In the civilisations of antiquity, duty was not merely a concept; it was a principal obligation of the citizen to his nation. Duty was not defined individually but by the spirit of society itself. In ancient Athens, it was the duty9 of every citizen to participate in democracy and other public affairs, and those who did not were branded idiōtai, the origin of our own word ‘idiot’. In ancient Rome, those men who raised traditional families, embodied the Roman spirit of virility, honoured the gods, fought for their country in war and engaged in public political discourse were called pius, from which the English ‘pious’ is derived. Some of the most common words in the English language are derived from the loftiest values of the ancients. Why then should it not be our duty to participate in the affairs of our nation, to defend it in war, to debate ideas openly with others and raise families to participate in it in the future? We owe it to our fellow citizens, and this is precisely why the ancients developed these concepts. They recognised that a functional society could not exist without connexions between their citizens, without a burden of duty placed on everyone. We owe the defence of our nation to our citizens for their security, we owe participation in political discourse to them for the discovery of the truth of what might benefit society in the future and we owe our society children so that our virtuous works might be continued in the future.
A sense of duty between citizens is what breeds general good. We serve the commonwealth of our nation, and therefore mankind, through our actions. The truly virtuous man feels that he is owed nothing by others but owes them his duty to further their causes justly. Duty imbues a certain magnificence to man — he accepts gifts only when others offer but gives the gift of his just and moral behaviour freely out to others. When such men walk the Earth, the race of men is most certainly uplifted. It is one thing to be a virtuous person; it is quite another to feel as though we owed that virtue to our fellow citizens; otherwise, what is the point of common citizenship without a sense of duty towards those who share that privilege with us?
Chapter V
Equality
We have already considered whether or not man is ‘equal’ in an abstract sense; are we born equal; can we achieve equality? Of course no two human beings are the same; some are born physically weak and some strong. How much of this state of inequality in mankind, however, is natural, and how much artificial? Is it virtuous to endeavour to reduce inequality, and indeed, is it even possible for us to do so?
Many thinkers on the left suggest that man, in his original and most primal state, was more equal. Before the modern age, many of the instigators of modern inequality, such as luxury and varied wealth distribution, were not present. Indeed, the early caveman recognised that it was more beneficial for him to hunt in a group rather than on his own, and it was only right for him to share the animal he hunted with those who helped him hunt it. Some of the potentially corrupting influences of civilisation were not present in early men, and so in this sense we might consider them to be more equal. This being said, we cannot say that life for early men was better than for mankind today; they may have been more equal out of necessity, but it was these same early men who chose chieftains from among the strongest and split apart to form nations as their villages became towns; their chiefs established laws and customs between tribes became irrevocably distinct. So perhaps mankind before civilisation was ‘more equal’, but that does not prove that mankind is in fact equal as a whole.
We may also consider the proposition that ‘all government is founded in opinion’. That is to say, citizens only consent to their government’s rule because they believe it to be most beneficial to them. If this opinion were taken away from them, all men would be of equal mind to remove their government. But this could be said about any system, no matter whether good or bad. A good government can be viewed by some as bad, and a bad government viewed by some as good. The nature of society, where men hold differing opinions on account of their natural independence and nuance, dictates that opinions will always be divided as to whether or not government should be improved or maintained, and it will, due to this division of opinion, be impossible to tell which party is right and which wrong. So much for the fundamental equality of interests.
Moral justice poses a harder dilemma entirely. We know that virtue, the improvement of others, is the driving force behind a moral form of political justice. However, if we were to ask someone who disagreed with our methods of implementing political justice, we would likely find that both we and the man we are arguing with agree that we are all seeking moral ends; we merely disagree over what is and is not moral. There is, then, outside the morality which is considered absolute across human civilisation, a moral inequality amongst mankind. We must be wholly convinced that our version of morality is superior, and others’ inferior, if we are to ever have the willpower to seek to implement it within a society. Whilst this does not necessarily mean enforcing morality (indeed, we cannot claim to be virtuous if we enforce something on others — persuasion is a virtue), it does mean that we must have enough confidence in our rational system to seek to build institutions around it.
The institutions of society itself are naturally hierarchical and have developed not out of imposition but by assent. The social contract, as we know, is founded upon assent, and if we see therefore that human beings across history have assented to societal structure and hierarchy, then it must follow that it is a natural inclination of mankind to produce hierarchy as a result of its own inequality. We have come to realise over time that without structure, no decisions can be made to suit society; without dividing roles between separate (and unequal) aptitudes, we cannot ever progress to something better than the status quo.
We are all endowed with reason and the ability to make logical judgements, but we are not all able to exercise it to the same level. This is not necessarily a failing of education (though of course it is possible for young people to be given a poor education), for it is simply the case that since we are all born different to one another, our brains must also be constituted differently from each other’s. We often find ourselves in situations where, when presented with a complex idea, we say to our fellows, ‘I don’t understand’. There are many people, for instance, who excel at mathematics but say ‘I don’t understand philosophy’, whereas there are others who live for philosophy but fail to understand the finer points of mathematics. To say that we are all capable of exactly the same if we taught in a certain way is nothing more than fantasy.
Nations are distinct in their character, history and people. Can we consider them all equal? In the sense that each nation on planet Earth contains human beings, we might suppose that they are, but they differ, and with difference comes divided opinion, and if there is divided opinion as we explored above, then there must be an inequality of opinion. The citizens of one nation might consider themselves better for various reasons than another, but the other nation which they criticize likely thinks exactly the same of them. It is precisely for these reasons that nations were formed, as a result of their unequal states. By laying claim to a territory which can be governed in a certain way in accordance with the customs of a people, they can avoid a large amount of inter-cultural dispute, fragmentation and eventual separation that almost always occur in nations of mixed values. It matters not which country is superior, and which inferior; it only matters that they are unequal, and for this reason they govern themselves separately and prevent those who would seek to destroy that system of government from entering their country by means of borders and defences. When this system breaks down, society itself divides and breaks down in turn.
Man is not, therefore, fundamentally equal. This does not mean that unequal men cannot cooperate in society — we have seen that it is precisely because they are unequal that they choose to cooperate and form societies. Indeed, it is fair to say that without the natural inequality of man, there would be no society, since there would be no reason for men to support one another in the betterment of their race if
every one of them were equal.
Chapter VI
Human Rights
Human rights have a contentious history. What started out as ‘the rights of man’ became a codified document which many countries assented to follow after the Second World War, but to this day the question of its legitimacy is a matter of some debate. The question raised is: do all human beings have certain rights which every one of them deserves, and should these rights be the foundation of every society, no matter what cultural or historical traditions it may be founded upon?
Society is founded upon the concept of justice, that is to say, self-maintenance, and the development of complete liberty through a system of legal constitution and virtuous government. What we describe as our ‘rights’ can be described in two separate categories, however. We are often described as having legal and moral rights. Both of these tend to change over time, and whilst both may overlap, moral and legal rights may not be the same at any given time. It may be the parents’ moral right to raise their children as they see fit, for instance, but the state may legislate to remove that from their legal rights. Legal rights, therefore, can be restricted and can be manipulated to suit the agenda of a government, whether that government is good or bad.
Is it always correct for the law to remain in line with moral rights, though, and are human rights important to force legislators to protect certain moral rights?
Societies and movements which have recognised the value of liberty as a virtuous spirit of government have produced legislation or declarations which lay out fundamental moral rights to which their citizens ought to be entitled. The British Bill of Rights, prefigured by the Magna Carta, and the Rights of Man by Thomas Paine which influenced the American and French Revolutions are examples of such sentiments. Today, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights defines several broad principles; I shall name just a few of the most important here: the Right to Equality, the Right to Freedom from Discrimination, the Right to Life and Liberty, the Right to Freedom from Slavery, and the Right to Freedom from Torture or Degrading Treatment. The foundation of these rights is said to be derived from ‘universal aspects of human behaviour’, and in general they have been approved out of their humanitarian considerations following the wake of the Second World War. However, when ‘rights’ as broad as these are defined, they are left open to very awkward and varied interpretations. We have already reached the opinion in this book that humans are not equal, but they deserve equal treatment in matters of law, for example. Should the Right to Equality refer specifically to the opportunity for liberty, to equality under the law or to the universal physical and moral equality of mankind itself? The last-named is blatantly impossible to achieve; the former two are more realistic and justifiably virtuous. Equally in matters such as Freedom from Discrimination, the terms used are not clear. Is a society not allowed to discriminate against those who would seek to deconstruct its liberty and wear away at the fabric of society? If we follow the principle of universal equality, society would be forced to do this, and indeed in many countries today this is the case; this is not a moral justice, however. Is it not the moral right of every man to live in his own society and be free from the fear of its destruction?
What we seek to define for the purposes of the ‘greater good’ is often contradictory. We might well wish to treat every cultural group with the same respect in the interest of equality, but when we see a different group mutilate the body of a criminal rather than attempt to place him back on the path of virtue, we would be rightfully disgusted and seek to resist such situations in our own society. In modern society, the debate over introducing legal euthanasia is beginning to gain traction, and yet we exalt the Right to Life — why should we allow others to help remove that life? If life is sacred purely for its value as an instrument of virtue, then it should rightly be preserved. In short, it is impossible to treat equally what is not the same.
It would not be correct, on the other hand, to say that the human race proves that it deserves no universal rights at all. We have already discovered that a politically just society is founded on virtue. The selflessness of citizens, the connexion between them which recognises that they exist for society as a whole rather than for an individual tunnel-vision version of life, forms the foundation of a good society. What we should have the right to, then, is not abstract ideas but tangible ones which human nature has genuinely proved to be functional.
The Right to Complete Liberty is perhaps most important, supported by the Right to Equality under the Law, the Right to Representation and the Right to Express Opinion Freely. These are just a few rights which support the continued progress of mankind, and through which citizens may live happily in the pursuance of virtue. Moral rights are those which governments should seek to align legal rights with, since the maintenance of moral rights can only lead to moral societies.
Moral rights are any rights which align with our principles of virtue and thus promote and maintain virtuous activities within a society. We might say, then, that it is a moral right for a child to have an education, but it is the moral right of the parent to guide that education so long as what they choose does not cause harm to the child or educate them in ideas which encourage violence or damage towards society. Equally, it is the moral right of an unborn child, once it has quickened in the womb, to live, for the reason that life is the only instrument of human progress and virtue, and no matter what handicaps may hold human life back, some good is always possible, just as we may still cast light into a dark room by lighting a small candle.
The risk with defining ‘human rights’ comes when in our attempt to define those rights, we become obsessed with the nuances of the terms we use. For instance, in the pursuance of the Right to Equality, as we call it today, we may stray from the maintenance of citizens’ moral rights. Since it is the duty of every country party to the Declaration of Human Rights to encourage such rights to be followed in every country on the planet, if deviations like this are widely propagated, we swiftly descend into a situation where moral rights are attacked across the globe for the sake of pursuing an abstract quality with no real bearing on the true state of human nature. It is therefore much more productive to encourage nations to advocate for moral rights among the citizens, and to ensure that a virtuous society becomes their principal aim, rather than cast a net around the whole of humanity based on a single interpretation of those abstractions and declare that deviations from these human rights deserve punishment. In a tolerant society, we may encourage, but unless harm is done, we may never enforce.
Chapter VII
The Value of Private Opinion
We have already faced the dilemma whereby we have had to find a working definition of virtue and morality, since without one we would be subject to the differing opinions of men. ‘One man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist’, etc. But if we are finding a system which we might subscribe to as the ‘most virtuous’ or ‘correct’ way of running a country, we risk coming across as tyrants ourselves. Every society faces the problem where restricting the opinions of dissenters is tyrannical, but allowing others to be persuaded by their alternative arguments risks the constitution of society being changed. What is the value of private opinion, then? Why should it be permitted, and how can free debate serve the progress of mankind rather than hamper it?
The human race’s intelligence when compared to other species of animal is so remarkable that we have often placed our creation at the level of the actions of a divine being. Whether or not this is the case, we should consider the gift of reason and intelligence a blessing, since no similar power on the same scale can be laid claim to by any creature besides humankind. What is becoming increasingly troubling in modern societies is the tendency towards the belief that opinion cannot vary, and a single way of viewing the world through the eyes of ‘progression’ is acceptable. We have already found that all political society is founded on the principle of the progression of humankind — even a conservative society, wh
ich believes that its progression is best found in established traditions. The distinction between ‘progressive’ and ‘non-progressive’ politics is therefore an artificial one, since political society is by its very nature progressive in accordance with human nature. Opinion merely differs on the means of obtaining the most effective and useful progression possible. It is dangerous to assume that just because a certain set of opinions are removed from one’s own that there is no truth in them. There is even in the most outwardly repulsive and seemingly useless opinions some grain of truth, or some personal meaning which is worth hearing, or else a fellow intelligent being would not hold them. It is therefore important to analyse every opinion that we can get hold of if we are to seek political justice, since society cannot operate without the opinions of its citizens to shape it.
‘Progressive’ politics, as we wrongfully call it, is something more akin to the politics of revolution, since it assumes that certain policies are necessary in order to ‘liberate’ certain sections of society from an oppressor. What this sort of politics does highlight is the downtrodden nature of several different groups of society. Often, attention is drawn to the poorest, and this should concern any society. As we have learnt earlier in our discussion, virtuous citizens have a duty to petition their government, and government has a duty to ensure that the opportunity for the enjoyment of liberty is offered to every individual in society in order to aid the makeup of the whole. We can find common ground in debates such as these, and whilst the radical may believe in liberating the poor by means of destroying the wealth of the rich (as both Godwin and Marx suggest), even if we disagree, we cannot deny the truth in some of what the radical says. The fact that the radical wants to enforce a certain solution on society which involves redistribution of wealth is a difference in opinion where the radical considers his position more virtuous than that of his opponents. If we follow the system of ethics that we have already established, and therefore oppose the proposition of this radical, then what engagement with him in debate proves to us is the existential threat to the completely libertarian society that we seek to defend.
Political Justice Page 7