Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War

by Herbert J. Redman

  Just after dawn July 23, Wedell mounted some heights above Züllichau to observe what the enemy were up to in preparation to attack them. Despite his elevation, he was unable to discern with accuracy the position the enemy held, since the forests near Paltzig in which they were encamped made a scan of their posts very difficult (Soltikov undoubtedly selected the position for that very reason). Soltikov had secured his rear when General Merdivinow reached Fölitsche (July 19). The Russian leader pressed past Babinmost (July 19), then to Kelschen (July 20). Here the main army paused in order to let Merdivinow to close up. Soltikov, leaving most of his heavy baggage at Holzen, pressed on to Paltzig on July 22. Immediately, rumors began swirling that the bluecoats were going after the vulnerable Russian baggage. If the latter happened to be captured, then Soltikov would undoubtedly have to retreat, at least into Poland.6

  Now the Prussians were gazing on the enemy. There, stretched out in the distance, and interspersed among the bushy, woody ground, known as the Eichmühlen Fleiss, Wedell saw a long double-line of green-uniformed Russians (which he took to be the left wing), and decided with this thin bit of evidence, Soltikov was going to stay immobile the rest of the day, just resting.

  As it worked out, the latter had marched just about dawn that morning with his right moving out ahead, followed systematically by the center and left.7 In fact, by the time that Wedell had taken view of the whole panoramic scene, it was already emptying of men, and the main body of Soltikov’s men were marching in concealment under the thick cover upon the Prussian camp. What Wedell had taken to be the Russian left wing was actually the rearguard attending the baggage and provision wagons. This side also boasted a thick barrier of skirmishers to shield any of the magazines from the Prussians. It was itself preparing to move out as soon as the main body burst through the woods. After a brief second look, Wedell returned to Züllichau (arriving about 1000 hours) and promptly gave orders to prepare to march and attack the enemy.8

  But the Prussians were still preparing to march when within an hour all was changed as the head of the extremely long enemy mass broke through the underbrush and began moving towards the bridge and village of Crossen. At the bridge, the Russians could cross the Oder and have Brandenburg virtually for the taking. They had learned, courtesy of Prussian deserters, that the foe was worried about Russian irruptions into Silesia. By now, Soltikov had already reached Paltzig—five miles northeast of Züllichau—and from there he was in effect between Wedell and that all-important bridge. The Prussians (though without additional orders) had gotten ready to march when the enemy showed their hand. Wedell immediately developed a counter plan: his army was to attack and roll up the Russian flank, emulating the Prussian stroke upon the allies at Rossbach two years before.9

  Alas, the circumstances were far different now.10 There were no hills to hide Prussian movements behind, there was no fine artillery arm to render support to the bluecoats here,11 the army was just not the well-trained cadres of 1757, and, lastly, the numerical imbalance was more pronounced. At Züllichau, Wedell faced Soltikov’s Russians with less than 30,000 men. The Russian army had 54 battalions with 46 grenadier companies, 58 squadrons, 3,900 Cossacks, 188 guns. In all, about 52,300 men.12 And, of course, there was no Frederick to take charge here, as at Rossbach.13

  If this were not enough, the topography angle definitely favored a defensive stance. As the Russians wound along the way, a small pool, along with nearby quagmires, lay between them and Wedell. This looked passable from a distance but could actually only be traversed by a small bridge at the hamlet of Kay (for which the battle was also known as). Behind the first pool, a branch off went between the Russians and the first, and was bridgeless. At about 1500 hours, Manteuffel, leading the van, at the head of which were the 3rd Infantry (Major-General Franz Adolf, Prince of Anhalt-Bernburg/Schaumburg) and the 7th of Brunswick-Bevern, two fine units, marched at Kay, where he crossed the stream and speedily ranked his men on the opposite side. With Wobersnow marched three Grenadier battalions and 15 squadrons of dragoons and hussars.

  The bluecoats were handicapped by the thick woods. Wedell had “calculated on making the assault on a broad front.”14 But the Prussians could not do so because of the topographical barriers, and was perforce to switch to a narrower front between Heidenmühl and the village of Glogsen. That small stream alluded to earlier was another of the barriers. The banks on either side of the stream were far too unsteady to do much with.

  Manteuffel then swept forward at the enemy, with the commander himself leading the way. The 3rd Infantry, advancing in spite of heavy Russian artillery fire, attacked the greencoats, but was soon flung back with heavy losses.15 Almost simultaneously as his attack struck the head of the Russian mass, Manteuffel’s initial charge rolled it back, scattering the opposing cavalry to the wind (and it was not ranked again as an organized body that day). The advance tended towards Paltzig, towards which Soltikov happened to be concentrating.

  As his leading troops faltered and fell back under the weight of the Prussians, Soltikov called forward his reserve to bolster the first, front line; at that point, on the verge of caving in. Manteuffel’s advance forced Soltikov to withdraw his forward line to reform it. He now steadied it into a long, wavy defensive line just behind the houses of Paltzig, and behind that second brook. The Battle of Züllichau had begun.16

  At the very moment that the Prussian advance reached the new Russian front, they slowed and were quickly brought to a halt. Soltikov, all the while, pumped his abundant forces into the new position, and ordered up batteries on the double. The latter took post within the gates of a local churchyard (which soon held almost 70 pieces of ordnance), blasting away at the attackers for almost an hour.17 The Prussian cavalry set itself in two lines behind Manteuffel’s infantry, which was right there. Then, as General Hülsen charged, a full 20 squadrons of the horse galloped into the Russian line near Paltzig. The Prussians looked for a time like they would carry the day.

  As Manteuffel’s line stalled, he was taken under a severe fire from the enemy’s front. The force retired on Kay, while the main body of the Prussians were ordered forward into action. The Russian front was by then protected by six batteries which riddled the bluecoats as they advanced. Wedell would have called off the attack had he not realized that Soltikov was in his rear and might conceivably cut him off from Brandenburg completely. His men had been forced to endure a hot and lengthy forced march to get to this point, and the greater portion (save Wobersnow’s rearguard) was in action facing an opponent who badly outnumbered them. This assault upon a well-prepared and numerically superior enemy had slim chance of succeeding with an army the size of Wedell’s. Hülsen’s attack—leading the main body—also miscarried, with heavy losses among his troops. Wedell called for Wobersnow, who now lent support to Hülsen. But the Prussians could nowhere make a dent in the Russians’ “armor,” even though three separate attacks were tried. Torn and battered as they were by the very accurate artillery fire and massed musketry of an enemy posted behind an impassable brook, the attackers suffered serious losses.

  During one of these strokes, Wobersnow fell, mortally wounded by cannon shot. As Wobersnow fell, General Hülsen took his force (six full battalions), to go in against the greencoat infantry, but the attack fragmented. Nearly simultaneously, four battalions under the direction of Major-General Georg Carl Gottleib von der Gabelentz (40th Infantry) attacked the enemy right, but was beaten back. At the end of his rope, Wedell ordered Schorlemer with four squadrons to gallop at the southern corner of the Russian position.

  Russian cavalry managed to stop this new assault. Meanwhile, Kanitz reformed a new line of infantry, which attacked the enemy opposite about 1530 hours. But there was nothing doing. It was nearly dark (2000 hours) when Wedell put a stop to the misery. The completely unsuccessful assaults had cost some 6,000 casualties in killed, wounded/captured. The 24th Infantry, for example, lost 933 men and 37 officers on this day.18 The struggle in all had been about nine hours long,
and, by 2100 hours, Wedell was marching his survivors back towards the Kay Bridge. Away from Soltikov, who mercifully did not pursue—making only a brief gesture in that direction—in no real hurry.19 Soltikov lost about 7,500 men, and although his men were shaken by the heroic Prussian effort, they were made confident by the victory.20 Wedell, during the night, recrossed the bridge. It had been far from another Rossbach. In fact, the sanguinary struggle did not impede the Russian advance. It had, however, all but shattered Wedell’s army. This was a far more serious result, since his army was the only protection on the eastern side of Brandenburg.

  With Wedell rooted out of the way, Soltikov could proceed with his plan. All along aiming for Crossen, he wasted no time. July 24, he moved there. Simultaneously, Wedell reacted. He crossed the Oder (at Tschicherzig) and made for Crossen’s bridge, which he did manage to occupy (July 25), before the Russians could arrive. It was some five miles south of the village, so the Russian commander decided to go to Frankfurt—some 50 miles south of his own army’s position—to pierce the Oder. Wedell had thwarted Soltikov indeed, but not for long. The first rumors gave credit for victory to Wedell. Ambassador Mitchell even wrote, early on July 24 “General Wedel[l] thought proper to attack … [the Russians], which he did with great success.”21 Soon the truth would become plainly, and painfully, evident.

  Meanwhile, Frederick still faced Daun in Silesia. So the province was exposed only to the eastern side, and quickly the king decided he would again have to go beyond the Oder to face the Russian threat. They had to be kept from rendezvousing with the Austrians, at all costs. This was clearly his most urgent task. Prince Henry was to hold Saxony. Other forces were to keep their opponents busy as well. Frederick finally heard the news of Wedell’s vanquishment late on the day after the battle, and made ready to go face the foe.

  He had also to intercept an Austrian detachment, direct from Daun’s army, before it could reach the Russians. Daun, not surprisingly, had been reluctant to march to join Soltikov himself, but he was aware that Laudon had served ten years in the Russian army before joining the Austrians. His first choice had been with Frederick the Great and his army, but the Prussian monarch had taken an immediate dislike to him and rejected Laudon, no doubt later regretting his decision.

  Hadik had been detached early in the campaign as had Laudon (with forces of 20,000 and 16,000 men, respectively). Both had been in front of Prince Henry, so Frederick ordered his brother to keep an eye on them. Henry’s forward elements, led by Finck, moved forward to Bautzen (July 11) with that in mind. Prince Henry wrote his royal brother that from there he and the latter’s army might be able together to contain Daun and the forces of Laudon. The irascible Laudon’s job while Daun was encamped at Mark-Lissa was to shield the left side of the main Austrian army, while General Beck, ensconced at Gebhardsdorf, performed the same for the right wing.22 Laudon promptly attacked the Prussians at Grieffenberg, under General Seydlitz, but was repulsed with the loss of some 300 men.

  Hadik was engaged in a bit of waltzing himself. He brought together a force at Grosshennersdorf, and moved (July 24) to intercept Prince Henry, who was sallying forth from Bautzen. Henry’s men suddenly descended on Rudolph Pálffy’s men, who were sheltered at Hochkirch, and, after a brief fight, sent them scurrying for shelter with Marshal Daun. This disturbing news made Daun realize at once that the bluecoats had no intention of letting a rendezvous between the main Austrian and the Russian armies take place. At least not without having something to say—and do—about it.

  Meanwhile, in his corner, General Ried had been rather energetically pressing the Hessians in the immediate vicinity, as they were pro–Prussian and did not respond readily to calls for neutrality or even giving due respect to the Imperialist army. Ried had at his disposal the dreaded Szėchėny Hussars. This body, accompanied by a force of Croats (with specific instructions to damage the enemy’s war effort), invaded the territory of Halberstadt, forcing prominent citizens of the region to flee and exacting contributions, seizing hostages for ransom, and plundering Halberstadt itself (July 21). This in spite of the fact that some 80,000 talers had been coughed up by the inhabitants to prevent looting/plunder.

  Zweibrücken pulled Luzinsky back, on to Münchberg, although the base activity of the Reich troops at the moment (aside from those committing terrible atrocities) was certainly involved with raising contributions and finding food for man and beast. Nor were these kinds of activities limited to just the territory of the “enemy” by any means.

  DeVille was by no means done in Silesia.23 He should have left well enough alone. The advance was carried on by some 20,000 or so men, which started forward (July 20) with some determination. DeVille’s patrols made it to Freiburg, but the ready Prussians tried to entrap his men nearby. DeVille ordered a withdrawal, but General Jahnus, trying to evict the bluecoats from rises near Gottersberg, miscarried badly (July 27), and had to retire. The Austrian force was unable to retreat by the direct route, as the Prussians had sealed off the penetration. DeVille withdrew by Gersdorf into Bohemia, but not quickly enough to prevent Major-General Gottlob Ephraim Wolfersdorff with a large force of above 5,000 men from being viciously attacked by Fouquet’s men, late on July 31, at Goldisnole. Wolfersdorff did escape, but not without loss.

  Prince Henry was still about in maneuvering, all right. But he left only frail guard forces in Dresden (greatly inferior in number to the opposing forces) to protect it from enemy raiders, led by General Joseph von Brentano-Cimaroli. Henry was able to push Laudon back to Lauban as he was striving forward in the direction of Sagan, apparently to link up with Soltikov. Frankly, Frederick had not approached the mission of Wedell with high expectations, and was actually rather complacent about accepting its failure. He was also quite aware that his own army was busy with Daun, consequently, to move it might entail risking reoccupation of Saxony and/or Silesia by the foe. On the other hand, Henry’s men could be safely disengaged, although Frederick, whether justifiably or not, was not overly confident of Henry’s capability to stem the Russian tide.24

  The solution was obvious: exchange commands. Saxony was to be left to Finck with 10,000 men, and he was also responsible for covering Berlin. The king hoped that the earlier raids would trip up the Imperialists.

  Hadik had not been inactive. July 14, MacQuire peeled off from the main body on to Aussig. In short order, MacQuire pressed to Hainspach (July 26), and to near Dresden the next day. The situation was not bad, from the Imperialist point of view. For a change. The attention of both the Prussian king and Prince Henry was shifting towards Silesia/Brandenburg and the Russians, while the French were keeping Ferdinand busy in western Germany. Zweibrücken did not fail to realize the opportunity being offered, and he readily took it.

  August 1, the Reich troops seized the mantle; Zweibrücken put his headquarters at Naumburg, while Vecsey took over Halle, riding roughshod through the place, robbing everyone who could be found of their valuables. Halle groaned under the occupation of Reich troops until August 24, and even then the invaders departed with most of the available supplies and money in the area. The behavior of the Reich troops when they were in Prussian territory, unpalatable at best, makes claims of Prussian cruelty in the allied territories appear hypocritical by comparison. The Austrians were just confident enough to expect the Reich troops to do something; if only in the absence of serious opposition.

  As for the Prussians, Frederick did not ignore the enemy in Saxony. He sent instructions to the Commandant of Leipzig, Major-General Friedrich Christian von Hauss, to threaten to burn down the place if pressed too hard.25 In actual practice, Hauss, with over 2,000 men, was hoping to hold as long as possible. Colonel von Widmann appeared before Leipzig on August 4, but the arrival of General Kleefeld the next day, did much to hurry things along on their “natural” course. Before dawn the next morning, Leipzig was officially in Imperialist hands, although the garrison would need time to take the proffered “Free Withdrawal” and march off. Unfortunately, as Hauss
marched out on Düben on August 7, he was unable to stem the flow of prisoners, to the tune of about 780 men of various nationalities, who had to be turned over to the Imperialists, as one of the conditions of withdrawal.

  Flushed with success, Zweibrücken concentrated his main force near Naumburg. There was hope for a fleeting moment that the Prussians would “go gentle into that good night” but nothing doing! Rumors had General Finck bringing a force of 6,000 men to Torgau to directly counter the Imperialists. It was a matter of some urgency if the Reich troops were to accomplish anything meaningful before the bluecoats could spoil the party, so to speak.

  By August 10, Zweibrücken was near Sellershausen, when word arrived of the defeat of the French at Minden by Prince Ferdinand. This raised some anxiety in the Imperialist camp, but General Kleefeld was sent to confront Finck. The latter actually paused for the moment at Hoyerswerda. Prussian scouts reported the Reich Army was approaching, so Finck reacted by ordering Wolfersdorfe to move from Senftenberg to the essential point of Torgau, an important base for the bluecoats in holding Saxony.26 Finck moved on Torgau on August 3, but new orders arrived almost immediately. Finck was ordered to march to join the king, who was preparing to confront the Russians in the East. The unfolding of events was turning in that direction.

  Eugene of Württemberg and a 6,000-man detachment went after Hadik and Laudon.27 Prince Henry moved to Sagan on July 29, following orders. Not satisfied, he set off for Schmöttseifen to see his older royal brother. Henry ended up assuming command of the “main” royal army, while Frederick himself set off at about 1600 hours, July 29, to take charge of what had been Henry’s army. Haste was once again of the essence, and the Prussian king was fully cognizant of what was at stake.