The first precautionary step by the British Admiralty was to release the eight destroyers from their guard duty in Vestfjord, where they were to have remained for 48 hours and to order them at 0945 hours to join Admiral Whitworth. It is claimed that Whitworth was not made aware of the orders to the destroyers until 1045 hours and he was given no reason for the Admiralty’s interference in fleet operations. While this may be true, it is strange that the order to the destroyers was not overheard by the radio operators on Renown and reported to the admiral. I believe the destroyers and Whitworth were notified at the same time and that the one-hour discrepancy in time is due to some authors working on Norwegian local time while others used Greenwich Mean Time. At 1115 hours, the Admiralty also passed on to Admiral Whitworth their newfound concerns that the Germans might actually be heading to Narvik.
Most British sources report that Whitworth received the Admiralty message ordering the destroyers to join him while he was still on a southbound track and that this is what caused him to head north.16 The official Norwegian naval history reports that Whitworth turned north because he realized he would arrive too late to assist Glowworm, and that he received the message from the Admiralty after he had already turned back north. However, Whitworth’s mission was not to assist Glowworm since she was presumed lost, but to intercept and destroy the force that Glowworm had engaged. It makes more sense, therefore, that Whitworth turned north after the Admiralty’s orders, in other words after 1115 GMT but probably closer to 1300 hours. Whitworth may have continued south after the Admiralty message at 1115 hours in the hope of intercepting any northbound German forces. At some point in the next two hours, he must have decided to turn around and link up with the destroyers from Vestfjord. The reduced visibility may have convinced him that he ran the risk of the Germans slipping past him and engaging the destroyers at the entrance to Vestfjord, which would have been a very unequal match.
Admiral Whitworth’s decision to turn north may have been fortunate. Had Renown and Greyhound continued on their southward track they may well have encountered Admiral Lütjens who was heading north towards the entrance to Vestfjord at 24 knots. On opposite tracks, the two forces may have been less than one hour apart (about 50 miles) when Whitworth turned north. An encounter between Renown with its lone destroyer and two German battleships and ten destroyers could have been catastrophic for the British fleet.
The Admiralty’s meddling in operational affairs had other unfortunate results. If the eight British destroyers had remained in the vicinity of the minefield as originally planned, they would probably have encountered the ten German destroyers loaded with troops, now separated from the battleships and almost out of fuel, on their way to Narvik. Whatever the outcome of such an encounter, it would have adversely affected TF 1’s mission.
It made good sense for the British to concentrate their forces in view of reports of heavy German surface units at sea. The location of that concentration and Admiral Whitworth’s decision after linking up with the destroyers had unfortunate results. The Admiralty now viewed Whitworth’s primary mission as preventing the Germans from reaching Narvik. It also appears that this view was transmitted to the admiral.
According to the Norwegian naval history, Admiral Whitworth linked up with the destroyers 20 nautical miles west of Skomvær Lighthouse at 1715 hours, two hours and 45 minutes before Admiral Lütjens detached the destroyers of TF 1 for their run up the Vestfjord to Narvik. The British literature is imprecise as to the location of the rendezvous point. Harvey and MacIntyre place it at or near the Skomvær Lighthouse, Moulton fails to mention the location, and Dickens writes that it was 23 miles south of the lighthouse. Whatever the exact location, the important point is that it was not the best place to intercept the Germans if they were heading for Narvik. The logical place to concentrate to prevent the Germans from reaching that city would have been at the entrance to Vestfjord, northwest of the British minefield. This would also have brought the British ships into a position somewhat in lee of the Lofoten Islands and the later problems with the weather would have been diminished.
The gate to Narvik was left wide open when Whitworth took his ships, as soon as they were assembled, on a westerly course away from the Norwegian coast. What led the admiral to make this perplexing move in view of the information passed to him earlier that the Admiralty had concluded that the Germans might well be heading for Narvik?
It is true, as some defenders of Admiral Whitworth have pointed out, that his instructions were either lacking or vague. However, the most damaging enemy course of action would be an attack on Narvik and the Admiralty had strongly alluded to this possibility. The approach to Narvik from the south was through Vestfjord, which is why the mines were laid there. The defenders also point out that the admiral was bombarded by a mass of irrelevant incoming messages as he headed north, that the required intense and critical evaluation of the situation was inhibited by increasingly rough weather, and finally that he was placed in a position where he was forced to second-guess the desires of his superiors.
These explanations are less than convincing, except that Whitworth may have given his superiors’ well-known fears of a German breakout into the Atlantic more consideration than it warranted. The earlier aerial reconnaissance reports about German ships on a west-northwest course off Trondheim may have caused him to think, as it did Admiral Forbes, that the German intention was to break into the Atlantic. However, by comparing the reconnaissance report from 1400 hours with the report of the bombers from 1330 hours on the previous day, it should have been apparent that something was wrong. The report from 1400 hours reported five ships while the report from the previous day had reported thirteen ships. In any case, Whitworth ordered his ships to look for the British west of the Lofoten Islands.
Admiral Whitworth listed the possible enemy courses of action after the encounter with Glowworm as follows: 1) return to Germany, 2) head for Iceland, 3) make for Murmansk, or 4) attack Narvik. It is difficult to understand why he placed the possibility that the Germans were heading for Iceland ahead of an attack on Narvik. The likelihood that the Germans were heading for Murmansk also did not make sense. Why would the Germans risk their ships in a dash for Murmansk, and for what purpose? The British should also have realized that, without refueling, both these destinations were beyond the range of the destroyers in the German force. Whitworth placed the possibility of an attack on Narvik last, notwithstanding intelligence to the contrary and despite the obvious fact that this was the enemy course of action most damaging to British interests. At the entrance to Vestfjord, Whitworth’s battle cruiser and nine destroyers would have been in an ideal position to bring on a major naval engagement and probably thwart the German attack on Narvik. In retrospect, positioning himself near the British minefield would have led to a German disaster since the battleships had separated from TF 1 and headed into the open sea. Instead, Whitworth apparently planned to be in a position to meet the Germans if they should attempt to pass northward, outside the Lofoten Islands. This fateful decision opened the gate to Narvik just as Admiral Forbes’ decision to alter course to the north and then north-northwest opened the gate to Trondheim.
At 1752 hours, shortly after Admiral Whitworth began to head away from the Norwegian coast and into the Norwegian Sea, he received a cautionary message from the Admiralty. It stated that since the aircraft that had sighted the Germans ships west of Trondheim had only spotted part of the enemy force, it was possible that the rest were still headed towards Narvik. Other than noting that the missing ships were two cruisers and 12 destroyers, Whitworth took no action.
The officials in London now had a clearer appreciation of German intentions than did Admiral Whitworth. At this time, the German destroyers were still about three hours from the entrance to Vestfjord, and so about two hours from separating from the battleships. Every minute counted. This was the proper time for the Admiralty to intercede and at 1850 hours a message was sent to Whitworth that should have left no doubt in
his mind as to the appropriate action to take: “To Vice-Admiral Commanding Battlecruisers, repeat to Commander-in-Chief. Most immediate. The force under your orders is to concentrate on preventing any German force proceeding to Narvik. May enter territorial waters as necessary.”17 Admiral Whitworth received the message by 1915 hours. There was no doubt that the message was an order. The words “is to concentrate” should have left no doubt.
Admiral Whitworth did not immediately take the action necessary to carry out the Admiralty order but continued on his westward course. At 2014 hours, he signaled his force: “Our object is to prevent German forces reaching Narvik. My present intention is to alter course at 2100 to 280 degrees (to north-northwest), and to turn 180 degrees to starboard (east-southeast) in succession at midnight.” These course changes left the British fleet steering away from the Norwegian coast for almost five hours after receipt of the Admiralty order.
The weather was now dictating Admiral Whitworth’s course of action. The conditions had deteriorated to a point never experienced by some of the seasoned sailors aboard the British ships. During the night the wind reached Force 11 on the Beaufort scale, a speed of 64 to 72 miles per hour, with towering 50-foot waves. The destroyers became almost unmanageable in the heavy seas and Whitworth felt it necessary to keep his fleet together and steer a course that would avoid sea damage to his ships. His explanation is as follows:18
On receipt of this signal (Admiralty 1850 hours message) I calculated that the enemy had had ample time to reach my vicinity if they were proceeding direct to Narvik. Assuming that they had not yet passed me I decided to proceed up Vestfjord with the object of placing myself between the enemy and his objective. There were two objections to this course of action. One was the possibility of being brought to action by a superior force (four of my destroyers had no torpedoes and only two guns).19 The other was the navigational danger of approaching a dangerous coast in low visibility without having been able to fix the ship’s position for three days.
The weather at this time showed signs of improving and I decided to disregard both these objections. But the improvement proved to be only a lull and it came on to blow with great force from the northwest, accompanied by rain and snow squalls with prolonged periods of bad visibility. This sudden deterioration in the weather decided me to change my plans, because I felt that the enemy would make little progress and not try to make Vestfjord during the dark, and would probably stand to seaward during the dark hours, so I decided to do the same.
A few observations regarding this appraisal are in order. The British ships had been on a westerly course for about two hours when Admiral Whitworth received the Admiralty order. The Norwegian lighthouses were not extinguished until after 2200 hours, and the order only pertained to those located south of Bergen. Skomvær Lighthouse sends out a powerful beam that should have been visible from the Renown in periods between squalls, and from the destroyers, which passed near the lighthouse to arrive at their rendezvous point. This should have given the British ships a sufficiently accurate fix on their position that positioning themselves at the over 30-mile-wide entrance to the fjord should not have presented an unacceptable navigational hazard. Furthermore, the destroyers obviously had a good fix on their position since they gave the Norwegians an accurate geographic diagram of the minefield they had laid.
Whitworth completely misjudged his opponents and overestimated the difficulties he faced. His reasoning that the Germans would not enter Vestfjord in poor visibility and in a violent storm was dead wrong. The German Naval Staff’s operational order emphasized that the operation was to be carried out despite navigational problems or bad weather. Captain Bonte displayed both skill and determination as he led his destroyers into the dark and dangerous fjord. Admiral Raeder’s proclamation, provided to every naval officer after departure from German harbors, reads:20 “Surprise, speed and quick action are the necessary prerequisites for operational success. I expect all task force commanders and all ship captains to be imbued with an unbreakable will to reach their assigned harbors despite all difficulties that may develop …”
It is doubtful that the British could have intercepted the German fleet before TF 1 was detached for its run up Vestfjord at around 2000 hours, even if Admiral Whitworth had implemented his order immediately upon receipt. After separating from TF 1, the German battleships were on a parallel track with Whitworth’s force, off the British port quarter, possibly 30 miles apart. If Whitworth had turned around, he may have encountered the battleships. The German ships had radar and this gave them a significant advantage in the near zero visibility that prevailed that night.
Admiral Lütjens’ orders, after detaching TF 1, were to draw any major British surface units away from the Norwegian coast but at the same time, he was instructed to avoid a decisive engagement. A British defeat would have been a serious blow to the Allies and would have left the German Navy in control of the northern waters for more than 24 hours, sufficient time for the destroyers in Narvik to refuel, if the tankers showed up, and start their return voyage to Germany.
Admiral Whitworth was notified about 2130 hours that the battle cruiser Repulse and its accompanying ships were on their way to join him. He reported his position to this force at 2200 hours as being 67° 09´ North, 10° 10´ East on a course of 310°. This shows that he was 40 nautical miles further out to sea than he had been at 1715 hours.
The weather in the Norwegian Sea improved somewhat during the night, and Admiral Whitworth finally turned east towards the Norwegian coast at 0240 hours on April 9, almost seven hours after receipt of the Admiralty order. Before long, Whitworth’s force found itself in battle with the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.
Battleship Action
Admiral Lütjens detached TF 1 at 2000 hours and started his planned diversion to the north and west. Western Group Command informed him at 2133 hours that two British warships of the Renown class were at sea and that an enemy cruiser and destroyer had been sighted in Vestfjord. He later received several reports about enemy naval forces, one that placed a British force very close to his own position.
Mountainous seas confronted Lütjens’ ships as they started their diversionary run on a course of 290°, and speed was reduced to 7 knots although it was later increased to 12 knots. The German battleships were about 80 nautical miles west-south-west of the Lofoten Islands at 0400 hours on April 9 when they made radar contact with an enemy force 18,500 meters to their west, 280° from their position. Soon, they observed a large enemy warship and the German ships altered their course to north.
On their way to the Vestfjord, the British were actually the first to sight the enemy when their lookout spotted two ships between themselves and the coast at 0337 hours. The early British sighting was probably because the German ships were silhouetted against the dawning eastern horizon. Whitworth reported to the Admiralty that a ship of the Scharnhorst class and a cruiser of the Hipper class confronted him. This left the Admiralty and Forbes guessing as to the location of the other German battleship they knew was at sea.
Whitworth continued on his southeastern course until 0359 hours, and then changed his course to 305° before opening fire with his main armament against Gneisenau and the secondary armament against Scharnhorst. The range was 17,000 meters and the time was 0408 hours. The Germans returned fire three minutes later. The British destroyers also opened fire with their 5-inch guns but they began to fall behind in the heavy sea. Renown also reduced speed in order to use her forward guns. Lütjens had orders to avoid decisive combat if possible and this was apparently the reason he changed course away from the British. In doing so, he placed his ships in a position where they could only use their aft guns.21
Whitworth changed course to northeast at 0418 hours. The German ships were now off his starboard bow and the distance had decreased to 15,000 meters. A 15-inch shell hit the Gneisenau, destroyed her forward fire control system, and made her main armament temporarily inoperable. Gneisenau sustained two more hits. One damaged t
he door to her forward turret and this caused the seas that were sweeping over the forward portions of the battleship to flood the turret, resulting in severe electrical damage. Three 11-inch projectiles also hit Renown but the damage was not serious. Scharnhorst was not hit and was able to assist Gneisenau by crossing behind her and laying smoke. The German battleships increased speed to 28 knots and Renown started falling behind. Frequent snow squalls also reduced the visibility. Renown increased her speed to 29 knots for a few minutes but after some ineffective salvos by both sides, the Germans disappeared from sight at 0615 hours. Whitworth thereupon detached the destroyers to guard the entrance to Vestfjord. Repulse and her accompanying ships, still more than seven hours away, were given the same mission.
Renown continued on a northwesterly course in the hope of reestablishing contact with the German ships in case they turned south. At 0900 hours, Admiral Whitworth received orders from the Admiralty to undertake operations to prevent German landings in Narvik and he thereupon concentrated all his forces on this mission. The southern approach to Narvik was finally closed, but long after the Germans had sailed through and attacked that city.
Admiral Lütjens has been criticized for lack of aggressiveness in not turning his battleships around and destroying his adversary. This criticism is unfair. His mission, after detaching TF 1, was to draw main surface units of the British fleet away from the Norwegian coast and the landing areas. Lütjens looked upon the engagement with Renown (the Germans identified their opponents as two or three large ships) as proof that he had successfully carried out his mission. His further orders were to avoid enemy contact and bring his ships back to Germany. It was possible for Lütjens to score a spectacular victory if he had turned on his opponent and approached him from different directions thereby dividing the enemy fire, but this was by no means certain. The British destroyers would have joined such an engagement and they presented a serious torpedo threat. Admiral Raeder, in his report to Hitler on April 13, fully endorsed Lütjens’ conduct:22
Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Page 15