Without the assistance of the Russians, the Prussian king did not feel himself and his army strong enough to beat the army of Daun alone. Especially now with the latter taking up very formidable defense positions. Around June 15, the strength of the army with the Prussian king consisted of some 85 battalions of infantry (approximately 52,779 men) and 157 squadrons of horse (some 21,350 effectives).43 During this time, things seemed to progress almost as they should. June 19, Russia and Prussia formally concluded a military alliance between the two powers. In effect, Frederick was agreeing to help Peter out with his little war with Denmark, and, in turn, receive the active help of the Russians in what was left of the Seven Years’ War. And, despite the many favorable aspects of Frederick’s new situation, the Austrians were not entirely bereft of advantages. Marshal Daun has often (both at the time and since) been accused of practicing a Fabian, lethargic style of warfare, but he also possessed the singular advantage of being a rock steady commander. This latter quality put him in good stead in Campaign 1762. Just at a time when the Austrians needed steady, patient leadership in the field.
Moreover, Daun was in a perfect position, Frederick knew, where he could easily withdraw back upon Waldenburg, and from there seize the passes near his right wing in the higher country and Schweidnitz as well, and at will. From there, even with the Russians at hand, it would be extremely difficult to get the Austrians, especially a seasoned army led by that past master of the defense, Daun, rooted out again. So the Prussians did not want to force Daun into a bind. At least, not too quickly.
The king merely marked time waiting upon Cherneyshev’s advent and the period from late May until late June 1762, passed with really no significant military operations in that region. Frederick did not have the stomach anymore to risk a major battle (the horrors of Torgau had been enough for him) and he was more than willing to settle for a campaign of limited objectives—practically the entire campaign in Silesia for the whole of the 1762 season, for instance, revolved around the recapture of Schweidnitz—since the war was obviously winding down at long last. The king did see good to detach General Werner, over towards Kassel, and then swing in upon Ratisbon (May 13), which move immediately put him right into Daun’s neighborhood no less.
The latter’s reaction was to strengthen General Beck, deployed within Moravia to cover the territory thereabouts, to some 8,000 men. General Brentano, with another force of some 5,000–7,000 men, took up post hard about Zobtenberg, in among the most elevated ground in the area. There was relative quiet overall, except for a couple of visible but routine Prussian cavalry patrols.
Lt.-Col. Reitzenstein took a force of 300 cavalry out of Parchwitz (June 12) on patrol. Austrian intelligence belatedly discovered the Prussian movement, and unleashed a large force to go surprise Reitzenstein if possible. Captain Graf Gourcy, with elements from the corps of General Ellricshausen, guarding the way from Canth and Neumarkt, was instead rudely, and completely, repulsed about 0200 hours at Lampersdorf (June 14). As for the marshal’s intentions, Daun’s overt movements showed that once more he had no objectives beyond purely defensive warfare. Despite the efforts to cause trouble for the Prussian scouts.
Then, June 20, a detachment of some 250 Croats, Dragoons and Hussars, commanded by General Draskovitch, was pushed out to oppose a roaming Prussian force of 250 men under a Major von Metzger, on another fairly ordinary mission. However, hard about Heidersdorf (June 21), about 0330 hours, a Prussian attack force of some 150 Prussians unexpectedly overthrew Draskovitch’s command after an involved altercation, five officers and 167 men were captured, among them Draskovitch himself, against two killed, 16 wounded, and 21 men as prisoners.44 The Austrian detachment promptly scurried off. Austrian shortages of both light troops and cavalry were showing an obvious deficiency. Both in sheer quantity of numbers as well as in the just as important realm of quality would such shortages manifest themselves.
Meanwhile, the greencoats had finally reappeared in the theater of war this time in a new role: as allies of Frederick the Great. June 25, Cherneyshev’s advance of Cossacks finally crossed the Oder at Auras, followed shortly thereafter by the main body. A day later, Frederick, impatient now to begin the endeavor upon Schweidnitz, heard of Cherneyshev’s tardy arrival. On June 27, the bluecoats moved forward upon Tintz. The king was learning first hand now some of the problems the Austrians had encountered so often in earlier campaigns from Russian dilly-dallying.
June 30, Cherneyshev reached Lissa (memorable from the Battle of Leuthen so many years before). Frederick proceeded to the Russian camp (July 1) and watched first hand an inspection of Cherneyshev’s troops, which surprisingly quite impressed him. He had once, as we know, held a low opinion of Russian armies; but that was before Zorndorf, Züllichau, and Kunersdorf had sure changed his perspective on the matter. Now he pronounced the men he had observed as among the finest soldiers in existence. In the first few days of July, Cherneyshev’s main body, after numerous further delays, duly reached Tintz, and immediately the anxious king commenced maneuvering against the cautious old Marshal Daun. The arrival of their new allies brought the king’s army to an aggregate 82 battalions of foot and 135 squadrons of cavalry, in addition to an artillery complement of 316 pieces of ordnance.45 Frederick, with his strength suitably augmented, moved out almost immediately.
The Prussians in this endeavor were led by General Wied; followed at a “safe” distance indirectly by their new Russian allies; they moved around the Austrian position against the western—left—side of Daun’s army, apparently trying to seize the mountainous passes, over by Kostenblut, through Weicherau and Bertelsdorf thereabouts, which controlled the entrance to Schweidnitz. The marshal was tipped off by the timely arrival of some deserters, who told him in no uncertain terms that the king intended to seize Freiburg from him. Night of July 2–3, Daun hastily rose and wended back, taking up a post behind Freiburg, arranging his left flank at Pulsnitz and his right over by Oberbögendorf.46
Daun’s reaction, in retrospect, had been uncharacteristically swift, for a change. As soon as he discerned the enemy’s attempt to round his flank, he had pulled up stakes and drifted backwards towards the Kunzendorf Heights. The king, in the meanwhile, repaired to the heights of Würben, over by Schweidnitz, to see what task lay ahead, with regard to regaining the fortress. Now Frederick does not seem to have believed that Daun would be able to deny Schweidnitz to him for long. July 3, Prussian scouts made themselves to home in their army’s old quarters at Bunzelwitz, since abandoned. General Wied forthwith made his way to Striegau, to threaten the Austrian lines thereabouts.
On the morning of July 3, General Brentano wiggled forward from Burkersdorf, deploying his forces at and about Adelsbach. Austrian forces quickly occupied the high ground in the area, specifically the Sachsenberg and the Engelsberg.47 Unfortunately, the whitecoats were too few in number. Brentano’s command was only around 5,000 men in the immediate vicinity. That being the case, the Austrians were clearly inferior in numbers. To an almost overwhelming degree, no less.
General Wied was unbuckled to outflank Daun’s western side to encroach upon Braunau. Before noon, the bluecoats attacked and pressed back part of the Austrian advanced guard. Wied assembled his men over by Hohenfriedberg and Baumgarten. His force, after a suitable preparation, rolled forward against that part of Brentano’s men ensconced on the Engelsberg and the Sachsenberg.
Brentano’s light forces were scattered by this new effort, over by Reichenau, about 0330 hours on July 6. A force of Croats deployed over by the place scurried off to the rear, but not before 33 of the dragoons from St. Ignon’s 31st Dragoons were captured as prisoners by the surging Prussians.48 Nevertheless, an element of Austrian jäger at Adelsbach, although in a good position to do so, failed utterly to intervene, while the whitecoats on the Engelsberg with the Austrian “left,” a force of the Warasdiner Croats, were here led by Major LaFontaine. They proved to be no match for the far more numerous bluecoats. There was a short fight, though. Mea
nwhile, Wied was at once unbuckled to do his best against the whitecoats thereabouts. The Prussian strike force against the enemy on the Engelsberg consisted of the infantry of General Lestwitz, and the Free Battalion of Wunsch. In support, a number of Prussian guns (to the tune of a dozen pieces) started to bombard the Austrians opposite to them. Right behind Wied, strode the king’s main body, some 22 battalions of infantry and 21 squadrons, with Frederick himself at their head.
Wied had just completed his task of sweeping away the enemy cavalry from over near Reichenau, but La Fontaine’s men took to their heels as the Prussians appeared in front of the Engelsberg. This action left a vacuum into which the Prussians pounded a little force of grenadiers under the charge of Major Chevalier Collins de Ham, ensconced on the ridge overlooking the low ground between Reichenau and Adelsbach. Major de Ham stuck firmly to the post, even though his little post was of particular concern to the bluecoats. Further, a Prussian battery of six guns of the Horse Artillery was set up and commenced belching fire from a post on the Engelsberg (now gained from its quickly expelled Austrian force), against the whitecoat posts dotting the Sachsenberg. Major de Hams had the vantage point over his opponents, but this was somewhat nullified by the arrival of the king’s main body, a large part of which was forthwith led to the scene of the action by Frederick himself. The king, upon hearing the heavy fire ahead of him, had charged forward towards the action with some Russians and a full seven squadrons of the Prussian horse. His presence was tonic to his men, even though the enemy fire was concentrating now from above, raining shells down upon the struggling bluecoats. Frederick forthwith ordered his men to scale the ridgeline to take the fight to the enemy.
Nothing daunted, the Austrian fire was directed down on the desperate enemy, and Ham’s men kept to their posts and thus prevented the Austrian right thereabouts from being turned. To compound matters, an impromptu thunderstorm just about then added its medley to the situation. Then, just before the bluecoats could so much as come to blows, the hesitating king suddenly called off the assault. Whether he had suddenly gotten cold feet or just had time to think about how formidable the Austrian posts ahead actually were, is unclear, but one fact was clear: only a small part of his attacking force against the Sachsenberg was actually turned back in time. The rest proceeded to their business. This unfortunate complication caused the whole assault to come unhinged. The bluecoat lines fragmented. As a result, the Prussian effort was somewhat diluted on this occasion. Worse, Frederick’s advent was met solidly, and rather unexpectedly, by an intense counterattack mounted by Colonel Joseph Maximilian Baron Tiller.
Rows of well organized soldiers with protruding bayonets pointing out to do damage to flesh and bone charged at the surprised Prussians. This attack slammed hardest into the Wunsch Free Battalion (which had arrived in the meanwhile right at the Austrian position) and which almost immediately appeared on the point of faltering. The sheer Prussian edge in numbers undoubtedly allowed them to keep the overall advantage in the tussle for a brief moment, but then the agitated bluecoats suddenly fell back down the ridge. Tiller’s men pressed after them, even rolling boulders and rock down hill on the staff and command of the harried king when the ammunition ran low. The Prince de Ligne witnessed Frederick himself being subject to the attack.49 In short, the bluecoats managed to keep on the field, but they were hard pressed. If nothing else, the whole episode showed the whitecoats still had fight left in them.
However, Tiller’s bold stroke did indeed force the Prussians back from the summit of the Sachsenberg. Even the king was in bad straits for a brief time following the tussle. Three Prussian battle colors were taken, and many of the frazzled men of the Wunsch Free Battalion simply fled the scene altogether. In short, Prussian numbers did not prove decisive on this day.
Finally, though, the combination of all of these moves finally pressed the Austrians of Ham off his rise. These developments caused Brentano to reel backwards upon the rearward high ground, but Daun had, in the meanwhile, seen good to dispatch some reinforcements, which reached the scene in a timely fashion. The cavalry accompaniment, ten full squadrons of fine Austrian cavalry, took refuge behind the main whitecoat line. The jäger were now finally ejected from Adelsbach, following a short fight, but further bluecoat efforts were stymied for the moment by the renewed efforts of de Ham, who continued still to put up a stout resistance for a time. The final Prussian effort was delivered as late as 2200 hours, but by then there was not even a prayer of Frederick being able to turn Brentano out of a post he and his men had defended with such valor. This was thanks to the reinforcements sent by Daun, and which had been employed so effectively by Brentano. The losses of the two sides in this encounter were the following: 88 dead, 602 wounded, over 660 prisoners for the king’s men, while the whitecoats lost 41 dead, 141 wounded, and 65 captured. General Lestwitz’ 31st Infantry alone lost 300 men.50 Major-General Christian Wilhelm von Ziethen’s 43rd Infantry had scaled the Engelsberg, “despite the heavy fire and the loss of 400 men.”51 These two particular units contributed a great proportion of the total Prussian casualties on this field.
Meanwhile, Marshal Daun’s main body was taking post. The Kunzendorf Heights were not inconsiderable. The latter lay directly between the Austrian rear and the Prussians, but separated by a valley from the rises which dominated the way right into Schweidnitz. Daun took up post immediately at Kunzendorf and prepared to defend himself there from encroachments by the vigorous Prussian king and his host. The marshal was still astride the main road to the fortress, which was well in view to the east-southeast beyond Schönbrunn. Daun had a forward position, and had not had to even fight for it. Alas, he would not be permitted remain there long.
Daun, although encouraged by the whole Adelsbach episode, was still cognizant of the superior number of Frederick’s troops, not to mention of Cherneyshev’s Russian detachment, and certainly did not want to be caught in an exposed position. He was fully aware that the Austrian field army under his command was his country’s only field force. The part of caution was, therefore, Daun’s. He would rather err on the side of caution here. Accordingly, just as soon as Adelsbach was a done deal, the marshal ordered his army to prepare to hitch backwards. In the event, under cover of darkness on July 6–7, the Austrians quietly issued forth from their posts on Bögendorf and Hoch-Giersdorf, moving on Reussendorf and Dittmansdorf. General Wied made it his objective to strike into Bohemia over by Braunau. Frederick made sure that Wied had sufficient men to accomplish his purposes. This latter force was augmented to a total of some 20,000 men, in 26 battalions of infantry and 34 squadrons of horse. Certainly, under the circumstances, enough to do the job.
Wied’s task was to range into Bohemia and do his very best to destroy the Austrian supply magazines located at Braunau. Wied’s new march directly threatened Brentano’s position at Adelsbach, so the latter reeled back without hesitation on to Friedland. The Prussian follow-up was put on hold for a day while the bluecoat commander called a halt to convene a hasty council-of-war to determine the next step for the beleaguered Prussians. This pause allowed Brentano the time he required to go occupy a far better position at Dittersbach. Prussian cavalry took up the gauntlet of pursuing the departing whitecoats, but Brentano, continuing to bask in his fine effort at Adelsbach just the same, followed up by displaying one of the most complete battle efforts of the war. He now conducted a very effective fighting retreat in trying to blunt the bluecoat advance.52 The Austrians were reinforced by the arrival of General Hadik, who rolled forward into the vicinity of Dittersbach with some 10,000 men. Prussian scouts immediately discovered the new size of the enemy force directly before them, and General Wied pulled off back towards Friedland. Wied was not through just yet, especially with regards to inroads into Bohemia. The aim was to shake up Daun enough that he would forsake his current post to go chase Wied out of Bohemia.
The latest Prussian move immediately threatened the Austrian hold on Braunau, the anchor magazine in the immediate region
for Daun’s army. Wied’s command was newly arrived at Trautenau and Schatzlar (July 9). This was a position remote from the main Prussian lines, and right at the passageway into Bohemia. Immediately orders to ride were issued to Colonel Reitzenstein to go spread confusion and wreck havoc in the region round the Austrian town of Königgrätz. The latter took the 10th Dragoons, some Cossacks, and the 9th Bosniak Hussars of Colonel Lossow with him. The last named had been strengthened to “a full regiment of 1,000 soldiers.”53 The force irrupted into Bohemia (July 10), looting and pillaging to their heart’s content over the wide rage of country before Königgrätz. The amount of plunder and the gear they were carrying must have really impeded the troopers, for Reitzenstein abruptly pulled up short at Smiritz, and, while still well short of his target, left most of his command thereabouts. Only 300 hard riding Cossacks were still on the move, the quickest moving men in the command. Not to mention by far the least disciplined.
The coming of the riders from the East was greatly feared. For example, a guard force of some 500 Austrians (under Lt. Colonel Weiss) stationed at and about Königgrätz fled upon hearing of the approach of the dreaded Cossacks, even though they had a secure post and were superior in number to the invaders. This was hardly a surprise. The reputation of the dreaded Cossacks for plunder had been well earned, as the Austrians were discovering first hand.
While Reitzenstein had been suitably employed against Königgrätz, another group of riders galloped towards Prague and vicinity. Ultimately, Reitzenstein’s force was bribed to prevent the wholesale sack of Königgrätz, a fact of which the Prussian commander had no hesitation to acknowledge. Reitzenstein demanded, and forthwith received, a “contribution” of 2,000 ducats, as the price to spare Königgrätz; but, before the day was done, most all of the place, including the Jesuit College and the notable Church of St. Anthony, would be sacked or destroyed altogether.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 102