by Robin Wright
The United States was increasingly caught up in damage control—not only in the Middle East. No foreign-policy initiative had been more disastrous to core American values, interests, goals, and status around the world.
On the eve of President Bush’s 2007 State of the Union speech, global opinion of the United States had plummeted. Almost three quarters of those polled in a survey of twenty-five countries on six continents disapproved of American intervention in Iraq.48 More than two-thirds said the Iraq war had done more harm than good.
In Britain, America’s closest ally, more than eighty percent opposed the U.S. intervention. Almost three out of every four Britons said America’s presence in the Middle East provoked more conflict than it prevented. And almost sixty percent said the United States played a mainly negative role in the world.
“It’s been a horrible slide,” Doug Miller, president of international GlobeScan polling company, told The Washington Post.49
By 2007, virtually every goal set by the United States for its intervention in Iraq was more illusive than on the eve of war in 2003. Terrorism was a far greater threat. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was a graver danger. Iraq was more unstable, with the war itself looking increasingly unwinnable. The sectarian divide across the Middle East was threatening to redraw the Middle East map.
“We are at a potentially historic moment when the modern Arab state order that was created by the Europeans in 1920 has started to fray at its edges and its core, perhaps in what we might call the Great Arab Unraveling,” opined Rami Khouri, the Lebanese political columnist who dotes on American sports. “Shattered Iraq is the immediate driver of this possible dissolution and reconfiguration of Arab states that had held together rather well for nearly four generations.”50
Strategically, the United States was also more vulnerable, as it held less credibility and influence in the Middle East than at any time since its oil needs and alliance with Israel took it deep into the region after World War II.
If the 1956 Suez Canal crisis marked the demise of Europe’s influence in the Middle East, the Iraq War could well mark the demise of American influence. The United States may still be the major player, but mainly by default and largely on paper. Washington will be unable to threaten the use of sustained force or confrontation again anytime soon for fear of even greater backlash.
The U.S. experiment with force to create democracy also took a heavy toll on the agents of change. It stranded new activists and movements regionwide. As Iraq disintegrated, the region’s autocracies acted as if they had carte blanche to do as they pleased. Several of the dissidents I interviewed for this book, particularly in Egypt and Syria, were subsequently detained for their activities. Most were still held as this book went to press, some for more than a year. Anwar al Bunni, the Syrian human-rights lawyer, was sentenced to five years.
“The complete failure in Iraq,” said Syrian political analyst Sami Moubeyed, “will only keep other regimes in power longer.”
Some of the new democrats felt American aid or support was downright dangerous. In 2005, during Iranian writer Akbar Ganji’s long hunger strike, President Bush issued a statement expressing concern about his deteriorating health in prison and demanding his unconditional release for medical treatment. The White House appealed to human-rights activists around the world to rally to the Iranian writer’s cause.
“His valiant efforts should not go in vain,” the statement said. “Mr. Ganji, please know that as you stand for your own liberty, America stands with you.”
But in 2006, during Ganji’s first trip to Washington to pick up a freedom-of-speech award, he stayed as far away from the White House as he could.
“You people have great accomplishments,” the diminutive Iranian dissident told me. “But no one trusts the American government now. Many people wanted to set up meetings while I was here. All the dissidents in Iran asked me not to.”
Iranian activists felt betrayed by America’s tactics, he said, especially compared with their own peaceful efforts. “Violence and force,” Ganji said, “can never by themselves create genuine beliefs.”
Yet Ganji was not giving up his campaign for democratic change. Nor were others.
Ghada Shahbender, the Egyptian mother who formed a group to monitor presidential and parliamentary elections, came to Washington in 2007. Despite growing obstacles in Cairo, she had persevered—and was making something of a name for herself in the region. When Yemen held elections in 2006, she was invited to help monitor its polls.
She was also planning long-term. “Democracy is not about one-time elections,” she told me as we had dinner overlooking the Potomac.
Shayfeencom (We’re Watching You) had recently launched a campaign against Egypt’s endemic corruption. The government countered with a warning not to cross into politics. But then her group, Shahbender told me with a chuckle, discovered a simple discrepancy. The UN Convention Against Corruption, which Egypt formally ratified in 2005, stipulated that it had to be published by every signatory to inform its citizens of their rights in fighting corruption—which Egypt had not properly done. So We’re Watching You turned around and took the government to court.
“Even if we don’t win, we’ve made a point,” Shahbender said. “It’s a step.”
Shahbender had brought sixteen teenagers with her to Washington. They were part of her latest venture—Kid-mocracy 2007. It was a trial program that she and a few friends pulled together in less than three months to expose young Egyptians to democratic practices.
“Students in Egypt don’t know what a constitution is. They simply aren’t required to learn about it,” she told me. “I didn’t even read the whole thing until we organized this program. So what we need is basic civic education.”
Shahbender’s group launched a competition for students aged thirteen and fourteen. Kids studied democracies around the world and then wrote an essay evaluating four countries, based on United Nations criteria. Two of them had to be Egypt and the United States. The sixteen winners won a two-week trip to the United States—one week at a Massachusetts school to do a joint human-rights project with their American counterparts, the other week touring Washington, New York, Boston, and Philadelphia. The students saw both Republicans and Democrats on Capitol Hill. They experienced local government at the Boston State House. They saw the Liberty Bell and Independence Hall in Philadelphia. And they watched international diplomacy at the United Nations.
“Our resources are flimsy, so we have become professional beggars among our friends,” Shahbender said. “My god, can’t you just imagine what the 500 billion dollars the Americans have spent in Iraq would do if it had been used for real promotion of democracy!”
I asked Shahbender what impact the Iraq experiment with democracy had on her efforts.
“In Iraq, Bush set back democracy and freedom in the region more than any other American president,” she told me. “Most Egyptians now raise their eyebrows and speak quite sarcastically about American democracy.”
If change eventually took root in the region, she added, it would be despite what the United States did in Iraq, not because of it.
So what, I asked, would she do next?
“Keep trying,” she replied.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book is the result of more than three decades of living and traveling throughout the Middle East. I am grateful to the thousands of people in two dozen countries who have shared their stories and offered their insights. I owe the most to the subjects of this book who met with me, sometimes at great personal risk.
My editors at The Washington Post—Leonard Downie, Liz Spayd, Susan Glasser, and Scott Vance—supported my project and graciously gave me the time to work on this book. My colleagues Thomas Ricks and Dana Priest offered thoughtful advice, and Glenn Kessler often had to do the work of two people so that I could take time off.
I am particularly grateful to the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center for Middle East Policy, which provid
ed a peaceful refuge to think and write as well as the research staff to help. I am enormously indebted to Strobe Talbott, Martin Indyk, and Kenneth Pollack for their thoughtful support and interest. At Brookings, Bilal Saab was a doting, determined, and thorough researcher who poured himself into this project. Christopher DeVito and Shai Gruber were diligent and imaginative assistants. All three worked long hours to come up with both historic and current material to supplement my field research and reporting.
During a pivotal year of travels through the region, I was fortunate to work with an array of talented people in each country. I also benefited from the personal perspective of many Middle East experts. It would take a whole chapter to name them all.
For the historic Palestinian election, Waleed Agel put aside his jazz and his studies long enough to guide me around the territories and through the local political networks. We had a great adventure. Nathan Brown of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Robert Malley of the International Crisis Group, who were both international election monitors, generously shared their insights. Palestinian legislator Ziad Abu Amr, with whom I’ve had a running discussion about political Islam for two decades, was immensely helpful.
In Egypt, good-natured Nagwa Hassan spent long hours ensuring I saw everyone and went everywhere I needed for the book. We accumulated some wonderfully poignant stories. Amr Hamzawy at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace shared his great expertise on his homeland and on political trends throughout the region.
In Lebanon, Nayla Khoury had the ability to navigate Beirut’s crazed traffic—moving a stick shift with one hand that also held a pen to jot down names, directions, or phone numbers on a notebook balanced on her lap, while getting information in any of three languages on a cell phone in the other hand, leaving her knees to steer the car. She redefined multitasking. Augustus Richard Norton, noted author of his own books on Hezbollah, read through the Lebanon material and made many helpful suggestions. Julia Choucair at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Emile el Hokayem of the Henry L. Stimson Center offered extensive advice. Nicholas Noe, Hezbollah expert and editor in chief of Mideastwire.com in Lebanon, helped track Hezbollah documents.
In Syria, sweet Dalia Haidar often had wise thoughts after tough interviews. I admire her determination and courage. Joshua Landis generously opened up his Rolodex so that I had a full range of contacts on all sides of the debate in Damascus.
My wonderful friends Shaul Bakhash and Haleh Esfandiari have guided me for almost twenty years on the subject of Iran. The intrepid Lily Sadeghi has been my right hand on many trips there. I learned much from the Hadi Semati, who is the joyful Shirazi spirit personified, and Najmeh Bozorgmehr, a colleague at the Brookings Institution. Karim Sadjadpour of the International Crisis Group always provided sage counsel.
In Morocco, Driss Aissaoui was a helpful assistant in Rabat. Stephanie Willman Bordat, who has done groundbreaking work, steered me through the minefield of women’s rights. Dalia Mogahed of the Gallup polling organization also helped me understand the broader attitudes on women’s issues throughout the Middle East. I’m particularly sorry that the noble human-rights activist Driss Benzekri passed away shortly before this book was published; he was such an inspiration.
On Iraq, Ellen Laipson, Henri Barkey, Robin Raphel, and I have spent years debating Iraq and U.S. policy; they always enriched my knowledge and stimulated my thinking. In Baghdad, Barham Salih was pivotal in helping me delve deeper into Iraq, as was Adel Abdul Mahdi. Charles Duelfer also shared his expansive firsthand knowledge after a decade in Iraq, both during and after the rule of Saddam Hussein. Anthony Cordesman is unparalleled in the output of thoughtful data and analysis and always generous with his time.
On the many sides of change in the Middle East, I’m especially grateful to the democracy project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, particularly Marina Ottaway and Paul Salem. Their work on democracy is the most comprehensive undertaken by any U.S. institution. At Brookings, Shibley Telhami is an encyclopedia of vital polling data tracking public opinion throughout the Middle East. Peter Singer was helpful on the precarious state of relations between the United States and the Islamic world.
At Penguin Press, Scott Moyers was a patient and nurturing editor. His advice and ideas made this a much richer book. I feel especially privileged to have worked with him before he left the field of editing. Esther Newberg, my agent, is always a wonderful shoulder; over the years, in other ways, she’s also taught me a great deal about the joys of charity.
No one has done more to inspire me than my mother, who encouraged her children from an early age to taste the world and understand all its people. She never hesitated to visit me in many of the war zones I lived in. And she is always my first—and best—manuscript reader. She would have been much better at what I do if she’d had the same opportunities. I can never thank her enough.
NOTES
PROLOGUE: THE MIDDLE EAST: THE PROSPECTS
1.Akbar, Ganji The Middle East: “Money Can’t Buy Us Democracy,” The New York Times, Aug. 1, 2006.
2.“Bloggers May Be the Real Opposition,” The Economist, Apr. 12, 2007.
3.Final statement of a conference, Arab Reform Issues: Vision and Implementation, held March 12–14, 2004 at the Bibliotheca Alexandrina in Egypt. Participating organizations included: the Arab Academy for Science and Technology, the Arab Business Council, the Arab Women’s Organization, the Economic Research Forum, and the Arab Organization for Human Rights. This text is available at arabreformforum.com in Arabic and English.
4.“Stop Terror Sheikhs, Muslim Academics Demand,” Arab News, Oct. 30, 2004.
5.Brian Murphy, “Moderate Muslims Using Quran to Wage ‘Counter-jihad’ against Radicals’ Interpretation of Islam,” Associated Press. Mar. 28, 2006.
6.Rami Khouri, “A Sensible Path to Arab Modernity,” distributed by Agence Global, Aug. 21, 2005.
7.Arab Human Development Report 2004: Towards Freedom in the Arab World (New York: United Nations, 2005).
8.Samir Kassir, “Being Arab” (New York: Verso. 2006), p. 28.
9.Jim Krane, “Voters in United Arab Emirates Set to Vote in Historic Elections Saturday,” Associated Press, Dec. 15, 2006.
10.Marina Ottaway, “Tyranny’s Full Tank,” The New York Times, Mar. 31, 2005.
11.Rami Khouri, “From Paris to Sydney, Baywatch to Bombers,” column distributed by Agence Global, Nov. 2005.
12.Ibid.
13.“How to Beat the Terrorists: Lessons from a Journey Across the Arab World,” Rami Khouri, column distributed by Agence Global, July 20, 2005.
14.Interview with pollster Nader Said of Birzeit University in Ramallah, Jan. 23, 2006.
15.Arab Media: Tools of the Governments, Tools for the People? United States Institute of Peace, Virtual Diplomacy Series, No. 18, Apr 12, 2005.
16.Robin Wright and Peter Baker, “Iraq, Jordan See Threat to Election from Iran; Leaders Warn Against Forming Religious State,” The Washington Post, Dec. 8, 2004.
17.Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic (New York: New York University Press, 1997), p. 93.
CHAPTER ONE: THE PALESTINIANS: THE CONUNDRUM
1.Two of the eight factions in the Palestine Liberation Organization were founded and led by Christians. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was founded by George Habash, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine was founded by Nayif Hawatmeh.
2.Janet Wallach and John Wallach, Arafat: In the Eyes of the Beholder, (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1990), p. 108.
3.Robin Wright, “Jeans and Dolls Put PLO into the Big Money,” The Sunday Times (London), Oct. 4, 1981.
4.Nathan J. Brown, Requiem for Palestinian Reform: Clear Lessons from a Troubled Record, Carnegie Papers Middle East Series, No. 81, Democracy and Rule of Law Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Feb. 2007.
5.Khalil Shikaki, “The Future of P
alestine,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no. 6, Nov.–Dec. 2004.
6.“Palestinian Corruption,” Middle East Reporter, Feb. 6, 2006.
7.Shikaki’s work has been groundbreaking in identifying trends and surveying public opinion among Palestinians. The United States Institute of Peace, the congressionally created and funded think tank in Washington, D.C., has supported his research and hosted his speeches in Washington. It described him as “one of the foremost authorities on Palestinian national politics.” The Ford Foundation is among several American and European funders of his projects. He has been a fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center for Middle East Studies and was the first appointment by Brandeis University’s new Crown Center for Middle East Studies in 2005. He has conducted joint projects with Hebrew University and worked with other Israeli academics. Khalil Shikaki would not discuss his estranged brother more than a decade after his death. His brother’s extremism has haunted his own career. In the early 1990s, before returning to the West Bank, Shikaki taught at Columbia, the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, and the World and Islam Studies Enterprise, a University of South Florida think tank. But Campus Watch, a group that monitors courses, faculty, and writings about the Middle East on American campuses, published allegations in 2006 that the younger Shikaki in the early 1990s also had connections to Islamic Jihad, had maintained covert contact with his brother, and had contributed funds that ended up with the extremist group. Khalil Shikaki, the report charged, was “a key intermediary in the organization of the American arm of the Palestine Islamic Jihad.” Brandeis University immediately issued a strong denial. Khalil Shikaki, it said, is “among the most serious, responsible, credible, committed and courageous observers of Middle East politics. For more than a decade and a half, he has been at the forefront of numerous attempts to help reach a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute.” He had often briefed American officials and had specifically reached out to Israeli and Jewish groups in the United States, it noted, including the Anti-Defamation League and the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). The allegations, the university countered, were based entirely on “unsubstantiated claims, mischaracterizations, innuendos, and guilt by association.”