Getz received copies of the orders to the Directorate of Roads and Chief of Railroads on April 27. An earlier forgery of an important message from General Fleischer made the 5th Brigade uneasy on this subject.1 Getz provided copies of the telegrams to General de Wiart since he assumed that the orders, if not falsified, were issued because of an imminent threat of enemy landings in the north that would menace the Allied rear and make the situation in Namsos critical. Since this possibility seemed rather remote, Getz sent a message to Fleischer asking for confirmation of the order. The following day he requested that the British undertake aerial reconnaissance of the fjords between Mosjøen and Mo in order to determine if there were any enemy activities in these areas.
It was natural for Colonel Getz to be concerned about the orders since the road from Mosjøen to Grong was not only his supply route but also a logical line of retreat if that should become necessary. Fleischer, rather than consulting with Getz, issued an order on April 28 to Lieutenant Colonel Nummedal, the military commander in Nordland, to carry out the orders conveyed in the previous day’s messages to the civilian authorities.
On the same day that Nummedal received his directive from the 6th Division, Getz was told that the order (for destruction) was to be carried out and that his authority over Nordland Province would be rescinded if he created any further difficulties. Getz answered the same day, explaining the military situation in Trøndelag and stating that if it became necessary for his forces to withdraw, they would do so towards Mosjøen and destroy the railroad and road behind them.2 In view of this, Getz asked for immediate confirmation that the 6th Division wanted the lines of communications destroyed between Mosjøen and Grong. Getz kept the Allies informed about the messages between himself and Fleischer and he claims they were equally convinced that the orders were false.3
Colonel Getz also sent a message to General Ruge asking if the Army High Command had any knowledge about what he described as “an incomprehensible message” from General Fleischer to Lieutenant Colonel Nummedal. He also stated that he viewed the message as a forgery and that he would not carry out the destruction called for before he had an answer from Fleischer giving the reasons for the order. Based on a report in June 1940, Nummedal, appears to have been equally confused about what was required by the 6th Division since the order was not implemented.4
Subsequently, Getz had a telephone conversation with Fleischer, in which he claimed that Fleischer admitted that the intention of the order was to prepare the lines of communications for destruction.5 Lindbäck-Larsen denies Getz’s version vehemently although he states that he had no part in the matter since Fleischer handled it personally.6 Lindbäck-Larsen goes on to allege that Getz tried to obtain authority from the British to sabotage the order in the morning of May 2. He does not explain this serious accusation. It is probably a reference to a letter from Getz to General Carton de Wiart on that day where Getz explains that Fleischer’s order only pertained to preparations for destruction and where he mentions that a letter from the British general to Fleischer about the affair would be helpful.7
Hovland writes that Fleischer was furious when he learned on May 2 that the Allies had evacuated Namsos without prior notification to Colonel Getz. He viewed their action as nothing short of abandoning their comrades on the field of battle. Getz was equally bitter towards the Allies. He demonstrated his anger by giving a copy of Carton de Wiart’s letter to a Swedish newspaper, Svenska Dagbladet. General Feurstein writes in his book that he met Colonel Getz on his way north and the colonel gave him a copy of the British notification of evacuation while they had breakfast together.8 Hovland also maintains that Getz tried to sabotage Fleischer’s order and that he sought Allied support for this action:
As untidy as the command relationships were, General Fleischer’s authority for the order is open for discussion. What is not open for discussion is the fact that his assessment of the situation was correct, and that Getz failure to follow orders from the only superior he had contact with at this time, had disastrous consequences for later operations in Nordland.9
Whatever the facts, it is very unlikely that successful destruction of lines of communications would have prevented the “disastrous consequences.” The Germans were prepared for heavy destruction of communications lines. This was the pattern withdrawing Norwegian forces had established in southern Norway. The Germans committed large resources to repairing and improving the road and railroad between Nord-Trøndelag and Mosjøen. Five engineer companies and a large work force were employed in opening and maintaining the Grong-Mosjøen road.
While roadblocks and blown bridges required much effort to repair, those repairs were carried out speedily. Many of the breaks were repaired within 24 hours and larger projects such as railroad bridges were opened for traffic within 48 hours.10 The composition and organization of Feurstein’s lead battle groups, Sorko and Schratz, were such that they could by-pass any lines of communications breaches and be supplied by airdrop or by seaplanes. The destruction of lines of communications was therefore only a small hindrance as long as German air superiority remained unchallenged. In their withdrawal from Mo to Posthus, the British destroyed about 30 bridges behind them. This had little effect on the speed of the German advance and goes a long way to deflate the arguments of those who claimed that Getz and Nummedal’s failure to carry out destruction of the lines of communication in the southern part of the province had catastrophic consequences. However, it was unfortunate that such relations existed between two commanders who shared a common goal and it is puzzling what motives Getz and Nummedal could have had in allegedly “sabotaging” Fleischer’s order. One explanation is that they considered it illogical to destroy lines of communications that were also their supply lines after April 26, ahead rather than behind withdrawing troops.
Colonel Getz informed General Fleischer on May 2 that he was relinquishing his authority in Nordland and that he had sent the 1/14th Inf back into that province. Getz’s remaining cavalry and infantry units covered the disengagement and withdrawal of the 1/14th. It is debatable whether Getz’s two infantry battalions could have disengaged and withdrawn via Grong after the surprise Allied evacuation. The Germans were quick to move north and occupy Grong. However, Getz should have tried. While his troops were almost out of ammunition and rations, it should have been possible for them to follow in the footsteps of the 1/14th in the hope that they would be supplied along their route of withdrawal. An order to that effect from General Ruge arrived on May 3, after the surrender and while Getz’s forces were in the process of demobilizing.11
The morale in Sundlo’s 1/14th Inf battalion was high prior to Getz’s surrender. The battalion was in position on the east side of Snåsvann and had repelled several strong German probes in that area. The news of the Allied evacuation and the subsequent surrender of Getz’s forces came as a shock to the battalion from which it never recovered. A train accident at the outset of the battalion’s transportation northward, resulting in seven killed and over 30 wounded, did not help. From just north of Grong, the battalion made its way on skis and by motor vehicles over the stretch where railroad tracks had not been laid, and arrived in Mosjøen on May 5.
The low morale among the Norwegian troops in the 1/14th, which resulted in a number of desertions as the battalion withdrew through its home area, almost became a mutiny. A soldier’s committee sent a telegram to General Fleischer on May 5 suggesting that the area not be made a war zone since the means available to the battalion were so inadequate that its position was untenable. Fleischer’s answer pointed out the importance for the operations against Narvik of a tough defense as far south in Nordland Province as possible. His message concluded, “A more important mission has never been given to a Norwegian battalion.”12
Allied Finger-Pointing
The British had considered it extremely improbable that the Germans would advance from Namsos to Narvik, and consequently they were presented with a situation for which they had not planned. However,
by the end of April, some in the Allied camp understood that the evacuation of Namsos gave the Germans an opportunity to advance north to relieve their hard-pressed forces in Narvik. Both Paris and London urged that part of the forces evacuated should do so overland while some should proceed to Mosjøen by sea.
The news that Carton de Wiart did not plan to leave forces in the area north of Namsos apparently came as a surprise to General Ironside. After a midnight call on April 29 from a French admiral, a hurried meeting with the French Military Attaché, and a visit to General Massy’s home before 0300 hours, Ironside discovered that his “orders issued about the occupation of various points on the fiords to the north of Namsos had not been obeyed.”13 A message from Massy to Carton de Wiart stressed the importance of holding Mosjøen and suggested that part of the force in Namsos be moved there by sea while other forces were used to delay the Germans along the road from Grong.
Generals Carton de Wiart and Audet argued that they did not have sufficient ski troops to cover the evacuation, that the road north was impassable because of the thaw, and that the troops would be exposed to heavy German air attacks.14 If the Allies had adequate liaison with Norwegian forces they would have learned that the railroad bed across the mountains had been cleared of snow prior to April 19 and that as of April 26, the 5th Brigade was supplied from Mosjøen by using both the railroad and road. At the time that local Allied commanders declared the route impassable, the 1/14th Inf was withdrawing over it.
General Gamelin, surprised by both the evacuation and the fact that forces were not left behind to hinder the German northward advance, sent instructions directly to General Audet on May 2, directing French forces to take up positions near Grong.15 While this led to a hurried meeting between Audet and Carton de Wiart, it came too late and was not sufficient to convince the two commanders. They argued that the force would be trapped since it could not withdraw overland.
It was unfortunate that the decision on how to withdraw from Namsos was left to the local commanders since it had a direct effect on the operations in Narvik over which neither they nor General Massy had any authority. Allowing the two battalions of 5th Demi-Brigade CA to fight a rearguard action along the Grong-Mosjøen road and railroad may have been to Allied benefit. It is quite possible that Getz, encouraged by the fact that some Allies were still at his side, would have withdrawn his remaining two battalions by the same route and the presence of French forces may have prevented the demoralization of the 1/14th Inf. The Allies did send a small French force of about 100 men with two British light anti-aircraft guns by sea to secure Mosjøen against airborne attack.
By a quick decision and decisive action it should have been possible to keep the forces fighting north of Grong supplied through the small port of Mosjøen. The German air threat mentioned by Derry did not present greater problems for the delaying force than it later posed to the piecemeal and ineffectual British attempts to insert troops along the coastline to stem the German advance. In fact, as the Allies were wrangling about how to withdraw their forces from Namsos, on April 29, General Mackesy was directed to send forces from the Narvik front to Nordland Province.
Generals Gamelin and Ironside insisted that part of the evacuating force conduct an effective delaying action between Grong and Mosjøen. The authors of Ironside’s diaries write:
Now that Namsos was on the point of being lost, it was imperative to stop the Germans moving up the coast and relieving their garrison at Narvik before we had captured it ourselves. Ironside [and Gamelin] accordingly wanted his only ski-troops, the Chasseurs Alpins, to retire, not by sea, but slowly up the road to the north, via Grong and Mosjoën, being supplied from the several small ports on the Norwegian coast, delaying the enemy as long as possible and eventually joining the British at Narvik.16
Gamelin’s and Ironside’s views are confirmed by the message Gamelin sent to the French commander in Namsos on May 2 and General Massy’s message to Carton de Wiart on April 29 after what Ironside describes as a stormy meeting in the early morning hours. Hovland places the blame on the British, more specifically on Churchill. Churchill, however, writes:
I was most anxious that a small part of the Namsos force should make their way in whatever vehicles were available along the coastal road to Grong. Even a couple of hundred would have sufficed to fight small rear-guard actions. From Grong they would have to find their way on foot to Mosjoen … I was repeatedly assured that the road was impassable. General Massy from London sent insistent requests. It was replied that even a small party of French Chasseurs, with their skis, could not traverse this route. “It was [seemed] evident,” wrote General Massy a few days later in his dispatch, “that if the French Chasseurs could not retire along this route, the Germans could not advance along it …”17
British authors appear to place the blame on the local commanders, especially the commander of the French contingent. Moulton writes that General Audet considered the road from Grong to Mosjøen impassable and that Carton de Wiart accepted his opinion. Derry writes that Generals Audet and Carton de Wiart were equally opposed to the idea of an overland withdrawal of some forces.
However, General Béthouart relates a different story:
One could have evacuated all or parts of the troops along this road [Namsos to Mosjøen] with all equipment and thereby delayed the enemy’s advance and established a front that with ease and effectiveness could have stopped the enemy … My half-brigade of alpines together with the Norwegian brigade under Colonel Getz were especially well suited for this mission.18
A Supreme Allied War Council decision in early April gave the British command of and responsibility for operations in Scandinavia. We know that General Carton de Wiart’s views on operations in Nord-Trøndelag were heavily influenced by the massive German air attacks on Steinkjer and Namsos. He may well have concluded that any operations in this area were futile unless he received effective air support. General Audet probably shared these views. However, the decision on what to do with the forces in Namsos was a strategic decision that affected what now had become the main Allied operation to recapture Narvik, and it was therefore a decision that should have been made in London, and insisted on.
Feurstein Begins his Advance
The Germans wasted no time in exploiting the vacuum left by the Allied evacuation and the surrender of the 5th Brigade. They entered the ruins of Namsos on May 4 and General von Falkenhorst issued orders that same day for the 2nd Mountain Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Valentin Feurstein, to begin its overland drive to establish contact with Dietl’s forces in Narvik.19
The 2nd Mountain Division was not part of the forces originally earmarked for the invasion of Norway. This elite unit was added when Hitler became concerned in late April about the situation in Norway and particularly about a link-up with Dietl in Narvik. The 2nd Mountain Division was located in the Eifel area when it was ordered to Oslo via Denmark. There were several difficulties and mishaps during its deployment.
Since the division had not been part of the original invasion force and therefore not part of the movement plans, there was a scramble to find transport and much of the heavy equipment was left behind. In addition, there were serious losses in equipment during the transport from Denmark to Norway. Finally, Group XXI detached the division’s engineer battalion for service in southern Norway.20
The 2/137th Inf, reinforced by one mountain artillery battery and one engineer company, moved by air to Værnes Airfield on May 2. Lieutenant Colonel August Sorko commanded this group. While the bulk of the division was underway to Trondheim on foot or by railroad, Sorko’s forces were rushed to Grong to begin the advance towards Narvik.
General Feurstein and his staff ran into some of the same problems that plagued other Germans in Norway. For example, they could not put their hands on adequate maps and were forced, like the pilots over Narvik, to rely on maps on a scale of 1:1,000,000 or road maps. Feuerstein met with General von Falkenhorst and his chief-of-staff, Colonel von Bus
chenhagen, in Trondheim on May 4 and received his marching order.
While Von Falkenhorst may have expected that any resistance north of Namsos would be minimal after the Allied withdrawal and the surrender of the 5th Norwegian Brigade, he also wanted to light a fire under his subordinate. His order emphasized the need for haste and made light of any possible opposition. Feurstein was less exuberant than his superior and answered, “We will do everything, but please do not expect the impossible.”21 Feurstein knew that there were still elements of the 14th Norwegian Regiment in the area north of Grong. Furthermore, he anticipated that the Allies would make every effort to impede his advance, an advance that threatened their stranglehold on Narvik and Dietl’s forces.
Feurstein and a small staff set out the following day from Trondheim in three taxis to make contact with Sorko. Group XXI’s evening situation report for May 5 stated that Group Feurstein was on its way from Grong to Mosjøen with all available motorized forces. Was this a sarcastic reference to the three taxis? The motorized transport for the two mountain divisions was still in southern Norway waiting for the opening of the road to Trondheim or in Denmark awaiting shipping to Norway. In his history of World War 2, General von Tippelskirch writes that an army corps consisting of one mountain division and one infantry division pressed forward into North Norway after the Allied evacuation of Namsos. Feurstein notes sarcastically that his “army corps” consisted of six and a half companies of mountain troops, one artillery battery, and a staff of six. The 181st Division under General Woytasch had conducted the operations against the Allies and Norwegians north of Trondheim but this unit was only used to repair the lines of communications behind the 2nd Division, assist in the supply effort, and later help clear the offshore islands. The major forces eventually available to General Feurstein for his mission consisted of the 136th and 137th Mountain Infantry Regiments, Colonel Weiss’ 138th Mountain Infantry Regiment (belonging to the 3rd Mountain Division), 83rd Engineer Battalion from the 3rd Division, 1st and 2nd Bns of the 730th Artillery, and the 40th Anti-tank detachment.
Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Page 50