At 2000 hours, District Command gave Fleischer the British warning that German naval forces were on their way to Narvik and could be there as early as 2200 hours. The 3rd Naval District had received it by telephone from the naval staff at 1925 hours and, according to the naval history, forwarded it promptly to the District Command. Captain Løken claims that the report from the 3rd Naval District was received at 2000 hours and a similar report from the General Staff arrived five minutes later.
Captain Løken also sent this report to Sundlo and asked what the colonel intended to do with respect to the defense of Narvik. Løken hinted that it might be a good idea to move the remainder of the 1/13th Inf into that city. Løken must have known that defense plans did not call for the move of the whole battalion to the south side of Ofotfjord. Colonel Sundlo answered that he still held the view that Narvik could not be defended by rifles against a naval force. Heavy guns were needed. Therefore, he did not plan to move the battalion to Narvik where it would be of no use.13
However, Colonel Sundlo did order Major Sverre Spjeldnæs, the commander of the 1/13th Inf, to send the machinegun company (Co 4) and the mortar platoon to Narvik. He also alerted Co 2, ordered that unit to send machinegun crews to the two bunkers, and directed its commander, Captain Langlo, to station an officer or senior NCO at each bunker. On his own initiative, Sundlo increased the strength of the guard detail at Nordal Bridge from 10 to 32 troops. This was done around 1800 hours, before the conversation with Captain Løken.
Lindbäck-Larsen’s version is different. He writes that General Fleischer ordered the movement of the 1/13th Inf from Elvegårdsmoen to Narvik after the news he received at 2000 hours and that the above statement by Colonel Sundlo was made when the District Command forwarded that order. Under this version, Sundlo’s statement was tantamount to a refusal to obey an order. Lindbäck-Larsen’s version is suspect and must be viewed in the context of what he writes in the same report:
It was the division’s wish to provoke a disobedience, which would make the removal of Colonel Sundlo from his command justifiable since the division viewed him as not being up to the demands that the current situation would require. The division order was also given the colonel in the most ostentatious way by Colonel Mjelde …14
Lindbäck-Larsen’s version of events and a distorted interpretation of Colonel Sundlo’s reaction to a later directive about firing on Germans but not on the British, led—according to Fleischer’s chief of staff—to a decision to remove the colonel from his command.
District Command passed Colonel Sundlo’s views on bringing additional infantry to Narvik to General Fleischer. On receipt of this information, Fleischer ordered Sundlo, via the District Command, to move the battalion immediately from Elvegårdsmoen to Narvik. If possible, the machineguns and their crews were to move within one hour. This order was issued at 2050 hours. Sundlo had already directed the machinegun company and the mortar platoon to Narvik. Prior to this order, the war plans did not give him authority to move the whole battalion into Narvik, even if he wished to do so, since that would leave Elvegårdsmoen defenseless. Sundlo told Colonel Mjelde, who had conveyed Fleischer’s order, that it was impossible to move the two machinegun platoons to Narvik in one hour. Colonel Mjelde answered that it was an order and as such had to be carried out as quickly as possible, if not feasible in one hour. Sundlo stated that he would comply.
At the same time as he ordered the battalion into Narvik, the division commander, again through Colonel Mjelde, asked for confirmation that Colonel Sundlo understood that his mission to defend Narvik was absolute. If Sundlo did not understand his mission clearly, General Fleischer requested that he state so immediately.15
It appears that General Fleischer used Colonel Mjelde as an intermediary in dealing with Colonel Sundlo. Fleischer’s lack of direct contact with his subordinates during the most critical phase of Norway’s modern history came up during Sundlo’s trial in 1947. Lindbäck-Larsen explained that Fleischer was reluctant to deal directly with subordinate commanders when he was away from his headquarters and that this had become a “principle.” As a result, the District Command functioned as a relay. It forwarded reports to the division commander and orders from the division to subordinate units. It is difficult to see any valid purpose in such an arrangement as long as the general and his chief of staff had means of communications at their disposal. Except for the afternoon of April 8, Fleischer could communicate directly with his subordinates as easily as he did with Mjelde. There appears to have been no direct contact between the general or his chief of staff and his two principal subordinates in the Troms/Ofoten region, Løken and Sundlo, before Narvik was captured.
At about 2050 hours and again through District Command, General Fleischer directed Colonel Løken to “Prepare the 2nd Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, including necessary trains, for transport by motor vehicles to the Narvik area. Orders for execution to follow.”16 This appears to be a repeat of directions Lindbäck-Larsen allegedly gave earlier that afternoon. Both Lindbäck-Larsen and Sandvik state that the move was to take place on April 9.
The District Command forwarded another order from General Fleischer at 2055 hours. This one directed the commander of the 3rd Artillery Bn, Lieutenant Colonel Hornslien, to move the motorized field artillery battery in Målselv to Øyjord that night, if possible. An advanced party was to leave for Øyjord at once. Colonel Sundlo was ordered to provide a work-detail to clear snow at the battery position. This work-detail came from Sundlo’s resources in Narvik and proceeded to Øyjord before midnight. The battery of four 75mm guns was created specifically to provide artillery support for the troops in Narvik. The explanation for locating the battery in Målselv, more than 50 miles from its designated wartime position, is that it was a better location for training and maneuvers.
At around 2100 hours, Colonel Sundlo ordered Major Spjeldnæs to move the rest of his battalion to Narvik as quickly as possible and gave him a brief account of what was happening. The colonel also called a hurried staff meeting at his headquarters. He gave the staff a quick orientation on the situation, as he knew it, and ordered the preparations required to receive the battalion. This meeting took place between 2100 and 2130 hours.
Sundlo did not ask the commander of Co 2, Captain Langlo, to attend the meeting since that company was placed on full alert around 2000 hours and he felt that under these circumstances the commander’s place was with his unit. The company executive officer, Captain Dalsve, attended the meeting and he was expected to brief Langlo. Some of Langlo’s later statements to his subordinates indicate that he did not understand the situation.17 The commanders of the engineer company, the railcar-mounted 75mm gun detachment, and the supply organization were not present at the meeting and Colonel Sundlo neglected to inform them about the events that were taking place. In addition, the chief of police and other civilian authorities were not notified.
Sundlo briefed Lieutenant Munthe-Kaas, the acting commander of the antiaircraft battery, about 2150 hours. He ordered Munthe-Kaas to insure that the guns were manned. The lieutenant pointed out that the battery did not have searchlights and it was impossible to pick out targets in the dark without them. Munthe-Kaas recommended that the personnel under his command be allowed to rest until morning and occupy the gun positions at first light. Sundlo agreed, provided that a skeleton crew was maintained at the battery during the night.18 This detail was given to a sergeant and ten men.
The battery’s primary mission was to engage enemy aircraft and the guns were therefore located on the high ground at Framnes. From that location, they could fire on targets in the fjord but not on targets in the harbor.
It took some time to move the battalion from Elvegårdsmoen to Narvik at night in a snowstorm. The ferry moved from Vassvik to Øyjord where it was ready to start loading at midnight. The distance from Elvegårdsmoen to Øyjord is 13 kilometers and the distance across the fjord is less than 5 kilometers. The ferry had to make several trips to bring the battalion to Vas
svik and the turnaround time was about one hour. The battalion started its move from Elvegårdsmoen around midnight. It brought along the battle and kitchen trains. The pack train and trucks were left behind. Company 4 with two platoons (one platoon was already in Narvik) and the battalion commander with a small staff traveled to Øyjord by motor vehicles and made the first trip across the fjord. These troops arrived in Narvik between 0130 and 0200 hours. The second ferry carried Co 3 and part of the trains. The ferry captain refused to load the horses because of heavy seas in the fjord. Consequently, the sleds for the trains were loaded manually and unloaded in Vassvik in the same manner. Company 3 arrived in Narvik about 0300 hours. The ferry brought Co 1 to Vassvik on its third trip. The company had to wait in Øyjord for over one hour and arrived in Vassvik about 0445 hours.
In Sundlo’s staff meeting at 2100 hours it was decided not to move the arriving units into defense positions immediately. Sundlo directed that the troops take up quarters in various locations in town to rest up and dry out from their rigorous travels. The troops were told to remain in battle gear and be prepared to move out on short notice. Officers were directed to remain with their units.
In view of what was known at the time, this was a logical decision. First, the only threat warning against Narvik came from the British and the Norwegian military authorities in Oslo passed it to General Fleischer and Captain Askim with the observation that it was not believable. Even Fleischer and his chief of staff concluded that the British report must have been false, since the authorities in Oslo did not order mobilization. They both expected a quiet night when they went to sleep. Second, Sundlo, the District Command and the 3rd Naval District believed that the two coastal defense ships had left the harbor to take up their planned positions at the Ofotfjord entrance. The distance from the early-warning patrol line at the Ofotfjord entrance to Narvik was approximately 60 kilometers (37 miles) and enemy warships, even if they traveled at maximum speed, would need more than one hour to reach the town. Even if he had known that the coastal defense ships had not taken up positions at the Ofotfjord entrance, it was reasonable for Sundlo to assume that the early-warning patrol vessels, with radios, would provide sufficient warning of an enemy approach to allow the troops in the city to take up defensive positions.
The decision not to deploy the forces immediately was sensible for yet another reason, although there is no evidence that it was an important factor in Sundlo’s mind. The Norwegian forces were inadequate to defend a relatively long stretch of shoreline. It would be wise to keep relatively large reserves until the enemy’s landing site was identified. If Sundlo deployed the forces as they arrived, he ran the risk of having only a small portion of his force covering the actual landing site and few, if any, reserves at his disposal. By retaining a sizable reserve and quickly moving it to the threatened location, it was possible for the Norwegians to muster sufficient combat power to frustrate an attacker.
Colonel Sundlo briefed Major Spjeldnæs when he arrived in Narvik. Apparently, both Major Spjeldnæs and Major Omdal, who was also present at the briefing, considered the decisions taken by Colonel Sundlo reasonable. At least they did not register any objections.19
Sundlo expected a mobilization order and he remained near a telephone in his headquarters all night. District Command had not informed him about the message it received from the General Staff at 2125 hours stating that a decision on mobilization would not be taken until the following morning. Sundlo was beginning to suspect that the warships approaching Bergen and Trondheim were the same ships that the report received at 2000 hours claimed were on their way to Narvik. Starting around 0300 hours, he tried to contact District Command by telephone but was unable to get through. Captain Dalsve, who was present, testified that the District Command had still not answered when he left the regimental headquarters at 0330 hours.
GERMAN ATTACK ON NARVIK
“Act with the greatest decisiveness in your approach to the designated debarkation harbors and do not permit signals to stop or other actions by military authorities, patrol vessels, or fortresses to keep you from reaching your objectives.”
ADMIRAL RAEDER’S INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS COMMANDERS FOR THE PROSECUTION OF OPERATION WESERÜBUNG
The German Attack Force
Task Force 1 was approaching Narvik at high speed in the early morning hours of April 9, 1940. It consisted of three destroyer flotillas commanded by Captain Friedrich Bonte.1
The 1st Destroyer Flotilla, commanded by Commander Fritz Berger, consisted of two ships, Wilhelm Heidkamp and Georg Thiele. Berger was aboard Georg Thiele while the navy and army component commanders were aboard Wilhelm Heidkamp.
The 3rd Destroyer Flotilla, commanded by Commander Hans-Joachim Gadow, consisted of four ships: Hans Lüdemann, Hermann Künne, Diether von Roeder, and Anton Schmitt. Commander Gadow was aboard Hans Lüdemann.
The 4th Destroyer Flotilla, under Commander Erich Bey, also consisted of four ships: Wolfgang Zenker, Bernd von Arnim, Erich Giese, and Erich Koellner. Bey was aboard Wolfgang Zenker.
The German destroyers were modern warships, launched between 1935 and 1938. The destroyers Wilhelm Heidkamp, Hans Lüdemann, Hermann Künne, Diether von Roeder, and Anton Schmitt had a displacement of 2,411 tons. Their armament consisted of five 5-inch guns, four 37mm antiaircraft guns, and eight 21-inch torpedo tubes. They could reach a maximum speed of 38 knots and each had a crew of 315 men. The other five destroyers were somewhat smaller, with a displacement of 2,270 tons; however, they had the same armament, speed and crew as their larger brothers. There were about 3,150 naval personnel in Task Force 1.
The army component of TF 1 consisted of three battalions of the reinforced 139th Mountain Regiment of the 3rd Mountain Division.2 The troops were for the most part Austrian. Colonel Alois Windisch was the regimental commander.3 There were also advanced elements of the 3rd Mountain Division staff, a company of naval artillery, and intelligence and signal elements. Total strength was approximately 2,000 and the troops were divided equally among the 10 destroyers. Major General Dietl assumed command during and after the landing.
General Dietl
Eduard Wolrath Christian Dietl was born on July 21, 1890 in Oberbayern. He came from a middle class family of artisans and soldiers. Dietl’s favorite hobbies were skiing and mountain climbing. He won numerous national and international sport awards and was captain of the German ski team at the 1936 Winter Olympics.
Dietl chose a military career, but his un-soldierly appearance kept him from being accepted in an infantry regiment from Bamberg. His second try resulted in an appointment, on October 1, 1909, in the 5th Bavarian Inf Regt. Dietl attended the Munich Military Academy and was commissioned a Lieutenant on October 26, 1911.
He began his service in World War I as a machinegun company commander. The courage and daring for which he became famous was quickly tested in the heavy fighting in Lorraine where he became the first German soldier in the war to receive the Iron Cross, 2nd Class. A couple of days later he was wounded and his two brothers killed. Dietl served as a company commander during the whole war, participated in the battles of Somme, Arras, and Flanders, and was wounded three times. The end of the war found him in a military hospital.
Dietl became a company commander in Freikorps Epp after the war and participated in the fighting against the communists. Later, he entered the Reichswehr and was assigned as company commander in the 3/19th Bavarian Inf. It was at this time that he became acquainted with Hitler. He and his company stood ready to support Hitler and his followers during the Beer Hall Putsch on November 9, 1923, but they were not called on to act. Subsequently, Dietl became an instructor in tactics at the Munich Infantry School and on October 1, 1928, he assumed command of the 3/19th Bavarian Inf. Dietl rose rapidly in rank. He was promoted to major on February 1, 1930, to lieutenant colonel on January 1, 1933, and to colonel exactly two years later. At the same time as he was promoted to colonel, he assumed command of the 99th Mountain Regiment in Füssen. Following the occupa
tion of Austria, he was promoted to major general and assumed command of the 3rd Mountain Division. The division operated in the Carpathian Mountains during the Polish Campaign.
Dietl had some familiarity with Norway since he had undergone winter training in that country. He was in Norway for a two-month period in 1930 and 1931, attending the Infantry Winter School at Terningmoen in eastern Norway.
Dietl was respected and beloved by his soldiers. The loyalty and respect worked both ways as is illustrated by his concept of leadership:
Soldiers must be led by the heart. Only then are they committed … He who has the soldier’s heart can defy the devil in hell … Leadership calls for two separate things. The first is definitely, live with the man. Wish to have nothing but what he has. Go with him, listen to him, understand him, and help him in tough places. However, the second is, be better than the man. Never forgive yourself anything. Always know what you as a leader have to do. Be hard if necessary, demand the utmost, but first do the outmost yourself.4
Dietl’s motto was “rules don’t apply.” This may in part explain some incidents that led the Norwegians to accuse the Germans of violating the recognized rules of war. Dietl was an ardent Nazi before the Beer Hall Putsch and he was one of Hitler’s favorites. Dietl ventured everything on living up to Hitler’s friendship and expectation. He faced the most difficult task in the German attack on Norway. Later in the war, he commanded the 20th Mountain Army in operations on the Murmansk front. He died in an airplane crash on June 23, 1944.
The German Plan
Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Page 20