Battle Ready (2004)

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Battle Ready (2004) Page 50

by Tom - Nf - Commanders Clancy


  The need right now is critical to transform our military in a deliberate and thoughtful, yet significant, way. Americans must acknowledge this need and support investment in this transformation for it to succeed. This will require a stronger and closer relationship between Americans and their military. This relationship has drifted apart, and has even been strained at times, since the end of the Vietnam War and the institution of the all-volunteer force.

  What should be the shape of that transformation?

  The military traditionally goes out there and kills people and breaks things. From that, we determine how we are going to straighten out the mess or resolve the conflict. Once upon a time, we looked at the other elements of national power--political, economic, information, whatever--to figure out how we could bring them to bear. That's what George Marshall did at the end of World War Two. It has not happened in recent times.

  The military does a damned good job of killing people and breaking things. We can design a better rifle squad than anybody in the world. We can build a better fighter, a better ship, a better tank, a smarter bomb. We are so far ahead of any potential enemy right now in those kinds of technological areas, in the areas of expertise, of quality of leadership, and of all the other elements that make military units great on the battlefield, that you wonder why we keep busting brain cells working to make it better, or to transform it into something else.

  Transformation has to include finding better and more remarkable ways to tap into technology, our own brainpower, our training and education, and creative ways of redesigning our organization to make our military even more efficient and more powerful on the battlefield.

  But transformation has to go beyond that.

  What is the role of the military beyond killing people and breaking things?

  Right now, the military in Iraq has been stuck with that baby. In Somalia, we were stuck with that baby. In Vietnam, we were stuck with that baby. It is not a new role, and it is going to continue. We have to ask ourselves how the military needs to change in order to actually deal with these political, economic, social, security, and information management challenges that we've already been facing for a long time. If those wearing suits can't come in and solve the problem--can't bring the resources, the expertise, the organization to bear--and the military is going to continue to get stuck with it, you have two choices: Either the civilian officials must develop the capabilities demanded of them and learn how to partner with other agencies to get the job done, or the military finally needs to change into something else beyond the breaking and the killing.

  What could this mean?

  It could mean that we return to a military that's a calling and not just a job. For more than a quarter-century, we have been operating with an All-Volunteer Force--and the American people tend to forget that, until the volunteers stop showing up and reenlisting. The troops will start getting out because they're deployed too long and too often. We need sufficient forces to meet our commitments, have the time for our forces to be properly trained, and provide for the quality of life that supports a first-rate military.

  We were building an All-Volunteer Force with professionals, not mercenaries. The troops certainly don't mind a better paycheck, but first and foremost they truly want to be the best military in the world. We owe them that and we owe them the care they deserve after serving our nation.

  It could mean military civil affairs will change from being just a tactical organization doing basic humanitarian care and interaction with the civilian population to actually being capable of reconstructing nations. That will require people in uniform, and maybe civilian suits as well, who are educated in the disciplines of economics and political structures and who will actually go in and work these issues. Either we get the civilian officials on the scene who can do it--get them there when they need to be there, give them the resources and the training, and create the interoperability that is necessary--or validate the military mission to do it.

  It could mean we would at last go into each of these messy new situations with a strategic plan, a real understanding of regional and global security, and a knowledge of what it takes to wield the power to shape security and move it forward. Where are today's Marshalls, Eisenhowers, and Trumans, who had the vision to see the world in a different way, and who understood America's role and what had to be done in order to play that role?

  Our military men and women should never be put on a battlefield without a strategic plan, not only for the fighting--our generals will take care of that--but for the aftermath and for winning the war. Where are we, the American people, if we accept less; if we accept any level of sacrifice without an adequate level of planning?

  It kills me when I hear of the continuing casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan and the sacrifices being made. It also kills me to hear someone say that each one of those is a personal tragedy, but in the overall scheme of things, the numbers are statistically insignificant. Bullshit. We should challenge any military or political leader who utters such words. The greatest treasure the United States has is our enlisted men and women. When we put them in harm's way, it had better count for something. Their loss is a national tragedy.

  AS I REFLECT on my own forty years of military service, and my later years of diplomacy and peacemaking, I have to ask: "What is our legacy?" My son is now a Marine captain. What have we left for him to look forward to?

  We all know that burgeoning technology will widen his horizons beyond anything we can imagine. It will also present new questions of ethics and morality that we have barely begun to fathom. Yet he must also live with the organization I have had to live with for forty years. Napoleon could reappear today and recognize the Central Command staff organization: J-1, administration stovepipe; J-2, intelligence stovepipe--you get the idea. This antiquated organization is oblivious to what everyone else in the world is doing: flattening organization structure, with decentralized operations and more direct communications. This must be fixed.

  My son will have to deal with the inevitable military-civilian rift and drift--which will become more severe in the future. He will also have to deal with the social issues we have not been able to fix. And they will get tougher, within a national debate over why we still need a strong military. My son's generation must ultimately face the question of how much the military should be a reflection of U.S. society. The people of America will get the military they want, in due course, but it is up to the military to advise them about the risks and consequences of their decisions.

  My son will face nontraditional missions in messy places that will make Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq look like a picnic. He will see a changed battlefield, with an accelerated tempo and greatly expanded knowledge base. He will witness a great drop in the sense of calling. People entering the military will not be imprinted with his code. On his watch, my son is likely to see a weapons of mass destruction event. Another and worse 9/11 will occur in some city, somewhere in the world where Americans are gathered. When that nasty bug or gas or nuke is released, it will forever change him and his institutions. At that point, all the lip service paid to dealing with such an eventuality will be revealed for what it is--lip service. And he will have to deal with it for real. In its wake, I hope he gets to deal with yet another--and better--Goldwater-Nichols arrangement.

  What will we expect of him as a battlefield commander? Brains, guts, and determination--nothing new here. But we would ask for more than battlefield skill from our future commanders. We want character, sense of moral responsibility, and an ethical standard that rises above those of all other professions. We want him to be a model who accepts the profession of arms as a calling. We want him to take care of our sons and daughters and treat their lives as precious--putting them in harm's way only if it truly counts. We'll expect him to stand up to civilian leadership before thinking of his own career.

  And I hope that we would think enough of him and his compatriots to show some respect for them along the way.

  I h
ave been all over this globe and exposed to most of the cultures on it. I am fascinated by them. I love the diversity. I want to understand them and embrace them. I could never understand prejudice or rejection or the sense of superiority that drive the hatemongers of the world. I lived through a tumultuous period of our history when our own minorities broke from second-class citizenship into full participation in this wonderful dream we call America. I have been proud of their accomplishments and contributions. They have proven the bigots wrong and made our nation greater. I hope the dream we have struggled to realize can be extended to the rest of the planet.

  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

  Working on this book has been a long, hard process. Thanks to the friendship, encouragement, patience, prodding, creativity, and skillful contributions of Tom Clancy, Tony Koltz, Neil Nyren, Marty Greenberg, and Fred Williams, this project was made possible.

  --Tony Zinni

  INDEX

  Abdullah, King (Jordan)

  Abdullah, Crown Prince (Saudi Arabia)

  Abdullah, Zaini, Dr.

  Abramowitz, Mort

  Aceh-Indonesia conflict

  Addis Ababa

  AD Skyraider aircraft

  Advanced Operating Base

  Afghanistan

  Africa . See also Somalia

  African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS)

  African Crisis Response Initiatives (ACRI)

  Aideed, Mohammed Farrah

  Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)

  Air campaign

  Air Power Doctrine

  Ala, Abu

  Albright, Madeleine

  Al Jazeera

  All-Volunteer Force

  Al Qaeda

  Altynbayev, Gen.

  Ambassadors

  American Empire

  Amphibious ops

  Anderson, W. M., Maj.

  Annan, Kofi

  Arabs

  Arafat, Yasser

  Armitage, Richard

  Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)

  Arroyo, Gloria

  Asymmetric capabilities

  Atto, Osman

  Authorized Weapons Storage Sites (AWSSs)

  Avebury, Eric, Lord

  Ba'ath party headquarters

  Badime

  Baker, James

  Balkans

  Bandar, Prince

  Bangladeshi Battalion

  Barak, Ehud

  Barre, Siad

  Barzani, Masoud

  Battle Command Training Program (BCTP)

  Battlefield commander

  Battlefield reports

  Battle of the Bong Son Plain

  Battle of Gallipoli

  Battle of Mogadishu

  Battle rhythm

  Battle Staff

  Bedard, Buck, Col.

  Beirut Air Bridge

  Beirut Marine barracks bombing

  Berger, Sandy

  Berlin

  Berlin Wall

  Binh Dinh Province (II CTZ)

  Bin Jassim, Hamad

  Bin Laden, Osama

  Birddog light observation plane ("Herbie")

  Body counts

  Bong Son Plain

  battle of

  Booby traps

  Booz Allen

  Bosnia

  Boutros-Ghali, Boutros

  Bright Star (military exercise)

  Brooks, Karen

  Burch, Hal, Brig.

  Burns, Bill

  Buscemi, Mario, Lt. Gen.

  Bush, George H. W.

  Bush, George W.

  Bushnell, Prudence

  Butler, Richard

  C-130

  Cadre status

  Campbell, Don, Brig. Gen.

  Camp David negotiations

  Camp Foster

  Camp Hansen

  Camp Hauge

  Camp Lejeune

  Camp Pendleton

  Capstone course

  Careerism

  Caribbean

  Carter administration

  Center of gravity

  Centers for Disease Control (CDC)

  Central Asia

  Central Command, U.S. (CENTCOM)

  Zinni appointed DCINC

  Zinni appointed CINC

  and Somalia

  staff organization

  strategy, politics, and New American Empire

  CH-53 helo

  Chalabi, Ahmed

  Checkpoint Charlie

  Chelberg, Bob, Lt. Gen.

  Cheney, Dick

  China

  Cholera

  Christians

  Civil Agency Response Element (CARE)

  Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)

  Clark Air Force Base

  Clinton administration

  Camp David negotiations

  National Security Strategy

  new global strategy

  Coalition Support Teams

  Code to live by

  Cohen, William

  Cold War . See also Soviet Union

  aftermath of

  peace dividend from

  vestiges of

  Combat missions

  Combined Task Force (CTF)

  Commander in chief (CINC)

  Commander in chief Europe (CINCEUR)

  Company D

  Company tactical test

  Company training

  Components

  Concepts and Capabilities Branch

  Conflict resolution

  Congress, U.S.

  Congressional delegation (CODEL)

  Constitution, U.S.

  Containment

  Conventional war

  Crisis Action Team (CAT)

  Croizat, Victor J., Col.

  Cuban revolution

  Cymkin, Tom

  Dahlan, Mohamed

  Dalton, John

  Dam Tra O

  Danang

  Danger close

  Danoon, Nashwan, Brig. Gen.

  DeCosta, Dick, Gunnery Sgt.

  Defense Department, U.S.

  Deputy commander in chief (DCINC)

  Dereliction of Duty (McMaster)

  Deskins, Corp.

  Development

  DiSabatino, Cecilia

  DiSabatino, Zupito

  Disaster assistance

  Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)

  Displaced persons

  Doctors Without Borders (Medecins Sans Frontieres)

  Dong Nai boats

  Downing, Wayne, Gen.

  Downing Commission

  Draft

  Drug use

  Dual Containment

  Dunant, Henri

  Durant, Michael, Chief Warrant Officer

  Early Bird

  East Africa

  East African Community (EAC)

  East Berlin

  Eastern bloc nations

  East Timor

  East-West competition

  Egypt

  Eisenhower, Dwight

  Ekeus, Rolf

  Eliezer, Ben

  Elmo, Capt.

  Emerald Express

  Engagement

  Environmental security

  Erekat, Sa'eb

  Eritrea

  Ethiopia

  Ethiopia-Eritrea war

  Ethnic hatred

  Europe

  European Command, U.S. (EUCOM)

  Evil Empire

  Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

  Failed states

  Fast-breaking missions

  Feedback

  Fieldcraft

  Firefights

  sense of

  Fire procedure

  1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF)

  Flak jacket

  Flamethrower

  Fleet Antiterrorist Support Team (FAST)

  Former Soviet Union (FSU)

  Forward headquarters

  France

  Franks, Tommy, Gen.

  Free Aceh Movement (GAM)

  Fugit, E
d

  Fulda Gap

  Galvin, Jack, Gen.

  Garcia, Lt. Gen.

  Garner, Jay, Maj. Gen.

  Garrett, John, Col.

  Gbeho, Victor

  Geneva Convention requirements

  Giap, Gen.

  Gingrich, Newt

  Globalization

  Godfrey, Jack, Maj. Gen.

  Golden Spear

  Goldwater-Nichols Act

  Gray, Al, Gen.

  Griffiths, Martin

  Grossman, Marc

  Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

  Gulf War

  Gunn, Lee, Rear Adm.

  Habbaniyah Air Base

  Hamas

  Hamilton, Bob, Capt.

  Haynes, Fred, Maj. Gen.

  Heebner, Dave, Gen.

  Helicopters

  Henri Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC)

  "Herbies" (observation planes)

  Hess, Capt.

  Highway 1

  Hirsch, John

  Hoar, Joe, Gen.

  Hobson, Jim, Brig. Gen.

  Ho Chi Minh

  Ho Chi Minh Trail

  Horn of Africa

  "House of Pain" (Iraq intelligence HQ)

  Howe, Jonathan, Adm.

  H & S Company

  Hue City

  Hughes, Dan

  Humanitarian Assessment Support Team (HAST)

  Humanitarian assistance

  in Iraq

  in Somalia

  Humanitarian Operation Center (HOC)

  Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRSs)

  Human relations training

  Hussein, Saddam

  Ia Drang Valley

  Incirlik Air Base

  Independence movements

  Inderfer, Rick

  India

  Indonesia

  Infantry

  Information revolution

  Innovations

  Institute of Peace, U.S. (USIP)

  Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)

  Iran

  Iraq

 

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