Bertrand was, no doubt, inter alia a peddler and purchaser of foreign government codes and I think that as he never had an opportunity in his own organisation of obtaining results from crypt, he had decided to concentrate on careful purchase as the surest method. I would say he did not have access to very much cash and frequently asked us to go 50-50 in a possible deal. We were averse to this as we already read most telegrams except the Russian and German neither of whom was among Bertrand’s customers. But the Admiral thought that occasionally it was well spent money to keep in with Bertrand. He must have been useful to SIS in other ways and I well remember an official lunch in ‘38 or ‘39 at which Menzies presented Bertrand with a gold cigarette case engraved with the Royal Arms.
It should be noted as of some ultimate importance that in the course of some of his visits to us in Broadway we arranged for Bertrand to have conferences with certain sections such as the Spanish and Italian. He heard explanations of our methods and saw results and with the Admiral’s permission received a regular supply of certain results.
I think he was impressed by our success and by the ability of certain officers and it might well be that this had an important bearing on his subsequent action.
The Spanish war had rekindled our interest in the German Enigma as, at last, we were intercepting a considerable volume of German Naval material and a little military or air traffic. Knox was working on the naval material with intermittent assistance from Foss. Tiltman was in the background but was really fully occupied with the military sections and the solution of the Japanese military ciphers. In addition to this we had found that the Italian Navy were using the commercial Enigma. This was cracked by Knox and a small section was formed with Bedworth in virtual charge to handle the current traffic leaving Knox clear for the German machine.
So far as I can remember this was the position in January 1939 when Bertrand asked me to come over to Paris as he wanted us to meet certain Polish experts. We assumed that such a meeting could only concern German and Russian work on both of-which we were so weak that we felt we might well profit by such a meeting. So I went over with (I think) Tiltman, Knox and Foss, We met in an atmosphere of secrecy and mystery. One of the Poles, a Major Ceski (sic), gave us the alleged results of their research into the Enigma machine as used by the German services. He had no English and his French and German were only fair but it was clear that he was describing the results of his work on the ‘message setting’ which at that period appeared as the first group in all messages in all services. (It was only in May 39 that the German Navy adopted the bigrammatic indicator which Knox quickly diagnosed and found himself forced to drop the Naval and concentrate on the Military/Air). The Pole gave us a prolonged and pedantic description of what Tiltman had spotted and learnt in an hour namely that the message setting was soluble because no letter could be ciphered by itself and the German operators were simple souls with childish habits. The Pole finished by saying they were obtaining a lot of material and pursuing their research and would keep us informed of any results. At that time we had to regard the meeting as a flop and that the Poles were no great find. Since then I have thought that it was our party who were being vetted by the Poles who were at that time reading the traffic and only wanted to know what progress we had made. Bertrand himself let it be understood on this occasion and always when the question was raised that he was himself ignorant of the ability of the Poles or of what they could read. He was aware, he said, that they obtained some results. Later he admitted that he had to visit Warsaw once a month at least to exchange raw material and results and further he considered them exceptionally well-placed to do ‘business’, as he understood it, with treacherous Germans and Russians.
For the next six months we heard nothing more from the Poles probably because they felt they did not require any help from us. In the middle of July however we received an invitation, through Bertrand, to pay them a visit in Warsaw. The international situation was now clear. England was pledged to go to the assistance of Poland if attacked by Hitler. Each party now knew that the other had an active cryptographic organisation. So it appeared quite natural that the Poles should invite us. But it must not be forgotten that the German Navy had changed in May. The Polish invitation specifically included Knox who was known both by the French and the Poles to be working on this subject. I do not think though now I cannot be sure that they were aware of our success on the commercial Enigma as used by the Italian Navy.
However the Admiral instructed me to take Knox with me. I could well wish now that I had added others of our party but everyone was fully occupied and could ill spare the time to travel to another flop as in January. D.N.I., in close touch with the Admiral, suggested that Sandwich should go also. Why I don’t know as Sandwich was not a cryptographer and the Poles had so many. Bertrand was, of course, of the party. Knox and I went by train as we wished to see Germany probably for the last time, the other two separately by air. We left on the 24th and were met by the Poles and Bertrand and lodged at the Bristol. We were there for work on 26th and 27th and leaving on 28th. I was back in London by Sunday 30th. Knox, whose passport had been wrongly stamped for his return transit through Germany, had to go back from the frontier to Poznan and get the visa from the British Consul in that town. The 26 (Wednesday) was THE day. The Poles called for us at 7am and we were driven out to a clearing in a forest about 20 kilometres from Warsaw. Here we found a new, strongly built and strongly guarded office with some underground accommodation and here we met the Polish cryptographers some of whom luckily spoke some French or German.
A prolonged full dress conference with the Polish senior officer in the chair (I have forgotten his name). Colonel Lange was in charge of the organisation in the forest. Major Ceski with the steckered Enigma now described in full detail the steps they had taken to break down the cypher and obtain the wheel order and to read the messages. We followed him each to the best of our ability. Knox, as our expert, was alongside Ceski and in the best position to follow his explanation. He, however, reacted very badly to the explanation which took about three hours with a break for a cup of tea. I confess I was unable to understand completely the lines of reasoning but when, as seemed part of the conference, we were taken down to an underground room full of electric equipment and introduced to the ‘bombs’ I did then grasp the results of their reasoning and their method of solving the daily key. Knox accompanied us throughout but maintained a stony silence and was obviously extremely angry about something. It was only when we got back into a car to drive away that he suddenly let himself go and, assuming that no one understood any English, raged and raved that they were lying to us now as in Paris. The whole thing was a fraud he kept on repeating. They never worked it out. They pinched it years ago and have followed developments as anyone could but they must have bought it or pinched it.
Our position became increasingly difficult as even Bertrand, who knew no English, was aware that Knox had a grudge against the Poles who, so far as Bertrand knew, had only been successful where Knox had failed. I assume that he did not believe that they had constructed the order on the wheels and he may have been correct in his surmise. Ceski’s explanation was very lengthy and involved and in a language which he knew only fairly well and I was not competent to judge of the possibility of complete success. So far as I was concerned they were reading messages up to the previous May and were now quite sanguine as to the reading of current messages again by means of their ‘bombs’. I have since thought that they were finding considerable difficulty especially with the naval and, knowing Knox’s reputation and ability, felt it was a good moment to come clean and gain his assistance especially in view of the political situation.
The rest of that day remains a nightmare to me. Knox remained aloof and alone. Bertrand, Sandwich and I discussed the situation at length and decided to get away as soon as possible. The next day had been allotted to personal contacts with their technical and intelligence officers, Knox had cooled down considerably and spent
a long morning with their technical staff examining the machine and their methods. Language was of course still a difficulty but he now seemed to understand their reasoning and in his conversations with me never referred to his outburst after the disclosures.
I was shown the mass of telegrams they had read, the naval traffic being practically only between Berlin and their fleet in Spanish waters, which formed the bulk of their material. They undertook to send us copies and a model of the machine through Bertrand, as we, of course, had no line of communication with them. The machine did arrive during August but I doubt if any messages arrived. As the situation was now clearly war and the service sections had already gone to Bletchley we were not interested in back material but were naturally concentrating on current air/army traffic.
I should add that on that second day Knox was really his own bright self and won the hearts and admiration of the young men with whom he was in touch. If only that first day of disclosures could have been avoided and pompous declarations by senior officers had been omitted, Knox’s mind and personality in touch with men who really knew their job would have made that visit a very real success. They were all simple and straightforward. To me Bertrand’s attitude remains a mystery. I still believe that he knew all about their work and feigned the surprise which he manifested at the Polish success.
* * *
Two years later my father tried to explain to Knox the difference between information and intelligence!
11.11.41.
Dear Dilly,
Thank you for your letter. I am glad that you are frank and open with me. I know you disagree fundamentally as to how this show should be run but I am still convinced that my way is better than yours and likely to have wider and more effective results.
If you do design a super Rolls Royce that is no reason why you should yourself drive the thing up to the house of a possible buyer, more especially if you are not a very good driver. I lost any confidence you had in me when I disagreed with you in Dec. 1939 and said that you could not exploit your own success and run huts 6 and 3. I was right - you broke new ground while the building in your foundation was carried on by Travis etc. who, I say, were better adapted to this process than you.
Your next big show was K. You alone among us found the way but the full value of your work could only be obtained by fitting results into the full picture in the Naval Section.
And now comes your latest effort which only proves again that you are the right man in the right place. You told me of a side-line in Intelligence that you wanted to develop. I agreed but begged you to remember your real metier. So you produced this result which none other of our party could have done.
You say you did it because you are a scholar who proceeds from his raw material to his finished text, well - who is preventing you - you have access to all past material and copies of all new.
What are my grocer’s window dressing. Eric Smith offers all productions in neat form to those who need them. Birch ties up information from every naval source and tells the story. Hut 3 collects and reports accurate information derived from the source you invented.
Do you want to be the inventor and the car-driver? Do you want to be Eric Smith, Strachey, Birch and Wing-Commander Humphreys and De Grey wrapt into one which will include Knox who is the source? If so I don’t agree and don’t mind at all what steps you take.
You are Knox, a scholar with a European reputation, who knows more about the inside of a machine than anyone else. The exigencies of war need that latter gift of yours though few people are aware of it.
The exploitation of your results can be left to others so long as there are new fields for you to explore.
I do disagree with you.
Yours ever,
A. G. D.
AGD and ADK remained friends of this frank sort till Knox died in 1944.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Berkeley Street crypto activities in 1943
On 30 January 1942 my father admitted to his diary that he was no longer director of GC&CS but Deputy Director (C). This, coming after the acknowledged successes of 1941 was a heavy blow, but my father - though privately bitter - took it well. We left Bletchley for Ashtead, from where he commuted daily to Berkeley Street. At this point his diary and the official file remain silent for the next 15 months. All the family knew was that we now had a smaller car and my mother had to learn to cook. I was beginning my second year as a scholar at Westminster School, evacuated to the Hereford/Worcester borders, and my fees were accordingly paid by the bounty of previous Westminster benefactors. My sister, 18 months older, left school and went to a secretarial college.
My mind is a blank on those 15 months, but hindsight reminds us that they were the months which started so badly for Britain and ended, despite remaining unsolved problems, better. The fall of Singapore in February 1942 was traumatic even for a schoolboy. The war at sea was still being won on a monthly basis by Admiral Doenitz, but there were British successes in North Africa. Above all, we no longer stood alone - for Hitler had overreached himself in the summer of 1941 and invaded the Soviet Union, and by December the USA had joined the Allies after Japanese aggression at Pearl Harbor. We were still downhearted for Germany was still the strongest nation on earth and it was to be another two years before the Allies invaded mainland Europe at Normandy on 6 June 1944 and over another year before VE day.
Just over a year before, the files suddenly gave a detailed rundown, in May 1943, on my father’s 200-strong operation on diplomatic and commercial signals intelligence in Berkeley Street and Park Lane. The McCormack report, released to the National Archives in Washington, is here reproduced in full. Some thriller readers may find it too circumstantial but I hope they will persevere.
Colonel McCormack (US army) to:
ARLINGTON HALL STATION*
MESSAGE CENTER
Date Filed May 21 1943
Time Filed 1212Z
Incoming Message
FROM: AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO: MILID WASHINGTON
NR; 4832
Denniston’s show, commonly called Berkeley Street, has none of the hectic atmosphere of Park but rather gives impression of well established operation that goes along through wars and peace. General impression is typified by the two ladies who receive and sort incoming traffic. (They started as telegraph clerks in Post Office in reign of Queen Victoria and were fully familiar with general field when they joined present organisation in 1919.) These little birdlike old ladies receive and register all incoming material and they have acquired such great familiarity with it that can do everything except actually decipher it. Whole organization is very simple and they seem to accomplish a great deal with quite limited personnel. Whole outfit consists of two hundred.
TO STRONG FOR CLARK AND CORDERMAN FROM McCORMACK
38 bodies divided, subject to some doubling up, as follows:
Deputy Director and administrative staff – 5;
Distribution and reference section – 5
Sorting section – 2
Typing – 14
Teleprinter clerks – 2
Geographical sections – 155
Commercial section – 50
Research section 5
Geographical sections are divided into enemy countries, neutral countries and allies.
Personnel in enemy country sections are:
German - 26; Italian and Vatican -19; Japanese - 36; French (which now overlaps enemy and allied groups -14; Siamese - 1 (who in off moment doubles up on Irish); Bulgarian - 2; Roumanian and Hungarian - 1; Finnish is now being worked on in Research Section.
Neutral countries are divided up as follows:
Spanish – 6 bodies; Portugese - 10; Swiss – 4; Irish - (see above)
Latin America, Spanish language – 5; Near East (which covers Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Egypt, Palestine and Syria - 17
All Scandinavia is handled in off moments by Rees, who is Chief Administrative Officer.
Allied countries account for full time personnel of 11, of whom eight work on Chinese, two on Belgian and one on Greek. Dutch is done by people who work in Near East section, Brazilian by Portugese section, Polish, Jugoslav and Czeck by the man who handles, with a clerk assistant, Bulgarian material, and Mexican of course is done by Latin American section.
Taylor will report later on composition of commercial section subdivisions. Principal sources of material, other than by exchange with United States, are censorships at London, Ottawa, Mauritius, Barbados, Gibraltar and Middle East. (Where there are joint censorships at Cairo, Baghdad, Teheran and possibly elsewhere.) Foreign Office intercepts stations in United Kingdom (Denmark Hill, Sandridge, Saint Albans, Whitchurch, Cupar and Brora) and, through BP, other intercept stations at Ottawa, New Delhi, West Africa (recently discontinued), Melbourne, Cape Town, Simonstown, Suez, Malta and Mauritius. You will observe what extensive coverage this adds up to. Other source of material is secret intelligence service in neutral capitals. General outline of workings of outfit follows: sorting clerks route material to proper geographical section, where it is registered in appropriate book in which notations are made under following headings:
Thirty Secret Years Page 14