct. 12, 1867, Stanton MSS; Dawes, “Recollections of Stanton under Johnson,” loc, cit., 504.
11 Grant to Sherman, Sept. 18, 1867, W. T. Sherman Papers, LC; Sherman to Grant, Sept. 25, 1867, HQA, Box 104, RG 107, NA; same to T. Ewing, Sr., Oct. 18, and Ewing, Jr., to Sr., Sept. 17, Oct. 12, 19, 1867, Ewing Family Papers, LC; Morse, Welles Diary, III, 234–4; Paul I. Miller, Thomas Ewing, Last of the Whigs (Ph.D. thesis, Ohio State University, 1933), 307.
12 Oct. 18, 31, Dec. 11, 19, 1867, owned by Gideon Townsend Stanton.
13 Wolcott MS, 209–11; Lieber to Martin R. Thayer, Nov. 20, 1867, and same to Sumner, Jan. 10, 1868, HL; Willard H. Smith, Schuyler Colfax (Indianapolis, 1952), 261 (cited hereafter as Smith, Colfax).
14 Lieber to Sumner, Jan. 2, 1868, HL; Richardson, Messages and Papers, VI, 558–81; Morse, Welles Diary, III, 186–90, 240, 244.
15 Undelivered draft in message vol. IX, Johnson Papers, LC; Richardson, Messages and Papers, VI, 583–94.
16 Gorham, Stanton, II, 413–26.
17 Stanton to E. L. Stanton, Dec. 26, 27, 1867, Pratt Collection, CU; James R. Doolittle, “Correspondence,” SHA Publications, XI, 6–9; Detroit Post, Chandler, 295; Flower, Stanton, 330; Pratt, Stanton, 451; Rhodes, op. cit., VI, 99n. The impeachment attempt failed on December 7, 1867; Congressional Globe, 40th Cong., 2d sess., 68.
18 Nation (Dec. 19, 1867), 493; Leader, Dec. 13, 1867; Mrs. Van Swearingen owns the inscribed Badeau volume; Intelligencer, Jan. 11, 1868. Documents are in Removal of Hon. E. M. Stanton and Others, House Exec. Doc. 57, 40th Cong., 2d sess.
19 Dec. 30, 1867, Fessenden Papers, LC.
20 To Marble, Jan. 2, 8, 1868, Marble Papers, LC.
21 Exchanges on McCardle between Grant, Ord, Stanton, and Stanbery, Dec. 31, 1867-Jan. 20, 1868, AGO, RP 670220, RG 94, NA. Other data in Flower, Stanton, 326–7n.; Brigance, op. cit., 173; King, Davis, 262–3; Carl Brent Swisher, American Constitutional Development (2nd ed., Boston, 1954), 324. Subsequently, Johnson sought to appease Grant by authorizing federal attorneys to defend Ord. Grant refused, and the special counsel was used.
22 To Fessenden, Jan. 13, 1868, HL; Fessenden, op. cit., II, 149–50; Stanton to Gen. E. S. Sanford, Jan. 8, 1868, Lincoln MSS, HU; to Mrs. Lucy Stanton, Jan. 8, 1868, CHS; Gorham, Stanton, II, 426–7.
23 Lieber to M. R. Thayer, ca. Jan. 16, 1868 (misdated 1867), HL; Hesseltine, Grant, 107–8n.; Dana and Wilson, Grant, 394; Browning, Diary, II, 169; Morse, Welles Diary, III, 255–7.
24 Badeau, Grant, 111; Lewis, Sherman, 590; Hesseltine, Grant, 104–5; and Rhodes, op. cit., VI, 100–2, offer interestingly different interpretations of the Sunday negotiations, of which Rhodes’s is the most accurate. But none take Stanton into account; nor do any of his biographers cover this weekend. See also Ewing, Jr., to Johnson, Jan. 12, 1868, Johnson Papers, LC, and Howe, Sherman Home Letters, 364–5.
25 Hesseltine, Grant, 105; Sen. Edmunds to Stanton, Jan. 13, 1868, Stanton MSS; Browning, Diary, II, 173; Flower, Stanton, 331; H. G. Howard, op. cit., 228–9.
26 Morse, Welles Diary, III, 259–62; Browning, Diary, II, 173–5; Hesseltine, Grant, 105–6.
27 Hillyer to Johnson, Jan. 14, 1868, Johnson Papers, LC. Of all the authors treating these events, only Rhodes, op. cit., VI, 100n., caught the significance of the Hillyer letter. See also “Notes of Colonel W. G. Moore,” loc. cit., 115–16; Welles to Johnson, Feb. 5, 1868, HL.
28 Sherman, Memoirs, II, 421–6; Howe, Sherman Home Letters, 365; Hesseltine, Grant, 107; Mrs. Trumbull to Walter Trumbull, Jan. 16, 1868, owned by the estate of Benjamin P. Thomas; J. B. Stillson to Barlow, Jan. 27, 1868, Barlow Papers, HL; Correspondence—Grant and the President, House Exec. Doc. 149, 40th Cong., 2d sess.
29 Wolcott MS, 210; Mrs. Trumbull to Walter Trumbull, Jan. 18, 1868, owned by the estate of Benjamin P. Thomas; Flower, Stanton, 336–8.
30 Wolcott MS, 210–11; and see accurate rumors on Stanton’s plans for resignation in Washington Intelligencer, Jan. 20, 1868.
31 Grant to Johnson, Jan. 30, 1868, CG Letterbook C, 328–9, 333–4, RG 107; Stanton to Seward, Jan. 24, 1868, Box 110, RG 108, and WD Executive Military Book, LIX, RG 107, NA, passim; Lewis, Sherman, 591; Howe, Sherman Home Letters, 369.
32 Morse, Welles Diary, III, 263, 267–8; Sherman, Memoirs, II, 423–6; “Notes of Colonel W. G. Moore,” loc. cit., 116–17.
33 Schofield’s reminiscence on Grant, to Hamlin Garland, Box 49, Garland Papers, USC; Benjamin to Horace White, June 1, 1914, ISHL; Johnson, “Reminiscences of Hon. E. M. Stanton,” loc. cit., 74; General Orders—Reconstruction, Sen. Exec. Doc. 342, 40th Cong., 2d sess.; Gorham, Stanton, II, 428–30.
34 Cramer, op. cit., 99–100; Dodge, op. cit., 100; Sherman to Reverdy Johnson, Feb. 1, 1868, Reverdy Johnson Papers, LC.
35 M. A. DeWolfe Howe, Portrait of an Independent: Moorfield Storey, 1845–1929 (Boston, 1932), 66–9 (hereafter cited as Howe, Portrait of an Independent); Howe, “Dickens, Stanton, Sumner, and Storey,” loc. cit., 30–3; Morse, Welles Diary, III, 277–9; Sumner to the Stantons, Jan. 21, Feb. 1, 1868, owned by Mrs. Van Swearingen; Mrs. John A. Logan, Reminiscences of a Soldier’s Wife (New York, 1913), 227–8; Young, Men and Memories, I, 128.
36 N. C. Roswell to Stanton, Feb. 14, 1868, Sec. War Correspondence File, Box 334, RG 107, NA, on business deals; Stanton to Grant, Feb. 8, 1868, ibid., Box 337, on reports to Congress, and see Morse, Welles Diary, III, 269–70, 274, Bigelow, Retrospections, IV, 94.
37 Binney to Fessenden, Feb. 5, 1868, Fessenden Papers, LC; Stanton to Colfax, Feb. 4, 1868, Sec. War, Reports to Congress, XI, 105, RG 107, NA.
38 Hesseltine, Grant, 108–11; Lewis, Sherman, 592–3; Morse, Welles Diary, III, 278
.
39 Thayer, Hay, I, 262–3; Dawes, “Recollections of Stanton under Johnson,” loc. cit., 499–500.
40 Wolcott MS, 210–11; Pamphila Stanton Wolcott to Andrew Wylie, Oct. 18, 1870, and financial details, owned by Craig Wylie. Requests, too numerous to cite, that Stanton stay on, in Stanton MSS.
41 Howe, Portrait of an Independent, 58; “Notes of Colonel W. G. Moore,” loc. cit., 119; J. B. Stillson to Barlow, Feb. 7, 12, 1868, Barlow Papers, HL.
CHAPTER XXVIII
NO ONE WILL STEAL IT NOW
IT WAS amusing to see how afraid everyone was of the War Office,” one of General Sherman’s friends remarked later. In mid-February, however, the President saw nothing to smile at.
After the humiliating refusal of chief clerk Potts to serve as a sacrificial lamb by becoming War Secretary ad interim, Johnson cast about for other possibilities. Welles, always eager to strike at Stanton, suggested that the President order Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas to return to his titular post. The adjutant’s duties, though secondary in importance to Stanton’s and Grant’s, included responsibility for personnel assignments and records. Having Thomas in charge of these matters would confront Stanton and Grant with an important Department functionary who, long out of favor with the Secretary and commanding general, would be dependent for support on the White House. In addition, bringing Thomas back would reduce the status of the acting chief adjutant, “Stanton’s man,” General Townsend. Johnson seized on the suggestion.1
Thomas, however, was a frail reed to employ as a staff. Except for field duty in the Seminole and Mexican wars, this sixty-three-year-old West Point graduate had spent his military career as a Washington desk soldier. Tall, thin to the point of gauntness, with a shock of white hair and a scraggly beard, Thomas was known in the Army as a tippler and an eccentric. He enjoyed very little popularity and almost no personal influence with his fellow officers, and up to this time was unknown to the public. If the President expected Thomas to rally any substantial popular support to the White House in a crusade against Stanton, or to amass opposition to the vast prestige and influence Grant possessed in the Army, then he had committed a great blunder.2
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