A further ironical twist to this famous case is that the Nazi intelligence service paid this most valuable agent hundreds of thousands of pounds in counterfeit English notes. Cicero has been trying ever since to get restitution from the German government for services rendered—in real money.
11
How Intelligence Is Put to Use
Information gathered by intelligence services or compiled by the analyst is of little use unless it is got into the hands of the “consumers,” the policymakers. This must be done promptly and in clear, intelligible form so that the particular intelligence can easily by related to the policy problem with which the consumers are then concerned.
These criteria are not easily met, for the sum total of intelligence available is very great on many subjects. Thousands of items come into CIA headquarters every day, directly or through other agencies of government, particularly the State and Defense departments. Many other items are added from the research work of scholars. When we consider all we need to know about happenings behind the Iron Curtain and in over a hundred other countries, this volume is not surprising. Anywhere in the world events could occur which might affect the security of the United States. How is this mass of information handled by the various collection agencies, and how is it processed in the State Department, the Defense Department and the CIA?
Between these three agencies there is immediate and often automatic exchange of important intelligence data. Of course, someone has to decide what “important” means and determine priorities. The sender of an intelligence report (who may be any one of our many officials abroad—diplomatic, military or intelligence) will often label it as being of a certain importance, but the question of priority is generally decided on the receiving end. If a report is of a particularly critical character, touching on the danger of hostilities or some major threat to our national security, the sender will place his message in channels that provide for automatic dissemination to the intelligence officers in the State and Defense departments and the CIA. The latter, as coordinator of foreign intelligence, has the right of access to all intelligence that comes to any department of our government. This is provided for by law.
There is a round-the-clock watch for important intelligence coming into the State and Defense departments and the CIA. During office hours (which in intelligence work are never normal), designated officers scan the incoming information for anything of a critical character. Through the long night hours, special watch officers in the three agencies do the monitoring. They are in close touch with each other, come to know each other well and continually exchange ideas about the sorting of clues to any developing crisis. In the event that any dramatic item should appear in the incoming nightly stream of reports, arrangements have been made as to the notification of their immediate chiefs. The latter decide who among the high policy officials of government—from the President at the top to the responsible senior officers in State, Defense and the CIA—should be alerted. The watch officers also follow the press service and radio reports, including those of Soviet and Chinese Communist origin. News of a dramatic, yet open, character—the death of a Stalin, a revolt in Iraq, the overthrow of a political leader—may first become known through public means of communication. Our officials abroad today have access to the most speedy means of transmission of reports from our embassies and our overseas installations, but these messages must go through the process of being enciphered and deciphered. As a result, news flashes sometimes get through first.
After there has been an important incident affecting our security, one that has called for policy decisions and actions, there is usually an intelligence postmortem to examine how effectively the available information was handled and how much forewarning had been given by intelligence. Incidents such as the Iraqi revolution of 1958 or the erecting of the wall dividing Berlin on August 13, 1961, required such treatment, since neither had been clearly predicted through intelligence channels. The purpose of the postmortem is to obtain something in the nature of a batting average of the alertness of intelligence services. If there has been a failure, either in prior warning or in handling the intelligence already at hand, the causes are sought and every effort is made to find means of improving future performance.
The processing of incoming intelligence falls into three general categories. The first is the daily and hourly handling of current intelligence. The second is the researching of all available intelligence on a series of subjects of broad interest to our policymakers; this might be given the name “basic intelligence.” For example, one group of analysts may work on the information available on the Soviet economy, another with its agriculture, a third with its steel and capital goods production and still another with its aircraft and missile development. The third type of processing involves the preparation of an intelligence estimate, which is described below.
There is, of course, not time to submit every important item of current intelligence to detailed analysis before it is distributed to the policymakers. But “raw” intelligence is a dangerous thing unless it is understood for what it generally is—an unevaluated report, frequently sent off without the originator of the message being able to determine finally its accuracy and reliability. Hence the policymakers who receive such intelligence in the form of periodic bulletins (or as an isolated message if its importance and urgency require special treatment) are warned against acting on raw intelligence alone.
Bulletins, both daily and weekly, summarize on a world-wide basis the important new developments over the preceding hours or days; they include such appraisal as the sender may give or as the CIA is able to add in consultation with representatives of the other government intelligence agencies. These representatives meet frequently for that purpose, going over the items to be included in the daily bulletin. New information may still be added to the daily bulletin up until the early morning hours of the day on which it is issued. When this intelligence is sent forward, explanatory material is often included as to source, manner of acquisition and reliability. Some messages carry their own credentials as to authenticity; most do not.
In addition to the current raw intelligence reports and the “basic intelligence” studies, there are the position papers, generally called “national estimates.” These are prepared by the intelligence community on the basis of all the intelligence available on a certain subject along with an interpretation of the “imponderables.” Here we come to a most vital function of the entire work of intelligence—how to deal with the mass of information about future developments so as to make it useful to our policymakers and planners as they examine the critical problems of today and tomorrow. Berlin, Cuba, Laos; Communist aims and objectives; the Soviet military and nuclear programs; the economics of the U.S.S.R. and Communist China—the list could be almost indefinitely extended and is, of course, not exclusively concerned with Communist bloc matters. Sometimes estimates must be made on a crash basis. Sometimes, particularly where long-range estimates are involved, they are made after weeks of study.
One of the major reasons for the organization of the CIA was to provide a mechanism for coordinating the work of producing intelligence estimates so that the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense could have before them a single reasoned analysis of the factors involved in situations affecting our national security. President Truman, who, in 1947, submitted the legislation proposing its creation, expressed in his memoirs the need for such a mechanism:
The war taught us this lesson—that we had to collect intelligence in a manner that would make the information available where it was needed and when it was wanted, in an intelligent and understandable form. If it is not intelligent and understandable, it is useless.
He also describes the system by which intelligence was coordinated and passed on to policymakers:
Each time the National Security Council is about to consider a certain policy—let us say a policy
having to do with Southeast Asia—it immediately calls upon the CIA to present an estimate of the effects such a policy is likely to have. The Director of the CIA sits with the staff of the National Security Council and continually informs as they go along. The estimates he submits represent the judgment of the CIA and a cross section of the judgments of all the advisory councils of the CIA. These are G-2, A-2, the ONI, the State Department, the FBI, and the Director of Intelligence of the AEC. The Secretary of State then makes the final recommendation of policy, and the President makes the final decision.1
1 Memoirs of Harry S. Truman (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1958).
What President Truman refers to as “the advisory councils of the CIA” was established in 1950 as the Intelligence Advisory Committee, which later became the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) and is often referred to as “the intelligence community.” USIB now has an additional member to those listed above—the head of the newly created Defense Intelligence Agency, which coordinates the work of Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence and is playing an increasingly important role in the intelligence community. So too is the intelligence unit of the State Department, whose head ranks as an Assistant Secretary of State. The USIB meets regularly every week and more frequently during crises or whenever any vital new item of intelligence is received. The Director of Central Intelligence, who is chairman of the board, is responsible for the estimates produced by the board. However, if any member dissents and desires his dissent to be recorded, a statement of his views is included as a footnote to the estimate that is finally presented to the President and interested members of the National Security Council.
Arrangements are made so that the President and other senior officers of government, as required, can be instantly reached by the Director of Central Intelligence or by their own intelligence officers in any emergency. Experience over the years has proved that this system really works. There was not a single instance during my service as Director when I failed to reach the President in a matter of minutes with any item of intelligence I felt was of immediate importance.
The CIA has also set up a Board of National Estimates within the Agency, on which sits a group of experts in intelligence analysis, both civilian and military. The board prepares initial drafts of most estimates, which are then coordinated with USIB representatives. To deal with highly technical subjects, such as Soviet missiles, aircraft or nuclear programs, competent technical subcommittees of USIB have been established. And, in certain cases, experts outside of government may be consulted.
Obviously, the procedure of preparing and coordinating an initial draft of an estimate, presenting it to the USIB, formulating the latter’s final report along with any dissenting opinions and submitting it to the policymakers is time-consuming. There are times when “crash” estimates are needed. One of these occasions was the Suez crisis of November, 1956. I had left Washington to go to my voting place in New York State when I received early on election eve a telephone message from General Charles P. Cabell, Deputy Director of the CIA. He read to me a Soviet note that had just come over the wires. Bulganin was threatening London and Paris with missile attacks unless the British and French forces withdrew from Egypt. I asked General Cabell to call a meeting of the intelligence community and immediately flew back to Washington. The USIB met throughout the night, and early on election morning I took to President Eisenhower our agreed estimate of Soviet intentions and probable courses of action in this crisis.
The contents of this and other estimates are generally kept secret. However, the fact that this mechanism exists and can operate quickly should be a matter of public knowledge. It is an important cog in our national security machinery.
When, on October 22, 1962, President Kennedy addressed the nation on the secret Soviet build-up of intermediate-range missiles in Cuba, the intelligence community had already been receiving reports from agents and refugees indicating mysterious construction of some sort of missile bases in Cuba. It was a well-known fact that for some time past, Castro—or the Soviets purporting to be acting for Castro—had been installing a whole series of bases for ground-to-air missiles. These, however, were of short range, and their major purpose apparently was to deal with possible intruding aircraft. Since the reports received came largely from persons who had little technical knowledge of missile development, they did not permit a firm conclusion to be drawn as to whether all the missiles on which they were reporting were of the short-range type or whether something more sinister was involved.
The evidence that had been accumulated was sufficient, however, to alert the intelligence community to the need for a more scientific and precise analysis. Reconnaissance flights were resumed, and the concrete evidence was obtained on which the President based his report to the nation and his quarantine action. This required, of course, not only the most careful intelligence analysis but prompt intelligence judgments. As the President stated, the air reconnaissance established beyond a doubt that more than antiaircraft installations were being constructed on Cuban soil. This was a case, incidentally, in which it was obviously necessary to give publicity to intelligence conclusions. Khrushchev’s subsequent statements and actions testified to their accuracy.
Here was another case where a “crash” estimate was required. Most of the estimating can be done on a more ordered basis, although there is usually a sense of urgency in the whole field of intelligence.
But whether as estimate has had weeks of analytical work behind it or is produced “overnight,” years of training in the whole tradecraft of intelligence analysis are part and parcel of the final product. For example, in the Cuban case, the estimate could only have been produced quickly because of devoted work over many years by the highest qualified technicians in photoanalysis. These men and women had reached such competence from the study of earlier photographs of missile sites that what would be entirely unintelligible or subject to likely misinterpretation in the hands of the novice produced clear and reliable intelligence for the experts.
There must be intelligence analysis on each and every country where our interests may be affected, as well as in specified fields of particular intelligence interest; for example, the Soviet achievements in the fields of nuclear physics, ballistics, aerodynamics and space; also in industry, agriculture, and transportation. Naturally, the political, economic and social situations of many countries may also be of significance. I recall that once I had to have quickly a massive amount of information about Greenland. Within a matter of minutes, there was laid before me a study of the geography, geology, climate, peoples and history of that little-visited area.
All this is by no means just a question of automation, of filing away old reports and pushing the right buttons and getting the answers. Automation is a help and speeds up the process. But as we move further into the age of scientific achievement, the complicated machines and scientific-detection devices require the greatest sophistication on the part of the operators and analysts. Without this, our scientifically produced information as well as that furnished by the tools of espionage would be of little use. For it is the patient analyst who arranges, ponders, tries out alternate hypotheses and draws conclusions. What he is bringing to the task is the substantive background, the imagination and originality of the sound and careful scholar.
The analyst has sometimes been described as the man who takes forty-nine documents and from them produces a fiftieth. He does not do this by combining all the others, condensing and summarizing them, but by comparing them for their similarities and contradictions and shaking them down until he has sorted out what is probably true and significant, what is probably true but insignificant, and what is doubtful. He is, in a sense, finding out from the mass of unanalyzed information at hand, what we really know with some surety and what its value is, and what we don’t know. He must bring to this task an impartiality that cannot be influenced by the fact that on the one hand lives may have been
risked to procure the information, or that, on the other hand, the “customers” in the intelligence community will be more satisfied to receive full answers to their questions than the available fragments that only answer part of their questions.
A single report, for example, on a technical installation somewhere behind the Iron Curtain may have been entitled by the intelligence officer responsible for the area, “Production of Fighter-Bombers at Plant X.” At headquarters, however, comparing this report with others on the same subject from a variety of sources, the analysts may find that some reference to metallurgical problems in the construction of a new rocket is the one valuable item in the whole report and that the main body of it, consisting of statistics on aircraft productions, is inaccurate or perhaps out of date. The latter part will therefore be shelved and the minute item on the rocket may alone find its way into that “fiftieth” document where it will be clearly ticketed as “untested” or “of unknown reliability,” and will remain so designated until further information from other sources confirms the truth of it or shows it to be in error or possibly the figment of some agent’s imagination.
There are knowable things which happen to be unknown. Sometimes they are easy, sometimes very difficult, to find out about. But there also are matters you cannot surely find out about at all. In such cases, if the requirement for a reasoned guess is high enough, we enter another phase of intelligence work—that of estimating. You make estimates not only about the knowable things that are not obvious, you make estimates also about those things which are literally unknowable, as we shall see.
The Craft of Intelligence Page 20