by Nigel West
The material to be used in the secret writing letters was found hidden in the two ties found in Liehr’s possession. He was informed that in the event he ran short of such material, he was to speak of such material by the code names of ‘Juan’, ‘Carlos’, or ‘Maria’ in the en clair portion of the letters, and that his comments as to the state of health of these persons would indicate whether he was running short.
During the period of his training Liehr was paid 2,500 escudos per month in payments of l,500 escudos, on the fifteenth, and 1,000 escudos on the last day of each month. He was required to sign a receipt under the name of ‘Icarus’. These payments were usually made by Stubbs, but on some occasions were made by Meier.
In May 1943 Stubbs gave Liehr a telegraphic code which he was to use in commercial cables sent to his ‘cover’ addresses announcing his safe arrival, his experience at the Trinidad Control Point, and additional messages concerning his receipt and use of the radio equipment. He was also given a code as to an announcement of his entry into the telegraphy school. Liehr states that in all of these telegrams, the word ‘Cesundheit’ or ‘Gesundheit vater’ refers to his safety and ‘Stirmung’ to the attitude of the German population toward Germany. The six code phrases to be used in open telegrams are as follows:
(1) ANGEKOMMEN – DATUM – GESUNDHEIT MEINE STUMUNG
(1. Safe arrival) (Experience of Trinidad Control)
(2) POSTEN ARGETRETEH – GESUNDHEIT – STHIIUNG
(Radio equipment received)
(3) BEZAHLUNG – GESUNDHEIT – STINNUNG
(No message received)
(4) URLAUSSBEGINN – GESUNDHEIT – STIMIUNG
(Traffic begins)
(5) URUUB ABGELEHT – GESUNDHEIT – STIMIUNG
(No messages received)
(6) VERLOSUNG VATET NINVERST/JDEN VERLOBUNG VATER NIGHT NIHVERSTANDEN
(I have entered radio telegraph school)
About May 5, 1943 Liehr again went to the Argentine Consul in Lisbon to inquire about the possibilities of obtaining passage on an Argentine ship. Failing to obtain satisfaction, he suggested to Stubbs that he should sail on the Cabo de Buena Esperanza, which he knew from the newspapers was due in Lisbon shortly. Stubbs told him to find out the cost of a third-class ticket and he would refer the matter to his superiors. On inquiry at the Ybarra Company, Liehr was told that the passage would cost 13,000 escudos but that he first must have his passport navicerted by the British Control. He obtained the necessary visas and contacted Stubbs, who gave him the money in 1,000 escudo notes, telling him that he would be allowed $200 expense money on the voyage. When Liehr went to Ybarra, he was told that only first-class passage was available and he accordingly tried to contact Stubbs again but was unable to do so. He left a note at Stubbs’ home and succeeded in meeting him there on the following day, May 19th, whereupon Stubbs said he would again consult his superiors as to whether they would pay the extra 3,000 escudos for a first-class passage.
Liehr offered to pay this amount out of the $200 expense money. Stubbs told Liehr to wait at the apartment until he returned and then left to consult his superiors. He was gone approximately two hours and when he returned he was accompanied by Meier. Liehr received the additional money and was told to leave the tie he was wearing with Meier. He was further instructed to report back at midnight.
After some difficulty with the Ybarra Company, which said he was too late, and a telephone call to the British Control, Liehr confirmed his passage and purchased his ticket. When he returned to Stubbs’ apartment soon after midnight, he was given two ties and the secret writing material by Meier, and the two cover addresses by Stubbs. One of the ties originally belonged to Stubbs.
Stubbs warned Liehr to memorise the cover addresses and other notes which he had taken, as he would otherwise be arrested at Trinidad.
He also told Liehr that they would give him further instructions concerning contacts in Buenos Aires after he had arrived in the Argentine. He would then introduce himself to these persons as ‘Icarus’. Liehr states that he concealed the secret writing materials and papers aboard the vessel a few days before arriving in Trinidad. He denies having been threatened in any way by the Germans with whom he came in contact, nor was he asked to take any oath of service. However, he was told to forget the names of Schmidt, Stubbs, and Meier.
A number of items of personal property were found on the person of Oscar Liehr. Among these was a printed booklet or passenger list for the current voyage of the Cabo de Buena Esperanza, on which the following names were marked:
Juan Pedro Bordelongue
Martin Ponce de Leon
Anastacio Monagorre
Dolores Membrive
At the conclusion of his interrogation by DSO Colonel Henderson, a report was drafted in anticipation of his transfer on 29 August aboard the SS Empire Settler to Liverpool, where he landed on 10 October for delivery to Camp 020. In the voyage he was accompanied by three other Spanish detainees, among them Joaquin Ruiz.
5
FIFTH REPORT,
1 SEPTEMBER 1943
Petrie’s report for the period July and August 1943 began with five spies interdicted through ISOS traffic, a demonstration of the source’s value. Manuel Perez, destined for Buenos Aires, was taken off a Spanish ship in Trinidad, flown to Panama and then transferred on a warship to Camp 020, arriving at the end of August 1943. Joaquin Ruiz had served as a third officer on the same vessel, having been recruited by the Abwehr in March 1942, and he too was detained at Ham for the rest of the war.
Although the French were anxious to run Georges Feyguine as a double-agent, MI5 was not so sure, and ended up by detaining him on the Isle of Man.
After providing the latest news of MUTT, and introducing TRICYCLE, the report concentrates on Gibraltar and describes an example of sabotage, a recent explosion on Coaling Island, and a coordinated attack by Italian divers on British shipping. The former, caused by the detonation of a magnetic limpet mine attached to a naval fuel tank, was the handiwork of a Spanish dockyard labourer, José Martin Muñoz, who had been identified by the Gibraltar Security Police as a potential suspect. Unaware that he had been compromised, Muñoz was arrested at the border the next time he tried to cross into Gibraltar from La Linea. He readily confessed his role, surrendered a second device hidden in a café, and pleaded guilty when charged. He was hanged in Gibraltar by Albert Pierrepoint in January 1944.
FIFTH REPORT (JULY AND AUGUST)
A. SPIES ARRESTED.
(1) PEREZ GARCIA
This secret Spanish Police agent attached to the Spanish Embassy at Buenos Aires was arrested at Trinidad when homeward bound on the Spanish SS Cabo de Hornos early this month. He was travelling on a Spanish diplomatic passport but his name did not appear on any diplomatic list. Perez, though working on behalf of the German Secret Service in the Argentine, has a background connecting him with the Gestapo. He has been denounced by no less than three confessed German agents whom we have in captivity and was the addressee of a note which was discovered sewn into the flies of one of these gentleman’s trousers. There is every reason to believe that we will be able to extract from him a wealth of intelligence concerning German espionage in the Argentine.
(2) RUIZ JOAQUIN
We have known from Most Secret Sources that Joaquin Ruiz, an officer on the Spanish vessel Cabo de Hornos plying between Spain and South America, has been working for the German Secret Service chiefly as a courier. Information was recently received that Ruiz was implicated in a plot to smuggle a wireless transmitter across to South America hidden in one of the saloons on the Cabo de Hornos. A search was made at Trinidad and the transmitter was found. Ruiz was therefore arrested and will shortly be sent to this country for interrogation.
(3) DILLEBAULE de CHAFFAULT, GABRIEL
In November 1942 Most Secret Sources revealed that a Frenchman, Gabriel Dillebaule de Chaffault, was to be sent on a mission as a spy by the German Secret Service to Montevideo. De Chaffault, a rich aristocrat, has
been in German pay since April 1942. He left last week on a Spanish vessel for Uruguay. When the boat called at Gibraltar he was arrested and has since confessed to his connection with the German Secret Service.
(4) FEYGUINE
This one-time fighter pilot in the French Fleet Air Arm came here from Gibraltar in company with a large number of recruits for the French Forces. At our London examination centre he voluntarily confessed that he had been charged with a mission on behalf of the German Secret Service and produced a ‘match’ with which he had been supplied for the purpose of writing his secret reports. In October last year Feyguine, consumed with a desire to fight Bolshevism, joined the Legion Tricolors and was sent to Paris, where he broadcast an appeal for 200 recruits whom he was to lead against the Russians. The project failed to materialise as Feyguine was rejected upon medical examination, but the proposal was then made to him that he should work for the German Secret Service either in England or in North Africa. He asserts that he accepted this offer as it afforded a means of getting to England and he had changed his outlook upon the war, having been disgusted with the behaviour of Deat and Jacques Doriot and other collaborationists.
(5) JANSSENS
On 29 June 1940 a Belgian named Joseph Janssens arrived in this country en route for the Belgian Congo, where he was to collect military, economic and political information. He was early identified as a spy for the German Secret Service whose previous career in Lisbon and in Belgium was well known to us.
Janssens, who had been in the Germans’ service for the past two years was well equipped and well trained for his mission having in his possession secret inks and materials for making them.
B. DOUBLE-CROSS AGENTS.
1) TRICYCLE
TRICYCLE was recruited by the German Secret Service in Yugoslavia before that country was invaded. Since then he has been an active British double-cross agent travelling several times to Lisbon, furthering our deception plans and recruiting for the Germans sub-agents supplied by us.
From August 1941 until October 1942 TRICYCLE was in the United States, where he acted as a wireless agent. He passed through Lisbon on his way to this country, where he managed successfully to remove some doubts that the Germans had had as to his bona fides.
He was sent back by us to Lisbon and it was hoped that through his ingenuity and intelligence he would beguile the Germans into giving their approval to his future plans for luring German agents to this country. It is clear from later developments that these hopes were justified. The Germans believe in TRICYCLE and are providing him with a wireless set to bring back to this country. It is possible that this set may be brought back by TRICYCLE in a faked Yugoslav diplomatic bag which the Germans will fabricate for his.
Among TRICYCLE’s successes has been the carrying through of a plan in August 1941 by which he was given in Lisbon $40,000 in exchange for £20,000 to be paid out in London to anyone the Germans chose to nominate. They in fact nominated the double-cross agent TATE, and this put us in the position of controlling their most convenient channel for paying spies in England.
2) MUTT
On the night of the 27th July, the Germans dropped MUTT another consignment of sabotage equipment, a radio set and £1,000 in £1 notes, just east of the river Ythan in Aberdeenshire. Unfortunately the parachute did not open. The radio set was smashed and some of the sabotage material, again of British make, was broken. As this consignment landed only half a mile from the agreed spot, MUTT has acknowledged receipt of it, reporting the damage which had occurred.
With this material a faked act of sabotage was committed on 7 August 1943 on a small electricity undertaking at Bury St. Edmunds. A violent emission occurred in a disused part of the works, and in another part an unexploded bomb, also part of the equipment dropped to MUTT, was ‘planted’ and duly found. The local police investigated the case, calling in experts from this Department, and came to the conclusion that it was the work of enemy agents. The matter leaked into the Press and the Germans are highly satisfied with the operation, an account of which they have broadcast on their Trans-Ocean Service.
C. SABOTAGE.
1) SUCCESSFUL GERMAN SABOTAGE IN GIBRALTAR
On 30 June 1943 there was a serious fire in the petrol stores on Coaling Island, Gibraltar. The fire was started by a high explosive charge placed against a large fuel tank. The shape of the hole in the tank caused by the explosion makes it almost certain that a bomb of British manufacture was used.
The sabotage organisation responsible for this has among its members a double-cross saboteur run by us. It was thought that if this agent could commit an act of sabotage he might learn the identity of the Coaling Island saboteur while collecting his reward. A faked act of sabotage to another petrol store at Gibraltar was therefore carried out on 7 July 1943. The plan succeeded and the Coaling Island saboteur was identified as a Spaniard who normally works in Gibraltar Dockyard. He has since re-entered the fortress, has been arrested, confessed, and is to be put on trial in the near future.
3) ITALIAN SABOTAGE IN GIBRALTAR BAY
Three Allied ships totaling about 22,000 gross tons were sabotaged on 1 August 1943 in Gibraltar Bay. It was the work of Italians and the Security Service believes that the saboteurs swam out from the Spanish mainland in light self-contained diving suits, attached their bombs to the hulls of the three ships, and returned to Spain. One Italian was captured and is being interrogated.
4) COUNTER-SABOTAGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The head of the Sabotage Section of the Security Service has just returned from a six weeks tour of Gibraltar, Middle East, Persia and Iraq, to investigate the problems of sabotage in those areas. His investigations led to the conclusion that the danger of sabotage was greater than was realised locally, and he was able to make a series of recommendations for counter-measures, all of which have been actively taken up by the local military authorities. The most important and the most vulnerable point is the Oil Refinery at Abadan, where proper precautions are now being taken. His visit has been acknowledged by the GOC Iraq and Iran as ‘most valuable’.
Another officer of the Security Service has now been sent to Gibraltar to study the sabotage situation there. The German Sabotage organisation in Gibraltar has been largely penetrated by our double-cross agents, but it is hoped to get it even more completely under control.
D. GERMANS WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH THE BRITISH COLOMBINE.
This man is an Obersturmführer of the Waffen SS who, following anti-Nazi activities in Poland, escaped from a Gestapo prison into Sweden and thence, with British aid, to England. His story is significant as an indication of the state of affairs among front line soldiers of the German Army on the Eastern front and he has supplied a great deal of valuable military intelligence to the War Office.
Despite early suspicions of a plant, we are now quite satisfied that this man is genuine in his desire to assist the Allied cause. He belongs to an opposition movement within the German Army, which has its representatives in even the elite formations and which has the general aim of preventing the Nazi extremists from dragging what is left of Germany to its final ruin.
The full and detailed story extracted from this young German soldier provides a valuable guide to the balance of forces inside Germany and, in particular, inside the German Army.
E. COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES.
D. F. Springhall, National Organiser of the Communist Party, whose arrest was mentioned in the previous report, was on July 28th found guilty of offences under the Official Secrets Act and sentenced to seven years’ penal servitude. The trial at the Old Bailey was held in camera. Springhall’s accomplice, a civil servant in the Air Ministry named Olive Mary Sheehan, who had already received sentence of three months’ hard labour at Bow Street Police Court, gave evidence for the prosecution.
The Communist Party has denied any knowledge ‘of any activity such as it has been alleged Springhall was engaged in’. Information drawn from Most Secret Sources indicated that the Communist Party leade
rs did not know of Springhall’s espionage activities in any detail, though they did know that he was up to some mischief. The organisation of the underground work of the Party is in the hands of one of the other Party leaders, Robson, and was no part of Springhall’s duties.
It is known, again from Most Secret Sources, that Springhall, at the time of his arrest, asked that news of it should be given to the Soviet Embassy. While no proof can be produced, there are strong indications that Springhall was supplying information to the office of the Soviet Military Attaché.
F. VISIT OF PORT SECURITY OFFICER TO THE USA.
At the request of the Chief of the US Office of Naval Intelligence, the Security Service has sent the head of its Port Control Section to America to give a course of instruction with a view to improving US travel and Port security.
1st September 1943.
* * *
The very first item to be mentioned by Petrie in his report, which was probably not read by Churchill until he returned in mid-September from the QUADRANT conference in Quebec, was that of Manuel Perez. However, he did not go into much detail, even if MI5’s Helenus Milmo described it as a ‘most important case’ and ‘the lynch-pin of the extensive German espionage organisation which operates in the Argentine’. Perez, who had been posted to the embassy in Argentina in December 1940, was separated from his wife and son and arrested when the Cabo de Bueno Esperanza reached Trinidad on a voyage from Buenos Aires to Spain in July 1943. He had been identified by three Spanish inmates of Camp 020 (among them Joaquin Baticon, the Ybarra courier whom he met in September 1941) as their spymaster, and he was flown to Colon, Panama, on a USAAF aircraft, and then delivered to Greenock from Colon, Panama, aboard the armed merchant cruiser HMCS Prince Robert at the end of August.