Morgan’s operational orders were equally confusing. His instructions dated April 16 read, “Your role to land Aandalsnes area secure Dombaas then operate northwards and take offensive action against Germans in Trondheim area.”5 If this was not ambitious enough, Morgan received additional orders from Ironside while en route to Norway. The emphasis seemed to have switched from an offensive to a defensive role and required him to face south as well as north. More baffling, Morgan was ordered to contact the Norwegian high command “and avoid isolating Norwegian forces operating towards Oslo.”6 Morgan’s orders were now contradictory, ambiguous, and unrealistic.
Ruge was forced to change his earlier strategic plan. He still considered the capture of Trondheim the highest priority, but forces operating against that city from the south would find their rear threatened and their line of communication to Åndalsnes cut if Norwegian defenses in the south collapsed. He considered it necessary to abandon the southern pincer against Trondheim in order to shore up the defenses in the south. King-Salter and Bertrand Vigne agreed with his assessment when they met Brigadier Morgan at Dombås in the afternoon of April 19. They described the situation in the south and pressed Morgan to help prevent a collapse of Norwegian resistance. King-Salter pointed out that Ruge had received a message from the War Office giving him authority to call on British forces. Morgan felt that he had to refer the issue to London since Allied operations that far south were not envisaged. In the meantime, he accompanied the attachés to meet General Ruge around midnight.
After expressing his displeasure at not being informed about Allied plans and disappointment at the size and composition of the British force, Ruge came right to the point. He expected all troops in Norway, no matter what nationality, to conform to his strategy, which he briefly explained. Morgan promised to give whatever help he could wherever needed. Ruge insisted that he needed the two British battalions in the area south of Lillehammer to bolster the Norwegian forces, consisting of two infantry battalions and a battery of artillery on east side of Lake Mjøsa under General Hvinden-Haug and two reduced battalions and a number of improvised units on the west side under Colonel Dahl.
Morgan ordered his units at Dombås to Lillehammer and this decision was endorsed by Ironside on April 20. Since Hammer has been cancelled the previous day, there was no longer an urgent need for Morgan’s troops to move north. The British planners had reached the conclusion that Trondheim could not be held, even if captured, without a significant increase in the resources the Allies had made available. The dispatch of the best troops to Narvik contributed to this state of affairs.
Ruge accompanied Morgan to the railroad station at about 0300 hours on April 20 to greet the British troops. One of Ruge’s officers, Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Roscher-Nielsen, remembers the disappointment: “These were not regular troops … and we were alarmed to see that they were only armed with rifles and light machineguns … No antiaircraft guns, no heavy antitank weapons, no artillery, no vehicles …”7
Morgan not only agreed to place the 148th Brigade under Norwegian command, he allowed the two battalions to be spread out among Norwegian units. This was an unorthodox step and the issue was raised at a conference at midday on April 20. It was a tense meeting because Ruge was angered by a suggestion from the British that there was an intelligence leak at his headquarters. According to Derry, Ruge presented a written document demanding that all British units comply with his orders or he would resign.
King-Salter had decoded a message from Ironside to Ruge less than two hours earlier. This message told Ruge that Morgan had instructions to cooperate but would not come under Ruge’s command. In this delicate situation, King-Salter decided to delay the message to Ruge. The conference ended on a positive note with Morgan promising cooperation and Ruge stating that he would try to hold the front near Lillehammer until Trondheim had fallen. His new allies had failed to tell him that the attack on Trondheim had been cancelled a day earlier.
Ruge’s decision to spread the British units among the Norwegian troops would be unwise under normal circumstances, but these were far from normal. After seeing that the British troops were not regulars and lacked all types of necessary weapons and equipment, Ruge was probably uneasy about their ability to hold a major sector against the Germans. The British infantrymen, with limited training, found themselves in completely unfamiliar surroundings, waist-deep in snow, and without equipment for winter warfare. They had no maps of the area, no artillery, no radio communications, no means of transport, and no supply organization. They relied on Norwegians for support in these areas. It was also hoped that the appearance of British troops in the major units would serve to stiffen Norwegian resolve and boost their morale. In the end, it had the opposite effect.
The German Breakthrough
A half battalion of Foresters, commanded by Major Roberts, was attached to Task Force Dahl with the mission of protecting its right flank. Lieutenant Colonel Ford, with the rest of the Foresters, was positioned behind the Torkilsen Battalion at Lundehøgda on the east side of Lake Mjøsa. Two companies of the Leicester’s, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Garman, were given a reserve mission behind the 2nd Cavalry Regiment near Åsmarka.
Major Roberts’ troops were recalled from their flank security mission and ordered to Biri. The Norwegian front in that area, under attack from battle groups Adlholch, Zanthier, and Nickelmann, was in danger of collapsing after hard fighting, including several Norwegian counterattacks. Colonel Dahl decided on April 21 to pull his line back to the area near Fåberg since his left flank was exposed after the Germans broke through Norwegian lines east of Lake Mjøsa. The withdrawal went well, covered by the two companies of Foresters and a Norwegian ski company and engineers. The covering force had difficulties extracting. It sustained a number of casualties, and many troops became separated from their units.
There were approximately 2,000 Norwegian soldiers contesting the German advance to the east of Lake Mjøsa but they were exhausted after ten days of continuous delaying actions. The 7-kilometer long Norwegian front was held by the Torkilsen Bn on the right with an approximate strength of 575. The left was held by units of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment. The Germans opened their attack on April 20 with one infantry battalion and a machinegun battalion along the road and railroad against the Norwegian positions on Lundehøgda, and one infantry battalion along the Moelv-Arneberg-Lillehammer road against the 2nd Cavalry Regiment.
The German attacks on the Norwegian positions at Lundehøgda were repelled all day but part of the defending force withdrew in the evening to Biskopåsen, about four kilometers behind the line. A British mortar section and two light antitank squads were sent forward to strengthen the Norwegian line. The Germans resumed their attack on April 21, with heavy artillery, mortar, and air support. The British mortars were silenced quickly. This was the first ground action between German and British forces in World War II. The Norwegian lines held until after 1400 hours when the right flank was driven back. The Norwegians counterattacked but the commander was badly wounded, the executive officer was killed, and the Germans were able to roll up the Norwegian positions. Despite problems in disengaging, the Norwegians eventually brought most forces to Biskopåsen but that position was abandoned in the evening. More than half of the Torkilsen Bn was captured or missing during the disengagement and withdrawal. By the end of the second day of fighting, it consisted of only 216 men.
A motorized machinegun company from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment held the German attack in check until noon on the 21st when it withdrew to the main positions at Arneberg. The Germans quickly attacked this position and the pressure increased during the afternoon. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment retreated during the evening to Fåberg. Lieutenant Colonel Garman’s two companies followed. Between 60 and 80 Norwegians were missing after the withdrawal. Some of these later rejoined their regiment.
The two British half-battalions on the east side of Lake Mjøsa withdrew during the night, mostly on foot in deep snow because
some of the Norwegian trucks did not show up. One group of six officers and 50 men was captured by the Germans. The German losses in the two-day attack were 35 killed and 50 critically wounded.
On the evening of April 18, Task Force Hiorth in Østerdal withdrew from Elverum to the Åsta-Rena area for reorganization, but this was hampered by relentless attacks by the Luftwaffe on the following day, which resulted in near destruction of the village of Rena. Group Fischer attacked Åsta on April 21. They broke into the Norwegian positions in the afternoon after heavy fighting and there were no reserves left for a counterattack. The Norwegians managed to withdraw but one company on the left flank was lost in the process. A delaying position was organized at Rena and the forward troops withdrew through this position during the night and organized in new positions at Deset and Kroken.
The British Defeat at Balberskamp
German forces were regrouped on April 21, primarily because of the threat posed by the Norwegian 4th Field Brigade that had crossed the mountains from the west. The northward advance of the 163rd Division was terminated and it was turned westward to protect the German left flank. Group Zanthier, west of Lake Mjøsa, which had been part of the 163rd Division, came under the command of the 196th Division when it reached the northern end of that lake. Group Nickelmann’s mission was limited to clearing actions. The reinforced 196th Division, with one column in Gudbrandsdal and another in Østerdal, was tasked to link up with the forces in Trondheim.
The strength of Norwegian forces withdrawing from Lundehøgda and Åsmarka had fallen to only 1,400 men. General Hvinden-Haug insisted that they needed rest and reorganization before they could again take part in operations. General Ruge reluctantly agreed since the Norwegian units were so reduced in strength that they were almost combat ineffective. He had no choice but to ask General Morgan to use his troops to buy sorely needed time to rest and reorganize the Norwegian remnants. The Torkilsen Bn was assembled near Fåberg and the 2nd Cavalry Regiment in the Øyer area, about 12 kilometers north of Fåberg.
After their difficult retreat, the four British companies under Lieutenant Colonels Ford and Garman, regrouped and decided to make a stand at the southern end of the defile at Balberskamp. The British formed their traditional two lines, with the two companies of Foresters in front and the Leicesters in the second line. The terrain rises steeply from the river east of Fåberg to the top of Balberskamp, a height of about 2,000 feet. This was the first time the British faced the Germans alone. They worried about their left flank since they had great difficulties moving a security force up the steep western side of Balberskamp. Morgan requested some ski troops from Ruge to protect the flank but none were available. The Germans were not about to give the British any respite. The four British companies came under intense mortar fire and air attack as they began occupying their defensive positions. With British attention fixed on the German approach along the road from Lillehammer, the Germans sent ski troops around and over Balberskamp, thus turning the British left flank.
The British made a rapid and disorganized withdrawal to escape the trap. Part of the German encirclement force overran the British headquarters with a surprise attack. Among the papers captured by the Germans were documents dealing with Allied plans to occupy Norwegian cities before April 9. It has never been explained what such documents were doing at a forward tactical headquarters. These documents, frequently referred to by Hitler, were used effectively by the Germans to justify their attack on Norway.
The two Forrester companies apparently did not receive the order to withdraw and most ended up surrendering to the Germans. The retreating British were subjected to continual attacks from the air, by tanks, and by armored reconnaissance vehicles. They abandoned most of their supplies along with 25 machineguns and 15 antitank rifles.8
General Hvinden-Haug described the loss of the Balberskamp defile as the “first serious defeat of the war,” and a loss that resulted in severe consequences for Norwegian units.9 This is an unfair statement. If he deemed the Balberskamp position so important, its defense should not have been left in the hands of untried troops unfamiliar with the terrain and unable to maneuver off the roads. He should have provided ski units to secure the British flank despite his troops’ exhaustion after 12 days of continuous fighting.
The British and Norwegian Defeat at Tretten
The 148th Brigade stopped temporarily at Øyer, about ten kilometers north of Balberskamp. Here, it was joined by the two companies of Leicesters previously left behind in Great Britain. The British came under heavy enemy fire and abandoned their positions by 1900 hours on April 22. A new delaying position at Tolstad, another five kilometers further north, was held until noon the following day when the retreat continued for another five kilometers to Tretten. Here, the British were joined by Major Roberts’ two companies of Foresters, earlier attached to TF Dahl.
The 148th Brigade began its final two days of existence as a fighting force. The British intended to stand at Tretten and Morgan insisted on Norwegian troops to secure their left flank. Ruge directed the 2nd Cavalry Regiment to make troops available for this purpose and three under-strength companies were sent forward and placed under Morgan’s command. The combined force confronting the advancing Germans consisted of eight British and three Norwegian companies, 700 and 300 troops respectively.
General Ruge reportedly considered it essential to hold Tretten for at least one full day. Other than winning time for reorganizing his forces north of Tretten, it is not clear why holding the place for the specified time was important. Some writers contend that Ruge had decided to bring TF Dahl into Gudbrandsdal and Tretten was the last crossing point over the Lågen River for over 50 kilometers.10
While Ruge had toyed with this idea, he had decided to leave Dahl on the west side of the river to present a flank threat to the Germans. While TF Dahl was under the operational control of General Hvinden-Haug in Gudbrandsdal, on April 23 Ruge directed that it stay on the west side of Lågen and later make its way either to the 4th Field Brigade in Valdres or rejoin the 2nd Division further north.11 Therefore, there was no reason to hold the bridge for the use of TF Dahl. Norwegian engineers had in fact prepared it for destruction. This would prevent the Germans from using it to strike at TF Dahl’s rear.
The British established a defense in depth with the equivalent of six companies near the village of Rindheim. The forward line consisted of two companies of Foresters with one company of Leicesters higher up the hillside. The Foresters occupied prepared positions. The three under-strength Norwegian dragoon companies were placed behind the British left flank on a plateau formed by the saddle between Hills 616 and 526. There were no prepared positions for the Leicester company and the dragoons, and their visibility was severely reduced in the heavily wooded terrain. A company of Foresters was in reserve along the road leading to Tretten and another company moved to the west side of Lågen. The rest of the Leicesters formed the second British line.
The British expected that the main German effort would be directed at their mountainous left flank so they placed a company of Leicesters and the Norwegian dragoons in this area. The Germans did not attack as the British expected. At about 1300 hours, their main attack, led by tanks, commenced along the road against the two Forester companies, with a secondary effort along the west side of the river. The British antitank rifles proved ineffective against the tanks. The reserve company was committed, but within one hour the British defenses disintegrated and the Germans continued towards Tretten.
The Norwegian dragoons, their route of withdrawal threatened by the German breach of the British line, started a retreat to Tretten. Fifteen to 20 British officers and NCOs offered to serve as a delaying force and most were killed or captured. The German advance was so rapid that the dragoons found their line of retreat cut. After a short engagement, the dragoons withdrew into the mountains and, after failing to reach friendly lines, were demobilized.
The fighting had now reached Tretten. The German force advancing on
the west side of the river was able to get guns into position where they could fire on the bridge and the village. Tretten and the bridge were held until early evening. In the confused withdrawal of British forces west of Lågen, the lines connecting the prepared charges were disconnected and the Norwegian engineers, caught up in the panicky withdrawal, did not stay around to reconnect the charges. The Germans captured the bridge intact. A rear guard held a final position about two kilometers north of the village until 2130 hours. The remnants of the brigade dispersed and, using trucks and busses, they headed for Heidal. A Danish officer, a volunteer in the Winter War and now serving as a volunteer in the Norwegian forces, gives a rather uncomplimentary description of the British retreat to Heidal:
Truck after truck of hysterical British soldiers drove past me. When I reached Fåvang, there was wild confusion on the road. British officers had managed to stop the trucks and tried unsuccessfully to restore order. They refused to follow orders and drove on, yelling and screaming. It had a depressing effect on the Norwegian soldiers who witnessed the behavior.12
British authors describe Tretten as an unmitigated disaster. Derry writes that the brigade, after regrouping, was reduced to nine officers and 300 men. A few dozen survivors managed to reach Sweden or the coast in the days that followed. The Germans captured about 250 British soldiers, including Lieutenant Colonel Ford and a severely wounded Lieutenant Colonel King-Salter, the British Military Attaché.
Moulton blames the Norwegians for the defeat at Tretten. He claims that the confusion over the withdrawal of TF Dahl from Gausdal was the immediate cause for the defeat. This conclusion is highly questionable and shows reliance on British accounts, to the exclusion of Norwegian and German sources. It is not obvious that the withdrawal of TF Dahl from Gausdal would have altered the outcome. This was the fourth action by the 148th Brigade and it is extremely doubtful that the outcome would have been any different if it had engaged the Germans further north. The fault lies with the British authorities who rushed an untrained and poorly equipped militia force into the snow-clad mountains of eastern Norway without air support, artillery, or effective antitank weapons while their best troops sat on their hands in the Narvik area.
Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Page 43