The Evacuation of Bodø
As the British and Norwegians were fighting at Posthus, the Germans made their breakthrough to the Channel Coast in France and the desperate British evacuation from Dunkirk was about to start. Churchill decided that all available resources had to be concentrated on the defense of Great Britain. Part of this decision involved the evacuation of Bodø, which was ordered on May 25, the first day of the fighting at Posthus. The British were still reinforcing Bodø that day with the arrival of the last company of the South Wales Borderers. It is rather ironic that the destroyer bringing this company to Bodø also brought Colonel Dowler from Harstad carrying the evacuation order for all British forces.
The original plan was to bring the German northward advance to a halt at Finneid. As pointed out by Ash, this was the best defensive position during the whole campaign with water in front and on the flanks, anchored against high mountains in the east, stretching to the Swedish border, about 30 kilometers away. The Norwegians considered it imperative to halt the German drive in this location in order to provide General Fleischer time to eliminate the Germans in the Narvik area and thereafter switch his forces against General Feurstein. For that reason, Lieutenant Colonel Roscher-Nielsen had concentrated the remnants of the withdrawing Norwegian forces and the newly arrived battalion from Bardufoss in this area.
The Norwegians were therefore dismayed to see the British forces withdraw westward to positions that were less suitable for defense and did not cover the route to Narvik. To the Norwegians, who were again not informed about the evacuation, the westward movement of the British forces was, in the words of Sandvik, “incomprehensible and ominous.” General Fleischer was notified by a telegram, copied to General Ruge, late in the evening of May 28. Gubbins made no mention to Roscher-Nielsen about the British evacuation decision, taken three days earlier. The same applies to a conference Major Lindbäck-Larsen had with Colonel Dowler at Harstad after the latter’s return from Bodø on May 26.
Lindbäck-Larsen reported his conversation with Dowler to Roscher-Nielsen on May 28, and to Fleischer, and Ruge the following day. Dowler had promised that British fighters would operate from Bodø, a lengthy deployment of British aircraft carriers to the Bodø area, eight Bofors guns for the Norwegians to use at Finneid, additional reinforcements, and that the Finneid line would be held.
The Norwegians redeployed their forces when the British moved their defense line to the Fauske area. A Norwegian force was sent towards Langset to delay the German advance. One company that had been sent to Sulitjelma earlier, to block the eastern and more mountainous route into the Finneid area, was ordered back to Fauske in order not to be isolated by the German advance, now that Finneid was not to be defended. The commander was told that Norwegian forces would attempt to hold the road through Finneid open until the following day (May 29).
The German advance was more rapid than anticipated and the Norwegians were forced back across the bridge at Finneid in the evening of May 28, after which the bridge was destroyed. The forces at Sulitjelma were isolated and Roscher-Nielsen ordered them to withdraw over the mountains and the glacier of Blåmannsisen to Røsvik.
Defensive positions south of Djupvik were prepared and occupied by two infantry companies from the 1/15th Inf, an artillery battery, two mortar platoons, and an engineer platoon. Brigadier Gubbins had promised Roscher-Nielsen that he would send his chief of staff to the latter’s headquarters to arrange details of future cooperation. The chief of staff never appeared.
The Luftwaffe attacked Bodø in strength on May 27, in a continuation of a series of bombing raids that began on May 20. The Germans began by dropping heavy explosive bombs and thereafter a large number of incendiary bombs. The attack lasted for two hours. The two remaining Gladiators were quickly put out of operation and the Germans reduced the town to rubble. Fortunately, most of the civilian population had evacuated when German air raids began a week earlier, and as a result, only 15 civilians were killed. Nothing was spared, including the hospital where a large number of wounded Scots Guards were located.
Roscher-Nielsen had a telephone conversation with Brigadier Gubbins after the German raid and when asked about the situation, Gubbins gave an ambiguous answer. Roscher-Nielsen came away from the conversation with the understanding that the British were still holding their positions in Fauske but he noted that Gubbins also made it clear that the Norwegians should remove their own units as quickly as possible.
Colonel Finne, the Norwegian liaison officer at the British headquarters in Harstad, was finally told on May 29 that the British were about to evacuate Bodø. General Ruge sent an immediate message to Colonel Finne directing him to appeal the evacuation decision, since a German occupation of Bodø meant that German fighters would soon dominate the skies over Narvik. He also pointed out that the surrender of the Bodø area to the enemy would have a detrimental impact on Norwegian morale after the operations there had resulted in the destruction of the city.
Roscher-Nielsen asked Fleischer to prevail on the British to delay their evacuation by three days to allow him to withdraw his troops safely. Fleischer did this through General Ruge’s headquarters on May 29. Derry and Hovland write that the request to delay the evacuation from Bodø for three days was accepted. This is misleading. The final evacuation took place in the evening of May 31, two days after the request. Furthermore, the withdrawal from Fauske was completed before May 30, when Roscher-Nielsen reported that he was alone on the isthmus.
The Irish Guards and the two independent companies had actually departed the isthmus in the morning of May 29. To the Norwegians, it was not important when the British evacuated the town of Bodø but when they evacuated the Fauske area. This would leave the Norwegians in the untenable position of facing the Germans alone. Ash agrees, writing that Gubbins withdrew his forces during the promised three-day delay and that the Norwegians were cut off long before the time was up.
The Norwegian Navy assembled over 100 fishing vessels and these were sent to Røsvik to evacuate the Norwegian troops. Roscher-Nielsen decided to hold the Djupvik positions with units from 1/15th Inf while the Reserve Battalion, 14th Inf was sent to Røsvik for evacuation. This battalion was successfully evacuated to the Lofoten Islands on May 30. Only one platoon from the company at Sulitjelma reached Røsvik. The rest of the company found its route of withdrawal to Røsvik blocked by German detachments and it was demobilized.
General Feurstein had to make a quick decision as his lead elements approached Fauske. He was presented with the same dilemma as had faced Admiral Lütjens, almost two months earlier. It was tempting to let battle groups Sorko and Schrantz aggressively pursue the retiring British troops. There is little doubt that large elements of the British brigade-size force would have been destroyed or captured if he had selected that course of action. However, Feurstein did not lose sight of the main objective, the relief of General Dietl’s forces in Narvik.
Feurstein split his forces when he reached Fauske. The forces approaching that location consisted of two and one-half mountain infantry battalions, two companies of bicycle troops, and one mountain artillery battery. Lieutenant Colonel Nake commanded these forces. Feurstein allowed one part of this force, under Nake, to follow the British while the remainder, under Sorko, continued its trek northward to Røsvik. The forces sent westward did not press their pursuit and there were no significant engagements between them and the retreating Guards. Between May 28 and 31, the British successfully evacuated their forces in two destroyers and the old cruiser Vindictive, under the cover of aircraft operating from Bardufoss. They faced little German interference. Two of the independent companies were taken directly to Great Britain aboard Vindictive, while the other forces were brought to Harstad. The British destroyed most of their heavy weapons, vehicles, and the oil storage facilities in the harbor.
British operations in Nordland Province, which had begun with considerable optimism three weeks earlier, ended as the last destroyer pulled away from Bodø. Britis
h losses in the Nordland Campaign, according to Derry, amounted to 506 killed, wounded, and captured. This included a small number from the South Wales Borderer’s on Ankenes Peninsula at Narvik.
The 1/15th Inf, under Major Omdal, fought an effective delaying action from their position at Djupvik. The first German attack was repelled. The position held until the early afternoon of May 31 when a withdrawal was ordered, covered by the machinegun company. The last engagement took place three kilometers south of Røsvik. The evacuation was carried out during a period of fog that prevented German air operations. Horses and vehicles were left behind but the floating depot was towed away. The rear guard managed to hold the Germans at a distance until the last unit had embarked at 1800 hours on May 31.
Operation Büffel (Buffalo)
With the British and Norwegian forces out of his way, Feurstein could begin what was perhaps the most difficult part of his effort to relieve Narvik. His forces had covered about 700 kilometers under difficult conditions in 27 days. These forces were still over 150 kilometers from Narvik and ahead of them lay a roadless mountain wilderness that the OKW had declared impassable even by mountain troops. There were several efforts underway to bring assistance to Narvik but the connection through the mountains was viewed by some as the only effective way.
Planning and preparations for the last leg of the advance began when the Germans were still between Mo and Posthus. Three battalions of specially selected individuals were created by selecting a platoon of the best soldiers from each company in the division. These three platoons from each battalion would form a company. The three companies thus formed became a “Narvik Battalion.” Each battalion was reinforced with three heavy machineguns, one infantry gun, and two mountain howitzers. The battalions consisted of about 600 men. Special equipment for high-mountain operations was ordered and delivered to Fauske.
Lieutenant Colonel Ritter von Hengl, commander of the 137th Regiment and a future commander of the 2nd Mountain Division, was selected to command the “Narvik Battalions.” He established his headquarters in Mo and began the detailed planning for the operation, code-named Büffel (Buffalo). According to Major Zorn, the 2nd Division’s operation officer, he selected this name because it used to be the battle cry of Dietl’s downhill skiers when Dietl was a company commander in Munich.
The route selected for the battalions avoided places where the troops could come under fire from British warships and any violation of the Swedish frontier was strictly forbidden. The advance would take place at night and the troops would rest during the day. Hengl selected the camps along the route during an aerial reconnaissance on May 29. He planned to complete the march to Narvik in nine to ten days, with the troops covering about 15 to 20 kilometers each night. The total force of about 2,500 men was to assemble when the Germans reached the Fauske area. Some of the troops would come from the lead units while others needed to be brought forward.
The soldiers were instructed to leave sub-machineguns behind and to carry only rifles and pistols. Hand grenades, helmets, and gas masks were also left behind. Each man carried 30 rounds of rifle ammunition. Four boxes of ammunition for each machinegun and 15 rounds for each light mortar were brought along. Supply was entirely by airdrop at designated rest areas and the heavy weapons and their ammunition were to be air dropped to the advancing troops when they reached a point close to Narvik. Each man carried rations for four days but these were not to be used unless the planned airdrops did not materialize. Essential Alpine equipment was brought along, such as ropes, iron climbers, ice picks, about 50 skis per battalion, and snowshoes. The men carried light sleeping bags and an additional 10 sleeping bags and five 10-man tents were to be air dropped at each rest area. These were to be left behind and new ones dropped at the next area.
The Luftwaffe was asked not to make advance airdrops since the Germans believed that a force of 500 Norwegian troops had taken the same route northward. Each company was assigned special medical personnel and litter carriers. In addition, one doctor and 25 litter carriers were to be stationed at the rest areas as these were reached, with five carriers at each location. The battalions were equipped with radios.
The Büffel force of 10 companies was assembled in the Fauske area in the evening of June 2. The June 1 evening situation report from General Dietl described the situation in the Narvik area as extremely serious. Sorko’s battalion, which was the lead element of the Büffel force, had already started on its way to Narvik, led by a special advance party of mountaineers. Inclement weather prevented Sorko’s unit from receiving the special equipment planned for the advance in time, and those units with a later starting time gave up some of their equipment to insure that the lead elements were properly equipped.
Feurstein was not optimistic about operation Büffel’s chances of success but Dietl was in dire straits and it seemed like the best of all alternatives for coming to his aid. He was not alone in his skepticism. Both Group XXI and the OKW had written off Dietl and his forces, despite all the various attempts to bring help. In fact, a force reorganization plan was prepared in early June for carrying out the conquest of North Norway after the anticipated loss of the 3rd Mountain Division. This involved the creation of a Mountain Corps under Feurstein’s command, consisting of the 2nd and 5th Mountain Divisions commanded respectively by Colonels Nake and Weiss.
In defiance of chronology, this may be the place to describe the end of Operation Büffel. By June 8, the forward elements of Sorko’s unit had reached only as far as Hellmoboten and were ready to continue to the next camp. That night, a message was received announcing the armistice and canceling the operation. Hengl considered that the most difficult part of the route was over and he stated later that there was no doubt in his mind that his regiment could have reached Narvik in a battle-worthy condition by the middle of June.17
A symbolic picked force of 20 men under Lt. Gressel was sent to Narvik over the planned route. Gressel and his men reached Skjommen and proceeded from there to their destination by boats. He reported to General Dietl on June 16.
General Feurstein did not share Hengl’s optimism about the ability of the 2,500-man force to reach Narvik and he writes that both Lieutenant Gressel, whom he discussed the issue with in Narvik, and Lieutenant Colonel Sorko shared his view.22
THE WEEK THAT LOST THE CAMPAIGN–STRAINED RELATIONS
“The commander finds no reason to push the advance. The commander prefers that the units first expand their supply service.”
EXTRACT FROM GENERAL FLEISCHER’S DIRECTIVE TO THE BRIGADES ON MAY 19.
Inactivity
It can be argued that a successful conclusion to the Narvik Campaign was lost in the ten-day period beginning on May 22. The delays, procrastinations, and failures of the Allies and Norwegians to coordinate their operations gave General Dietl the respite he so desperately needed to bring in additional reinforcements and to organize his new defensive line. The planned attack on Narvik, initially scheduled for May 21, suffered several postponements that delayed the operation by one week. The Norwegian and French forces on the northern front took a breather after May 22 and did not re-start offensive operations until May 30, after the operation against Narvik was completed. This failure to orchestrate their operations had ruinous consequences at a time when the flow of reinforcements to Dietl tripled, the German air activity increased, and when the Allies suffered devastating defeats in France.
Béthouart and the British Navy planned the Narvik attack. The first of several postponements took place on May 19 after a meeting at British headquarters. The reasons were that landing craft were not available because they were supporting the construction at Bardufoss Airfield and land-based air support was not available. The new date was the night of 23–24 May, or the first favorable opportunity after that date. A “favorable opportunity” depended on weather that would prevent German air operations during the landing as well as the availability of sufficient Allied land-based air support to make air cover effective.
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p; German air activity increased significantly after the Bjerkvik landing. In addition to ground support operations, numerous attacks were carried out against lines of communications, harbor facilities in the rear areas, the town of Harstad, and naval forces. Carrier-based aircraft were not able to neutralize enemy air operations despite energetic attempts. It became obvious that land-based aircraft with the ability to remain over the target area for a considerable period was a prerequisite for any amphibious operation. The Bjerkvik landing earlier in the month was carried out in favorable weather and during a period when German air operations over Narvik were on a much-reduced scale.
At a meeting between General Béthouart and the British around noon on May 23, it was decided to postpone the attack on Narvik until the night of May 25–26, May 26–27, or May 27–28. Weather played a role in which night was selected but the deciding element was the availability of sufficient air cover. General Auchinleck had decided that it would be reckless to undertake the operation with only one fighter squadron in support. He decided, with Admiral Cork’s approval, to postpone the operation until the Hurricane squadron was available.1
The Norwegians were informed that the attack had been postponed indefinitely but they were not given the reasons. They believed the delay was caused by a leak through the national broadcasting system. A report from the front by a reporter was read over the radio at 2000 hours on May 23. The reporter stated that all civilians in Øyjord were ordered to move, as the Allied and Norwegian forces were preparing to take Narvik within a couple of days.
The Allies were furious and the Norwegians launched an investigation. It revealed that the report had been aired through a misunderstanding at the station. In a distortion of the sequence of events, Derry writes that this leak not only caused the postponement of the attack but was also a factor in the decision to keep the Norwegians in the dark about their planned evacuation.2 The broadcast took place eight hours after the Allies had decided on the final postponement, and it is now obvious that the deciding reason was Auchinleck’s view that sufficient fighter assets were not available.
Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Page 60