by David Wragg
There were other problems. Some of the merchant ships waiting in Iceland for the next convoy had been troubled by indiscipline. The rapid expansion of the merchant fleets created by the war, and the loss of so many experienced men to the navies as reservists were called up, had meant that many of those manning the ships lacked experience of life at sea, while others saw no reason why they should risk life and limb for what they saw as a British war. Idleness contributes greatly to indiscipline, and life for the merchant seamen was a dreary round of visits to unattractive locations, with too much time spent cooped up in ships that were overcrowded, given the presence of the AA gunners for which the merchantmen had not been designed, and in between there was the stress and strain of fighting the convoys through, and if they were not fighting the Germans or waiting for them to attack, it was usually because the weather was so bad! Even the Royal Navy was not immune to problems of discipline, with those men assigned to the convoys more likely than usual to be late back from leave, often taking the view that even a spell in the cells at a detention centre was better than life with the convoys.
The Admiralty had already lost two cruisers, HMS Trinidad and Edinburgh in Arctic waters. But the presence of such ships had a deterrent effect on the Germans and a comfort factor for those with the convoys.
For PQ17, a larger than usual escort was planned and rescue ships would be provided as well as a dummy convoy. Quite how a dummy convoy could be provided given the shortage of merchant ships is another question, but in fact the ‘dummy’ turned out to be more of a dummy raiding force than a convoy. The distant cover would include the United States Navy’s Task Force 99 under Rear Admiral Griffen, while Rear Admiral Louis ‘Turtle’ Hamilton would command the First Cruiser Squadron sailing with PQ17. Tovey would also have his new second-in-command, Vice-Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser. Hamilton was an advocate of naval air power, and one of those who shared the view of the United States Navy, that air power should be used to keep the seas open rather than bombing German cities.
The dummy convoy was known as Operation ES, and consisted of minelayers and four colliers escorted by two cruisers, Curacao and Sirius, five destroyers and a number of armed trawlers. Doubtless colliers were chosen as such ships were more likely to have been available given that the normal heavy British coastal traffic along the east coast was largely suspended after the fall of the Low Countries as it was too exposed to attack by German aircraft and light forces. ES sailed from Scapa Flow two days after PQ17 and headed towards the Norwegian Sea to give the impression that it was making for southern Norway on a raiding or mine laying mission. It remained undetected by German reconnaissance, even when repeated a week later, and was nothing more than a waste of time and fuel, keeping scarce ships away from more productive duties.
Meanwhile, a telex message from German naval headquarters to the local commander at Narvik on 14 June had been intercepted by Swedish intelligence and the information passed to the British Naval Attaché in Stockholm, Captain Henry Denham. This revealed details of operation Rosselsprung, otherwise ‘The Knight’s Move’, which comprised the German plans to destroy the next convoy. Aerial reconnaissance was to locate the convoy before it reached Jan Mayen Island, so that air attacks could be mounted from bases in northern Norway. The heavy cruisers and six destroyers would move to Altenfjord while Tirpitz and Admiral Hipper would move to Narvik, and warships would commence operations once the convoy reached 5 degrees east. Once the convoy reached the meridian of Bear Island, there would be coordinated attacks by aircraft, surface vessels and U-boats. In short, the complete and devastating destruction of an entire convoy, using surface vessels that could achieve as much in a few hours as a U-boat wolfpack could achieve in as many days. The more adventurous and confident approach being planned could have owed much to the replacement of Vizeadmiral Otto Ciliax, who was unwell, aboard the Tirpitz by Vizeadmiral Otto Schniewind, who was anxious that his battle group should conduct offensive operations. A further sign of the change in attitude was the allocation of 15,000 tons of scarce bunker oil. The Germans had also built-up their air strength in Norway, and while this included additional He115 seaplane torpedo-bombers, the real significance lay in additional He111s and Ju88s, and thirty Ju87 Stuka dive-bombers, while reconnaissance strength was also boosted.
The one advantage that the Royal Navy held was its possession of naval air power, and even the limited capabilities of the British naval aircraft of the day had undermined confidence to a degree perhaps not appreciated outside Germany. Obsolescent Swordfish biplanes had not only crippled the Italian battle fleet at Taranto, they had contributed to the loss of the Bismarck, sister ship to Tirpitz, the previous year. Even earlier, Blackburn Skua fighter/ dive-bombers had sunk the cruiser Konigsberg during the Norwegian campaign of 1940. Even the fighters, the slow and lumbering Fairey Fulmar, had had an impact. The head of the German Navy, Grossadmiral, Grand Admiral, Erich Raeder, was keen to show what his service could do and win the Fuhrer’s favour, but he hesitated to send his ships to sea without strong assurances of support from the Luftwaffe. The two heavy cruisers, or ex‘pocket battleships’, Lutzow and Scheer, with a maximum speed of just 28 knots, were regarded as being especially vulnerable, for, after all, their sister, Graf Spee, had been destroyed by just a heavy cruiser and two light cruisers.
Three U-boats were sent to patrol off Iceland, keeping watch for Allied shipping movements. During the period 15–23 June, eight U-boats were despatched to a patrol area off Jan Mayen Island to wait for the next convoy.
Nevertheless, caution was still the watchword, even at the very top. Raeder approached Hitler with his plans for the Knight’s Move, seeking full Luftwaffe support, since only the Fuhrer himself could ensure that this would happen. Hitler agreed, but on condition that the major fleet units were not to venture out to sea until any aircraft carrier had been dealt with by the Luftwaffe. Disappointed, Raeder did at least manage to persuade Hitler that the ships could go to sea if carrier-borne aircraft were out of range. Hitler reluctantly agreed, but the plan could still only go ahead subject to his approval. Once again, the Fuhrer system was stifling initiative, while locally communications between operational units of the two armed services involved remained patchy. In both world wars, it was also the case that Germany’s battleships were regarded as so important that their use was limited by fears about their safety.
Tovey took the Home Fleet to sea to provide the distant or heavy escort, flying his flag in the battleship Duke of York. His deputy Vice-Admiral Fraser was aboard the aircraft carrier Victorious, with Rear Admiral Burrough aboard the cruiser Nigeria, joined by the heavy cruiser Cumberland, while Rear Admiral Griffin was aboard the battleship USS Washington. An antisubmarine screen of a dozen British and American destroyers completed the force.
After the Home Fleet wasted time and fuel steaming eastwards as if it was covering the decoy convoy ES, Tovey could take his force to patrol an area where it could offer some support to the convoy. Amongst Tovey’s problems, the First Sea Lord, the ailing Dudley Pound, was interfering in his decisions, using the fact that the Admiralty could have more up-to-date information due to the Ultra decrypts to reserve much of the decision-making to himself. It was clear that the Admiralty expected to control the convoy from a distance.
PQ17 consisted of thirty-six merchantmen, most of them American, under the command of Commodore Dowding in the River Afton, but it also had two fleet oilers, one of them comprising Force Q with its own escorting destroyer. The convoy carried 150,000 tons of stores and general cargo, as well as 594 tanks, 4,246 military vehicles and 297 aircraft.
On 2 July, PQ17 and the reciprocal convoy QP13 passed, and Force Q, the oiler and destroyer, switched from PQ17 to QP13. The following day, three of the destroyers were detached on direct orders from the Admiralty to conduct a sweep looking for the Tirpitz, known to be missing from her moorings. The following day, QP13 was divided, again on Admiralty orders, with nineteen ships, including the Empire Selwyn with Commodore Gal
e aboard, directed to Loch Ewe in Scotland, while the remaining sixteen, mainly American, maintained their course for Hvalfjordur with Captain J. Hiss, master of the American Robin, as commodore.
PQ17 meanwhile had been reduced to thirty-five ships when an American ship ran aground off Iceland, and despite a trawler and a tug being sent to her aid, the ship was left behind. Most of PQ17’s ships were intended for Archangel, with just eight for Murmansk as the latter port had been bombed so heavily that it had had to suspend operations for a period. The ice cap had receded further than usual for the time of year, allowing the convoy to keep well to the west and pass north of Bear Island. Nevertheless, while still in the Denmark Strait heavy ice was encountered and another American ship was too badly damaged to continue, and her repeated radioed requests for help doubtless helped to provide the Germans with the position of the convoy. Next, one of the naval auxiliaries, the oiler Grey Ranger, intended to act as a fuel ship in Russia, also struck an iceberg that split her bows wide open so that she too would have to turn back. It was decided that she should swap places with the Aldersdale, the other fleet oiler, and that her fuel should be used to top up the escort vessels.
On 30 June the ocean escort arrived. This was led by Commander J.E. Broome in the destroyer Keppel, one of eight destroyers and three corvettes, two anti-aircraft ships converted from fruit carriers, and two submarines, escorting the convoy, while another destroyer and the tanker Aldersdale comprised Force Q. There was also a solitary CAM-ship, Empire Tide. This was the only air cover available to PQ17.
Rear Admiral Louis ‘Turtle’ Hamilton had been present when Broome had briefed the convoy masters at Hvalfjordur. His four cruisers, led by his flagship London, were to provide heavy support for the convoy. The other cruisers were Norfolk and the American ships Tuscaloosa and Wichita, supported by one British and two American destroyers. While the masters had been briefed on what to do in the event of air attack, Hamilton’s naval commanding officers knew that while the primary objective was to get PQ17 to the Soviet Union, a subsidiary objective was to try to draw out the heavy units of the Kriegsmarine, not for the cruisers to engage these, but instead to shadow them and report their position to the Home Fleet.
The cruiser squadron was the last to leave Iceland, sailing on 1 July, their superior speed making it easy for them to catch the slow moving convoy, proceeding at just eight knots. The weather at the outset was good, and on 1 July while the Allied Cruiser Squadron was catching up, the escorts took the opportunity to refuel. At midday, the first U-boats were sighted and chased off, but this caused radio silence to be broken and confirmed to the Germans once again the convoy’s position. Two U-boats, U-255 and U-408 now maintained contact with the convoy’s progress, while U-334 and U-456 were directed to join them. Another six U-boats were directed further east to form a wolfpack or patrol line. The U-boats were assisted by a Blohm und Voss Bv138 reconnaissance flying-boat which arrived at 14.00 and started to transmit homing signals for the U-boats. Alarm spread through the convoy when capital ships were spotted silhouetted against the horizon, but on investigation by a trawler these proved to be the Home Fleet.
The number of German aircraft keeping PQ17 under observation rose to three. Later that afternoon, the convoy was forced to wheel to avoid torpedoes believed to have come from U-456, which was counter-attacked by three destroyers and a corvette, but without success. At 18.00, the USS Rowan, an American destroyer escorting the Allied cruisers, approached the convoy to refuel from the Aldersdale, and as she did so nine He115 seaplanes made a half-hearted torpedo attack on the anti-aircraft ship Pozarica, until confronted by her heavy AA fire to which Rowan also made a contribution, shooting down one of the aircraft, which crash-landed in the water. The Germans were not without nerve, however, as one of the other aircraft landed and rescued the crew from the downed aircraft! Mercifully, fog then descended and the convoy was able to change course to the east, towards Bear Island, evading the Luftwaffe.
The following day started with a number of U-boat scares, which kept the escorts busy as the convoy passed in and out of fog banks. While tracking down U-boats doubtless kept them at bay, it also meant that fuel and in some cases depth charges were being used at a considerable rate. With Hamilton and his cruisers steering a parallel course some forty miles to the north, the convoy continued to be kept under close observation by a Walrus, at this time from HMS London. At this time Hamilton believed that Tirpitz and Hipper would be sent after QP13 in an attempt to draw the Home Fleet away, leaving PQ17 for Lutzow and Scheer. Doubtless with the Battle of the River Plate in mind, Hamilton believed that his orders gave him scope to engage these two German ships. There was an exchange of fire between the Walrus and a Bv138 later when the former landed close to Keppel with a message from Hamilton for Broome, advising the SO(E) that the ice-edge had receded considerably to the north and also advising that the convoy should change course northwards increasing the distance between it and the Luftwaffe base at Banak, but Broome, the SO(E), didn’t take the convoy as far north as Hamilton suggested, anxious to continue pressing eastwards.
The situation was complicated at this time by poor weather over Norway that prevented effective aerial reconnaissance. No one on the British side was aware that the Lutzow, Scheer and six destroyers had left their base at Narvik under the command of Vizeadmiral Oskar Kummetz, but they were convinced that Vizeadmiral Otto Schniewind had taken Tirpitz from Trondheim with the Hipper, four destroyers and two large ocean-going torpedo-boats. Nevertheless, the more northerly of these two forces, that from Narvik, soon ran into trouble, with the Lutzow running aground as she emerged from the Ofotfjord in fog, while further south three of Schniewind’s destroyers hit uncharted rocks, although two replacements were with him when he took the Tirpitz and Hipper into the Altenfjord.
Aware of the movements of the Tirpitz group, Hamilton was then shadowed by German aircraft and sent his Walrus off on a reconnaissance sortie, but the aircraft hit fog and then ran out of fuel, having to make a forced landing and be taken in tow by a trawler. Meanwhile, the fog that had made life so difficult for the Walrus closed in over the convoy so that the German reconnaissance aircraft lost track of it, and when it did begin to lift, the fog then settled at a convenient mast height – poor for aerial reconnaissance, but reassuring for station-keeping.
Once again information came from intelligence sources in Sweden about German intentions, which were that the convoy would be attacked between longitudes 15 and 30 east, and this was passed on by the Admiralty early on 4 July when the convoy was almost exactly midway between these two points. With the movement of the German ships, it seemed that a combined heavy force was preparing to attack the convoy.
PQ17 was by this time some sixty miles north of Bear Island, when a lookout aboard the anti-aircraft ship Palomares, heard the sound of aircraft engines overhead, and as the fog thinned those aboard saw a Heinkel He111 diving to launch its torpedo. Too late, the ship’s AA defences opened up while six blasts were given on her siren to warn those around the ship that she was about to take evasive action. The torpedo missed Palomares, but continued and hit the American merchantman, Christopher Newport, a Liberty ship carrying 10,000 tons of munitions, despite one of the gunners aboard calmly taking aim and striking the torpedo with his .30 machine guns. Exploding in the engine room, the torpedo killed an engineer and two greasers, while the ship lost power and started to swing round out of control, forcing the rest of the convoy to have to change course to steer around her. Unwelcome fireworks with which to celebrate Independence Day! The rescue ship Zamalek was soon alongside and took aboard forty-seven survivors, many of whom had time to dress in their best clothes and bring with them small arms and personal possessions. Broome ordered the submarine P614 to torpedo the Christopher Newport, but two torpedoes from the submarine and then depth charges from the corvette Dianella failed to deliver the desired coup de grace, leaving the job to U-457 later.
Set against this loss was the signal from the A
dmiralty to Hamilton allowing him the discretion of taking his cruisers beyond 25 degrees east. Unaware of the full picture, Tovey later signalled Hamilton warning him not to enter the Barents Sea unless he could be certain that he would not encounter the Tirpitz. Hamilton decided to take his cruisers further south, only then did he discover that the convoy was thirty miles further south than he had expected it to be, as a result of Broome’s decision to press on to the east. He eventually took his ships to a position twelve miles ahead of the convoy and at 16.45 ordered Broome to change course to the northeast. The convoy obeyed, but meantime it was under observation by both the Luftwaffe, who had decided that the antisubmarine aircraft flown from the USS Wichita had come from an aircraft carrier, and the commanding officer of U-457, shadowing the convoy, who reported that the cruiser squadron included a battleship: combined these two reports misled the Germans into believing that the Home Fleet was much closer than was the case, when in fact it was 350 miles away from the convoy. The result was that the German surface ships would not sail because Hitler had insisted on any aircraft carrier being put out of action first. Meanwhile, the other U-boats were homing in on U-457 and PQ17.