42. Fegley, Equatorial Guinea, 41–58; Samuel Decalo, Psychoses of Power: African Personal Dictatorships (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989), 42–48.
43. Full detail may be found in Tony Hodges, Western Sahara: Roots of a Desert War (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill, 1983). Mauritania was initially a junior partner in partitioning the Spanish Sahara; however, its small army and meager finances proved totally inadequate in the face of the insurgent Polisario challenge; The first and long stable postcolonial regime of Mokhtar Ould Daddah was fatally undermined by its humiliation in this territorial seizure and was overthrown by the military in 1978; the latter abandoned its share of the Western Sahara to Morocco in 1979.
44. Cited in James Duffy, Portuguese Africa (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), 270.
45. Basil Davidson, “Portuguese-Speaking Africa,” in The Cambridge History of Africa, 8:758.
46. Davidson, “Portuguese-Speaking Africa,” 760.
47. For valuable detail see Alistaire Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962 (London: Macmillan, 1977), 415–62.
48. King Leopold II, whose gargantuan imperial appetite was joined to a consummate skill in the diplomacy of the colonial partition, created the Congo as a personal fiefdom. He was obsessed with the notion that only a colony could secure Belgian national identity and settled on central Africa only after peering at China, the Philippines, Fiji, and other possible sites. The famous medallion presented to a reluctant finance minister, inscribed “Il faut à la Belgique une colonie” (“Belgium must have a colony”), reflected this conviction. It was a conviction shared by few Belgian leaders at the time, and that made it necessary for him to assume personal rule over this vast domain. The uninhibited plunder and scandalous atrocities that soon followed made the king’s fief a national embarrassment by the time that Belgium assumed responsibility for the territory in 1908. Once the worst abuses had been remedied by the 1920s, and the sweet scent of economic expansion was in the air, Belgians of all descriptions found a role in the swelling ranks of the administration, colonial corporations, and Catholic missions. By the early 1950s, the colonial Congo seemed embarked on a march to prosperity; it was an “oasis of peace” or “empire of silence” untroubled by nationalist agitation. On the role of Leopold, see especially Guy Vanthemsche, La Belgique et le Congo: L’impact de la colonie sur le metropole (Brussels: Le Cri, 2010), Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), Neal Ascherson, The King Incorporated (London: Allen and Unwin, 1963), Jean Stengers, “La Belgique et le Congo,” in Histoire de la Belgique contemporaine (Brussels: La Renaissance du Livre, 1974), and Roger Anstey, King Leopold’s Congo (London: Oxford University Press, 1969). On the construction of the colonial Congo in the Belgian national imaginary, see Kevin C. Dunn, Imagining the Congo: The International Relations of Identity (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2003).
49. For a vivid and moving account of this gradual but relentless process, see Renee C. Fox, In the Belgian Chateau: The Spirit and Culture of a European Society in an Age of Change (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1994). She concludes that the reality of Belgium as a nation and a social community was disappearing into the past, its breakup a subject of serious discussion. Vanthemsche adds that “the loss of the Congo reduced the possibilities for imagining a Belgian nation by Walloons and Flemings and must be considered as among the factors leading to decentralization and regionalism in Belgium after 1960” (La Belgique et le Congo, 89).
50. See the contributions in Mark R. Beissinger and Crawford Young, eds., Beyond State Crisis? Postcolonial Africa and Post-Soviet Eurasia in Comparative Perspective (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002).
51. See Herschelle S. Challenor, “The Contribution of Ralph Bunche to Trusteeship and Decolonization,” in Ralph Bunche: The Man and His Times, ed. Benjamin Rivlin (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990), 109–57, and Brian Urquhart, Ralph Bunche: An American Life (New York: Norton, 1990).
52. For detail, see Marc Michel, “The Independence of Togo,” in Decolonization and African Independence, 291–319, Georges Chaffard, Les carnets secrets de la decolonization (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1965), Victor T. Le Vine, Politics in Francophone Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), and Bernard Chidzero, Tanganyika and International Trusteeship (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).
53. Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 79.
54. Gretchen Bauer, “Namibia: Limits to Liberation,” in Politics in Southern Africa: State and Society in Transition, ed. Gretchen Bauer and Scott D. Taylor (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 205–36; Lionel Cliffe, The Transition to Independence in Namibia (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994).
55. Norma J. Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
56. Patrick Chabal et al., A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 4.
57. Of the substantial and sometimes hagiographic accounts of the Eritrean liberation war, I find especially useful Ruth Iyob, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, Resistance, Nationalism, 1941–1993 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), and Michela Wrong, I Didn’t Do It for You: How the World Used and Abused a Small African Nation (London: Harper Perennial, 2005). Worth noting is that Ethiopia, like the European colonial powers, was traumatized by the long Eritrean independence war, whose end coincided with a collapse of the preceding Ethiopian regime.
58. Malyn Newitt, “Mozambique,” in The History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa, 190.
59. Ken Flower, Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record—Rhodesia into Zimbabwe (London: John Murray, 1987), 105–15.
60. For a sympathetic but critical examination, see Colin Leys and John S. Saul, Namibia’s Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword (London: James Currey, 1995).
61. Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Amii Omaru-Otunno, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1800–1985 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1987).
62. The realization that colonial hold on the populations was vanishing was particularly acute in the Belgian Congo in 1959; Belgian constitutional law made it difficult to envisage sending metropolitan units with conscripts to fight a colonial war, as did popular mobilization against dispatch of troops to defend “Union Minière.”
63. Ali A. Mazrui, introduction, UNESCO General History of Africa, vol. 8, ed. Ali A. Mazrui and Christophe Wondji (London: Heinemann, 1993), 10.
64. W. M. Hailey, An African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 252–53.
65. Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (London: Frederick Muller, 1956), 23.
66. James S. Coleman, “Nationalism in Tropical Africa,” American Political Science Review 48.2 (1954): 404–26.
67. Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa.
68. Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of African and Asian Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 379.
69. Cheikh Anta Diop, Nations nègres et culture (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1965). Following his death in 1986, the distinguished University of Dakar was renamed in his honor.
70. Aimé Césaire, Cahier d’un retour au pays natal (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1956); Léopold Senghor, African Socialism (London: Pall Mall, 1964).
71. Placide Tempels, La philosophie bantoue (Elisabethville: Lovanie, 1945). An English translation was published in 1969 by the journal Présence Africaine.
72. Mabika Kalanda, La remise en question: Base de la decolonization mentale (Brussels: Remarques Africaines, 1967), 150–51.
73. See especially Frantz Fanon, Peau noir, masques blancs (Paris: Seuil, 1952), and Frantz Fanon, Les damnés de la terre (Paris: Maspero, 1963).
74. Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea: An African People’s Struggle—Selected Texts (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969). For a valuable appraisal, see Patrick Chabal, Amilcar Cabral: R
evolutionary Leader and People’s War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
75. For Nkrumah’s vision, see in particular his collection of policy addresses: I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology (New York: Praeger, 1961). I recollect this pledge being cited when I visited Ghana in 1958 and 1984.
76. These estimates are from several decades ago and may no longer be accurate owing to a millennial slow drift to Arab identity among Tamazigt (Berber) communities. See Charles F. Gallagher, “North African Problems and Prospects: Language and Identity,” in Language Problems of Developing Nations, ed. Joshua Fishman, Charles A. Ferguson, and Jyotirindra Das Gupta (New York: John Wiley, 1968), 129–50. In Algeria at the liberation war stage, another limit to Arabhood was the limited mastery of the language by much of the intellectual elite. I recollect attending North African student congresses in the late 1950s; in Morocco and Tunisia, these were conducted in Arabic, but the Algerians had to use French, as too many lacked fluency or even knowledge of Arabic.
77. Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1955). Egyptian nationalism had an older pedigree than most; British intervention in 1882 was partly stimulated by the nationalist challenge of native Egyptian officers led by Ahmad Urabi to the dynasty of Albanian rulers founded by Muhammed Ali in 1805 after Napolean’s withdrawal. Egypt was also unique in the extraordinary historical depth of continuous alien rule (by Persians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Mamelukes, the French (briefly), Albanians, and then the British), from 332 BC till 1922.
78. Among other sources, I find especially useful Gail M. Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
79. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (New York: Meridian, 1946).
80. Wale Adebanwi, “The Cult of Awo,” Journal of Modern African Studies 46.3 (2008): 335–60.
81. Crawford Young, “Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Class in Africa: A Retrospective,” Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines 26.3 (1986): 438.
82. Invaluable detail is provided in Roth Berins Collier, Regimes in Tropical Africa: Changing Forms of Supremacy, 1945–1975 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
83. Collier, Regimes in Tropical Africa, 63–94.
84. “Significant opposition” is defined as winning at least 25% of the vote and gaining some parliamentary representation: the countries who meet this standard include Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Zambia. Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, Morocco and Tunisia did not have preindependence elections. Data from Dieter Nohlen, Michael Krennerich, and Berhard Thibaut, Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
85. Richard A. Joseph, “The Reconfiguration of Power in Late-Twentieth Century Africa,” in State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa, ed. Richard A. Joseph (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 57–80.
86. For detail see I. F. Nicolson, The Administration of Nigeria 1900–1960: Men, Methods, and Myths (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1969), and Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995).
87. Robert O. Collins, A History of Modern Sudan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 46–59. In the 1936 treaty with Egypt, Britain formally recognized Egyptian sovereignty over Sudan. In 1951, King Farouk abrogated previous treaties and declared the “unity of the Nile” under the king.
88. The major party favoring unification with Egypt at the time was the Democratic Unionist Party rooted in the Khamiyya Sufi order and the Mirghani family. The other major political currents, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Communists, were also anti-Egyptian. None of these movements had any presence in southern Sudan.
89. Peter Woodward, “The South in Sudanese Politics, 1946–1956,” Middle Eastern Studies 16.3 (1980): 178–92.
90. A succinct and convincing account is found in M. W. Daly, “The Transfer of Power in the Sudan,” Decolonization and African Independence, 185–97; see also Deng, War of Visions, Muddathir ‘Abd al-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1969), and Robert O. Collins, Shadows in the Grass: Britain in the Southern Sudan, 1918–1956 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983).
91. Verhaegen, L’ABAKO.
92. Jules Gérard-Libois, Katanga Secession, trans. Rebecca Young (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966).
93. Alfred Stepan, Arguing Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 316–34.
94. J. F. Ade Ajayi, “Expectations of Independence,” Daedalus 111.2 (1982): 2.
95. Young, The African Colonial State, 284.
96. James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).
97. Mamadou Diouf, personal communication.
98. Although Asian states are rarely if ever described as “postcolonial,” the recent field of “postcolonial studies” is dominated by Asian diasporic intellectuals. I am indebted to Aili Mari Tripp for this observation.
99. So I argue in “The End of the Post-Colonial States in Africa? Reflections on Changing African Political Dynamics,” African Affairs 103.410 (2004): 23–49.
CHAPTER 4. THE ROAD TO AUTOCRACY
1. Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 219–64.
2. See René Lemarchand, ed., African Kingships in Perspective: Political Change and Modernization in Monarchical Settings (London: Frank Cass, 1977).
3. John Waterbury, The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite—A Study in Segmented Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), xviii. His analysis stands the test of time remarkably well.
4. Rahma Bourquia and Susan Gilson Miller, In the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power, and Politics in Morocco (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 12. See also the section on globalizing monarchies in Clement Moore Henry and Robert Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 212–60.
5. Robert H. Davies, Dan O’Meara, and Sipho Dlamini, The Kingdom of Swaziland: A Profile (London: Zed, 1985).
6. Among many sources, Edmond J. Keller, Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People’s Republic (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), provides a lucid account. See also the marvelously insightful though lightly fictionalized portrait in Ryszard Kapuscinki, The Emperor (London: Quartet, 1983).
7. “Neither Consolidating Nor Fully Democratic: The Evolution of African Political Regimes, 1998–2008,” Afrobarometer Briefing Paper no. 67, May 2009.
8. Aristide Zolberg, Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), 49–50.
9. Jan Vansina, personal communication.
10. Zolberg, Creating Political Order, 42.
11. Naomi Chazan, Peter Lewis, Robert A. Mortimer, Donald Rothchild, and Stephen John Stedman, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 55.
12. On the dimensions and impact of foreign aid, see especially Carol Lancaster, Aid to Africa: So Much to Do, So Little Done (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), and Nicolas van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
13. See the detailed review of Gabon political leadership in the obituary of Omar Bongo Ondimba in Jeune Afrique, 14–20 June 2009, 18–41.
14. Thomas Hodgkin, African Political Parties (Baltimore, MD: Penguin, 1961); Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Independence (New York: Random House, 1961); Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa.
>
15. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969). The issue, argues Huntington, was not what kind of government but how much government; achieving development required a strong state.
16. The process of marginalizing the independent press is well chronicled by William A. Hachten in Muffled Drums: The News Media in Africa (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1971).
17. For a more complete discussion, see Zolberg, Creating Political Order, 66–127, and Ruth Berins Collier, Regimes in Tropical Africa: Changing Forms of Political Supremacy, 1945–1975 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 95–151.
18. Nelson Kasfir, The Shrinking Political Arena: Participation and Ethnicity in Africa, with a Case Study of Uganda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
19. Léopold Senghor, Nation et voie africaine du socialisme (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1961).
20. Soriba Sylla, personal communication. Such tours were reminiscent of the sessions (“barazas”) that touring district commissioners once held in colonial times to deliver government messages to (obligatorily) assembled local communities.
21. Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa—From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair: A History of Fifty Years of Independence (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 30.
22. See Edward Luttwak’s engaging primer of military coup preparation and implementation, Coup d’état: A Practical Handbook (London: Allen Lane, 1968).
23. Useful detail on decolonization politics is provided by John Obert Voll and Sarah Potts Voll in The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multicultural State (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985), by Peter Woodward in “The South in Sudanese Politics, 1946–1956,” Middle Eastern Studies 16.3 (1980): 178–92, and by Robert O. Collins in A History of Modern Sudan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
24. CIA station chief Larry Devlin provides new details on this complicated era of multiple external interventions in his memoir, Chief of Station Congo: A Memoir of 1960– 67 (New York: Public Affairs, 2007).
B009THJ1WI EBOK Page 56