October 20, after a three-day pause at Lübben (dreadful news of an enemy move upon Berlin, covered below, had reached him at Gross-Mückro on October15), Frederick marched. In the direction of Saxony and further adventures there. He reached Jessen (some 55 miles away) on the banks of the Elbe on October 22.
The march was successful, but the king had only brought 30,000 men with him, having detached about 8,000 men (16 full battalions and 38 squadrons of horse under Goltz) with instructions to head for Glogau to join up with the Prussians thereabouts. This was to help bar the Russians and Laudon from the fortress. Thus far only Daun and the Imperialists opposed him, .but, on October 23, Lacy rejoined the main army. As for Laudon, he stayed put in Silesia. Frederick, balked by a reluctant foe from an open field encounter, resolved to carry the fight across the Elbe. This would all follow his linking up with Hülsen and Eugene, then strike at the enemy wherever he happened to be found.
Zweibrücken and his army were deployed behind the Elbe and were determined, for once, to pin the Prussians down from crossing the river if they could. As for Daun, his men were already posted behind the high entrenched walls of Torgau. He had issued orders to construct more fortifications to accentuate and improve upon the formidable works constructed by Prince Henry during previous years to the north-northwest of the place. The Imperialists strutted around a little bit, actually preparing as best they could for the arrival of the bluecoats. However, when the disturbing word came that Frederick was nearing Wittenberg, they retreated towards Leipzig upon Düben—some 36 miles distant. They paused there momentarily, cowering from a fight.
Frederick by then had Hülsen and Eugene coming to rendezvous, Eugene having sent Kleist to deal with the intrusive raids of the Duke of Württemberg into the country near Halle. After his subordinates joined him, the king could dispose of some 44,000 men. However, for the moment, Daun, still distant at Torgau, had over 65,000 men with him, while Zweibrücken had another 35,000, making a grand total of some 100,000 men. With such a formidable quantity of enemies opposing him, it is surprising to report only negligible opposition (even from enemies such as Daun and Zweibrücken). Even when the king’s men, the bridges being readied, crossed the Elbe, at Schanzhaus (some 14 miles from Wittenberg) on October 26. Schanzhaus is located central to the Mulda and Anhalt-Dessau, as well as the country near Halle. It was in this area where the king rested his army after it had crossed the Elbe.
The Imperialists, meanwhile, had heard word of the imminent advance of their most dreaded adversary, and in great haste, they fled from Düben at about 0100 hours, October 27. By that point, Daun had risen from Torgau and was coming on as fast as he could towards this vicinity. He was thinking, correctly as it turned out, that his allies would be needing some aid against the vigorous enemy. Zweibrücken, for his part, had from the first it would appear every intention of making for Leipzig. When news reached him that the bluecoats were making straight at him to force the issue, he now merely carried out his plan and marched17 towards the latter city. Frederick, realizing quickly what a façade the Imperialist army of the German Reich often was in a real battle, had been prone to ignore it. That was both at that point and in the past.
But, with Daun obviously trying to form a junction with Zweibrücken, and thus give him overwhelming support in the impending battle for control of Saxony, Frederick knew this rendezvous had to be prevented if at all possible. October 29, the Prussian king marched his army to Düben, abandoned as we have seen by Zweibrücken. This maneuver formed a wedge of sorts between the still disunited opponents, cutting off badly needed Austrian support to stiffen the wavering Imperialists. To make matters worse for Zweibrücken, Frederick forthwith detached Hülsen to sweep forward towards Leipzig to seize it, rendering Zweibrücken’s plan wholly invalid.
The king himself set to work building a magazine at Düben for the use of the Prussian field army. Hülsen dogged the Imperialists all the way to Leipzig, arriving outside of the city on the evening of October 30. The enemy still possessed the place, and when Hülsen summoned the defenders to surrender, the request was categorically refused, and even a weak show of force demonstrated by the defenders. This was all bluff, as Zweibrücken was merely stalling for time to permit him to withdraw. Hülsen made preparations for an immediate attack, but when the Prussians went forward at about 0500 hours the next morning, they discovered that the enemy had taken advantage of a thick overnight fog enshrouding the city to make off.
Zweibrücken was moving at best speed for Moravia. General Hülsen merely left a small garrison to hold Leipzig and returned at best pace to the main camp. Daun had pulled up at Eilenburg (October 26) near to the bluecoats. However, he began withdrawing on Torgau, as quickly as he learned that Zweibrücken had retreated. The marshal had been ordered by his superiors to keep that fortress at any cost—even that of doing battle with Frederick and his Prussians. The latter, by then rejoined by Hülsen’s detachment, hurried along in pursuit of the retiring main Austrian army. It was the Prussian king’s avowed intention to force Daun from Torgau and on back into his own country.
On November 2, Frederick, taking the precaution of dividing the army into four columns—led by Hülsen, Holstein, Ziethen, and, of course, he himself—to prevent any Austrian maneuvers to threaten the magazine at Düben or the whole supply system based there, moved off. This was directly towards Torgau. The king was with the advanced guard as usual during this maneuver. Reaching Schilda (some seven miles south of the fortress of Torgau), the Prussians paused. Frederick, although still outnumbered, was grimly determined to strike at Daun’s entrenched works at the Torgau fortress. As soon as possible, plainly on the morrow, if at all possible. It was, by all calculations, a desperate gamble indeed!18
Before we take up the narrative of the ensuing Battle of Torgau, it might be appropriate to recount what had happened with the whole allied effort against Berlin.
Cherneyshev, following the incident after the Battle of Liegnitz, was anxious to get in some meaningful blows against the bluecoats. He had 20,000 men under his control, while the Austrian general Lacy with 15,000 men and some 63 guns was in a position to render assistance. To provide a diversion for the allies, as well as to ensure that the campaign of 1760 was not a wasted effort, a second raid upon the Prussian capital of Berlin was decided upon. The Russian van was under the command of General Totleben, who had some 5,600 men with him. It crossed the Oder (at Beauthen) not far from Sagan on September 20, heading towards the heart of the Prussian kingdom aiming at Berlin.
Lacy was to have a hand in the capture, he being scheduled to march on Berlin with his whole army. Cherneyshev’s role was to be limited to covering the allied operation against any major Prussian attempt to interfere with it. Perhaps, it was assumed that a major allied sweep toward Berlin would deflect Frederick’s attention in that direction, causing him to fret over the safety of Brandenburg and of Berlin.
Although that may very well have happened to a certain extent, it was a direct move upon his capital by the “combined” enemy armies in full strength with a view to occupying it that Frederick most feared, not an isolated raid. The Prussian covering force on that side, under Goltz, gravely weakened by Werner’s departure for Colberg, could not interfere (Goltz dispatched a note on September 30 to the king informing him of Tottleben’s maneuver). Totleben, in the meanwhile, was progressing. Present at Schönau on September 26, his Russian force hitched into Güben on September 29, and at Beeskow the following day. The Russians were careful not to make too large a splash as they advanced, but a move upon Wusterhausen was a necessary preliminary to being in the vicinity of the Prussian capital. Totleben’s march, a solid achievement, was a blow to Frederick’s psyche, but not debilitating. The Prussian king was not above resorting to outright bribery if necessary and the whole Berlin episode would sure bring this to the fore.
In late September, Lacy swept forward from Silesia into Brandenburg at a swift pace. Lacy unbuckled Major-General Brentano with a task force to
try to keep Prussian patrols occupied while the invaders made for Berlin. Lacy reached Seydendorf (September 28), and Johnsdorf (September 29), finally, Bunzlau the next day.
At the latter, the Austrians had to take a short break in order to try to corner sufficient supply arrangements for the force, no mean feat considering they were in enemy country. October 2, Lacy’s men trudged forward, over to Triebel on October 3. On the following day, the commander’s men were finally in the area of Berlin at Cottbus. Although some of the raiding cavalry ranged far and wide, inflicting widespread damage on the countryside, the rather slower-traveling foot soldiers were acting like a drag upon the unfolding Austrian mission. It did not take Lacy long to realize he would likely be unable to accomplish much, even to hold up the Austrian end of the mission upon Berlin, unless he acted with some decisiveness. Lacy galloped straight towards his destination, accompanied by four regiments of horse. He linked up with General Brentano, giving him a nucleus of 43 cavalry squadrons with which to go for Berlin, leaving the infantry to follow at a more leisurely pace. October 7, the whitecoats roared into the terrain immediately around Berlin, to find their Russian allies under Cherneyshev already about. The Russian presence was already demonstrating a greater share of the expedition and its development. The garrison of Berlin, in the beginning, was a mere 2,000 men.
Fermor brought the main Russian army, some 20,000 strong, over and above Cherneyshev from Christianstadt, to Frankfurt to await developments there (October 6). Again, Goltz, with fewer than 7,000 effectives, could do little more than harass and annoy Fermor’s greatly reduced main army. Prince Henry, alarmed by the weak screen for Brandenburg and Silesia at the east, was living in expectation of just such a move upon Berlin.
Nevertheless, within supporting distance of Berlin—albeit long supporting distance—was the Prussian detachment of some 12,000 men under Stutterheim and Eugene, opposing the Swedes at the Northern Front.19 The host from Scandinavia was decidedly unpopular even among the “Allies.” Lacy, alone among the major allied commanders, tried to entice the Swedes into getting more involved in the operations against Berlin. Lantinghausen’s men were ensconced near Werbelow (hard-by Pasewalk) from about September 30. The imminent departure of the Prussian forces to go to the rescue of Berlin should have fundamentally changed the Swedish prosecution of the war.20
Lacy forthwith sent a rider to gallop towards the Swedes, and inquire about securing General Lantinghausen’s cooperation in the expedition against Berlin. By the time the Swedish commander was cognizant of the proposal, it was already too late to really attempt.21 So the bluecoats were not entirely bereft of rescue forces for the capital city. In the meanwhile, the allies had been moving up. Tottleben appeared suddenly on October 3 near Berlin, marching around and trying to find a weak spot in the defenses. There was no great fear by Rochow22 for the safety of the Imperial family and the archives, as they had already been removed to Magdeburg, and he had available to him the services of the still ailing Seydlitz and of even old Lehwaldt (for the latter, a rare opportunity to participate in any military affairs in the twilight of the great struggle).
But the quality of the defense force left much to be desired. The defenses of the Prussian capital had had surprisingly little upgrade. Moreover, with the demands of the war waging generally far beyond Berlin’s borders, there was little effort to develop a first-class garrison. In fact, “invalids, sick, all were up in arms.”23 It is a sad commentary to report this was largely the make-up of the city’s garrison. Nonetheless, Russian demands for four million in thalers (talers) and the immediate capitulation of Berlin were snubbed, and, about 1500 hours, Russian guns, sited for this specific purpose, began shelling the Prussian capital. The bombardment was more or less intermittent at first, but was followed within a few more hours by some heavy hammering.
This prolonged effort lasted until 0300 hours, October 4, with actually very little to show for it. In the meanwhile, Eugene was on his way from in front of the Swedes, heading to the rescue of Berlin.24 The greencoats moved off from the environs of Berlin, learning of Eugene’s approach, upon Cöpenik; here Tottleben paused late on October 4. Eugene, drawing near, pursued him, but unsuccessfully. Berlin was nonetheless relieved of danger. For the moment, that is.
Eugene had only brought a reinforcement of some 5,000 men, however, and Lacy arrived nearby that very same evening. From Saxony, Hülsen, who had still some 9,000 men, had marched earlier to go to Berlin’s relief as well. Lacy promptly informed Tottleben that he was at hand, giving the combined force 35,000 men, while the bluecoats, even after the arrival of Hülsen on October 8, totaled only some 14,000 men.
Eugene’s men rolled out of the Schlesischen-Tör (over by the Spree) and were immediately attacked by the Russians with some intensity, for a period of six hours (October 4).25 Following that, Totleben moved towards the Hallisches-Tör—on the road northward from Tempelhof—from which Hülsen deployed (October 5). Totleben’s scouts reported enemy forces approaching from Potsdam, which caused the Russians to abruptly break off the action. About then, “Green” Kleist erupted from Teltow with the vanguard of Hülsen’s men. The combined force of Totleben and Lacy was unbuckled upon Hülsen’s post, but the attack miscarried, and was forthwith called off. Russian reinforcements were arriving about the same time. Lt.-Gen. Panin joined Cherneyshev’s men beyond Litchenberg. The size of the Russian force promised to increase as the mission wore on.
The allies, thus loosely united, tried to draw the Prussian forces at hand into an action before Frederick had a chance to interfere. The Prussians, thinking that to attack and be defeated was worse than not coming to battle, not to mention the possible consequences for Berlin, withdrew to Spandau to figure out what to do. The allies were on the point of entering the Prussian capital with their advanced forces, while the bluecoats’ withdrawal was completed by late evening. Hülsen and company withdrew on Spandau. The citizens left in Berlin began negotiating with Tottleben for the surrender of the city.
About 0700 hours, October 9, the negotiations were completed, and the Russians marched into Berlin. A new Commandant, named Bachmann, was appointed by Tottleben. This was much to the disgust of the Austrians of Lacy. He felt cheated because he had had no part in the negotiations for the capitulation of Berlin. Indeed, animosity was readily apparent between the Prussians and the Austrians,26 but also between the Russians and the Prussians. During the period when the Prussian capital was under enemy control, it was the Austrian Croats rather more than the Russian Cossacks that gave Berlin much grief. Perhaps part of the reason was the simple geography of Central Europe.
Because Prussia and Austria were so close together, it was just as easy for the Austrians to imagine Prussian invaders parading through downtown Vienna as Austrians strolling through the tortured streets of Berlin. For the Russian troops, both rank-and-file and officer classes, the war with Prussia was viewed more as a foreign conflict which involved Russia largely because her Czarina felt slighted by the sharp-tongued Frederick. The men knew that Prussian armies would never directly threaten Russia’s vitals. That the Prussian monarch had neither the desire nor the means to attempt such an expedition. This knowledge, plus a deserved respect for Frederick’s military genius, allowed for the taking of fewer risks than the Austrians, living so close to the Prussians, could afford to ignore. This attitude was again manifested, as it had been so many times during this war, with regard to Berlin.
Lacy took post in the Friedrichstadt quarter, with the Austrian headquarters at Tempelhof, on less than cordial terms with Tottleben and Bachmann. Austrian posts ranged from Potsdam to Spandau. This while raiders plundered the military uniform store thereabouts, the nearby small arms’ factory, and destroyed or carted off much of the production, although Sans Souci was kept secured by a guard force and largely spared from devastation. Saxon scavengers, full of revenge for the treatment meted out to their country by the hated Prussians, plundered Charlottenburg, and Lacy insisted that the Russians aid him in dest
roying the supply house for military uniforms, spirits housing—the Lager-Häus—as well as an arsenal, the Zeughäus, located conveniently there. The enterprise, handled in a most unprofessional manner, was botched, however. Nevertheless, Berlin did suffer during the brief period of occupation. To their credit, the citizens were able to face the challenge of being under foreign domination better than might have been expected. Especially again, with regards to the Russians. Much of the potential damage was allayed by the presence of the Dutch Ambassador to Berlin, M. Verelst.27 Nor does this in any way suggest the citizens of Berlin escaped entirely. The Allied troops were all quartered gratis at the expense of Berlin’s citizens, and, worse, the intruders often did not hesitate to help themselves to whatever they wanted. In fact, “there were few inhabitants of Berlin, whom these guests [?] did not cost hundreds or thousands of crowns.”28 Still, Tottleben was a humane invader, and appeared to get along well with some of the upper-class Berliners. Tottlben, apparently, was even secretly in the pay of the great Prussian king all along. This during all the time his troops were in occupation of the Prussian capital. The initiative for this appears to have originated with the Russian commander himself. Prince Henry was told of a high-ranking Russian officer, who was “prepared to act as a Prussian spy in return for a commission as Lieutenant-Colonel in the Prussian army.”29 The Cossacks, restrained by their officers, even generally managed to behave decently.
Nevertheless, Berlin’s military arsenals and foundries did not escape entirely. Lost were 57 pieces of artillery, 9,000 muskets, 9,765 cannon shot, and 7,000 mortar rounds.30 The cannon works and the powder mills were decimated by the invaders. Lacy’s exorbitant demands of contributions were drawn upon Berlin’s suburbs. This while the city’s most influential men, most particularly Ernst Gotzkowski, “persuaded” Tottleben to settle for a ransom of 1,500,000 thalers, plus an additional 200,000 if the Russian officers kept their men under control for the duration. To their credit, both Austrians and Russians respected private property during the occupation more than they could have, confining actual plundering largely to property of the Prussian state. Apparently this did not apply to the newspapers. The Russians, infuriated by the acid remarks in the local newspapers, took “their revenge on the editors [of the newspapers].”31 Meanwhile, over in Potsdam, Austrian irregulars sacked the engineering headquarters. There they hauled off a rich cache of the maps of the major fortresses of Europe.32
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 84