The Prussians were not inclined to give ground, having gained their immediate objective. They moved upon Görlitz and that neighborhood as being a step closer to Neisse. Prince Henry was put under pressure, but with no lasting success for the Austrians. Laudon tried again the following day, but again with negligible results. Daun forthwith decided there would be no way to halt the Prussian march short of a battle, which the Austrian commander (in spite of his victory at Hochkirch) was unwilling to attempt. Thus there was “still considerable reluctance to face Frederick again in open field.”9 At Hochkirch, the Prussians had severely handled the marshal’s men, in spite of inferior numbers. Here Daun would not try. Even with a crushing superiority over the bluecoats by more than two to one, the weaker side was allowed to resume its mission. An objective, we might add, that would undo all that Hochkirch and the campaign had achieved. Nothing could more clearly testify to the caution of marshal Daun than that. October 29, General Bornstedt arrived hard by Grüna with the provisions. Simultaneously, General Braun moved from Görlitz upon Leopoldshayn, there to wait with the artillery train.
After a few days’ rest and recuperation, the Prussian army again was on the way. It rose from Görlitz on October 30, and made for Neisse through Hirschberg and Schweidnitz. Laudon followed, pricking at the Prussian rear for a couple of days. Prince Henry repulsed him, and then occupied Hirschberg to prevent the enemy from doing so. Prince Henry was able to thwart Laudon by setting Schönbrunn afire. He took a detachment to get hold of Landshut. Henry’s men drew out the guns that had been brought from Dresden to blast and break up Laudon’s raiding parties when they came on too strongly. Frederick, by way of retaliation for these raids, ordered several Saxon villages burned down. And the Austrians, in spite of their best efforts, could not get ahead of the king.
Daun moved with his main force on Görlitz, there to await the king’s next move. He had strong detachments maneuvering on the Liegnitz road to prevent the enemy from moving around him that way. Laudon, tiring from the game, returned to the main army. Prussian patrols reached Schönberg and fought a hard little fight with General Vehla. Other forces probed to Lichtenau, while Laudon, hearing word the Prussians were on the move again, barged through Görlitz to nip at Prince Henry’s rearguard. Vehla had reinforced Laudon by then, and the combined force took up post near Pfaffendorf. Frederick’s lines were stabilized about Geilsdorf, although the local threat of Austrian irruption continued.
Daun saw good to detach Arenberg to support Laudon. November 1, the Prussian army filed out of Lauban-Geilsdorf, and crossed the Queiss River. Laudon reacted immediately. Austrian batteries were set up near the old Prussian posts and began lobbing shells at the enemy’s rearguard, but that was the extent of Laudon’s effort at the moment. The king, leading the Prussian rear now, was rather careful to avoid an entanglement with the irascible Laudon. Once the latter was forced to break off, the king moved on Löwenburg. Laudon followed him at a safe distance, and moved succinctly across the Queiss. The arrival of the Prussian king nearby was immediately conveyed to Harsch. The latter made preparations to retire. Frederick marched on Jauer (November 2), then on Schweidnitz (November 3). Laudon, probing cautiously, moved on Petrowitz, sending troopers to harass the Prussians at Hirschberg, which consisted of Ziethen and his troopers. Fouquet joined with the main royal army, while Prince Henry took up at Landshut. Ziethen, unbuckled on to Thomasdorf, was given the task of linking Henry’s and the king’s men. Harsch, stuck between a rock and a hard place, did all he could.
The news of the Prussian king’s march into Silesia spread ahead of him like wildfire. About the first of November, word reached Neisse and Tresckow learned that relief was on its way—this from some Austrian deserters. Five days after, at about 1300 hours on November 6, Tresckow’s scouts informed him that the enemy siege lines around Neisse were abandoned, Harsch having pulled up stakes the night before and withdrawn back into Moravia. Harsch departed so quickly that much unexploded ammunition and supplies were left to the Prussians.10 This was anticipated by the garrison, who had noticed the weakening of the enemy’s efforts. At Kossel, next turn, the irregulars fled upon word of the dreaded Frederick’s approach. Harsch had been dealt with, no need of a battle.11 The king moved to Münsterberg, and then put in an appearance at Neisse to inspect the recent siege damage. On November 6, General Retzow perished, of dysentery. He had been suffering from general ill-health, and this latest effort had served to finish him off.12 This added another name to the growing list of Prussian generals already perished in this war: Keith, Schwerin, Francis of Brunswick, Mosel (at Hochkirch). Prince Moritz, who had been allowed to return to Bautzen shortly after his capture, was again with his own army. But he never returned to a command; his wounds took long to heal, he developed cancer and died on April 11, 1760. Faithful Driesen, hero of Leuthen, died in Dresden on November 2, 1758. A shortage of good commanders was beginning to show its disadvantages, as Frederick found himself with no alternative but to assign ever greater responsibilities to those competent men who were left and move up officers not entirely suited.
Back in Saxony, meanwhile, Daun having received word that Harsch had withdrawn, decided as a counterstroke to lay siege to Dresden, and to seize it before Frederick could hasten back to rescue his garrison there. If Dresden could be wrestled away from the Prussians, this would automatically give the marshal control of southern Saxony and provide a good cap to what had, overall, been a successful campaign. Frederick, back in Silesia, had satisfied himself of the danger of the Austrian marshal sweeping down upon Dresden while he was busy elsewhere. Even if he did, the king assumed that Finck could handle the incursion with the troops at his disposal until help could arrive.
In the meanwhile, Frederick thought of sweeping into Lusatia to beat up some of the enemy’s posts there.13 November 8, Prince Henry heard news that Daun was planning such a move from enemy deserters. He quickly passed the information on to his brother, with a qualifying note that the source of the information was none too reliable.
Marshal Daun might look with some satisfaction on what his army had accomplished during the campaign of 1758: Foiling Frederick’s designs upon Olmütz; invading and nearly conquering Saxony while Frederick had gone to face the Russians; then surprising and defeating the main Prussian army at Hochkirch. To capture Dresden would put a good culmination to the campaign, and might give the marshal even greater favor at Vienna than in 1757 when he stopped the Prussian king cold at Kolin. There was some correctness in this logic. It is significant to note that the two serious reverses suffered by the Prussians so far in this war had both been inflicted courtesy of the steady, patient Daun. Except in terms of actual maneuvering, Daun’s slow, cumbersome way appeared to be superior to the king’s. But it sure showed up on this occasion.
However, had Daun been swift on his march, Dresden would have fallen to him. With the short space of time at hand before Frederick might reappear, a successful siege of the Saxon capital was simply not feasible. The story of Daun’s lethargic attempt to besiege Dresden and Frederick’s very swift—ultimately successful—effort to curb him makes for some eye-opening reading. The Austrian commander moved his army gradually upon Reichenbach. In front of Dresden, Daun was well aware that Finck would do his best to delay the Austrian advance until the king could return from Silesia.14
The preparations made to besiege the Saxon capital had to be kept as secretive as possible. If Prussian intelligence learned of this attempt, then Frederick would never allow himself to be drawn off towards Silesia. The bringing forward of the bridge train with which to prosecute the siege was thus held up, deliberately.
Bringing forward this siege equipment took a long, drawn-out amount of time. But Daun proceeded to business. November 4, at 0400 hours, the Austrian army was shaken into motion and rolled forward, barging into Bautzen (November 5). Things could have gotten unpleasant quite quickly, but the measured pace of the maneuver helped to slow things down. On November 6, the marshal was at Helmsd
orf. From here, it was crystal clear that Daun was not aiming for Silesia on this occasion at all. The Imperialists were cooperating as fully as they could in this new endeavor. New bridging had been prepared in as quiet a manner as possible at Copitz, and the Imperialists kept a close watch thereabouts. Austrian posts at Dittersbach were pressed over the Elbe on to Pirna and the vicinity (November 7). The Imperialists had been more active than usual in trying to help with the task at hand.
The Imperialist move was by a circuitous method which would help pin the Prussians’ attention to any problems with the marshal. Zweibrücken himself rose with his army and marched on Hermsdorf on November 4. He was only too aware of the lateness of the campaign season and that Dresden, if it were to be regained, was now or never. Thus the energy level was at high pitch. November 6, Zweibrücken brought his expectant army to Freiberg. A good point to take a breather was at hand. The movement had not been easy, and the artillery teams in particular had struggled.
Prussian efforts to see what was afoot had been low key, but there remained the chance Frederick’s minions would put in an appearance. Zweibrücken could not do much here. For the enemy responded first. Itzenplitz rolled forward on Kesselsdorf, in direct response to Zweibrücken’s march. This was unexpected by Daun. The latter had the unpleasant experience of seeing Itzenplitz linked back up to Dresden, which had been allowed by the Imperialists. This was in spite of allied efforts to disguise their mission.
The bluecoats would have none of it. On November 4, with his suspicions aroused, Finck rose and fell back on Kesselsdorf. This action put him in much closer proximity to Dresden, but forfeited Gahmig. For the allies, however, this put Zweibrücken in bad straits. Prussian patrols were strengthened towards Meissen. The allies unbuckled Ujházy to march on the latter. Again, Prussian reaction was strong. There were numerous shifts on the part of the Prussians. The allies inched closer to the enemy’s lines.
Dresden itself was held by the Prussians with an unsteady hand. On November 4, Luzinsky suddenly attacked Mayr’s force. This was less than a surprise. The assault was strong enough to drive the hussars of Belling and Mayr’s men from their posts. About 1200 hours, Mayr was forced back into Dresden itself. The allies broke off the action for the moment. Still, no one expected Daun to put in an appearance when he did, especially with Frederick and the main body of the Prussians so close at hand.
The defenses of the capital had been neglected by the bluecoats. Colonel Török, who was in close proximity, kept the situation in the city closely monitored. On November 7, Finck fell back to try to maintain communication with the Prussian forces at Dresden. Daun presented an overwhelming force. The rumors about a Prussian withdrawal on Meissen proved unfounded. The marshal’s patrols reached Lockwitz on November 7; he was of a mind to have Zweibrücken pin down Itzenplitz while his army did the task. Hadik had the more direct duty of striking at Torgau. This was yet another attempt to upend the Prussians. Daun had apparently worked up a scheme to seize control of Dresden and bring the campaign 1758 to a successful conclusion.15
Zweibrücken intended for the campaign to end successfully all right, with factors other than Dresden in the bag. Zweibrücken’s chief worry was that his army was scattered. Too spread out to bring together in a single day. Hadik was already unbuckled upon Torgau and other forces pressed on Prussian posts in and about Meissen. As for Daun, he was firmly in the driver’s seat. Thus far, Itzenplitz had no inkling of what was transpiring. Now arose, from the depths of history, a tale of some speculation. Months before, Zweibrücken had tried resort to an old nemesis of mankind: greed. No one other than Zweibrücken or King Augustus’ himself was more interested in maintaining Dresden in the best condition possible. So a monetary offer was forthcoming. This was to be directed to the commandant of Dresden, Schmettau. Whether the Austrians felt this scheme would be successful is unknown, although Schmettau had, in the past, spent a considerable amount of time in the Austrian service. It does appear Schmettau was actually contacted with regard to selling out the Prussian cause, or, more specifically, selling out Dresden. There is no evidence to indicate whether or not Schmettau ever seriously considered the offer.16
In light of the later treatment meted out to Schmettau by the king, he must have felt something had transpired. Zweibrücken, for the moment, was also worried about the status of Torgau. That major Prussian magazine was certain to be at center stage in this whole bid to reconquer Saxony. Now Daun, as soon as he appeared at the gates of Dresden, instead of decisively acting, hesitated. This put the situation up in the air. Moreover, the whole matter of Schmettau’s treachery was shaky at best, much of it speculation. Itzenplitz might have something to say about this whole matter of betraying the Saxon capital. That general abandoned a well-prepared camp near Kesselsdorf and fell back directly on Dresden (night of November 9–10).17 This move helped leverage the Allies away from the Saxon capital. Daun not only thought of employing Hadik to take care of Torgau, but also that Zweibrücken should march straightway upon Leipzig. But late word of Wedell’s move from Pomerania to the theater of war close-by had reached Zweibrücken. This made the latter hesitate just enough to cause the latest Imperialist’ mission to fail.
After a momentary burst of optimism, Daun regressed once more into gloom and doom. As of November 9 the Austrians were right in the vicinity of the Saxon capital, but the marshal could not express an optimistic outcome to the proceedings on Dresden. He composed a gloomy note on that day to Vienna. In this letter, Daun recounted that Dresden could no longer be taken by a swift stroke. That alternative being put aside, the last one was a lengthy, well-involved siege. The lateness of the season and the state of the Prussian defenses virtually ruled out such an option. It did not take much effort for Daun to talk himself out of trying anything. Dresden had sufficient supplies, and the main enemy army might appear any time.18 Itzenplitz’ advance units were engaged in light skirmishing with the Austrian patrols late on the same night. Finck was also engaged in trying to cause Daun as many problems as he could. During the overnight hours, General Finck energetically shifted his men back on Neudörfel. This move put him right into Dresden itself.
As soon as Daun drew close, Schmettau resolved to deny to the Saxon royal family any possibility of escaping to the allies. The Prussian guard at the Palace was strengthened and preparations made as complete as they could be for the arrival of the massive Austrian army nearby. Now, with Schmettau’s threat to torch the suburbs apparently not taken seriously, the bluecoats took appropriate measures. A still stronger force occupied the Palace and “four munition wagons, each containing 15,000 cartridges” were hauled up.19 Nonetheless, there were some present at the capital who did not believe the Prussians would seriously entertain letting Dresden burn.20
To make it clear to all concerned the bluecoats would take whatever measures they had to, Schmettau called together the mayor of Dresden (Freyberg) with his cohorts on November 9. The general made it clear he considered doing his duty of utmost importance.21 And he would not listen to remonstrances made by the Saxons themselves that they may have swerved Schmettau’s resolve.
Finck was a less skilled commander than Prince Henry, and he showed it. But help was indeed on the way. Dohna was ordered (October 29) to march from Pomerania to Saxony. November 2, he was at Stettin. Reaching Berlin on November 8, Dohna pressed forward to Herzberg (November 13). As for Dohna, he was unable to even approach the Elbe until November 4–5; he seized the bridge opposite to Pirna and occupied it (November 7). His intentions were to view the bridge as essential, through it ran his line-of-communication and supply route. The marshal was really then tied to the bridge, and could not venture far from it without leaving strong detachments nearby. Zweibrücken was to press against Finck’s lines.
The Imperialist commander did actually weakly probe forward, marching cautiously past Finck. The latter rose from Gahmig and fell back across the water barrier of the Elbe, a move that left the face and roads south of the Saxon capital exposed
. Finck took up post at Kesseldorf (near Rabenau again), but the Imperialists, coming on with greater strength, forced him to take drastic countermeasures. Finck made off hastily from his new camp, and moved to the Elbe, the foe closing in behind in great force. Utilizing a pontoon-bridge, he crossed below Dresden, which was a wise precaution as it allowed both protection under the guns of the Saxon capital and an open line of retreat to the north in case of defeat.
Simultaneously, Hadik and his Croats were detached from the main army to go to other towns in Saxony to secure their capture. Hadik rode into Waldheim on November 8, and from there to Grimma on November 9. With Kleefeld detached, the latter made at pace for Borna, where he arrived on November 7. The enemy were in fear of a move against Leipzig, which seemed to be inevitable under the circumstances. Suddenly on November 11, Hadik suddenly struck for Torgau. He had 10,000 men, while Torgau had a garrison of about 320 men, under Colonel von Grolmann, but this was inadequate for defense. Hadik closed up on it, and launched an assault (September 12); the fortress did not give way, but the garrison guessing—correctly as it turned out—that Wedell should be approaching, was able to stonewall Hadik until the reinforcements appeared. Hadik withdrew back towards Pirna immediately.
Daun, however, had it all his own way, at first. The foe having been cleared from the roads south of Dresden, the marshal (night of November 8–9) moved near Rabenau, taking up on the southern side of the city. Finck ordered Mayr to continue delaying, and his troopers were sent riding around the Austrian positions. But Daun was quite free to commence the siege of Dresden. The defenses of the place were weak, the garrison weak (not above a few thousands), the entrenchments were old and ill-kept. Even worse, the southern suburb—called the Great Garden—was defended by very small detachments. Against these rather flimsy defenses, Daun/Zweibrücken together boasted over 100,000 men; a slight push, it seemed, should suffice. Dresden seemed as good as fallen.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 53