32. Huschberg, 140–142.
33. Showalter, 150.
34. Nancy Mitford, Frederick the Great (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1984), 203.
35. Duffy, Wild Goose, 234.
36. Arneth, V, 165–167.
37. Colin Lindsay, Tempelhoffe, I, 19–20.
38. A fact which had to be visible to Prussian eyes, making Frederick ever more anxious to get the actual invasion underway.
39. Karl August Ludwig Philipp Varnhagen von Ense, Leben des Generals Freiherrn von Seydlitz (Berlin: 1834), 38–40.
40. Helden Geschichte, IV, 7–19; Reihe von Vorlesungen, I, 151–160.
41. Jomini, Treatise, I, 99–100.
42. Cogniazzo, II, 266–269.
43. Die Kriege, Part 3, II, 45–50.
44. This depot, for instance, alone held “food for forty thousand men for three weeks” (Asprey, 443).
45. Karl August Ludwig Philipp Varnhagen von Ense, Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen von Schwerin (Berlin: 1841), 186–189.
46. Serbelloni should, ideally, have moved to cut across Schwerin’s path; that would at least have slowed the latter down and forced him into battle before he could join his forces up with Bevern.
47. Duffy, Wild Goose, 240–241.
48. One can imagine the sheer quantity and quality of the rumors that would have been floating about early in the invasion.
49. Cogniazzo, II, 269–273.
50. Asprey, 443–444.
51. Lloyd, I, 33.
52. At Budin and at Koschlitz.
53. Where his left leaned on the village of Przylep and his right upon a steep height.
54. Asprey, 445.
55. Duffy, Wild Goose, 245; Campbell, III, 42.
56. Complete History of the Present War, 208.
57. Lloyd, I, 32.
58. Colin Lindsay, Tempelhoffe, I, 20–22.
59. Reihe von Vorlesungen, I, 160–168; Dobson, 16–17.
60. Charles-Emanuel de Warnery, Remarks on Cavalry, trans. G. F. Koehler (London: 1798), 18.
61. Jomini, Treatise, I, 101.
62. Seyfart, II, 315–319; Decker, 46–51.
63. Helden Geschichte, IV, 272–274.
64. Pauli, VI, 137–152; König, IV, 416–419.
65. Decker, 46.
66. Die Kriege, Part 3, II, 73–82.
67. Complete History of the Present War, 208–209; Huschberg, 140–143; Retzow, I, 78–83; Gottlob Naumann, Sammlung ungedruckter Nachrichten, so die Geschichte der Feldzuge der Preussen von 1740. bis 1779, three volumes (Dresden: 1782–1783), II, 577–588.
68. Consisting of five squadrons each from the Normann Dragoons and the Prince of Württemberg Dragoons. This along with five additional dragoon squadrons (König, IV, 272–275).
69. The Prussian ordnance was well served on the day of the action.
70. Which occurred in part because of the failure to take a flanking position against Königsegg.
71. Pauli, V, 148–149: König, I, 430–432; II, 220–222.
72. As Lloyd pointed out, the decisive outflanking maneuver near the end of the battle should have been performed at the beginning of it (Lloyd, I, 36).
73. Pauli, VI, 153–176.
74. Entick, II, 232.
75. Colin Lindsay, Tempelhoffe, I, 22.
76. Jomini, Treatise, I, 102.
77. Schaefer, I, 313; Naumann, II, 589–591.
78. Asprey, 443. The king, in his History, understated Prussian losses at 300 (120).
79. Dorn, Cavalry Regiments, 70; König, III, 108.
80. Franz-Lorenz von Thadden, Feldmarschall Daun; Maria Theresiss grösser Feldherr (Vienna: Verlag Herold, 1967), 220–224.
81. Lloyd, I, 38–39.
82. Naumann, I, 455–457.
83. Varnhagen von Ense, Winterfeldt, 158–161.
84. Pauli, I, 23–38; König, I, 432–434.
85. Pauli, I, 159, passim.; König, III, 32–33.
86. Die Kriege, Part 3, II, 104–109.
87. A fact which was plainly evident.
88. Die Kriege, Part 3, II, 87–88; 169; König, III, 453–462.
89. An oversight from which the bluecoats benefitted greatly.
90. Die Kriege, Part 3, II, 90–104.
91. Where his presence might have negated Schwerin’s attempt to break across the Elbe.
92. This unwise order, though, found Serbelloni while he was in transit. This ensured the “fiery” Italian could be neither at Königgrätz nor at Prague in time to do anything.
93. Pauli, II, 165–184; König, IV, 172–175.
94. Varnhagen von Ense, Leben Schwerin, 187.
95. The men of Wartenberg’s former command were so infuriated that they henceforth “cut down all Croats who tried to surrender” (Asprey, 445).
96. Frederick II, Seven Years’ War, I, 122.
97. Die Kriege, Part 3, II, 114–119.
98. The whitecoats had surely been caught off guard, but they were clearly digging their heels in now (Franz Klutschak, Die Kriegsjahre Prags in der Mitte des vorigen Jahrhunderts: Drei Episoden aus dem österreichischen Erbfolge—und Siebenjährigen Kriege [Prague: 1866], 120–127).
99. Varnhagen von Ense, Leben Seydlitz, 37–39.
100. Some insight can be gleaned from Charles’s brief “Journal” entry (Friedrich Ammann, Die Schlacht bei Prag am 6 Mai 1757 [Heidelberg: 1887], 12).
101. Especially in view of his opponent, Frederick the Great.
102. Colin Lindsay, Tempelhoffe, I, 35–38.
103. Sam Coull, Nothing But My Sword (London: Birlinn, Ltd., 1999), 162.
104. Arneth, V, 172–174.
Chapter 6
1. Adolf Müller, Die Schlacht bei Prag (Berlin: 1857), 25–49; Decker, 52–66; Seyfart, II, 323–332; Huschberg, 145–151; Retzow, I, 95–105.
2. Jomini, Treatise, I, 110; Helden Geschichte, IV, 19–37.
3. Jany, II, 394–403; König, III, 469–470.
4. To be fair, part of the reason for the apparent inactivity was the Austrians’ lack of concentration. For instance, Nádasti was still deep in Moravia. This was Browne’s responsibility (Tuttle, IV, 85). Nevertheless, a fine opportunity to catch the enemy at a disadvantage before their rendezvous was wasted.
5. Die Kriege, Part 3, II, 120–148; Reihe von Vorlesungen, I, 141–217.
6. Duffy, Wild Goose, 247.
7. Colin Lindsay, Tempelhoffe, I, 44.
8. Complete History of the Present War, 210–211.
9. Retzow, I, 96–98.
10. Ammann, 105–114.
11. Thus temporarily abandoning the usual Austrian practice of ranks four men deep, necessary here to prolong the front enough to confront the formidable foe.
12. Frederick II, Seven Years’War, I, 123.
13. Tuttle, IV, 85.
14. Campbell, III, 44.
15. One of the king’s biggest critics supported Schwerin in this contention, even though Frederick’s decision not to delay the action does appear justified in retrospect (Retzow, I, 84).
16. Arneth, V, 175–179.
17. Die Kriege, Part 3, II, 69–72.
18. Another valid argument for waiting was the battlefield was in enemy country, which meant there was limited opportunity to survey the area. The Prussians, in short “had no accurate knowledge of the nature of the ground” (Francis Kügler, The Pictorial History of Germany, during the Reign of Frederick the Great [London: 1845], 311). This deficiency would soon manifest itself in a nearly fatal demonstration, as the king’s failure to realize the true nature of the terrain in front of the Austrian position proved.
19. Quoted in Duffy, Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 195–196. The superstitious present took it to mean a “good omen” for the day’s events.
20. Pauli, II, 277; König, III, 136–139.
21. Tuttle, for instance, appears to imply the key to the whole impending battle “was the village of Sterbohol” (Tuttle, IV, 86).
22. The oblique order and other similar maneuvers were like sec
ond nature to the Prussians, but the Austrian army seldom tried anything so complicated at this early stage of the war. This would begin to change with the Battle of Hochkirch in 1758.
23. Retzow, II, 96–98.
24. Varnhagen von Ense, Winterfeldt, 165–168.
25. Pauli, IV, 102–104; König, II, 355–359.
26. Dorn, Infantry Regiments, 90.
27. Pauli, VIII, 317 passim; König, II, 58–60.
28. Cogniazzo, II, 291–293.
29. Jany, II, 399–400.
30. Duffy, A Military Life, 115–121.
31. L. J. Blumenthal, Lebensbeschreibung Hans Joachims von Ziethen: Königlich-Preussischen Generals der Kavallerie, two volumes (Berlin: 1797), II, 296–298.
32. Jomini, Treatise, I, 112–113.
33. Janson, 334–346.
34. Varnhagen von Ense, Winterfeldt, 168–171.
35. Fraser, 344.
36. One eyewitness says several of the battalions had to leave their guns behind entirely “despite the urgent need for them” (Archenholtz, I, 49).
37. 1757: Reichenberg and Malleschitz: The Journal of Horace St. Paul, ed. Neil Cogswell (Guisborough, England: Gralene Books, 1997), 35–36. No doubt, what Horace St. Paul and his associates took to be “good artillery support” and what the Prussians interpreted it as were somewhat different perspectives.
38. In retrospect, this royal mistake could have cost the Prussians the entire battle. Had his troops lacked their vaunted iron discipline, the assault would likely have stalled, and Browne, if no one else, could then have exploited the opportunity. The success of the battle, then, was largely due to the firmness of the bluecoats.
39. Dorn, Die Schlachten, 55.
40. Pauli, II, 199–204; König, III, 311–313.
41. Colin Lindsay, Tempelhoffe, I, 53.
42. Jomini, Treatise, I, 113–114.
43. Varnhagen von Ense, Leben Schwerin, 216–219.
44. Dorn, Infantry Regiments, 64. For Ziethen, see König, IV, 309–321.
45. Frederick II, Seven Years’ War, I, 124.
46. Ibid., 127. Which begs the question, “How high did Frederick place his own worth?”
47. Blumenthal, II, 300–301.
48. “Thus was the marshal obliged to leave the field… [just] when his orders were most necessary” (St. Paul, 1757, 36).
49. Dorn, Cavalry Regiments, 30; König, II, 8–11.
50. Historians are really unclear about this wound. It may have been from sheer exhaustion. Tuttle wrote the Austrian leader “fell twice in a swoon” from apparent exhaustion (Tuttle, IV, 87). Other sources say the unfortunate man may have suffered a heart attack, no doubt brought on by high levels of stress (Coull, 164). Whatever was the cause, the absence of both Browne and Charles at a critical time put the whole Austrian army in a bad bind. This when they needed their best effort with the crack Prussians in front of them.
51. Huschberg, 148–151.
52. Duffy, A Military Life, 119–121; Showalter, 153–156.
53. Showalter, 155.
54. It would appear Hertzberg himself gave the order to advance into the chasm. As one source makes clear “the action was ordered by the King… [even] though he was too far away at the time” (George Heinrich von Berenhorst, Aus dem Nachlässe von Georg Heinrich von Berenhorst, two volumes [Dessau: 1845–1847], I, 102). Undoubtedly, Hertzberg was acting in the spirit of the king’s instructions, without the timely verbal prompt.
55. Dorn, Die Schlachten, 55; Schmitt, I, 31–33.
56. Georg Friedrich Tempelhoff, Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges in Deutschland six volumes (Berlin: 1783–1801), I, 155–156.
57. Dorn, Infantry Regiments, 14.
58. Jomini, Treatise, I, 115.
59. Horace St. Paul, 1757, 38.
60. Pauli, VI, 251–280; König, I, 430–432.
61. The wastage of the officer class of the Prussian army would only accelerate as the war progressed.
62. Pauli, II, 247 passim.
63. Dorn, Cavalry Regiments, 38.
64. Chester V. Easum, Prince Henry of Prussia: Brother of Frederick the Great (Madison: Greenwood Press, 1942), 42. This statement was not uttered just because of who Prince Henry was either. His later conduct in the war’s proceedings would bear this out.
65. Duffy, A Military Life, 119.
66. Pauli, VIII, 146 passim; König, I, 144.
67. Dorn, Cavalry Regiments, 72.
68. Dorn, Die Schlachten, 55.
69. Frederick II, Seven Years’ War, I, 125–127.
70. Schaefer, I, 313–322. “They [i.e., the horsemen] filled themselves with wine,” and, in the process, allowed the “beaten squadrons to escape” (Tuttle, IV, 87). Incidentally, the Blumenthal biography of Ziethen does not mention this episode.
71. Dorn, Cavalry Regiments, 136.
72. Frederick was fully aware of the number of fugitives in Prague (Ammann, 114).
73. The king recorded in his History about some of these difficulties, then wrote, “This [exhaustion] did not prevent the king’s hot pursuit of the foe” (127).
74. The king goes on to say the battle was “one of the most murderous of the present century” (127).
75. Helden Geschichte, IV, 37.
76. Tuttle also indicates the Prussians captured 33 guns, 71 battle flags, and 40 pontoons (Tuttle, IV, 89).
77. One source stated there were 76,000 Austrians present for action (Huschberg, 146).
78. Showalter, 154–155.
79. Charles-Emanuel de Warnery, Campagnes de Frėdėric II Roi de Preusse, de 1756 à 1762 (Amsterdam: 1788), 121.
80. Ibid., 135.
Chapter 7
1. The very size of this hodgepodge force immediately put a terrible strain on the city’s supply depots. The Austrian command had simply never prepared for a force of this size.
2. Helden Geschichte, IV, 55–79; Huschberg, 153–156; Retzow, I, 103–111; Reihe von Vorlesungen, I, 218–247; Waddington, I, 306–319; Klutschak, 127–156.
3. When it was reported by Colonel de Chevalier di’ Haumont that the Prussian lines had been strengthened, making an attempt towards Beneshau too hazardous, the move was postponed.
4. Lawley, 34.
5. Varnhagen von Ense, Leben Seydlitz, 39–40.
6. Oelsnitz died on May 8.
7. The king had summoned Prince Charles to surrender Prague right after the battle. The latter replied with more than a little bravado the garrison would “defend itself to the last man” (Archenholtz, I, 55).
8. Seyfart, II, 332–336.
9. Pauli, IV, 189–204; König, II, 346–348.
10. Die Kriege, Part 3, III: Kolin, 23–25.
11. Ibid., 34–35.
12. Thadden, 232–235.
13. Helden Geschichte, IV, 79–90.
14. For example, Archenholtz maintained a determined breakout early in the proceedings would have been successful (Archenholtz, I, 55–56).
15. Lloyd, Part I, 58–59. The besiegers, in a normal siege, would have a big surplus of forces investing a fortress. This was not in evidence at Prague. Lloyd even consents a serious Austrian effort against the still shaky Prussian force, weakened as it was by numerous detachments, as well as disunited by the numerous bodies of water close-by, must have “destroyed their army.”
16. This was a strange army; about which more later (Brabant, 79–105).
17. Despite the low opinion the king had about the Prussian artillery in general.
18. Asprey, 453.
19. Giles MacDonogh, Frederick the Great: A Life in Deeds and Letters (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000), 254.
20. Archenholtz, I, 56.
21. 1757: The Defence of Prague, The Journal of Horace St. Paul, ed. Neil Cogswell (Guisborough, England: Gralene Books, 1998), 38.
22. Wolfgang Venohr, Fridericus Rex, Friedrich der Grosse: Porträtt einer Doppelnatur (Berlin: Bergisch Gladbach, 1988), 249.
23. Retzow, I, 108.
24. Varnhagen von Ense, Jakob Ke
ith, 150–151; Janko, 35.
25. Horace St. Paul says it was the “bluecoats” some of the Croats wore.
26. Horace St. Paul, 1757 Prague, 62.
27. Varnhagen von Ense, Jakob Keith, 152–154.
28. Archenholtz, I, 57–58.
29. Mitford, 204.
30. Archenholtz, I, 58.
31. Horace St. Paul, 1757 Prague, 67.
32. Varnhagen von Ense, Jakob Keith, 152–157.
33. Fraser, 348. There were also 12 heavy mortars, throwing a 50-pound bomb.
34. There is more detailed information available on the heavy pieces in Martin Guddat, Kanoniere, Bombardiere, Pontoniere: Die Artillerie Friedrichs des Groβen (Hamburg: Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1992), 50–54.
35. Asprey, 454.
36. Krsowitz, I, 62–64.
37. An undoubted exaggeration of the Prussian losses (Horace St. Paul, 1757 Prague, 74–75).
38. Die Kriege, Part 3, III, 18–20.
39. Horace St. Paul, 1757 Prague, 83.
40. Varnhagen von Ense, Jakob Keith, 159–160.
41. All in all, Marshal Keith’s keen observations of prevailing conditions were solid (Entick, II, 246–247).
42. Archenholtz, I, 60.
43. Horace St. Paul, 1757 Prague, 87.
44. Charles’s scouts had been able to slip through the thin Prussian lines to tell Daun the field rations would only hold out until about June 20 or so.
45. Most especially since there had been no clash between the two armies at that point.
46. In fact, this was done to use up the surplus ammo/shells.
47. This latest episode reinforced the fact the majority of the sorties had not measured up. As one source offered, “The invested army made several attempts to sally out, but they were badly planned and did not succeed” (Jomini, Treatise, I, 117).
48. Varnhagen von Ense, Jakob Keith, 160–161.
49. Coull, 170.
50. Horace St. Paul, 1757 Prague, 98.
51. Coull, 100.
52. Campbell, Frederick’s Court and Times, III, 56–59.
53. Brackenbury, 144, stated 9,000 townsfolk “perished in this siege.” Considering the miserable conditions, disease, short rations, heavy attention from Prussian guns, the number could have been higher still.
Chapter 8
1. Archenholtz, I, 63; König, I, 136–137.
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