6. In a diary entry on September 26, 1940, 493–495, EL, Ike explained that “it has been a constant battle to stay with the outfit.”
7. Walter Krueger to George C. Marshall [hereafter GCM], June 11, 1941, in The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, ed. Larry I. Bland (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 2:534n.1 (henceforth Marshall Papers).
8. See, for instance, Ike to Hugh A. Parker, February 8, 1941, in Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 1905–1941, ed. Daniel D. Holt and James W. Leyerzapf (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 514–516: “Of one thing I’m certain: I’m weary of these eternal staff details. I’d like to get a command of my own, even if just a squad.”
9. Notes for Colonel Charles H. Corlett, June 1941, in Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries, 517–520.
10. Ike, who feared that MacArthur might again request his services, urged his friend Wade Haislip (Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, at the War Department) not to send him “back to gugu land, no matter how wonderful the possibilities may appear to be.” DDE to Wade Haislip, July 28, 1941, in Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries, 534.
11. GCM, Speech to the Army Ordnance Association, October 11, 1939, Marshall Papers, 2:83. In 1939, Marshall replaced General Malin Craig as US Army Chief of Staff.
12. GCM to Major General Walter K. Wilson, October 7, 1941, Marshall Papers, 2:631–633. “I might tell you, and most confidentially, that General McNair’s greatest concern and that of all his officers is the problem of corps command. That was the greatest lesson of the Louisiana maneuvers.” See GCM to Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, October 30, 1941, Marshall Papers, 2:655–657, for part of the political kickback to the changes in leadership.
13. See Chapter Three.
14. Christopher R. Gabel, The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1992), esp. 185–194. “The thirty-one caretakers, commanders of major units in the GHQ maneuvers who did not win combat commands, gave way to younger, more promising, officers” (187). Also see Carlo D’Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life (New York: Henry Holt, 2002), 277–281; Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope (New York: Viking Press, 1963), 162–163; and Cole C. Kingseed, “Eisenhower’s Prewar Anonymity: Myth or Reality?,” Parameters 21, no. 3 (1991): 87–98.
15. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, 92–101. The issue of officer retirements was particularly politicized where the National Guard was involved.
16. Gabel, GHQ Maneuvers, 170–184.
17. In October, after the Louisiana maneuvers, Eisenhower had told Gerow: “Things are moving so rapidly these days that I get almost dizzy trying to keep up with the parade.” In December, of course, the pace would get even faster. DDE to Leonard T. Gerow, October 4, 1941, in Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries, 547.
18. D’Este, Eisenhower, 282.
19. Chaumont is the French community where the American Expeditionary Force had its headquarters in the World War.
20. Eisenhower, Papers, 1:5–6, 9. Eisenhower and Marshall agreed that they could probably not protect the Philippines from a full-scale invasion, but they both thought an effort had to be made to “save them.” A revised version of the paper, dated December 17, 1941, can be found on 9.
21. Not all the recommendations were strong. General McNair put Eisenhower at the bottom of a list of general officers with potential for higher command positions. D’Este, Eisenhower, 282.
22. While Marshall had his problems at VMI, he was the top cadet for military activities, ranking corporal in the second year, ranking first sergeant in the third, and first captain in his final year. He did not so do well in class but managed to push himself up to be fifth by the time he graduated.
23. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880–1939 (New York: Viking Press, 1963), 53. “I tried very hard”; “I was very exacting and very exact in all my military duties; as I gradually developed from the mild authority—almost none—exercised by the corporal, to the pronounced authority of the first sergeant.” Also see Edgar F. Puryear Jr., Nineteen Stars (Washington, DC: Coiner Publications, 1971), 37. Marshall sought “military distinction” and did not receive any demerits in four years. During this time, he was also very much in love, and often snuck out to see his girlfriend. Luckily for him, he was never caught.
24. Puryear, Nineteen Stars, 43–66. General MacArthur had a negative influence on Marshall’s career, probably as a result of the latter’s association with what was called the Chaumont group around General Pershing. See Chapter Five for the details.
25. On the Eastern Front, see John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin’s War with Germany (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), esp. 101–249. Papers, 1:19–20, 23–31 provides an excellent perspective on Eisenhower’s work in support of Marshall during the Arcadia conference.
26. The Churchill Project, Hillsdale College, “Were ‘Soft Underbelly’ and ‘Fortress Europe’ Churchill Phrases?,” April 1, 2016, https://winstonchurchill.hillsdale.edu/?s=soft+underbelly. Churchill’s metaphor involved the alligator, which he said should be attacked on the belly and not on the snout.
27. Marshall apparently threatened to resign over the issue of control over war supplies, but this may have just been a rhetorical ploy. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, 287.
28. Ibid., 261–288.
29. In the course of organizing and reorganizing the War Department, the War Plans Division became the Operations Division, but both names were used for a time. Papers, 1:109. Ike replaced his good friend Gerow, who moved on to command an infantry division. In regard to the plans involving North Africa, see Papers, 1:137–142.
30. The unity question extended from the top to the bottom of the joint effort. On unified commands see Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, 275–282. A fully annotated copy of Eisenhower’s December 26, 1941, draft instructions to the Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Theater, is in Papers, 1:24–31. In January 1942, Ike wrote in his notes: “The struggle to secure the adoption by all concerned of a common concept of strategical objectives is wearing me down”; Papers, 1:66. The forces pressing against unity were rooted in national, service, and personal interests that were in conflict. See, for instance, Papers, 1:174–176 for an attempt to allocate responsibilities between Britain and the United States. See also the directive to Douglas MacArthur, March 18, 1942, Papers, 1:189–192. See DDE to Marshall, March 20, 1942, Papers, 1:197–198, on an effort to achieve unity of command between the US Navy and Army in the Caribbean.
31. DDE to Marshall, March 25, 1942, Papers, 1:205–208. Also see Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, 305–306. For a different version of the respective roles of FDR and Churchill, see Nigel Hamilton, The Mantle of Command: FDR at War, 1941–1942 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014), 101–135, 254–264, 310–321, 363–370.
32. This was the cross-Channel assault code-named SLEDGEHAMMER (part of the broader buildup named BOLERO). On Marshall’s trip to Britain, see Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, 302–320.
33. Ibid., 326. The Soviets were maneuvering to get the Allies to launch an attack through France as soon as possible. One part of that effort involved repeated hints that Stalin might reach an agreement with Hitler and leave the war.
34. Marshall put through Ike’s promotion to major general in March 1942. See Papers, 1:217–218, and Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 249–250. Despite the advantages of his position, Ike called it a “slave seat.” DDE to Patton, April 4, 1942, Papers, 1:227.
35. DDE Memorandum, May 30, 1942, Papers, 1:318–327.
36. DDE to Marshall, June 3, 1942, and Notes, June 4, 1942, Papers, 1:327–328.
37. DDE to Marshall, June 3, 1942, Papers, 1:327–28. See also DDE to Marshall, June 6, 1942, Papers, 1:331–332.
38. Quoted in Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, 339.
39. In 1941, General McNair ranked Eisenhower as his eighteenth choice for command of a division.
40. D’Este, Eisenhower, 304–305, describes Ike’s first enc
ounter with Montgomery, who told his American visitor that he had to snuff out his cigarette during the briefing. Things did not go much better when Ike first met Brooke (305–306). For the formal (“nice-nice”) versions, see Papers, 1:318–327.
41. Joseph Patrick Hobbs, Dear General: Eisenhower’s Wartime Letters to Marshall (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 5–6, emphasizes the influence the evaluations of Generals Pershing and Conner had on Marshall’s decision; still, I find the choice startling.
42. DDE, Notes, June 8, 1942, Papers, 1:333–334. See also DDE, Notes, June 11, 1942, Papers, 1:337: “The C/S says I’m the guy.” The appointment was effective June 25.
43. Compare DDE to Marshall, July 7, 1942, 373–376, with July 11, 1942, and July 14, 1942, 378–381. See also DDE, “Conclusions as to the Practicability of SLEDGEHAMMER,” July 17, 1942, Papers, 1:388–392, and DDE to Marshall and Ernest J. King, July 19, 1942, Papers, 1: 393–396.
44. DDE Memorandum, July 22, 1942, Papers, 1: 405–406. Marshall and King gave in to the British and learned that FDR already had a North African campaign in mind. Pogue calls his chapter on these events “Marshall Loses a Fight.” Ordeal and Hope, 321–349.
45. DDE to Marshall, July 23, 1942, Papers, 1: 407–414. Ike considered the North African campaign “defensive in character,” but he concluded that it was preferable to the other possibilities. Eisenhower called July 22, when the decision was reached, “the blackest day in history,” See also Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, 348–349.
46. Eisenhower had also been promoted to lieutenant general on July 7, 1942. His title would now be Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force.
47. Gruenther (USMA 1918) was one of Ike’s close personal friends; he had served as chief of staff of the Third Army, the position Eisenhower had held before going to Washington.
48. Lee (USMA 1909), who had extensive experience in the Corps of Engineers, would serve as Ike’s logistical expert—a function that imposed unwelcomed, unglamorous, and unyielding constraints upon the progress of all combat units.
49. Smith, who had served with Eisenhower in Washington, became Ike’s chief of staff.
50. Eisenhower’s evaluation of Bradley would shoot up during the campaign in Tunisia.
51. See, for instance, DDE to Hastings Lionel Ismay, August 6, 1942, Papers, 1:444–447.
52. Crucial decisions were being made from early August through early November 1942; see Papers, 1:439–658 for the details.
53. DDE to Marshall, August 17, 1942, Papers, 1:476–479.
54. DDE to Marshall, June 3, 1942, Papers, 1:327–328; DDE to Prichard, August 27, 1942, Papers, 1:505–507.
55. See DDE to Marshall, October 17, 1942, Papers, 1:622–625, for a careful discussion of the issues and imponderables.
56. See Hobbs, Dear General, 12–15, for a good discussion of this problem.
57. The timing of the attack was under continuous discussion; schedules were very tight both for manpower and for supplies. Eisenhower and the Combined Chiefs of Staff gradually pushed back the date of attack. Despite pressure from the president of the United States and the prime minister of Britain, October plans were postponed until Sunday, November 8, when the three-pronged amphibious assault began. See, for instance, DDE to Marshall, September 10, 1942, Papers, 1:549–550, and September 12, 1942, Papers, 1:555–556.
58. Martin Blumenson, Mark Clark (New York: Congdon and Weed, 1984), 76–92.
59. DDE to Marshall, November 7 and November 8, 1942; to Combined Chiefs of Staff, November 8, 1942; to Mark Wayne Clark, November [8], 1942, Papers, 2:665–676.
60. Blumenson, Mark Clark, 91–96; D’Este, Eisenhower, 344–348.
61. DDE to Walter Bedell Smith, November 9, 1942, Papers, 2:677.
62. DDE to Combined Chiefs of Staff, November 14, 1942, Papers, 2:707–711.
63. DDE to Marshall, November 17, 1942, Papers, 2:729.
64. See, for instance, DDE’s long, anguished message to Walter Bedell Smith, November 18, 1942, Papers, 2:732–736. Ike said, “God knows I’m not repeat not trying to be a kingmaker.”
65. DDE to Marshall, November 19, 1942, Papers, 2:737–739. On that same day, Ike told Mark Clark, “For two days here I thought I would simply have to go to a padded cell” (2:739–741).
66. The pressure from the media is described fully in Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower: The Personal Diary of Captain Harry C. Butcher, USNR, Naval Aide to General Eisenhower, 1942–1945 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), esp. 236–251.
67. The situation became slightly less complex after a Free French assassin killed Darlan in December 1942.
68. George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1957), 89–273, describes in detail the landings and immediately subsequent battles. This narrative account gives a good sense of the difference between strategic plans and the resulting, chaotic action.
69. D’Este’s Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life, 360–374 (a chapter titled “The Dreariest Chapter in the History of Allied Collaboration”) provides an excellent account of the campaign and its problems.
70. DDE to Winston Churchill, December 5, 1942, Papers, 2:801–805.
71. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory (New York: Viking Press, 2002), 5, says FDR “imposed no unified plan.” Nor did Marshall have a unified position from the Chiefs of Staff (15). With FDR leaning toward the Mediterranean and accepting a delay in the cross-Channel attack, Marshall and Eisenhower were unable to impose their own strategy on the conference (15–31).
72. DDE to Henry Harley Arnold, January 19, 1943, and DDE to Marshall, January 19, 1943, Papers, 2:910–911. Merle Miller, Ike the Soldier: As They Knew Him (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1987), 463–464, says Ike was “napping” when this happened. It seems more likely to me that he was worried about being replaced as Supreme Commander. Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942–1943 (New York: Henry Holt, 2002), 303, 327–329.
73. Ike had been digging rather deeply into detailed aspects of the campaign in Tunisia. See, for example, DDE to Kenneth Arthur Noel Anderson, December 14, 1942, Papers, 2:840–841; also DDE Memorandum, December 15, 1942, Papers, 2:842–844. He was increasing his role as the Casablanca meeting approached. DDE to Combined Chiefs of Staff and British Chiefs of Staff, December 29, 1942, Papers, 2:871–873.
74. As recently as December 29, Eisenhower had wanted to appoint Spaatz to head the new Allied Air Force (DDE to Marshall, Papers, 2:873–875), but the Combined Chiefs of Staff appointed Air Chief Marshal Tedder instead. DDE to Combined Chiefs of Staff and British Chiefs of Staff, December 31, 1942, Papers, 2:879–880.
75. In case you forgot, the first time was near the end of his service with General MacArthur; see Chapter Five. On Casablanca, see Michael Korda, Ike: An American Hero (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 359–363; D’Este, Eisenhower, 382–390; Alan Brooke Alanbrooke, War Diaries 1939–45: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 356–365. With Ike pushed “up into the stratosphere,” Alexander would (Alanbrooke concluded) now “restore the necessary drive and co-ordination which had been so seriously lacking of late.” For a different perspective on Ike’s situation at Casablanca, see Eric Larrabee, Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 428–431.
76. Two developments on the German side were of overwhelming importance. First was Hitler’s decision to pour men and equipment into the defense of North Africa, despite Rommel’s advice to the contrary. The second was the struggle between Rommel and Generaloberst Juergen von Arnim to control strategy and tactics in Tunisia. See Martin Blumenson, Rommel’s Last Victory: The Battle of Kasserine Pass (London: Allen and Unwin, 1968), esp. 179ff.
77. DDE to Combined Chiefs of Staff, February 15, 1943, Papers 2:953–955.
78. Eisenhower had commended Fredendall after the landings. DDE
to Walter Bedell Smith, November 10, 1942, and DDE to Marshall, November 10, 1942, Papers, 2:685–689. As late as February 4, he was pushing for Fredendall’s promotion (DDE to Marshall, Papers, 2:936–938), even as he expressed concern about what Fredendall was doing to defend the army’s southern flank. For Ike’s concerns, see DDE to Lloyd Ralston Fredendall, February 4, Papers, 2:939–941.
79. “Chronology,” Papers, 5:105. Eisenhower was with the II Corps on February 13 and 14. D’Este, Eisenhower, 391–394; Korda, Ike, 365–370. See Blumenson, Rommel’s Last Victory, for a detailed description of the series of battles and the rationale for Rommel’s withdrawal. See also Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 357–392.
80. Andrew S. Grove, Only the Paranoid Survive: How to Exploit the Crisis Points That Challenge Every Company (New York: Doubleday, 1999), 3–7.
81. Korda, Ike, 365–367; D’Este, Eisenhower, 392–394; Blumenson, Rommel’s Last Victory, 86–87, 120–129; Eisenhower, At Ease, 261–263.
82. Eisenhower had dealt with the problem of officers who did not perform well in his message to Marshall, December 11, 1942, Papers, 2:827–829, but Fredendall was a more serious and complicated matter.
83. Eisenhower first tried to bolster Fredendall by sending General Ernest N. Harmon to restore order at the front. Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 460. Soon, though, it became necessary to oust Fredendall and bring in Patton. DDE to Patton, March 6, 1943, Papers, 2:1010–1011. Also see D’Este, Patton, 460–470. Once Patton had completed his work, he would return to the job of getting ready to invade Sicily and would be replaced in Tunisia by General Omar Bradley. DDE to Marshall, March 8, 1943, Papers, 2:1016–1017.
84. Eisenhower later followed Patton’s advice and replaced General Ward with General Harmon in command of the 1st Armored Division. DDE to Marshall, April 3, 1943, Papers, 2:1066–1067.
Eisenhower Page 26