Lopukhin, for instance, was moving south just behind the advanced guard. He had already reluctantly yielded up his heavy artillery to Fermor—who was supposed to be in line before his men—and the rest to the vanguard. All that remained was the cache of “secret” howitzers alluded to already and the regimental guns. Russian artillery could be critical for the coming encounter, no matter how tough the infantry might be.
Fermor’s assurances of Lopukhin’s security now rang hollow in the ears of the concerned 2nd division commander. Fermor’s delay reduced by about half the troops moving down the Allenburg road towards the clearing. The advanced guard, with the thick and, in the course of a battle, generally worthless Cossack screen, was out beyond real support range; Fermor was still forming and preparing. Browne’s 3rd would be unable to aid Lopukhin without delay because Fermor’s still moving formations would be in the way.
Meanwhile, Lehwaldt with his Prussian force was marching forward. He knew the Russians were close, and was determined to take advantage of whatever surprise was open to him. The old warrior was not at the peak of confidence. However, Lehwaldt sent the Duke of Holstein with his cavalry (20 full squadrons) riding towards Sibilsky’s forces. On the left, Schorlemer’s cavalry moved through the undergrowth towards Weynothen, while the Prussian center (composed entirely of infantry) drove past Uderballen and Metsschüllen. This was right into the Norkitten.
The sun was shining when the horsemen of Schorlemer started forward. A Russian battery (led by one Major Tyutchev),3 sited just south of Uglinskii’s Division and supported by the 1st Grenadiers, opened on the enemy horse as soon as it appeared. Tyutchev’s battery was accurate in its fire. Schorlemer’s riders were rather rudely surprised by the guns. As for the Russians, it was certainly a manageable business. The formations had been still on the march when the Prussians suddenly put in their appearance. “Their marching columns,” wrote one historian, “collapsing into disorder as officers sought to deploy”4 were immediately at a disadvantage. Through it all, Browne endeavored to close the space between the Pregel and the Norkitten, this against the Prussian cavalry.
Meanwhile, the Prussian infantry got down to business as well. The 4th Infantry (Lt.-Gen. Carl Erhard von Kalnein5) pressed the enemy back towards the east, in a furious fight in which 78 men and the grenadier battalion commander, Johann Dietrich von Pölentz, were lost.6 This unit was knocked about. Nor was this division the only one involved. The 11th Infantry (Lt.-Gen. Lorenz Ludwig von Below) ultimately lost almost all of its grenadiers in this hot, deadly action.7 However, its neighbor, the solid 16th Infantry (Lt.-Gen. Count Christoph Dohna) held the Prussian left steady.8
For most of the Russian officers present, they had never been in an action where the enemy were as aggressive as these Prussians. They had to reach inside and find that extra resolve to go on. For some, it was too much. Andrei Timofeevich Bolotov, for example, gave one distressing example of an officer who “galloped around distractedly … [shrieking] out meaningless orders.”9 Nor was this development confined to officers. One source mentioned a number of faint-hearted soldiers who took the “opportunity” of a fully involved battle to go guard the baggage or hang around in the bushes and scrub nearby.10 Fortunately for the Russian cause most did what was expected of them. And the Russian ordnance, which did turn out to be crucial after all, opened with a noteworthy fury from the start of the action. Sibilsky’s and Lopukhin’s men turned to form a coherent battle line, while Browne had no immediate aim beyond containing Schorlemer’s horsemen, who were successfully held at bay until Fermor unaccountably ordered Tyutchev’s battery back from its forward post. Just why has never been satisfactorily explained.
Schorlemer had 30 squadrons of fine Prussian cavalry that were rendered free to attack by Fermor’s blunder. They charged past heaps of their own dead and dying towards a weak Russian cavalry shield. Although his men had been pounded by Russian artillery, the latter’s mounted arm was no mean match for Schorlemer’s far more capable riders. As soon as the Prussian blow fell, the cavalry, which included Nizhegorodski’s Dragoons, Serbian, Hungarian Hussars, and Rizhskii’s Cuirassiers, melted away as a cohesive force.
The situation was desperate for a time. The 1st Grenadiers, directed by Lt.-Gen. Matvei Lieven11 to fill up the line south of Uglinkskii’s Infantry Division protruding into the Norkitten, helped stiffen the faltering resolve of the forward units. What was more, the vacancy left by Tyutchev’s battery was filled by the Sibilsky and Nevskii Infantry Divisions.12 They shifted positions from the rear of Browne’s line to close the exposed area between Browne and General Petr Semenovich Soltikov’s Brigade, a gap of nearly ¾ of a mile or so at the start of the battle. Schorlemer’s surging charges were threatening Leontev’s Infantry Brigade. The 9th Dragoons (Holstein’s own unit) rode through the enemy lines, giving much more than it got and capturing eight cannon. Losses were 55 dead and wounded.13 Its neighbor, the 10th Dragoons (Major-General Friedrich Ludwig, Count Finck von Finckenstein) did not escape without damage. It lost 34 dead and wounded troopers, along with 19 horses.14 The loss ratio could have been much worse in retrospect.
The Nevskii-Sibilsky combination turned the tide, aided by the timely arrival of a Russian reserve force pushed forward under Major-General Petr Aleksandrovich Rumyantsev. This combined force would soon press the Prussians out of the woods.
The Prussians were stopped cold and turned back again, with heavy losses. As they withdrew past, Russian guns again plastered away, emptying saddles and sending terrified, riderless horses in all directions. The blasts from the guns hammered the Prussian infantry, which had entered the thickets in their way but were forced out by the self-same shelling. Through it all, the Prussian infantry were still at it. In the smoke shrouding the Norkitten from the shelling and in the midst of all the confusion, the Garrison Regiment II (Colonel Hans Sigismund von Sydow), the second line of this unit mistakenly fired into the backs of their front line comrades, killing and wounding many of their own men.15
There was additional drama carried out when the Duke of Holstein led his Prussian squadrons from Uderballen galloping against the Russian hemisphere, striking the Butyrskii and Apscheronski Regiments in front of him.16 The Cossacks of Sibilsky’s command and Serebryakov sucked the Prussian horsemen forward, feigning a debilitating retreat. For a moment, the bluecoats seemed to have it their own way. The 8th Dragoons (Major-General Dubislav Friedrich von Platen) fared relatively well here; it lost 33 men, and 27 horses during the fracas.17
The advancing Prussian horse sliced through the green-coated infantry, but then came squarely up against Sibilsky’s heavy guns. The latter pieces opened a furious pounding of the surprised Prussian horsemen, who had their way of escape closed off and were badly used by the Russians. The “attack” fizzled out, and these attackers were either killed or captured, almost to a man.
The auxiliary Prussian forces had thus pretty much shot their bolt; still, the main Prussian body had yet to put in an appearance. At approximately 0600 hours, the latter finally launched an attack. This new blow fell on the 1st and 2nd divisions, the Russian bodies emerging on the southern side of the Norkitten confronting Uderballen. The attack was delivered in salvo form, the bluecoats halting long enough to fire, three times (with relatively little effect), then continuing on. This was the crisis of the battle, quickly degenerating into a sustained firefight. The Russians employed their “secret” howitzers here. Then a fourth Prussian volley ripped through the green-coated ranks, prompting a fierce reply. The moment was critical. All seemed lost, as the faltering 2nd division of Lopukhin was on the point of being driven off,18 when suddenly, the Narvskii regiment, already all but bereft of its officers through casualties from the fairly accurate Prussian fire, sped forward, from its post hard by Uderballen, to carry the day. By 0700 hours, the Russians had thoroughly stopped the enemy, “after a brave stand.”19
This done, the Prussian leaders ordered retreat, and Lehwaldt pulled back from a now thoroughly aroused op
ponent. But the extrication was slow. It was another hour or so before the heavy fighting died down with heavy losses among the general Russian officers. Lopukhin was killed in the final moments of the battle, with the Russian Quartermaster-General Ivan Ivanovich Weywarn, Yurii Lieven and Villebois all wounded. What had transpired on this day? Lehwaldt failed because he lacked troops, and he had little of Frederick the Great’s tactical skill.20 Moreover, the tenacious nature of the Russian soldiery contributed to Lehwaldt’s misery.21
The Russian artillery, the guns that so mercilessly raked the Duke of Holstein’s and Schorlemer’s men, won the day for the Russians. It must be kept in mind that the latter had not had the opportunity to form a conventional battle line, with the surprise attack and all. Sibilsky tried to mount a pursuit of the faltering Prussians, but, with only cavalry close at hand, it could not be sustained.
Moreover, Apraxsin aborted further pursuit because he had to have the soldiers called back to the field. This was done to quell a situation where some of the men were ranging over the stricken battlefield, killing the wounded and stealing from men of both sides.22
The first test of arms with the Russians had, indeed, been a test. Individual Prussian field formations had behaved commendably. The 2nd Infantry of Kanitz, for instance, had leveled bayonets and broke through the enemy’s front on the right wing.23 But lack of support doomed it to failure and the second Russian line held. The whole matter cost the unit 16 officers and 489 men.24 Nor were heroics of the day’s efforts confined to the foot soldiers.
Four horse units, based in East Prussia, had performed with much spirit. The 7th Dragoons (Major-General Christoph Friedrich Stephan von Plettenberg) led the Duke of Holstein’s powerful stroke. The Russians had three cavalry regiments shattered in this particular stroke, the bluecoats, in the process, capturing a battery and riding down some Russian infantry. For this, the tally sheet was 136 men lost.25
The battle was a costly one. Lehwaldt lost 4,520 men, including 282 officers. There were some 1,800 dead among the bluecoats, along with 17 battalion guns and 11 big guns. The Russians lost 5,989 men, including 1,487 dead. Russian losses also included 11 generals, a very high figure.26
Even Apraxsin, in his account to the Czarina Elizabeth of the battle, had to admit, during the first phase of the battle “the victory was all this while doubtful.”27 A Prussian description of the battle, printed on pages 143–144 of the same source, on the other hand, discounts entirely the steadiness of the Russians and blames the loss on the lack of coordination between the Prussian formations, along with the very thick smoke.
Lloyd thinks Lehwaldt badly underestimated the quality of the Russian forces to the point he did not provide enough troops to form a strong strike force, but instead opposed them point-for-point. Being badly outnumbered, this was unwise. Except for the wars against Sweden and, especially that against Charles XII, Europe knew little of the Russians’ ability to fight. The frequent clashes with the Ottoman Turks hardly illuminated the case. In short, Lehwaldt did not know what enemy he were opposing.28 Neither, for that matter, did the Prussian king. Finally, Lloyd observed the Russians could only be killed, not merely defeated; this though the battles of Zorndorf and Kunersdorf were still off in the future.
Ironically, the Russian army made no use of its victory and go ahead towards Königsberg. Apraxsin made no further penetration into East Prussia. After pausing at Wehlau, the marshal gave marching orders for home. He told his superiors he could get no supplies, but the real reason for this abrupt change of heart was news that Czarina Elizabeth was dying had reached his ears. Apraxsin did not wish to incur the wrath of Grand Duke Peter, that great admirer of the Prussian kingdom, by occupying part of that kingdom. Even so, maintaining the army through the winter in quarters in East Prussia would have been difficult at best. Impossible at worst.
Lehwaldt came forward after Apraxsin, and did not break off until the last of the Russian troops (except for a garrison left to retain control of Memel; which had fallen—see below) had left Prussian soil. Thus, although he really had no right at all to expect it, Frederick’s easternmost province would remain in the unsteady hands of his old Marshal Lehwaldt.
Chapter Fourteen
Final Preliminaries to Rossbach
Meanwhile, on the Northern Front, the Swedes had begun to move. In early September, General Gustav David Graf Hamilton (leading the army until Sternberg could arrive) brought his army of some 22,000 men1 to the Peene River (the recognized boundary between Prussian and Swedish Pomerania). September 12, demonstrations by the Swedes were made to confuse the bluecoats as to the actual crossing point, followed under cover of night (September 12–13), by a rapid crossing of the river. The aim for this force, divided into three columns, was on Wölgast, Anklam, Loise, and Demmin.2 The Swedish vanguard was opposite to Pasewalk. One Prussian regiment (of Johann Gottfried von Stockhausen) stood vigilantly on the Peene. But the bluecoats were too few to accomplish much. Under the king’s directions, militia companies had been raised to oppose the invaders, and a small Prussian flotilla was ordered prepared for a sea campaign as well. At Stettin, General Manteuffel was in command (the Commandant of Stettin itself was Constantin Guido von Podewils3); but he suffered from a lack of the mounted arm and mostly stayed within range of the fortress itself. His command was two full regiments, a grenadier battalion, and the militia.
But the Swedes progressed well, initially. The first of the Swedish columns, led by General Jacob Albrecht von Lantinghausen, moved on Demmin; the second, under Major-General Ehrensward, pressed on Anklam, while the van, under Lt.-Gen. Graften Lievan, pressed through Wölgast towards Usedom. Only in front of Peenemünde, which had an entrenched post held by 190 men under Captain Philipp Ludolf von Oppen, were the Swedes really impeded.
Peenemünde endured a siege from about September 14, until September 23, when the stricken fortress finally fell. The losses were three killed and one wounded.4 By September 27, the Swedish army was encamped at Ferdinandshof and had seized Wollin. The van, under General Lievan, had reached Prenzlau by that stage. Sternberg vainly hoped that the French in near-by Hanover would actively cooperate. Among other things, the Swedes had rather ambitious designs upon the powerful Prussian fortress of Stettin, which early on in the war boasted Major-General von Podewils as commandant. One singular fact remained: Stettin would turn out to be no pushover under any circumstances.
Nevertheless, for the moment, the Swedes had it all their own way, but Frederick knew they would be very slow about developing any major maneuvers they might attempt.5 The Swedes were separated by distance from the vital Brandenburg province, and, besides, Lehwaldt, the threat of the Russians now temporarily nullified, was marching towards Prussian Pomerania to oppose this northern menace.
We can now examine what developments there were in the West. Keith was being pressured by the allies,6 who, in the king’s absence, were advancing again, joined at length by Broglie’s men (October 19–23), boasting a strength of some 60,000 men. Broglie’s men were a sight, lacking even basic tents to shelter themselves, or the provisions to feed them or even sufficient ammunition for their guns. This so-called “reinforcement” was probably worse than nothing at all, compounding Allied difficulties.7
October 24, Frederick marched for Leipzig, hearing disturbing word in the meantime of the enemy’s advance. Soubise and Hildburghausen had crossed the Saale and moved forward into Saxony. On October 24, the Reich Army occupied Weissenfels, and sent summons to Keith (then in Leipzig) to surrender his post immediately. The French were still distant beyond the Saale at that moment. Keith replied he would rather burn the suburbs of the city than surrender the place. The Scotsman was never one to be bullied. So the Imperialists, hearing word the king was once more on the march that way, withdrew to the Saale and re-crossed the river, pausing on the opposite bank. They would have marched off had they not been directly ordered to stand fast.
Frederick was in Leipzig on October 26, joining Keith and ordering a c
oncentration at that place of the troops of Ferdinand, Prince Moritz, Keith, and his own. This gave a total of about 22,000 men, numerically inferior to the enemy but of superior fighting ability.8 The feat of bringing the different forces together at Leipzig is often overlooked. The following day, Prince Henry arrived with the main body, while Ferdinand brought his men from Magdeburg later the same afternoon. Prince Moritz, the Berlin affair at an end, was in Leipzig by October 28. Although the men had marched great distances—even up to 25 miles a day in some cases—they “desired to be led out [at once] against the enemy.”9 October 30, the king marched from Leipzig forward to the historic village of Lützen, Mayr in the lead, as usual, flushing out allied pickets10 and driving away reconnaissance parties, thereby clearing the way for the main army, which dribbled in throughout the night.
The Allies were not inactive. Hildburghausen, once he had retired behind the Saale, was determined to hold the river line. Broglie moved on Halle, to guard the bridge there from the king’s men. Soubise was pivoting his force towards both that post and Merseburg, but not beyond. In a surprise move, especially from the Allied Coalition’s view against Prussia, the French government ordered Soubise to keep as close to the line of the Saale as he could. This was the first true indicator the French were generally going to stay as far West in Germany as they could reasonably do.11 Even Soubise himself could scarcely believe the new instructions. Worse, Frederick’s arrival at Leipzig meant Prussian patrols thereabouts were suddenly stepped up. The Austrians had a force of 1,000 Cuirassiers and the two regiments of Szėchėny Hussars close to Markrandstädt.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 25