Once out of sight they would stop and cut the telegraph line and the track to preclude pursuit. Even though there was no telegraph in Big Shanty, cutting the line was a wise precaution. As they sped north, stationmasters might become suspicious and telegraph enquiries back down the line. The raiders would head north at high speed, periodically cutting the telegraph line in case it was rapidly repaired further down the line, as well as cutting the track. This would be accomplished by prying up rails. No demolitions would be involved.3 Andrews did not plan on burning any of the smaller bridges until he reached the Etowah River and its big bridge, and then the Oostanaula River Bridge; both high-value targets. The bridges had to be burned south of Dalton as there was a branch line that ran northeast to connect to the same east–west line that the W&A connected to in Chattanooga.
Andrews was armed with an explanation to deceive stationmasters as they headed north. He would say they were on special assignment hauling gunpowder to Corinth in northern Mississippi for Gen P.G.T. Beauregard, whose forces were currently in the area. He expected that word of the Union advance designed to coordinate with the raid would have been received by then. It was entirely possible, however, that their cover story would be questioned, because it was known the Yankees had cut the east–west line at Huntsville; Corinth was further west. Additionally, none of the locomotive’s crew would be recognized by stationmasters and yard workers: specific locomotives were assigned to particular runs with regular engineers and firemen. Thus the raid’s increased manpower could be crucial if they needed to shoot their way out of a dire situation. This was unlikely though, as few, if any, W&A employees were armed, and there were apparently no armed guards at yards and stations. In fact, even after the November bridge-burnings and the increased security measures, there is no mention in contemporary writings of encountering bridge guards. Andrews’ biggest fear was being shuttled to a siding to make way for unscheduled high-priority trains. Cutting the telegraph lines to the south prevented word of any unscheduled trains being sent ahead so they would have no advance warning if this was likely.
They would need to take on water and wood en route. Atlanta to Chattanooga was known as a “five-cord run,” which meant at least two wood and watering stops. The tender carried only one and three-quarter cords of wood and the engine would be running at higher than normal speed.4
Assuming no unexpected difficulties, on reaching Chattanooga they would turn west at the Market Street crossing on to the Nashville & Chattanooga line then the Memphis & Charleston, and soon run into the advancing 3rd Division, moving east to take Chattanooga. No doubt greeted as heroes, they would have accomplished a great deal if all went well, much more than normally expected of such a small, unconventional band.
The main goal of the raid was no more ambitious than to deny the rebels use of the W&A line north of the Etowah River, simply by burning bridges, cutting rails on the single-track line, and disrupting telegraph communications. They would not try to disable locomotives or rolling stock encountered en route, attack or otherwise halt troop or supply trains, engage enemy forces, damage railroad facilities, or blow up the Tunnel Hill tunnel. If successful, Andrews’ raiders would have performed an invaluable service by preventing rebels from sending trains north with troops, munitions, and supplies, and rendering them severely hampered in the withdrawal of troops, casualties, and materials. The area’s road network was very poor and the W&A was the only reliable means of moving large numbers of troops and supplies. It was hoped that stranded trains caught between Chattanooga and the burned bridges to the south would eventually be seized by Union forces, although realistically most would probably be destroyed by their operators.
The Atlanta railyard with more troops loaded on boxcars. The barely visible locomotive to the right-center is an American Standard 4-4-0 similar to the General and the Texas. To the right is the office of the Daily Intelligencer newspaper.
There was apparently little thought of the long-term impact of the bridge-burnings. If Northern forces were able to immediately exploit the capture of Chattanooga and advance south toward Atlanta, even if they were able only to move part of the distance to gain a foothold in Georgia, the burned bridges would hamper their advance. If such an advance was delayed, the Confederates would no doubt quickly repair the bridges themselves, with the Yankees poised to advance from Chattanooga. Realistically Mitchel’s lone division with limited logistics support would not be able to advance further south without significant reinforcement, which would be slow in coming. When the Federals did resume the advance south there was little doubt that the Confederates would once again burn the bridges. Mitchel had a credible bridge-building capability but, nonetheless, burned bridges could delay an advance for weeks. As it was, these bridges would be burned and rebuilt numerous times before the war was over. The Etowah River Bridge itself was burned and rebuilt a total of six times.
The risks and costs for Mitchel were minimal. If the mission failed Mitchel was no worse off than he would have been if he had not ordered the attempt. The cost would be only a couple of dozen men and a small amount of money. Even if it failed overall it might create at least some degree of delay and confusion on the main Confederate rail line, although Mitchel undoubtedly envisaged himself accepting the surrender of the starved Chattanooga garrison within two weeks. At the time, Confederate forces in Chattanooga were weak and Mitchel hoped to reach the rail center before it could be reinforced. Andrews’ raid might well help him achieve that goal.
From statements made by the men accompanying Andrews on the failed March raid attempt they were disconcerted and rattled by the experience. Andrews had asked the members of his first expedition and none were interested in a second chance of attaining glory. He learned that while he was comfortable operating behind Southern lines, that was not the case for conventional soldiers, who were entirely out of their element. Few, if any, had even been in the South in peacetime, much less performed as spies, an offense that led to the gallows. Andrews asked for volunteers who fully understood that they were embarking on a dangerous mission behind enemy lines. There was no time available for him to interview volunteers personally as he no doubt wished. He had his own preparations to make.
Photographs are available of all of the Andrews raiders, but most were taken after, often long after, their April 1862 exploits. This photograph of Pvt John R. Porter of Company G, 21st Ohio is one of the few available photographs taken before the raid. Porter missed the train, but was later identified as a member of the Andrews party, imprisoned with the other raiders, but successfully escaped. He was the last of the raiders to pass away in 1923. (Bogle)
Mitchel took the simple expedient of having company commanders in one of his brigades recommend and select the men. They would know best who were steady, reliable, and resourceful. Andrews may also have specified men with strength, owing to the necessary heavy labor and their value in a close fight. He also requested some men who had been locomotive engineers or possessed other railroading experience.
Mitchel was born in Kentucky, but raised in Ohio and considered himself an Ohioan. He directed that the volunteers be selected from the 2nd, 20th, and 33rd Ohio Infantry Regiments of Col Joshua W. Sill’s 9th Brigade. Verbal orders were sent out before the meeting was concluded to the three regiments’ company commanders, seeking men with soldierly qualities to volunteer for an unspecified secret mission. It is assumed that the company commanders chose the one or two men5 from their units based on their knowledge of their abilities and character. Among them were one regimental sergeant major, two sergeants, seven corporals, and 12 privates. Very few knew one another. It is possible that Marion A. Ross, the 2nd Ohio’s regimental sergeant major, was sent simply to have an overall military leader of the troops as he does not appear to have been detailed because of his martial knowledge and leadership ability. He had been in the Army for only a year, had been first promoted to regimental quartermaster sergeant and then sergeant major, the senior NCO in the regiment and basicall
y an administrative assistant to the staff. He was considered somewhat of a dandy and attracted to military pomp and ceremony. At 29 he just did not fit the image of a hard-bitten experienced sergeant major. Not surprisingly Ross did not demonstrate any exceptional leadership talent or offer any military advice to Andrews.
On one level it seems unusual that an officer was not detailed so that the soldiers would be under formal military command rather than answering to a civilian. There are three reasons why this was not the case. Experienced officers were scarce; why risk one on a chancy secret mission? Also, why risk his reputation on the same? It just was not the kind of action for an officer and gentleman to be involved with. It could be, too, that it was simply to prevent any leadership and authority conflicts between Andrews and an officer, especially one inexperienced in such sordid affairs. Andrews had formulated the plan, he knew the rail line and its operation intimately, and was in the best position to make immediate decisions with regards to rapidly changing circumstances, even if he lacked military experience.
For the most part the volunteer raiders had little combat experience. Most of these men had volunteered between August and November 1861, with a few having enrolled earlier in the year in the 2nd Ohio on three-month enlistments and when soon discharged reenlisted for a further three years. They were dedicated to the cause but most had seen no action in their short time in the Army. Some had fought in the battle of Ivy Mountain, Kentucky6 on November 8–9, 1861, a minor action against Confederate cavalry raiders. Most were between 17 and 25 years of age. The youngest was 16, Pvt Smith, and the oldest were Pvt George Wilson and Cpl Hawkins, both 32. Most of the men were farmers or tradesmen with between six and eight months’ military experience. Nearsighted Cpl Pittenger was a schoolteacher and Cpl Llewellyn a coal miner. Pvt Robertson was a sawmill engineer, prep-school-educated Sergeant Major Ross was an accomplished musician, and Cpl Jacob Parrott was an illiterate farmer.
Andrews’ raiders Parent unit Birth–Death
James J. Andrews † Civilian of Kentucky 1829–1862
Pvt William Bensinger‡ Co. G, 21st Ohio 1840–1918
Pvt Wilson W. Brown* Co. F, 21st Ohio 1837–1916
Pvt Robert Buffum‡ Co. H, 21st Ohio 1828–1871
William H. Campbell† Civilian of Ohio 1839–1862
Cpl Daniel A. Dorsey* Co. H, 33rd Ohio 1838-1918
Pvt William J. Knight* Co. E, 21st Ohio 1837-1916
Sgt Elihu H. Mason‡ Co. K, 21st Ohio 1831–1896
Cpl Jacob Parrott‡ Co. K, 33rd Ohio 1843–1908
Cpl William C. Pittenger‡ Co. G, 2nd Ohio 1840–1904
Cpl William H.H. Reddick‡ Co. B, 33rd Ohio 1840–1903
Pvt Samuel Robertson† Co. G, 33rd Ohio 1842–1862
Sgt Maj Marion A. Ross† Staff, 2nd Ohio 1832–1862
Sgt John M. Scott† Co. F, 21st Ohio 1839–1862
Pvt Charles P. Shadrach† Co. K, 2nd Ohio 1840–1862
Pvt Samuel Slavens† Co. E, 33rd Ohio 1831–1862
Pvt George D. Wilson† Co. B, 2nd Ohio 1830–1862
Pvt John Alfred Wilson* Co. C, 21st Ohio 1832–1904
Pvt John Wollam* Co. C, 33rd Ohio 1840–1890
Cpl Mark Wood* Co. C, 21st Ohio 1839–1866
Raiders who did not participate in the chase:
Cpl Martin J. Hawkins* Co. A, 22nd Ohio 1830–1886
Cpl Samuel Llewellyn§ Co. I, 33rd Ohio 1841–1915
Pvt John R. Porter* Co. G, 21st Ohio 1838–1923
Pvt James O.W. Smith§ Co. I, 2nd Ohio 1844–1868
* Escaped † Executed ‡ Exchanged
§ Impressed into Confederate service and deserted.
Name Notes: Pvt Shadrach’s real name was Philip G., which he disliked, and usually listed his name as Charles P. or Perry D. His last name is sometimes incorrectly spelled “Sharack.” Pvt Wollam is sometimes incorrectly listed as “Whollan,” “Wollen” or “Wollum.” William Campbell is often erroneously listed as a “citizen of Kentucky” and informed his captors he was in Company K, 2nd Ohio.
THE RAIDERS’ REVOLVERS
There is seldom any mention of the makes and models used by the raiders. Being from infantry units, to which revolvers were not issued, it can only be surmised that they obtained non-issue side arms. Officers bought their own revolvers and it was not uncommon for rankers to unofficially do the same. The raiders’ handguns would have been obtained either from officers or friends, as none were available to purchase locally. A revolver of the period was expensive and a private made $13 a month; Government cost for a Colt was $25. The most common makes were Adams, Colt, Kerr, Lefaucheux, LeMat, Remington, Savage, Starr, and Whitney. The Colt was very popular, and expensive, with the two most common models being the .44-cal Model 1860 Army and .36-cal Model 1851 Navy. “Navy” models were used almost as widely by soldiers as “Army” models. The one confirmed revolver carried by a raider was indeed a Colt Navy Model 1851. Andrews himself carried a pearl-handled Colt. Other widely used handguns were the Remington New Model 1861 Army .44-cal and Navy .36-cal models, plus the Star .44-cal Army Model. Some may have had only small-caliber pocket pistols. There was little standardization of calibers and cartridges, with most makes having their own unique ammunition. No doubt several types of ammunition were carried by the raiders. These were all single-action, percussion six-shooters. These revolvers used conical bullets held, glued, in a combustible paper or linen cartridge containing the black powder charge. Cartridges were packed in six-round packets and the raiders may have carried about six packets. One account describes “a liberal supply of cartridges.”
To load these weapons was a time-consuming process. The hammer was placed at half-cock and a cartridge was inserted into the chamber from the cylinder’s front and the bullet pressed in with the thumb. The cylinder was rotated by hand to align the loaded chamber over the trigger. The loading lever under the barrel was pulled downward to ram the bullet solidly into the chamber and compress the powder ensuring positive combustion. This process was continued until all chambers were loaded. Next a percussion cap was pressed by the thumb on to the cone (or nipple) over each chamber on the rear end of the cylinder. The cylinder was again rotated by hand until all nipples were capped. The piece was taken off half-cock and it was ready for action. Sometimes non-combustible paper cartridges were used and the lower end had to be torn open with the teeth, the powder poured into the chamber, and the remaining paper worn off and spat out before inserting the bullet. Certainly loading a revolver was not something one could easily do on the run or at a mounted trot.
In some companies, word of the need for volunteers to undertake a secret expedition was spread by mouth. In others the captain called together a small group of men thought capable, and one man was selected. In still others the commander went directly to an individual or two he thought suited for such an undertaking. Those selected and consenting were ordered to report to their regimental commander. They were given no details of what the mission would entail other than they would be embarking on a dangerous operation behind Southern lines under the command of a civilian.
Besides manpower Andrews needed experienced locomotive engineers who would drive the stolen train, serve as a fireman, and teach the other men how to operate as a brakeman7 and other duties. He also needed backups or alternates for these assignments. This was fortuitous as two of his experienced railroaders failed to make it to the train the morning it departed Marietta. All the men were interviewed by Andrews himself to determine the extent of their skills, knowledge, and experience.
Privates Knight and Brown had both been locomotive engineers, the first in Indiana and Illinois and the second with the Mobile & Ohio RR. Pvt Smith had been a machinist for the Columbus & Indiana Central RR and Cpl Hawkins, the most experienced engineer, a locomotive engineer in Pennsylvania. However, Smith and Hawkins missed boarding the train at Marietta. Cpl Wood was also a machinist and strangely an Englishman.
The only other civilian besides Andrews was William C
ampbell, an experienced locomotive engineer. Campbell appears to have been a shady individual, reputed even to have been a “whoremonger.” The reason for his unofficial presence in the camp of the 2nd Ohio is unknown, although it may have had something to do with his reported reputation. It has been suggested that he was visiting friends there as a means of avoiding enquiries from the law; there were stories that he may have murdered a man. Described as a hulking, bullying type, it appears he volunteered for adventure and perhaps some degree of profit. Being a civilian, and considering his background, there can be little doubt that Andrews paid him for his services.
Mitchel provided Andrews with an unknown sum of money for the purchase of civilian clothing, food, and other items. The raiders also needed money en route for meals, hotels, and train tickets. This he disbursed to the men on the night of the 7th. It is not known how much Andrews was paid for his services. Rumors have it anywhere from $20,000 to $50,000 in gold. This was a considerable sum in 1862, $20,000 being equivalent to $425,000 today. But is doubtful if his fee was that high. Another story is that he was paid an unspecified but not inconsiderable sum, plus the right to trade freely across the lines for up to $5,000 in transactions per month.
The infantry volunteers would, of course, receive no financial reward. No doubt there were some glory seekers among them, but they were motivated mainly by a strong sense of duty. They had not seen any real war, having been occupied with training, encampments, and marching into Alabama. They had wintered in Ohio, near home, and their present situation found them camped in the South in spring weather and with no enemy in sight. Many wanted to see some action, being young, enthusiastic, and naive to the horrors of war.
In the morning the men were given money and a pass to nearby Shelbyville, with a population of a few hundred. They were instructed to purchase appropriate civilian clothes, food, and, even though this is seldom mentioned in accounts, to purchase or borrow pistols. There were none available in such a small town, especially one that had been under Southern control and now had an occupying army present. There were only a few dry goods and general stores and their inventories were no doubt sparse. One man, Cpl Dorsey, was unable to find fitting civilian pants and began the adventure wearing dark blue issue trousers. Others borrowed civilian clothing from friends, perhaps because there was insufficient available in town or perhaps just to hang on to the money given them. What little clothing was available was cotton rather than the preferred wool: caps, coats, vests, checkered shirts, trousers or denim jeans, mostly in brown or butternut (yellowish light brown).
The Great Locomotive Chase Page 3