by Kershaw, Ian
His skill in exposition was most striking. Everything he said he demonstrated as incontrovertible truth; nevertheless his ideas were not unreasonable and were entirely free from any propagandist pathos. He spoke with moderation and was obviously anxious to avoid anything that might shock us in our capacity as representatives of a more traditional society… The thing that impressed me most about this man was his absolute conviction of the rightness of his outlook and his determination to translate this outlook into practical action. Even at this first meeting it was obvious to me that Hitler’s power of propaganda would have a tremendous pull with the German population if we did not succeed in overcoming the economic crisis and weaning the masses from radicalism. Hitler was obsessed by his own words, a thorough fanatic with the most powerful effect on his audience; a born agitator in spite of a hoarse, sometimes broken and not infrequently croaking voice.261
Schacht tried at the time to persuade Brüning to include the NSDAP in a coalition, presuming the responsibilities of government would have tamed it. Thyssen, attracted by the corporatist ideas in the NSDAP’s programme, had similarly advocated working with the Nazis to the Chancellor.262 Neither Schacht nor Thyssen was, however, representative of the leaders of big business.
During the 1920s, big business had, not surprisingly, shown little interest in the NSDAP, a fringe party in the doldrums without, it seemed, any prospect of power or influence. The election result of 1930 had compelled the business community to take note of Hitler’s party. A series of meetings were arranged at which Hitler explained his aims to prominent businessmen. At the end of September 1930 he put his views to the former Chancellor and current head of the Hamburg-America shipping line, Wilhelm Cuno, who was rumoured to be contemplating running for Reich President with NSDAP support when Hindenburg’s term of office expired in 1932.263 Cuno was impressed with Hitler, who advanced a ‘moderate’ economic programme upholding capitalist enterprise and even claiming that there would be no violent persecution of Jews under Nazi rule.264 Hitler also spoke again at the Hamburger Nationalklub, a meeting arranged by Cuno, and to a group of Ruhr industrialists at the home of Emil Kirdorf, the aged Ruhr coal magnate and long-standing Nazi sympathizer, near Mülheim.265 Further meetings with a number of business leaders, arranged by Walther Funk, the former editor of the financial newspaper the Berliner Börsen-Zeitung, followed early in 1931 in Hitler’s suite at the Kaiserhof Hotel, at which considerable funding was reportedly pledged in the event of an attempted left-wing coup.266 The reassurances given by Hitler at such meetings, as well as by Göring (who had good links to top businessmen), were, however, not able to dispel the worries of most business leaders that the NSDAP was a socialist party with radical anti-capitalist aims. Hitler was seen by many of them as a ‘moderate’.267 But whatever favourable impression Hitler himself was able to make, it was insufficient to remove the ‘socialist’ image of his party in the eyes of many businessmen. The NSDAΡ’s support of the Berlin metalworkers’ strike in autumn 1930, and the participation of the Nazis’ surrogate trade union, the Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellenorganisation (NSBO, National Socialist Factory Cell Organization), in four strikes the following year, alongside the continued anti-capitalist rhetoric of some party spokesmen, seemed active proof of its ‘dangerous’ tendencies.268
Despite growing disillusionment with the Brüning administration, most ‘captains of industry’ retained their healthy scepticism about the Hitler Movement during 1931. There were exceptions, such as Thyssen, but in general it was the owners of smaller and medium-sized concerns who found the NSDAP an increasingly attractive proposition.269 The story put about in the memoirs of the later press chief Otto Dietrich of Hitler ceaselessly touring Germany in his big Mercedes in the second half of 1931, cultivating big business leaders and breaking down their resistance to the NSDAP, was no more than part of the myth that Hitler had won power by conquering the hearts and minds of every section of the German people.270 No more solidly founded was the view of the Left at the time that the Nazi Movement was the creature of big business and sustained by its funding. Most leaders and executives of big business were shrewd enough to spread their funding round as a form of political insurance, once the Nazi breakthrough had taken place. But most of it still went to the Nazis’ political opponents on the conservative Right.271 The leaders of big business were no friends of democracy. But nor, for the most part, did they want to see the Nazis running the country.
This remained the case throughout most of 1932, a year dominated by election campaigns in which the Weimar state disintegrated into all-embracing crisis. Hitler’s much publicized address on 27 January 1932 to a gathering of some 650 members of the Düsseldorf Industry Club in the grand ballroom of Düsseldorfs Park Hotel did nothing, despite the later claims of Nazi propaganda, to alter the sceptical stance of big business.272 The response to his speech was mixed. But many were disappointed that he had nothing new to say, avoiding all detailed economic issues by taking refuge in his well-trodden political panacea for all ills.273 And there were indications that workers in the party were not altogether happy at their leader fraternizing with industrial leaders. Intensified anti-capitalist rhetoric, which Hitler was powerless to quell, worried the business community as much as ever.274 During the presidential campaigns of spring 1932, most business leaders stayed firmly behind Hindenburg, and did not favour Hitler. And during the Reichstag campaigns of summer and autumn, the business community overwhelmingly supported the parties that backed the cabinet of Franz von Papen – from a Westphalian aristocratic family, married to the daughter of a Saarland industrialist, well connected to industrial leaders, landowners, and Reichswehr officers – a somewhat lightweight, dilettante politician, but one who epitomized the ingrained conservatism, reactionary tendencies, and desire for a return to ‘traditional’ authoritarianism of the German upper class.275 He was the establishment figure; Hitler the outsider and, in some respects, unknown quantity. Papen, not Hitler, was, not surprisingly then, the favourite of big business. Only in autumn 1932, when Papen was ousted by Kurt von Schleicher, the general at the heart of most political intrigues, maker and breaker of governments, did the attitude of most leading figures in business, worried by the new Chancellor’s approach to the economy and opening to the trade unions, undergo a significant change.276
The NSDAP’s funding continued before the ‘seizure of power’ to come overwhelmingly from the dues of its own members and the entrance fees to party meetings.277 Such financing as came from fellow-travellers in big business accrued more to the benefit of individual Nazi leaders than the party as a whole. Göring, needing a vast income to cater for his outsized appetite for high living and material luxury, quite especially benefited from such largesse. Thyssen in particular gave him generous subsidies, which Göring – given to greeting visitors to his splendidly adorned Berlin apartment dressed in a red toga and pointed slippers, looking like a sultan in a harem – found no difficulty in spending on a lavish lifestyle.278 Walther Funk, one of Hitler’s links to leading industrialists, also used his contacts to line his own pockets. Gregor Strasser, too, was a recipient.279 Corruption at all levels was endemic.
It would be surprising if none of such donations had reached Hitler. Indeed, Göring is alleged to have said that he passed on to Hitler some of the funding he received from Ruhr industrialists.280 Hitler had from the earliest years of his ‘career’, as we have seen, been supported by generous donations from benefactors.281 But by the early 1930s he was less dependent on financial support from private patrons, even if his celebrity status now unquestionably brought him many unsolicited donations. His sources of income have remained largely in the dark. They were kept highly secret, and totally detached from party finances. Schwarz, the party treasurer, had no insight into Hitler’s own funds. But his taxable income alone – and much was doubtless left undeclared – trebled in 1930 to 48,472 Marks as sales of Mein Kampf soared following his election triumph. That alone was more than Funk had earned from a
year’s salary as editor of a Berlin daily. Though for image purposes he repeatedly emphasized that he drew no salary from the party, nor any fee for the speeches he delivered on its behalf, he received hidden fees in the form of lavish ‘expenses’ calculated on the size of the takings at his meetings. In addition, he was paid handsomely for the articles he contributed to the Völkischer Beobachter and, between 1928 and 1931, to the Illustrierter Beobachter. And with the foreign press now clamouring for interviews, another door to a lucrative source of income opened. Partly subsidized, if indirectly, by the party, partly drawing substantial royalties from his stated occupation as a ‘writer’, and partly benefiting from unsolicited donations from admirers, Hitler’s sources of income were more than adequate to cover the costs of an affluent lifestyle. His proclaimed modest demands in matters of food and clothes – a constant element of his image as a humble man of the people – fell within a context of chauffeur-driven Mercedes, luxury hotels, grand residences, and a personal livery of bodyguards and attendants.282
X
During 1932, the terminal nature of Weimar’s ailing democracy became unmistakable. A prelude to the drama to follow had its setting in the presidential election in the spring.
Reich President Hindenburg’s seven-year term of office was due to expire on 5 May 1932. In the prevailing conditions of economic depression and political turmoil, the prospect of a bitterly contested election for the presidency was hardly enticing. But the chances of the parties agreeing on a single candidate were zero. Moves, initially prompted by Papen, had already therefore been afoot since the previous autumn to have the eighty-four-year old war-hero Paul von Hindenburg und Beneckendorff confirmed by the Reichstag for a further period in office, without the need for a divisive election. But a constitutional change would be required to achieve this, necessitating a two-thirds majority in the Reichstag. This could only be obtained if the National Socialists and DNVP were prepared to support it.283 Hitler was summoned early in January 1932 to a meeting in Berlin with the Reich Defence and acting Interior Minister Wilhelm Groener and Hindenburg’s State Secretary Otto Meissner, where the proposition was put to him. Hitler did not commit himself immediately. But the Nazi leadership recognized that such a move could only strengthen Brüning’s position. The Chancellor’s tactics had put them on the spot. ‘The chessmatch for power begins,’ noted Goebbels.284
A week later, Hitler notified the Chancellor of his party’s rejection of the proposal – on ‘constitutional, foreign-political, domestic, and moral grounds’.285 A rancorous public exchange with Brüning followed.286 How genuine Hitler’s constitutional scruples were became clear in his offer to support Hindenburg’s candidacy if the Reich President dismissed Brüning and announced new Reichstag and Prussian elections, following which the newly elected Reichstag – which Hitler was confident of controlling – would extend his period of office.287
Hindenburg’s refusal, expected though it was, left Hitler in a quandary. In the event of presidential elections, he could scarcely refrain from standing. Not to stand would be incomprehensible, and a massive disappointment to his millions of supporters. They might start to turn away from a leader who shied away from the challenge. On the other hand, a personal contest between the corporal and the field-marshal, between the upstart political adventurer and the revered hero of Tannenberg, widely regarded as the symbol of national values above the fray of party politics, could hardly be expected to result in a victory for Hitler. Faced with his dilemma, Hitler dithered for more than a month before deciding to run for president. Goebbels was almost in despair at the indecision, as party morale wavered and Hitler preoccupied himself with grandiose schemes for rebuilding Berlin.288 At last, on 22 February, Goebbels was given permission to announce Hitler’s candidacy during his speech at a big rally in the Sportpalast that evening. ‘Thank God’ was the propaganda chief’s reaction. The cheering following the announcement lasted for ten minutes. Goebbels’ barely concealed criticism of Hitler’s leadership in the past weeks was immediately dispelled. ‘He is and remains our Leader,’ he reminded himself. And a few days later, he added that the Führer was ‘again on top of the situation’.289
A technicality had to be cleared up: Hitler was still not a German citizen. Previous ideas of attaining citizenship for him, in Bavaria in 1929 and Thuringia the following year, had foundered. He remained ‘stateless’. Rapid steps were now taken to appoint Hitler to the post of Regierungsrat (government councillor) in the Office of State Culture and Measurement (Landeskultur- und Vermessungsamt) in Braunschweig and as a state representative in Berlin. Through his nomination as a civil servant, Hitler acquired German citizenship. On 26 February 1932, he swore his oath as a civil servant to the German state he was determined to destroy.290
Just how far the political centre of gravity had shifted to the Right was shown by the perverse alignments in the presidential election campaign. Hindenburg was dependent for support on the Socialists and Catholics, who had formed his main opposition seven years earlier, and made strange and unwelcome bedfellows for the staunchly Protestant and arch-conservative doyen of the military caste. The bourgeois Right, headed by Hugenberg, refused Hindenburg their support. Showing how fragile the professed unity of the Harzburg Front had been, they also denied it to Hitler. But their largely unknown nominee, the deputy leader of the Stahlhelm, Theodor Duesterberg, was hardly a serious candidate.291 On the Left, the Communists nominated their leader, Ernst Thälmann, sure of support only from his own camp. It was plain from the outset, therefore, that the main contenders were Hindenburg and Hitler. Equally plain was the Nazi message: a vote for Hitler was a vote for change; under Hindenburg, things would stay as they were. ‘Old man… you must step aside,’ proclaimed Hitler at a rally attended by an estimated 25,000 in the Berlin Sportpalast on 27 February.292
The Nazi propaganda machine went into top gear. The country was engulfed during the first of five major campaigns that year with a veritable flood of Nazi meetings, parades, and rallies, accompanied by the usual pageantry and razzmatazz. Hitler himself, his indecision resolved, poured all his energies as usual into his speaking tourneys, travelling the length and breadth of Germany, and addressing huge crowds in twelve cities during the eleven-day campaign. In Breslau he arrived four hours late, in Stuttgart two hours behind schedule. The crowds still waited. The Völkischer Beobachter claimed – though certainly with some exaggeration – that he spoke in all to around half a million people.293
Expectations were built up. ‘Everywhere there’s a victory mood,’ wrote Goebbels on election day, 13 March. But he added, cautiously: ‘I’m somewhat sceptical.’ He shared the bitter disappointment and depression of Hitler’s supporters when the results were announced.294 The 30 per cent won by Hitler was more or less in line with expectations, though lower than the NSDAΡ’s showing in the Oldenburg and Hessen state elections the previous year. But Thälmann, with only 13 per cent, had done less well than anticipated, Duesterberg had gained under 7 per cent, and the SPD’s supporters, whatever their distaste for the President, had evidently stuck by Hindenburg, whose vote had, therefore, held up well. With over 49 per cent of almost 38 million votes cast, the Reich President ended up a mere 170,000 votes short of the absolute majority.295 There had to be a second round.
This time Nazi propaganda had a new gimmick. Hitler took to the skies in a hired plane, American-style, in his first ‘Germany Flight’ (Deutschlandflug), embellished with the slogan of ‘the Führer over Germany’. Flying from city to city in a truncated campaign squeezed into less than a week to accommodate an Easter truce in politicking, Hitler was able to hold twenty major speeches in different venues before huge audiences, totalling close to a million persons.296 It was a remarkable electioneering performance, the like of which had never before been seen in Germany. This time there was no disappointment in the Nazi camp. Hindenburg, with 53 per cent, was re-elected. But while Thälmann had slumped to only 10 per cent, Hitler had increased his support to 37 per cent. He had
done much more than merely save face. Well over 13 million, 2 million more than in the first round, had voted for him.297 The Führer cult, the manufactured commodity of Nazi propaganda and once the property of a tiny collection of fanatics, was now on the way to being sold to a third of the German population.
Quite literally while the votes were being counted, Goebbels was laying the preparations for the next battle: the series of state elections on 24 April in Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg and Anhalt, and the city elections in Hamburg.298 All in all, this amounted to about four-fifths of the country.299 Without a break, the frenetic campaigning continued. In his second ‘Germany Flight’ between 16 and 24 April, Hitler – this time taking his campaign not just to the cities but deep into the provinces – gave twenty-five big speeches.300 In small towns in provincial backwaters, the impact was enormous. Nothing had been seen like it before. At Miesbach, in Upper Bavaria, the local press described Hitler’s speech as ‘an unprecedented sensation’. Thousands had waited for hours in pouring rain for it.301 Elsewhere it was ‘Führer weather’. ‘The April sun shone as in summer, turning everything into a picture of happiest expectation,’ wrote Luise Solmitz, a Hamburg schoolteacher, about the atmosphere in which Hitler addressed over 120,000 people crowded on to the speedway track at Lokstedt in the Hamburg district on 23 April. The streams of people arriving by foot and unloading from trains seemed endless. Most had a lengthy wait to see their hero. Frau Solmitz herself was there two and a half hours before Hitler was due to speak. But the massive crowd was well-behaved, controlled only by stewards with the police keeping in the background. Most of those attending were already attracted to the Nazi cause. ‘No one said “Hitler”, always just “the Führer”,’ recorded Frau Solmitz. ‘“The Führer says”, “the Führer” wants, and what he said and wanted, that seemed good and proper.’ Her description continued: