66. Ibid., in a chapter aptly titled “Breaking the Back of the Wehrmacht: April–August 1944,” esp. 191–326.
67. Churchill had already (May 2, 1944) anticipated that the Soviet Union would dominate East Europe and the Balkans; he was assuming, however, that the cross-Channel attack would be successful. See note 5, Papers, 3:1844, on the prime minister’s remarks at the War Cabinet meeting. For Eisenhower’s thoughts on the postwar situation, see Eisenhower to Walter Bedell Smith, May 20,1944, Papers, 3:1872–1876. Ike noted, however, that, “we cannot predict what areas will be occupied by our respective armies at that moment.”
68. Matloff, Strategic Planning 1943–1944, 287–288.
69. Matloff, Strategic Planning 1943–44, 497, comments on “the steady resistance of the President and his close advisers to any introduction of political or military bargaining with the Russians.”
70. Butcher, My Three Years, 560–563. D’Este, Eisenhower, 517–529, provides an excellent account of the difficult days from June 1 through June 5. The author says with authority that “June 5 was a supreme test of his generalship and his ability to keep his nerve under the most trying circumstance he would ever face as a commander” (527). Concerned, as always, about unity, Eisenhower had first visited British troops getting ready to invade. Eisenhower to Marshall, June 6, 1944, Papers, 3:1914–1915.
71. On Ultra, the code machine that gave the Allies a significant intelligence advantage, see Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War, esp. 167–168, 217, 286, 291, 351–352, 384. See also Paul Gannon, Colossus: Bletchley Park’s Greatest Secret (London: Atlantic Books, 2007), esp. 299–314.
72. General Patton is, in this regard and many others, a special case. He was obsessed with thoughts of his own death—always in combat—and sprinkled his correspondence with his thoughts on this subject. See Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York: HarperCollins, 1995).
73. Eisenhower to Marshall, June 6, 1944, and Eisenhower to Combined Chiefs of Staff, June 8, 1944, Papers, 3:1914–1918.
74. Harrison, European Theater, 302–384, covers in detail the operations from June 6 through 18.
75. Butcher, My Three Years, 571–574.
76. Harrison, European Theater, 284.
77. Ibid., 252.
78. Ibid., 264.
79. Ibid., 265.
80. See, for instance, Eisenhower to Montgomery, June 18, 1944, Papers, 3:1933–1934.
81. See Eisenhower to Combined Chiefs of Staff, June 9, 1944, Papers, 3:1921–1922, on the matter of issuing “supplemental francs” in liberated areas. In many regards, the French situation resembled the problems in Italy following the surrender. But the French economy was larger and de Gaulle was larger than life.
82. Eisenhower to Marshall, June 19, and 21, 1944, and Eisenhower to Marshall and King, June 20, 1944, Papers, 3:1936–1942.
83. Notes to Eisenhower to Montgomery, June 25, 1944, Papers, 3:1949–1950.
84. D’Este, Eisenhower, 555; Eisenhower to Tedder, June 29, 1944, Papers, 3:1960–1961.
85. D’Este, Eisenhower, 554.
86. He went beyond “assertive” in his defense of the invasion of southern France and his rejection of Churchill’s continued demands for a campaign in the Balkans. See, for instance, Eisenhower to Marshall, June 29, 1944, Papers, 3:1958–1960. The excellent notes to this document lay out the tiresome exchanges over this issue. The prime minister lacked a mental fuse that would stop him when he had gone over the limits of human endurance in debate.
87. Bradley’s approach to problems was similarly practical. When his tank guns were unable to penetrate the armor of German tanks, he wheeled more effective antiaircraft artillery into his combat teams and continued the action. Eisenhower to Walter Bedell Smith, July 3, 1944, Papers, 3:1970–1971; Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961), 45.
88. Eisenhower continued to talk as if he expected Montgomery’s forces “to break out into suitable tank country.” Eisenhower to Marshall, July 26, 1944, Papers, 3:2010–2031. But he was clearly looking to Bradley and Patton for the progress he sought. Meanwhile, he was forced yet again to fend off the bomber command. See Eisenhower to Arthur Travers Harris, July 27, 1944, Papers, 3:2033.
89. Eisenhower to Marshall, July 5, 1944, Papers, 3:1971–1972.
90. Eisenhower to Walter Bedell Smith, June 16, 1944, and Eisenhower to Marshall, July 27, 1944, Papers, 3:1927–1930, 2034–2035.
91. The quotation is from Eisenhower’s June 6, 1944, message to the “Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Forces,” Papers, 3, 1913.
92. Butcher, My Three Years, 583, 612–626.
93. Ibid., 580.
94. DDE to Montgomery, July 28, 1944; DDE to Marshall, July 30, 1944; Papers, 4:2041–2042, 2043–2044.
95. DDE to Marshall, July 30, 1944, Papers, 4:2043–2044.
96. DDE to Marshall and Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 2, 1944, Papers, 4:2048–2051.
Eight. Tested Again
1. He apologized to Marshall and the Combined Chiefs of Staff in his cable of August 2, 1944. Papers, 4:2048–2051.
2. Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961), 176.
3. John Erickson, The Road to Berlin: Continuing the History of Stalin’s War with Germany (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 310–318.
4. DDE to Marshall, August 3 and 5, 1944, Papers, 4:2054–2056; Butcher Diary, August 6–7, 1944, Papers, 4:2057–2058. Churchill was not an easy man to brush off; see DDE to Churchill, August 11, 1944, Papers, 4:2065–2066.
5. Blumenson covers the campaign in meticulous detail in Breakout and Pursuit. See especially 53–77, 175–182, 185–304.
6. Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 571–615.
7. Jonathan W. Jordan, Brothers, Rivals, Victors: Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, and the Partnership That Drove the Allied Conquest in Europe (New York: NAL Caliber, 2011), 296–316.
8. DDE to Somervillel, August 8, DDE to Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 15, and DDE to Marshall, August 17, 1944, Papers, 4:2061–2073.
9. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 305–558; DDE to Marshall, August 9 and 11, 1944, Papers, 4:2062–2065.
10. For a different perspective, see Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 307–320.
11. For all you need to know about the gap, see William Weidner, Eisenhower and Montgomery at the Falaise Gap (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris, 2010). Also see DDE to Marshall, August 17, 1944, Papers, 4:2071–2073. There was a serious public relations difference between the British and American commands, and Eisenhower felt compelled to explain to Marshall in detail what was happening in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) as well as what would happen on about September 1, 1944. DDE to Marshall, August 19, 1944, Papers, 4:2074–2077.
12. See DDE to Montgomery, August 24, 1944, Papers, 4:2090–2092, and DDE to Marshall, August 24, 1944, Papers, 4:2092–2094, which explain Ike’s position very clearly.
13. On August 24, 1944, Ike put it bluntly to Marshall: “The British have already been compelled to cannibalize one division, the 69th, and will have to break up another before the end of the month. Their replacement situation is tight.” Papers, 4:2092–2094. Ike also compromised with de Gaulle by allowing a primarily French force to march into Paris—a sideshow that was of immense importance to de Gaulle and trivial importance to the war.
14. DDE to Bertram Home Ramsay et al., August 29, and DDE to Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 30, 1944, Papers, 4:2100–2104.
15. DDE to Combined Chiefs of Staff, September 9, 1944, and DDE to Marshall, September 17, 1944, Papers, 4:2124–2128, 2157–2160.
16. DDE to Marshall, September 17, 1944, Papers, 4:2158.
17. DDE to Marshall, September 4, 1944, Papers, 4:2118–2119.
18. DDE to Combined Chiefs
of Staff, September 9, 1944, Papers, 4:2124–2128.
19. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 334–363; DDE to Bradley, September 15, 1944, Papers, 4:2146–2147.
20. DDE to Montgomery, September 20, 1944, Papers, 4:2164–2166.
21. DDE to Montgomery, September 15, 16, 20, 22, and 24, and October 9, 10, 13, and 15, 1944, Papers, 4:2148–2149, 2164–2166, 2215–2217, 2175–2176, 2185–2186, 2221–2225, 2227–2228; DDE to Lee, September 16, 1944, Papers, 4:2153–2154.
22. DDE to Robert Elliott Urquhart, October 8, 1944, Papers, 4:2214; Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974); DDE to Bradley, September 23, 1944, Papers, 4:2183.
23. Carlo D’Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life (New York: Henry Holt, 2002), 613.
24. David Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War, 1943–1945 (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), 441–500, provides a full explanation of the debates over Market Garden and the controversies it later inspired.
25. DDE to Marshall, September 25, 1944, Papers, 4:2186–2188.
26. DDE to Montgomery, September 24, 1944, Papers, 4:2185–2186; DDE to Marshall, October 26, 1944, Papers, 4:2252–2254.
27. DDE to Combined Chiefs of Staff, September 29, 1944, Papers, 4:2199–2202.
28. DDE to Walter Bedell Smith, September 22, 1944, Papers, 4:2181–2182. See also DDE to Alphonse Pierre Juin, October 13, 1944, Papers, 4:2225–2227.
29. DDE to Marshall, September 25 and October 22, 1944, Papers, 4:2186–2188, 2242–2243.
30. DDE to Combined Chiefs of Staff, October 29, 1944, Papers, 4:2263–2264.
31. DDE to Marshall, September 14, 1944, Papers, 4:2143–2145.
32. Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 308–330.
33. Ibid., 429. See especially Chapter 5 “Breaking the Back of the Wehrmacht: April—August 1944,” 191–330.
34. Ibid., 422.
35. Ibid., 429.
36. Ibid., 424.
37. Ibid., 424–426.
38. DDE to British Chiefs of Staff, October 31, 1944, Papers, 4:2268–2269.
39. DDE to Montgomery, December 16, 1944, Papers, 4:2350.
40. Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 430.
41. DDE to Marshall, December 5, 1944, Papers, 4:2335–2336.
42. Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1965), 1–32, 51–444. See also Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War, 554–645, for an excellent discussion of the battle and its outcome.
43. DDE to Brehon Burke Somerville, December 17, 1944, and DDE to Bradley and Jacob Loucks Devers, December 18, 1944, Papers, 4:2355–2357.
44. Cole, The Ardennes, 445–555; DDE to Combined Chiefs of Staff, December 19, 1944, Papers, 4:2358–2359; DDE to Bradley and John Clifford Hodges Lee, December 19, 1944, Papers, 4:2361; DDE, Memorandum, December 23, 1944, Papers, 4:2371–2376.
45. Cole, The Ardennes, 610–614, 668–676; DDE to Combined Chiefs of Staff, December 20, 1944, Papers, 4:2363.
46. DDE to Montgomery, December 31, 1944, Papers, 4:2386–2388; also DDE’s “Outline Plan” of the same date, 2388–2389.
47. John S. D. Eisenhower, General Ike: A Personal Reminiscence (New York: Free Press, 2003), 128–131. D’Este, Eisenhower, 654–658, also provides an excellent description of the crisis. Montgomery’s chief of staff was Major General Sir Francis de Guingand.
48. See, for instance, DDE to Marshall, January 10, 1945 (2 messages) and January 11, 1945, Papers, 4:2412–2420, 2422–2423.
49. DDE to Marshall, January 7, 1945, Papers, 4:2394; DDE, “Draft,” January 4, 1945, Papers, 4:2408–2410.
50. DDE to Combined Chiefs of Staff, December 21, 1944, Papers, 4:2367.
51. DDE to Marshall, December 26, 1944, Papers, 4:2379; DDE to Stalin, December 29, 1944, Papers, 4:2384–2385.
52. Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 446–447.
53. DDE to Combined Chiefs of Staff, January 20, 1945, Papers, 4:2444–2449.
54. 53 DDE to Marshall, January 15, 1945, Papers, 4:2430–2435.
55. DDE to Marshall, February 9, 1945, Papers, 4:2473–2474.
56. Charles B. MacDonald, The Last Offensive (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1973), 208–235; Ambrose, Eisenhower, 1:387–388; D’Este, Eisenhower, 681–682.
57. DDE to Marshall, March 12, 1945, Papers, 4:2521–2523.
58. D’Este, Patton, 711–713.
59. DDE to Combined Chiefs of Staff, March 24, 1945, Papers, 4:2539–2540.
60. DDE to Marshall, March 26, 1945, Papers, 4:2543–2545.
61. For that massive campaign—involving ninety-one divisions—see MacDonald, The Last Offensive. The German ground strength was nominally eighty divisions, but many of these units were understrength. Despite the strategic bombing campaign, German industrial production peaked in the fall of 1944.
62. DDE to Montgomery, March 28, 1945, Papers, 4:2364.
63. DDE to Marshall, March 30, 1945 (2 messages), DDE to Churchill, March 30 and April 1, 1945, DDE to Montgomery, March 31, 1945, and DDE to Combined Chiefs of Staff, March 31, 1945, Papers, 4:2559–2563, 2567–2571.
64. We will never know whether Ike enjoyed the fact that Montgomery was now forced into the subordinate position he had happily assigned to the American forces in North Africa and in Sicily. But we do know that Eisenhower was human and given to some of the same emotions all of us have.
65. DDE to John Russell Deane and Ernest Russell Archer, March 28 and 29, 1945, Papers, 4:2551, 2557–2558.
66. Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 528–529.
67. See Louis Galambos, The Creative Society and the Price Americans Paid for It (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 128–130. Also see two important books by John Lewis Gaddis: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972) and Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). See also Gregg Herken, Brotherhood of the Bomb: The Tangled Lives and Loyalties of Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, and Edward Teller (New York: Henry Holt, 2002), 149–156.
68. MacDonald, The Last Offensive, 373–406. As MacDonald notes, between April 5 and 13, the First, Third, and Ninth US Armies had pushed 150 miles across central Germany.
69. DDE to Montgomery, March 31, 1945, and DDE to Combined Chiefs of Staff, March 31, 1945, Papers, 4:2567–2571. This question, like so many others involving the war, inspired a cottage industry of debates that much exceeded the amount of thought Ike gave to the question. See, for instance, Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 1945: The Decision to Halt at the Elbe (New York: W. W. Norton,1967).
70. DDE to Marshall, April 15, 1945, Papers, 4:2612–2613.
71. DDE to John Russell Deane and Ernest Russell Archer, April 21 and 22, 1945, Papers, 4:2632–2636.
72. DDE to Marshall, April 28, 1945, Papers, 4:2661.
73. DDE to John Russell Deane and Ernest Russell Archer, April 30, 1945, Papers, 4:2664 n. 5.
74. DDE to Marshall, April 15, 1945, Papers, 4:2614–2617.
75. See, for instance, the discussion in S. P. MacKenzie, “On the ‘Other Losses’ Debate,” International History Review 14, no. 4 (November 1992): 717–731.
76. These excerpts from Eisenhower’s address would later appear on the Eisenhower Memorial in Washington, DC. For the entire speech, see the version published in Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 388–390.
Nine. Duty, Honor Party
1. DDE to Paul Williams Thompson, August 8, 1945, Papers, 6:247.
2. DDE to Thomas Troy Handy, October 27, 1945, Papers, 6:481.
3. DDE to Lucius Du Bignon Clay (hereafter LDBC), November 8, 1945, Papers, 6:521.
4. DDE to LDBC, November 8, 1945, 6:523.
5. See Papers, 7:742ff.
6. DDE to Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 4, 1946, Papers, 7:823–82
4.
7. DDE to Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 13, 1946, Papers, 7:856–858.
8. DDE to Robert Porter Patterson, March 29, 1946, Papers, 7:962–964. Also see John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).
9. DDE to Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 7, 1946, Papers, 7:1105–1107.
10. DDE to Joseph Taggart McNarney, April 17, 1946, Papers, 7:1010–1013. Also see DDE to Chester William Nimitz, June 29, 1946, Papers, 7:1157–1159.
11. DDE to Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 7, 1946, Papers, 7:1105–1107.
12. DDE to John Sheldon Doud, August 23, 1946, Papers, 8:1250.
13. DDE to Willis Dale Crittenberger, September 20, 1946, Papers, 8:1312–1313.
14. DDE to Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 12, 1947, Papers, 8:1581–1585.
15. DDE to Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 25, 1947, Papers, 8:1855–1858.
16. DDE to Walter Bedell Smith, November 28, 1947, Papers, 9:2084–2085.
17. DDE to All Members of the Army, July 26, 1947, Papers, 9:1867–1868.
18. DDE to James Vincent Forrestal, February 7, 1948, Papers, 9:2242–2256.
19. These lessons began early. See, for example, DDE to Rear Admiral Henry K. Hewitt, October 13, 1942, Papers, 1:612.
20. David L. Stebenne, “Thomas J. Watson and the Business-Government Relationship, 1933–1956,” Enterprise and Society 6, no. 1 (March 2005), esp. 45–75, discusses Watson’s links to Eisenhower.
21. Travis Beal Jacobs, Eisenhower at Columbia (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2001). See also Joan D. Goldhamer, “General Eisenhower in Academe: A Clash of Perspectives and a Study Suppressed,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 33, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 241–259.
22. DDE to Roger John Williams, September 15, 1948, Papers, 10:194–195.
23. DDE to Philip Young, August 14, 1950, Papers, 11:1277–1278.
24. DDE to James Vincent Forrestal, November 4, 1948, Papers, 10:283–284. Also see Diary, December 13, 1948, Papers, 10:365–368.
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