Now McCarthy focused his efforts on finding a chief counsel. J. Edgar Hoover recommended twenty-five-year-old Roy Marcus Cohn, an assistant U.S. attorney in New York City. Cohn was the only child of Albert Cohn, a respected New York State judge, and Dora Marcus Cohn, from the well-to-do Marcus family. Doted on by his parents, the young Cohn was a prodigy of sorts. He graduated from Columbia College at nineteen and from Columbia Law School a year later. After being admitted to the bar at twenty-one, Cohn used family connections to help him obtain the position of assistant U.S. attorney.
Like Joe, Roy Cohn had a knack for getting publicity. He first attracted notice for his participation in a number of important anti-Communist cases. But it was the prominent role he played in the 1951 espionage trial of Julius Rosenberg and his wife, Ethel, that brought Cohn to the attention of J. Edgar Hoover. The Rosenbergs, both natives of New York City, had met when they joined the Young Communist League in 1936 to support the republican cause in the Spanish Civil War. They married three years later and had two young sons. In March 1951, the Rosenbergs were put on trial, charged with being spies for the Soviet Union. Julius, an electrical engineer, was accused of obtaining atomic secrets from his brother-in-law, David Greenglass, a machinist at Los Alamos where the first bombs were developed, and of passing on the highly classified information to Soviet agents. Ethel was charged with aiding her husband in his spying efforts.
Ethel and Julius Rosenberg during their trial for espionage in New York City in 1951. Note that Julius is handcuffed. AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS
Roy Cohn conducted much of the questioning at the Rosenbergs' trial. His relentless cross-examination of David Greenglass produced the testimony that many said had the most impact on the jury. Its members found Julius and Ethel Rosenberg guilty of all charges on March 29, less than three weeks after their trial began.
Moving swiftly, Judge Irving Kaufman on April 5 sentenced them both to death in the electric chair and went on to explain why he had settled on such a severe penalty. "I consider your crime worse than murder," he said, looking straight at the Rosenbergs. "I believe your conduct in putting into the hands of the Russians the A-bomb years before our best scientists predicted Russia would perfect the bomb has already caused, in my opinion, the Communist aggression in Korea, with the resultant casualties exceeding 50,000, and who knows but that millions more innocent people may pay the price of your treason." Later, Roy Cohn would claim that he had persuaded Judge Kaufman to impose the death penalty on both Rosenbergs.
The case went through several appeals, and the sentence still had not been carried out in December 1952, when Cohn met Joe McCarthy to discuss the job of chief counsel for the senator's committee. The meeting took place during a crowded party for Joe's supporters in his suite at the Hotel Astor in New York City. In a memoir, Cohn recalled his first impression of Joe. "Among the dozens of men and women in formal dress, the senator had removed his jacket, shirt, and tie. He wore tuxedo trousers, patent leather shoes—and suspenders over a T-shirt."
Joe made it clear he was aware of Cohn's background and accomplishments. Cohn thought the senator might be put off by the fact that—though he usually supported Republican candidates—he, Cohn, was a registered Democrat. But that didn't matter to Joe. "I couldn't care less about your politics," he said. "I'm interested only in your ability to do the job."
McCarthy listens to his newly appointed chief counsel, Roy Cohn.
The National Archives
Joe proudly announced the hiring of Roy Cohn as his chief counsel on January 3, 1953, the same day the Senate committee investigating McCarthy issued its report. He was truly impressed with Cohn, whom he often described as "one of the most brilliant young men whom I have ever met." The hiring story overshadowed accounts of the report in many newspapers, as Joe had hoped it would.
G. David Schine (left) with Roy Cohn and Sen. McCarthy at a hearing of McCarthy's subcommittee. The Library of Congress
A month or so later, Cohn persuaded Joe to take on a good friend of his, twenty-six-year-old G. David Schine, as an unpaid "consultant" to the committee. The son of a wealthy entrepreneur who owned a chain of hotels and a string of movie theaters, Schine had attended Harvard College, spent some time in Hollywood, and worked as a press agent in the music business. He had also tried his hand at writing song lyrics. One of his efforts, a mournful ballad that he published himself, was called "Please Say Yes or It's Goodbye."
At some point along the way, David Schine had become interested in ideology and had produced a six-page pamphlet, filled with misspellings and errors of fact, titled Definition of Communism. Schine's father had copies of the pamphlet placed in the rooms of all Schine Hotels, and one of them came to the attention of Roy Cohn. He sought out Schine, and that was the beginning of their friendship.
The two young men couldn't have been more different in appearance. Cohn was five feet eight and dark complected, with black hair that he combed straight back. His heavy-lidded eyes made him look sleepy, but his mind was always active. He spoke quickly, rarely smiled, worked long hours, and usually seemed tense. Schine, on the other hand, was tall, slim, and fair skinned, with short blond hair. Unlike Cohn, he had a relaxed, easygoing manner. Writer Richard Rovere summed him up as "a good-looking young man in the bland style that one used to associate with male big band singers."
Some of Joe's colleagues questioned why he had hired Schine, even as an unpaid consultant. Schine seemed to be a lightweight, with almost no credentials for the job. McCarthy brushed aside their concerns, saying that as long as Schine's appointment made Roy Cohn happy, it was fine with him. Besides, he had more important things on his mind. He wanted his subcommittee to have first choice when it came to future anti-Communist investigations, and that meant a struggle with other powerful Congressional committees that conducted such investigations. Joe assured doubters he was ready for the fight.
18. Cohn and Schine Go to Europe
JOE FAILED TO ANTICIPATE how strongly the other Congressional committees would defend their turf. In the end, he had to work out a compromise with the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee; it would continue to have first crack at anti-Communist investigations but would consult on them and share information with McCarthy's subcommittee. He also agreed to exchange information with the House Un-American Activities Committee so that the two committees would not launch similar probes.
When he was questioned about these arrangements on the TV program Meet the Press, Joe explained that his subcommittee retained the right to look into any examples of Communist subversion that the other two committees failed to explore. When the interviewer suggested that perhaps Joe was being pushed out of the main struggle against Communism, McCarthy bristled. "No one can push me out of anything," he said.
He seemed to prove the point when budgets for the various Senate committees came up for discussion. Joe made such an eloquent plea for funds to finance his planned investigations that his subcommittee received $200,000 to cover the cost of its operations. The Internal Security Subcommittee received only $150,000.
Those sums may not sound particularly large today, but they seemed extravagant to many at the time—especially to some Senate Democrats. Allan J. Ellender of Louisiana, a fiscal conservative, believed the Senate was going "somewhat haywire" on investigations. He had especially harsh words for McCarthy's budget request. "He wants to televise all these hearings," Ellender said. "He is going overboard on this." But Ellender's criticism didn't prevent Joe's subcommittee from getting the full $200,000 that had been appropriated.
Premier Joseph Stalin (left foreground) and President Harry'S. Truman meet for the first and only time at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. Behind Stalin's right shoulder is Charles E. Bohlen, and behind Truman's left shoulder is Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko. The smiling man between Bohlen and Gromyko is unidentified. The Library of Congress
Before the subcommittee could begin its work, Joe's attention was claimed by a decision of President Eisenhower
's that made him furious. The position of ambassador to the Soviet Union was vacant, and the president selected Charles E. Bohlen to fill it. Moderate Republicans and liberal Democrats alike thought Bohlen was an excellent choice. He had worked in the Foreign Service branch of the State Department for twenty-five years, spoke Russian fluently, and was an authority on the Soviet Union.
Joe and other right-wing Republicans saw Bohlen very differently. The experienced diplomat had been a key advisor to President Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference, which ultraconservative Republicans wanted the Eisenhower administration to repudiate. He had also worked closely at the State Department with Dean Acheson, an archvillain in the minds of the same Republicans. His nomination to such a key position seemed to Joe and his fellows like a major betrayal, and they vowed to fight it every step of the way.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee began consideration of the nomination in late February. Charles Bohlen appeared before the committee on March 3. He impressed the members with his frank, thoughtful answers to their probing questions about Yalta and other matters, and he appeared to be headed toward a relatively quick confirmation. But right-wing newspapers ran critical accounts of Bohlen's testimony—accounts that reflected the thinking of Joe and other Republican conservatives.
Further discussion of the nomination was delayed by startling news from Moscow on March 5, 1953. Joseph Stalin, who had ruled the Soviet Union with an iron fist for almost thirty years, had died of heart failure. It wasn't immediately clear who would succeed Stalin, but most observers of the Soviet Union believed that major changes in the way the country was ruled were bound to occur no matter who took power.
Walter Bedell Smith, the undersecretary of state, gave the members of the Foreign Relations Committee a private briefing on the implications of Stalin's death. Smith urged the committee to swiftly confirm Charles Bohlen as ambassador to the Soviet Union. "The sooner we get in there, the better, because there is going to be a very unusual series of developments," Smith predicted. "And Mr. Bohlen, of course, is the best man we have ... to go there and make reports during this critical period."
Joe and his allies didn't see it that way. They viewed the Communist-ruled Soviet Union as an immovable force, totally resistant to change, and Charles Bohlen as a weak-willed liberal who had aided in the "surrender" of Eastern Europe to Stalin at the Yalta Conference. With the help of Scott McLeod at the State Department, Joe and the others claimed they had information that Bohlen had associated with "some bad eggs" in the past. Although the information was based on an anonymous letter and several hearsay reports, it was enough to make the Foreign Relations Committee postpone action on Bohlen's nomination and schedule another hearing.
Secretary of State Dulles thought seriously about withdrawing Bohlen's name from consideration, but President Eisenhower persuaded him to continue resisting the heavy pressure from Joe and other right-wingers. When McCarthy learned of the secretary's decision, he warned Dulles that he was making "a great mistake."
Dulles and Bohlen were both invited to appear before the Foreign Relations Committee on the day of the second hearing. Dulles contacted Bohlen and suggested they not ride in the same car to Capitol Hill. That way there was no chance they could be photographed together. Bohlen later wrote, "His [Dulles's] remark made me wonder if he would have the courage to stand up to the McCarthyites."
In fact, Dulles did much more than stand up for Bohlen. The secretary had read all the FBI information on Bohlen that Scott McLeod had passed along to Joe, and he told the committee that it contained nothing that was seriously damaging: "There is not a whisper of a suggestion that I have been able to turn up throwing any doubt at all about his [Bohlen's] loyalty, or upon his security as a person." Dulles's words were so convincing that the committee members voted unanimously, 15–0, to approve Bohlen's nomination.
Joe was enraged by the committee's action. He said he was sure the president would withdraw his backing for the nominee if he saw "the entire file on Bohlen." Senator Pat McCarran echoed McCarthy and urged that Bohlen's nomination be delayed until every senator had a chance to see "the full and complete file on the nominee."
The Eisenhower administration responded swiftly to these and similar challenges from the Republican right. The president told reporters he "thoroughly approved" of Bohlen's nomination. Secretary of State Dulles held a news conference during which he said he had informed Eisenhower of all the "derogatory material" in Bohlen's file. Senator Charles Tobey, a moderate Republican from New Hampshire, was disgusted by the delaying tactics of Joe and his fellow right-wingers. "The opposition comes from a little group of willful men," Tobey said. "Instead of backing the President, they are trying to block him and put daggers in his back.... These critics are not worthy to unlace Bohlen's shoes."
Joe, Pat McCarran, and others made every effort to block the nomination. But Majority Leader Taft—pressured by the president—overrode their objections and scheduled a debate on the nomination by the full Senate.
Not surprisingly, the debate, which began on March 23, was unusually heated. Joe started things off by suggesting that Bohlen be given a lie-detector test about the material in the FBI files. "I think Mr. Bohlen would agree with me that if the information in the files ... is correct, Moscow is the last place in the world to which he should be sent," McCarthy said.
No one supported the lie-detector idea. Senator Ralph E. Flanders accused Joe of undermining Secretary of State Dulles and President Eisenhower by trying to defeat their nomination of Bohlen. Flanders urged Joe to take a second look at the matter and give the new Republican administration a chance to succeed.
Joe was not about to take orders from Flanders. Stubborn as ever, he said, "I do not care whether a president is a Democrat or a Republican; when he has made a bad nomination I intend to oppose it, on the floor of the Senate or anywhere else!"
The debate remained at an impasse until Majority Leader Taft proposed that a senator from each party read the FBI file on Bohlen and report to the full Senate on their findings. Taft and Senator John J. Sparkman, Democrat of Alabama, were selected for the job, and J. Edgar Hoover assured them that the file summarized all the relevant FBI material on Bohlen. They were also told that they would be reading the same summary that Scott McLeod and Secretary Dulles had seen earlier.
The next day the senators made their report. They echoed Secretary Dulles's statement to the Foreign Relations Committee, saying they had found nothing in the summary to shake their confidence in Bohlen. Taft commented, "There was no suggestion anywhere by anyone reflecting on the loyalty of Mr. Bohlen in any way, or any association by him with Communism, or support of Communism, or even tolerance of Communism."
Joe and his cohorts were still not satisfied. They kept on trying to throw up roadblocks to the nomination, going so far as to suggest that Bohlen was not the president's personal choice. Eisenhower put a stop to that rumor at a news conference on March 26. He stated firmly that Charles Bohlen was the best-qualified man he could find for the job, and said he was deeply concerned about the fate of the nomination.
Some of Eisenhower's close associates urged him to take an even stronger stand and denounce Joe's delaying tactics. But Eisenhower refused, just as he had refused to confront Joe about George Marshall during the election campaign. He told aide Emmett John Hughes, "I just will not—I refuse—to get into the gutter with that guy."
At last Joe and his allies ran out of excuses for delaying a decision on the nomination, and Majority Leader Taft called for a vote. Most Senate Democrats joined forces with moderate Republicans to confirm Bohlen's nomination by an overwhelming margin, 74–13. The vote was a major setback for Joe and the ten other Republicans and two conservative Democrats who had voted against Bohlen. Even some of McCarthy's most loyal supporters criticized Joe's actions during the nomination fight. The Wisconsin State Journal, for example, said, "There are times when Joe McCarthy makes it tough to play on his team."
Joe didn't seem fazed by the
Senate defeat, or the criticism of his behavior. He turned his attention to an investigation his subcommittee had launched while the Bohlen hearings were still going on. The inquiry focused on the Voice of America (VOA), a State Department agency that broadcast information on the United States in more than fifty different languages to listeners all over the world. In announcing the probe, Joe said it would look into possible instances of "kickbacks, mismanagement, and subversion" within the agency's ranks.
McCarthy was by no means alone in investigating suspected subversion in the late winter of 1953. The House Un-American Activities Committee sought evidence of Communist leanings among public school teachers in New York City and returned to Hollywood for a renewed investigation of Communist influence in the movie industry. The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee looked into the loyalty of Americans working for the United Nations in New York, then shifted its focus to charges that Communist sympathizers were active in the public schools of Washington and Boston.
A climate of caution and fear affected the entire country, influencing all aspects of the nation's life from labor unions to cultural institutions. People were afraid that someone would accuse them of saying or doing something that seemed unpatriotic, or worse yet, something that made it sound as if they held left-wing views. If that happened, they might well lose their jobs and find themselves blacklisted in their chosen professions.
The quiet urban campus of Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio, was hundreds of miles from the hurly-burly of the Capitol in Washington, but the investigations taking place in the halls of Congress still had a huge impact on the individuals who taught and studied at the university.
The Rise and Fall of Senator Joe McCarthy Page 16