Frederick the Great and the Seven Years’ War, 1756–1763
* * *
* * *
HERBERT J. REDMAN
McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers
Jefferson, North Carolina
The author would like to express his appreciation to Nanette Argabrite, Isaac Hodges, and Delbert Gibson for their assistance with the preparation of the maps for this work.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGUING DATA ARE AVAILABLE
BRITISH LIBRARY CATALOGUING DATA ARE AVAILABLE
e-ISBN: 978-1-4766-1300-0
© 2015 Herbert J. Redman. All rights reserved
No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying or recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
On the cover: artwork Friedrich the Great, Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia, 1910 © 2014 PicturesNow; banner © 2013 Shutterstock; background map: Battle of Krefeld—map printed in The Gentleman’s Magazine, 1758
McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers
Box 611, Jefferson, North Carolina 28640
www.mcfarlandpub.com
Table of Contents
Preface
Introduction: Prelude to War
PART I. 1756–1757: THE CONTEST OPENS
1. The Invasion of Saxony
2. The Battle of Lobositz
3. The Saxon Surrender; The End of the Campaign
4. Winter Interlude; Start of the 1757 Campaign
PART II. 1757: INVASION OF AUSTRIA
5. Early Operations
6. The Battle of Prague
7. The Siege of Prague
8. Headed for Battle at Kolin
9. The Battle of Kolin
10. Siege of Prague Lifted; Prussians Retire from Bohemia
PART III. 1757: PRUSSIA IN RETREAT AND RECOVERY
11. The War Settles Down
12. Operations in Silesia; Preliminaries to Rossbach
13. The Battle of Gross-Jägersdorf
14. Final Preliminaries to Rossbach
15. The Battle of Rossbach
16. The Austrians Attempt to Reconquer Silesia
17. Preliminaries to Leuthen
18. The Battle of Leuthen
19. Mopping Up After Leuthen
PART IV. 1758: THE THIRD CAMPAIGN
20. Winter Interlude; Start of Campaign 1758
21. Frederick Invades Austria a Second Time; Siege of Olmütz
22. Frederick Retires from the Walls of Olmütz; Russian Advance on Brandenburg
23. Operations in Brandenburg Prior to Battle at Zorndorf
24. The Battle of Zorndorf
25. Prussians Follow up on Fermor; Frederick Marches for Saxony
26. Preliminaries to Battle at Hochkirch
27. The Battle of Hochkirch
28. Aftermath of Hochkirch; Maneuvering to the End of the Campaign
PART V. 1759: THE FOURTH CAMPAIGN
29. Frontier Incursions and the Russian Threat
30. Battle at Züllichau
31. Preliminaries to Kunersdorf
32. The Battle of Kunersdorf
33. The Swedes Show Their Hand
34. Allies Spring to Life
35. Maneuvering in the East; Frederick Prepares to Move to Saxony
36. Fall of Dresden; Soltikov Departs
37. Preliminaries to and Battle at Maxen
PART VI. 1760: THE FIFTH CAMPAIGN
38. Austrian Successes in Silesia; Frederick Ruminates There
39. Battle at Landshut and Events Up to the Siege of Dresden
40. Frederick Besieges Dresden
41. Maneuvering in Silesia Prior to Liegnitz
42. Battle at Liegnitz and Aftermath
43. Preliminaries to Torgau; Allied Raid upon Berlin
44. The Battle of Torgau
45. Aftermath of Torgau; End of the Campaign
PART VII. 1761: THE SIXTH YEAR
46. Campaign 1761 Opens with a Flourish
47. Opening Salvoes in Silesia; Allied Union Realized
48. Frederick Leaves Bunzelwitz; Schweidnitz Is Captured; End in Sight?
49. The Swedes Launch Their Last Offensive; Colberg Falls
PART VIII. 1762: THE LAST CAMPAIGN
50. Operations in Silesia Commence
51. Battles of Burkersdorf and Reichenbach; Fall of Schweidnitz
52. The Campaign of 1762 in Saxony
PART IX. MAPS
Chapter Notes
Bibliography
List of Names and Terms
Preface
The research and writing of this book has occupied many years—much longer than the duration of the war. In a time just removed from the world wars of the twentieth century, wars in which Germany played a significant rôle, we take pause and reflect. That nation demonstrated, even as she fell short in both of her major wars, a tenacity and a military prowess which has had few equals in the history of the world. The question can be legitimately asked, “From whence did this rich tradition of military prowess originate?” In a similar query, “What rôle did Prussia, the old northern German kingdom, play in Germany’s military rise and tradition?” This long, proud tradition that has extended for centuries cannot be denied. Part and parcel of that tradition, and its noted founder and earliest chief benefactor, was King Friedrich II, better known to history as Frederick the Great (1712–1786).
It can be argued, with some justification, that Frederick’s father, Friedrich Wilhelm, forged the weapon that had been instrumental in his son’s military accomplishments, the Prussian army, but the fact remains that the son alone utilized the tool that had been so carefully crafted by the father.
The subject of this work, the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763), remains the greatest achievement of that aforementioned son. It is a tale shrouded in some mystery, even though interest in military history has been revived of late. The Seven Years’ War is not well known in North America, which has been concerned mostly with its own part in that war—otherwise known as the French and Indian War. This is in spite of the fact that the struggle in Central Europe from 1756 to 1763 had a profound effect on the rest of the fighting. This work is an attempt to shed some light on this subject, in a readily accessible form.
In the interest of clarity, some terminology should be explained. Throughout the book, the Prussian army is also referred to as “bluecoats”; the Russian army as “greencoats”; the Austrians as “whitecoats”; and the British as “redcoats.” These terms, of course, refer to the uniform colors worn by the respective armies.
I first learned of the Prussian King Frederick and of the Seven Years’ War as a small boy, on a trip to the local arcade with my father. I picked up an oversize book, Great Military Battles by Cyril Falls et al., read about the Battle of Rossbach and was intrigued by this eighteenth century monarch. Napoleon and Hitler were also represented in Falls’ book and, though they were interesting, I determined right then and there to find out more about this Frederick the Great and the Seven Years’ War.
A war waged for seven long years, often against overwhelming odds, and at the end of it all stood Frederick, who had neither won nor lost but merely weathered the storm. Against long odds, Prussia’s military reputation had not only survived the conflagration, but, by 1763, had been enhanced.
It is this tale that is told in these pages. To the author’s knowledge it is the first detailed account of the war in Germany from 1756 to 1763 in more than a century. As such, the view of the war’s events can only benefit from more recent scholarship that was not a
vailable to earlier authors. It is my sincerest hope that the following work will be well received by both the scholars of the period as well as the reading public.
Introduction: Prelude to War
In 1756, the first war in the history of the world that could be called a world war sprang forth. The king of Prussia, Frederick the Second (II) or Frederick the Great, imagined he was about to pay for a “sin” he had committed 16 years earlier. In 1740, he had marched into the province of Silesia, which was part of the Austrian Empire (it also happened to be the country’s richest province just then). Frederick had seized the opportunity afforded by the death of Emperor Charles VI of Austria on October 20, 1740, and the assumption of the throne of Austria by a young, inexperienced woman of 24, Maria Theresa.1
The First and Second Silesian Wars directly resulted from this aggressive act, but this was not the sole reason the powers of France, Austria, Russia, Sweden, and most of the German Reich were preparing to crush Prussian military power in the mid–1750s. There were actually a number of motives, and not all can be laid at Frederick’s door. But the king of Prussia had established a well-deserved reputation for making alliances with foreign powers and then breaking those agreements when it no longer benefitted his country.2
If that factor were not bad enough, the monarch possessed the honest, but annoying, habit of speaking his mind with little thought of diplomacy. He practiced this “freedom of expression” just about whenever and wherever he chose. There were inevitable consequences. For instance, Frederick’s formerly friendly relationship with the Russian Court soured based entirely upon some biting witticisms about Czarina Elizabeth I made by the irascible Prussian monarch. Not satisfied, the Prussian king then turned his attention to the court at Versailles. Soon, the coarse jokes that issued forth from the mouth of Frederick piqued the other two major female representatives of Europe, Madame de Pompadour, King Louis XV’s minister in France, and that Queen of Austria, Maria Theresa.3 In particular, Maria Theresa did not appreciate her northern neighbor’s biting wit, and she wanted Silesia back. This in spite of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, where Austria officially acknowledged Prussian ownership of Silesia, a document signed by Maria Theresa. But it was obvious, even at the time, that no one power had been satisfied by the treaty.4 This was an important point, even as the Austrians tried to draw new allies for their cause.5
Looking at these events centuries removed from them, it is apparent Frederick had to reap the whirlwind from a policy he had practiced during the period from the early 1740s, in trying to isolate his country from the predicaments of his foreign neighbors. By the mid–1750s, this policy of insulating Prussia was leaving her without allies in what was to be the coming fury. France was distant to a renewed alliance, but the Prussians calculated that the age old enmity between France and Austria would sooner or later lead France back into the Prussian fold.
Unfortunately for Frederick, he miscalculated on changing times in the mid-eighteenth century. Great Britain had replaced Austria as France’s chief rival by the 1750s. This was due in part to political issues in Europe, but also because the English were encroaching increasingly upon the vulnerable French colonies in both North America and Asia. Even worse for Frederick, the French also recognized this.
Just when Frederick realized that Maria Theresa and her ministers were formulating a new plan to recover Silesia and humble Prussia at the same time, is not known. He probably suspected since the end of the Second Silesian War in 1745. The Prussian king was notorious for not communicating his intentions. And there were additional problems.
The Prussian monarch was terrified of Russian incursions into Central Europe, as that vast empire to the east possessed unknown resources and influences. Frederick calculated Austria would require allies if she were to go to war again to regain Silesia. Russia would fit that bill well. Elizabeth’s armies were a ready threat to the eastern provinces of Prussia, one too powerful to ignore.6 This was a foe absent from the earlier Silesian wars, but, by the mid–1750s, Russia was ready to venture into the affairs of mainstream Europe. A weakness for the English at the Russian court existed, through her ambassador to St. Petersburg, Sir Charles Hanbury Williams. Ironically, this same gentleman had been sent first to Berlin to represent English interests there, but he had angered Frederick and was almost immediately recalled.7 Now an open breach between Russia and Great Britain did not occur during the coming war, as it worked out. However, Williams’ appointment did nothing to help prevent the coming struggle.
The Prussian king not only insulted the Russian leadership with his tongue, but through his wallet. The greedy Russian chancellor, Alexis Petrovich Bestuzhev-Riumin, who was accustomed to being bribed, was insulted when the Prussians failed to offer him a bribe to gain his good offices. Frederick even sent representatives to try to stir up the Turks to attack the rear of the Russians, so as to divert their attention away from Europe towards the south rather than meddling with the Europeans. Russian reaction can be guessed! Frederick inevitably was not going to make much headway with the Russian court under these circumstances,8 and the Austrian court was simultaneously looking around for allies to be set against this same nefarious king.
France represented another obstacle. King Louis XV was really upset about the callous remarks made about Madame de Pompadour and he was still perturbed about being abandoned in the earlier wars when Prussia signed a separate peace. In short, this was another power not to be taken lightly. On paper, France represented the strongest military power in Europe at the time, having at her disposal an army of about 200,000 men, and the ready ability to raise about an equal number of additional forces.
The English, represented by Sir William, offered, in August 1755, the Russian court a subsidy in exchange for the dispatch of 80,000 troops to defend Hanover from any foreign invasion, French, Prussian, or otherwise. Elizabeth picked up the mantle right away. She saw this as an opportunity to accomplish three goals all at once: (1) Earn some subsidy money; (2) Humble the sharp-tongued Prussian king; (3) Get directly involved in the political climate of Central Europe. For its part, the Austrian government saw an opening to discuss joint military operations against what had become a common enemy, Frederick the Great. The Prussian king had his spies out; he discovered the subsidy treaty’s existence and soon had a copy of it.9
The British calculated that, once Frederick learned that Great Britain and Russia might come together, this might force Prussia to the bargaining table. Prussia, because of her strategic position, was far more useful for a defense of Hanover than Russia, which would have to bring troops across hundreds of miles in order to fulfill the obligations of the Anglo-Russian Subsidy Treaty, never ratified anyhow.
British and Prussian representatives promptly began meeting to iron out details of an alliance of some sort. The Prussian king had little choice left. Russia had turned on him, as had Austria. What little hope of any negotiations with France were fading fast. The king informed the English that he expected the French to renew their alliance with him, an obvious subterfuge,10 and one which the English saw right through.
Nevertheless, the two countries really needed each other to play important roles in this coming war. Great Britain needed Prussia to use large armies to contain the French in Europe, keeping them deflected from English ambitions across the water. As for Frederick, he needed Great Britain to keep from being completely isolated, for the most part. He could also use some British troops fighting on the Continent with him, or in conjunction with him. Besides, a subsidy would be a nice addition to the proceedings. Matters thus ran their course, and, on January 16, 1756, the Convention of Westminster was concluded between the two powers. Any thought of cementing relations with France were immediately dashed, and the French began casting about towards Austria. The idea of an alliance with their western neighbor was looked upon in the Habsburg realm with some favor. Austrian Chancellor Count Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz pointed out to the French how the two nations of France and Austria h
ad fought each other for decades all right, but to no advantage to either side. There was promise.
But it was in Russia itself, in the person of Czarina Elizabeth, that Frederick found his most antagonistic opponent. Elizabeth regarded the treaty between the English and Prussians as a deliberate attempt to curtail any solid Russian ambitions in Central Europe. As for the French, they reacted to news of the Convention with little enthusiasm and a lot of resentment. Although there was an initial attempt to reapproach the Prussian king, this effort fizzled on the vine. In May 1756, the countries of France and Austria concluded a formal defensive alliance, the Treaty of Versailles. One of the provisions of this agreement involved either power coming to the rescue of the other should either one be willfully attacked.11 The French miscalculated completely the impact on their country. It was clearly a bad bargain from the French point of view.12
Russia had resolved to attack Prussia herself, despite the fact that the English were practicing their own form of subterfuge by assuring the Prussian king that all was well in their relationship with Russia. Russia started to prepare for war. Frederick issued orders to mobilize his country for war in June 1756, and then received further disturbing reports from some of his spies that Saxony, too, was entering the contest on the Austrian side. With Saxony so close by, this could be very serious. It was even given out the center of the “conspiracy” against him was in Dresden, the capital of Saxony. Austria was also mobilizing, and the king enquired the nature of these preparations. With no satisfactory reply, Frederick resolved to strike first at the “heart” of the gathering coalition, Saxony. Besides, it has been postulated that both sides were actually intending offensive action, but that Frederick beat his enemies to the punch.13
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 1