by Barry Krusch
These latter efforts were comparatively primitive. But an August 5, 1968 memo detailed a propaganda project in southern Florida aspiring to the level of Operations Northwoods sophistication, a project designed to suck some of the sunshine out of the Sunshine State.
Working with their “propaganda assets,” local COINTELPRO specialists oversaw the creation of a television “documentary” on both the black liberation movement and the new left in the Miami area, a documentary anything but “news”: the basic idea was to take the least media-savvy representatives of the “New Left”, and shine the spotlight on them instead of their more articulate brethren (The Cointelpro Papers, p. 119):
The program, viewed by a large Florida television audience not aware that the FBI was doing a “Walt Disney” on them, was edited to take the statements of key activists out of context in such a way as to make them appear to advocate gratuitous violence and, in addition (and inconsistently) seem cowardly. To add to the professionalism, the documentary made sure to de-contextualize the comments of the activists, thus turning potentially plausible claims into inherently absurd claims, utilizing camera angles deliberately selected to make those interviewed come off like “rats trapped under scientific observation” (The Cointelpro Papers, p. 119):
The FBI leadership called upon “[e]ach counterintelligence office [to] be alert to exploit this technique both for black nationalists and New Left types,” which was extremely effective in framing those who were on the show in “a most unfavorable light” (The Cointelpro Papers, p. 119):
Shows like this obviously played a role in accounting for much of the negativity with which the New Left and black liberation movements came to be publicly viewed by the end of the 1960s. Unfortunately, the FBI made sure that the agents in charge would not alert the American public that they were the well from which the geyser of disinformation was spurting, so that government-manufactured reality would appear to be the natural order of things (The Cointelpro Papers, p. 119):
This particular COINTELPRO operation could have probably gone on indefinitely, but the memos you have seen were distributed to news agencies. Having their cover blown, Director Hoover declared that this flavor of COINTELPRO was deep-sixed (at least until the heat was off).
However, while the official program supposedly was ended, the program was unofficially continued by changing the name of activists to “terrorists,” which then opened the door to re-frame further organizations. The FBI started with the Mafia, and ended with . . . nuns? (The Cointelpro Papers, p. 306; footnotes omitted; definition of acronym added in brackets):
This was accomplished in the immediate aftermath of COINTELPROs alleged demise, as is shown in the accompanying April 12, 1972 Airtel from Director L. Patrick Gray to the SAC, Albany. The word selected was “terrorist”. . . The public, which experience had shown would balk at the idea of the FBI acting to curtail political diversity as such, could be counted on to rally to the notion that the Bureau was now acting only to protect them against “terror.” Thus, the Bureau secured a terminological license by which to pursue precisely the same goals, objectives and tactics attending COINTELPRO, but in an even more vicious, concerted and sophisticated fashion.
The results of such linguistic subterfuge were, as was noted in the introduction to this book, readily evidenced during the 1980s when it was revealed that the FBI had employed the rubric of a “terrorist investigation” to rationalize the undertaking of a multi-year “probe” of the nonviolent CISPES [Committee In Solidarity With The People Of El Salvador] organization — extended to encompass at least 215 other groups, including Clergy and Laity Concerned, the Maryknoll Sisters, Amnesty International, the Chicago Interreligious Task Force, the U.S. Catholic Conference, and the Virginia Education Association — opposed to U.S. policy in Central America. Needless to say, the CISPES operation was attended by systematic resort to such time-honored COINTELPRO tactics as the use of infiltrators/provocateurs, disinformation, black bag jobs, telephone intercepts, conspicuous surveillance (to make targets believe “there’s an agent behind every mail box”), and so on.
If the FBI can on a limited budget and with limited motivation frame people of little notoriety who, being alive, could defend themselves, just imagine what they could do to a person dead, with no defense, a national pariah to boot, and with resources and motivation unlimited.
A person like Lee Harvey Oswald.
Conclusion
What have we learned? That the Land of Oz and the Magic Kingdom may be home not-so-sweet-home, and you may not have to look so hard to find “A CRIME” in “AMERICA”.
The relevance of the foregoing to the Kennedy assassination is clear:
The Military, whose Northwoods plan was rejected by Kennedy, and which showed conclusively it would manufacture reality to commit acts of treason against the United States, had control of President Kennedy’s autopsy;
The CIA, which was fingered as a potential suspect for a coup d’état by "a very high official" in the Kennedy administration in a news article six weeks before President’s Kennedy’s assassination, and whose ex-director Allen Dulles (fired by Kennedy) served on the Warren Commission (which had top-down responsibility for the investigation into Oswald), had control of the media;
The FBI, which authored a memo that set the “removal of King from the national scene” as a national priority, and which manufactured reality to thwart the goals of groups opposed to the Vietnam war — had bottom-line control of the investigation into the assassination of the President.
Didn’t find reading this chapter that enjoyable, did you? Well, I can’t really say I enjoyed writing it either.
But this chapter had to be written, because if you’ve learned just one thing, it’s this:
HERE is where you can stick the epithet “wacky conspiracy theorist”!
(I had another image in mind, but I discarded the idea when I decided to make this a family-friendly book.)
We now know that governments can, and do, manufacture reality, and with that key observation proven, we are now ready to take a look at The Case Against Lee Harvey Oswald in detail.
Chapter 7
The Case Against Lee Harvey Oswald
Let’s sum up what we have learned so far.
There can be no conviction in any case where there is reasonable doubt (which can be seen in terms of confidence level).
A case consist of propositions dividable into elements.
The confidence level for a proposition can, at best, be no stronger than the confidence level for the weakest element associated with that proposition.
The confidence level for an element is affected by evidence, and not just the quantity of evidence, but also the quality of evidence, using the criteria of comprehensiveness, credibility, sufficiency, and consistency.
Certain kinds of evidence can reduce confidence level.
Some evidence, particularly manufactured evidence, can positively obliterate the prosecution’s case by its mere presence.
Various arms of government have, from time to time, manufactured evidence.
With this background in mind, we now turn to The Case Against Lee Harvey Oswald. At the outset, you should know that The Case Against Oswald is not simply “Lee Harvey Oswald killed President Kennedy.” That is not the “case”, that is simply a general conclusion related to the case. Being too simple, it does not allow for a precise examination of how the evidence relates to the case’s specific components.
When we define the case specifically, we find it can most concisely be described as being comprised of four statements:
The Legal Assumption underlying two propositions and a conclusion.
Proposition One, related to the number of gunmen (1).
Proposition Two, related to the identity of the gunman (Oswald).
The Conclusion, which naturally follows if the legal assumption is true and the evidence establishes the truth of the propositions beyond a reasonable doubt.
We can see The Case Aga
inst Oswald from this bird’s eye view:
THE CASE AGAINST LEE HARVEY OSWALD
LEGAL ASSUMPTION
All the evidence in The Case Against Lee Harvey Oswald stipulated as admissible is authentic. This admissible evidentiary record is comprehensive, credible, sufficient, and consistent to the extent that it precludes reasonable doubt regarding both of the following propositions regarding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy:
PROPOSITION ONE
There was one and only one gunman in Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963, and that gunman was neither aided nor abetted by any person or group.
PROPOSITION TWO
Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone gunman in Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Lee Harvey Oswald fired the shot that killed President John F. Kennedy.
Remember, if reasonable doubt is established for even one of the first 3 statements above, then the conclusion cannot be supported!
Along these lines, I need to make two important points: Reasonable doubt applies to the legal assumption as well; if the legal assumption is invalid, the propositions must fail by definition. What is also interesting is that if the first proposition is not demonstrated, the case for the second proposition also begins to fall apart, and the conclusion must fall as well, for reasons we will detail shortly.
Let’s discuss these in turn.
LEGAL ASSUMPTION
All the evidence in The Case Against Lee Harvey Oswald stipulated as admissible is authentic. This admissible evidentiary record is comprehensive, credible, sufficient, and consistent to the extent that it precludes reasonable doubt regarding both of the following propositions regarding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy:
Underlying the entire case is the legal framework within which it is analyzed. The United States Constitution refers to the concept of “due” process, and there are numerous protocols which are due. If these protocols are absent and/or violated, they can result in a “not guilty” verdict purely on what someone may refer to as “technicalities,” but in fact are constitutional safeguards designed to make sure that innocent people do not go to jail. Millions of American soldiers have risked their lives in a defense of these “technicalities,” if that’s the word you want to use. But if so, it’s the wrong word: at the risk of stating what ought to be obvious, the Constitution isn’t a “technicality,” it’s the supreme law of the land. And the officers of government take an oath of office that they will follow that law.
One of the key protocols defining the process that is “due” is known as the Federal Rules Of Evidence, and its chief reason for being is to mandate, as close as possible, the satisfaction of the above. Underlying these Federal Rules are, of course, the laws of logic, which inspired not only the Federal Rules but all the other rules of evidence in United States.
With that in mind, we start with the most basic concept of all, that any evidence offered to prove a case be authentic. This authenticity requirement is a sine qua non parameter for any case to go forward.
A key case in this area is Miller v. Pate (386 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 785), which was argued before the Supreme Court on January 11, 1967, and decided October 13, 1967.
In that case, a prisoner (Lloyd Miller) was appealing his conviction for murder. Key evidence securing his conviction was underwear shorts covered with reddish-brown stains. The prosecution said that Miller was wearing the shorts when he committed the murder, and referred repeatedly to bloody shorts, as well as a scientific analysis showing that the stains were blood. The jury even heard expert testimony that the stains were, in fact, blood (Miller at 3-4):
Against this background the jury heard the testimony of a chemist for the State Bureau of Crime Identification. The prosecution established his qualifications as an expert, whose “duties include blood identification, grouping and typing both dry and fresh stains,” and who had “made approximately one thousand blood typing analyses while at the State Bureau.” His crucial testimony was as follows:
“I examined and tested ‘People’s Exhibit 3’ to determine the nature of the staining material upon it. The result of the first test was that this material upon the shorts is blood. I made a second examination which disclosed that the blood is of human origin. I made a further examination which disclosed that the blood is of group ‘A.’”
Now, an “expert” said that, and not just any expert, but an expert who had approximately 1000 blood typing analyses to his credit. Experts wouldn’t lie, would they? We certainly would hope not, especially since false testimony could send an innocent man to his death.
Because we don’t want to believe that anyone would do anything so malicious and for apparently no good reason, we naturally are more likely to believe the “expert” than the “murderer,” and as a result, this evidence was extremely important in securing the conviction against Miller (Miller at 4-5):
The “blood stained shorts” clearly played a vital part in the case for the prosecution. They were an important link in the chain of circumstantial evidence against the petitioner, and, in the context of the revolting crime with which he was charged, their gruesomely emotional impact upon the jury was incalculable.
But then, at a later proceeding, Miller was permitted to have the shorts examined by a different expert, a chemical microanalyst. What was discovered was shocking (Miller at 5):
What the microanalyst found cast an extraordinary new light on People’s Exhibit 3. The reddish-brown stains on the shorts were not blood, but paint. . . . The witness said that he had tested threads from each of the 10 reddish-brown stained areas on the shorts, and that he had found that all of them were encrusted with mineral pigments “. . . which one commonly uses in the preparation of paints.” He found “no traces of human blood.” . . . It was further established that counsel for the prosecution had known at the time of the trial that the shorts were stained with paint. The prosecutor even admitted that the Canton police had prepared a memorandum attempting to explain “how this exhibit contains all the paint on it.”
Needless to say, this discovery of inauthentic evidence completely obliterated the case of the prosecution (Miller at 7; footnotes omitted):
More than 30 years ago this Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot tolerate a state criminal conviction obtained by the knowing use of false evidence. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103. There has been no deviation from that established principle. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264; Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213; cf. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28. There can be no retreat from that principle here.
Once again, at the risk of repeating myself, this is no isolated phenomenon. Readers interested in this area of law are referred to the following articles available at a county law library near you:
Conviction on testimony known to prosecution to be perjured as denial of due process. 2 L ed 2d 1575, 3 L ed 2d 1991.
Conviction of criminal offense without evidence as denial of due process of law. 80 ALR2d 1362.
Suppression of evidence by prosecution in criminal case as vitiating conviction. 33 ALR2d 1421.
Thus, in the legal assumption I have broken out the authenticity requirement separately, when it could be considered to be a subset of either admissible or credible evidence. However, as I stated, this is a special category, because if you can show that the prosecution has admitted into evidence that which he could have reasonably been expected to know was inauthentic evidence, it taints all the other evidence that has been admitted, and with the essential cornerstone of the case removed — a belief that the evidence-gathering authority is itself credible — the entire structure erected by the prosecution must fall.
If the evidence is authentic, we can then move to the other criteria: conclusions must have admissible evidence behind them, and we are not entitled to see conclusions as true without an evidentiary base that satisfies the four criteria discussed in the earlier chapter.
Now that we have
a better understanding of the legal assumptions, let’s move to a discussion of the propositions, and the sources stipulating them.
PROPOSITION ONE
There was one and only one gunman in Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963, and that gunman was neither aided nor abetted by any person or group.
What is the source of the content of this proposition? We have several sources, two official government investigations, and two notable books which are proponents of the Lone Assassin Theory: