The Ottoman Empire: a Historical Encyclopedia [2 Volumes]

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The Ottoman Empire: a Historical Encyclopedia [2 Volumes] Page 67

by Kia, Mehrdad;


  Selim ascended the Ottoman throne in April 1789. He inherited an empire in chaos and decline. The central government had lost much of its authority in the provinces. Worse yet, the Ottoman armies were losing territory to Russia and the Habsburg Empire. Fortunately for the Ottoman Empire, both European powers were anxious to end the hostilities. Russia was concerned about Sweden’s attempt to incorporate Finland, and the Habsburgs were greatly alarmed by revolts in Hungary and the Netherlands, as well as by the growing power and influence of Russia in the Balkans. The powers shared a common concern over a new Triple Alliance among Prussia, the Netherlands, and Britain.

  The Habsburgs agreed to a new peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire, which was signed in Sistova (present-day Svishtov), in present-day Bulgaria, on August 4, 1791. The Habsburgs returned Bosnia, Serbia, and parts of the Romanian-populated principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia that they had occupied. In return, the Ottoman sultan promised fair treatment of his Christian subjects and the recognition of the Habsburg emperor as their protector. The peace with the Habsburgs encouraged Selim III to organize a new campaign against Russia. This campaign ended with a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Russian armies in April 1791. The Ottomans agreed to a new peace treaty, signed at Jassy in present-day Romania on January 9, 1792. The sultan recognized the Russian annexation of the Crimea and Russia’s sovereignty over Georgia, in return for Russian withdrawal from the Principalities. The Dniester River was accepted as the boundary between the two empires.

  The peace treaties with Russia and the Habsburgs provided a golden opportunity for Selim to introduce governmental reforms aimed at modernizing the Ottoman state and its armed forces. The repeated defeats suffered by the Ottomans at the hands of the Russians and the Habsburgs had convinced the new sultan of the urgent need to introduce reforms that would restore the power of the central government in its provinces, while at the same time preserving the territorial integrity of the empire against internal and external threats. Internally, the greatest challenge to the authority of the young sultan was the growing power of the local notables or āyāns. Although they accepted the suzerainty of the Ottoman sultan, some of the āyāns had established themselves as quasi-independent rulers, maintaining private armies and conducting their own foreign policy. Externally, Russia posed the greatest threat to the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state.

  Shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Jassy with the Russians, the sultan implemented his ambitious reform agenda, the Nizam-i Cedid (New Order). Selim centered his reforms on the creation of a modern army or Nizam-i Cedid Ordusu (Army of the New Order), which was to restore central government control over provincial power centers. Initially the sultan believed that the existing janissary and sipāhi corps could be modernized by introducing new methods of training and administration. He soon realized, however, that the reform would ignite fierce opposition from within the corps. Therefore he opted for the more radical approach of creating a new army altogether. The recruitment for the new army began in 1793–1794. By 1807, when Selim was deposed, the new army had nearly 30,000 well-armed and well-equipped men (Zürcher: 22).

  The creation of a new army required modern weaponry, which had to be either purchased and imported from European countries or designed and manufactured in factories built by the Ottoman government. A new army also required proper training and a highly educated officer corps. A new officer corps had to be trained in modern military schools and colleges by European instructors imported from European countries. Selim established a military engineering school in 1795. His reform measures required considerable funding. The revenue generated by the central government came from the collection of taxes. The Ottoman state, however, lacked the military and administrative institutions to collect taxes in the provinces, relying instead on the local notables, who were not interested in funding Selim’s centralizing reform measures. Without the support and collaboration of the local notables, the treasury could not generate the revenue it needed to implement the sultan’s modernization reforms. Desperate for additional revenue, Selim resorted to policies that made his reforms increasingly unpopular among the population (Zürcher: 24). He debased the coinage and imposed new taxes on basic consumer goods such as coffee and tobacco, thereby creating additional financial burdens for a population already overtaxed (Zürcher: 24).

  To train Selim’s new army, the Ottoman government recruited instructors and trainers, mostly from France. The arrival of French officers created a new cultural environment in which Ottoman officials and army officers intermingled with Europeans and learned about the latest political, social, and cultural developments transforming European societies. With the arrival of European trainers and the introduction of a modern military school, the antireform forces began to mobilize against the sultan. The new army was fiercely opposed by the janissaries, who viewed it as an open challenge to their traditional dominant role. The introduction of European education was opposed by the ulema, who considered Selim’s reforms to be fundamentally incompatible with Islam. Aside from the growing opposition from the janissaries and the ulema, Selim also faced a fluid, dynamic, and confusing international arena.

  Selim ascended the throne at a time when Europe was being transformed by the French Revolution, an earthquake that was shaking the foundations of European power politics. The French Revolution began on July 14, 1789, and diverted the attention of the European powers from the Ottoman Empire, allowing Selim to focus on internal reforms. For the Ottomans, the name of the game was survival in an international arena dominated by predatory European powers. As long as the revolution in France resulted in the European powers fighting among themselves, the Ottomans welcomed it.

  The Ottoman Empire had enjoyed a close and friendly relationship with France. Selim considered the French monarch Louis XVI, with whom he had corresponded, a close ally (Zürcher: 21). It was natural, therefore, that the Ottoman court received the news of the arrest and trial of the French king, followed by his execution in January 1793, with shock and horror. The Ottomans were relieved, however, that the events in Paris had forced Russia and the Habsburgs to seek peace with the Ottoman state in order to shift their focus to what was unfolding in France.

  The Ottoman relationship with France broke down when a French army led by Napoleon Bonaparte landed in Egypt in early July 1798 and occupied Alexandria. The Mamluks, who ruled Egypt on behalf of the sultan, either fled or were crushed by the invading French force, which captured Cairo on July 22. Although the occupation of Egypt was accomplished with relative ease, the French fleet was destroyed by the British at Abukir (Aboukir) in August 1798. The French also failed in their attempt to establish their rule in Syria when the local notable Ahmed Cezzar (Jezzar) Pasha managed to defend Acre with support from the Ottoman land forces and the British fleet in the spring of 1799. Although the French defeated an Ottoman force at Abukir in July 1799, Napoleon abandoned his ambitious plans of conquest in the east and returned to France in August. After suffering a defeat at the hands of an Ottoman army backed by British naval forces, the remaining French troops evacuated Egypt in September 1801. The French expansionist policy toward the Ottoman Empire had forced Selim III to seek an alliance with England and Russia (Zürcher: 25).

  Selim’s reforms threatened the janissaries more than any other group in the ruling elite. The janissaries were not alone, however, in their opposition to Selim’s reforms. The janissaries enjoyed the support of the religious classes, including the conservative ulema, who feared that the sultan’s reforms would undermine their power and status. In May 1807 the rebellion that had been brewing finally erupted. Not surprisingly, the backlash began when the janissary corps stationed outside Istanbul killed a member of Selim’s new army. Instead of nipping the rebellion in the bud, Selim hesitated, encouraged by the şeyhülislâm to adopt a conciliatory approach toward the rebels (Shaw: 1:273–274). The result was disastrous. The janissary units moved into Istanbul, gathering on their way other janissaries as well as the
ulema and their students. When they arrived in front of the palace, the sultan once again tried to negotiate with the rebels, promising them that he would abandon his new army and throwing a number of his own supporters, including his grand vizier, into the crowd, who tore them to pieces. As in the past, appeasement merely emboldened the rebels (Shaw: 1:274). The ulema threw their support behind the janissaries and declared Selim’s reforms incompatible with the laws of Islam. The rebels now demanded that the sultan step down from the throne. Recognizing the serious nature of the revolt, Selim accepted his fate and returned to the palace cage.

  Selim’s cousins, Mustafa and Mahmud, were the only princes of the Ottoman royal house who could succeed him. Since Mahmud was suspected by the rebels of being sympathetic to Selim’s reforms, Mustafa was brought out of the royal harem to ascend the Ottoman throne as Mustafa IV on May 29, 1807. Weak and incompetent, the new sultan was merely a convenient tool in the hands of the rebels, who used him to reverse Selim’s reforms.

  Although many among the āyāns opposed Selim’s new army and his centralizing reforms, a few powerful notables recognized the need to build a modern military force capable of defending the empire against the Habsburg and Russian empires. Among the provincial notables in southeast Europe supportive of Selim and his reforms, none was as powerful as Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, the powerful lord of Rusçuk (Ruschuk/Ruse) in present-day northeastern Bulgaria. Mustafa Pasha organized the Rusçuk Committee, which brought some of the powerful āyāns of the Balkans under one umbrella. He then marched to Istanbul in July 1808. As the news of the arrival of the army from Rusçuk reached the palace, Mustafa ordered the murders of Selim and Mahmud, the only members of the Ottoman royal family who could replace him. Selim was assassinated, but Mahmud managed to escape through the roof of the palace and sought refuge with Alendar Mustafa Pasha (Jelavich: 125–126). The newly arrived army deposed Mustafa and installed Mahmud as the new sultan on July 28.

  See also: Empire and Administration: Nizam-i Cedid; Sultans: Mahmud II; Mustafa IV: Primary Documents: Document 10

  Further Reading

  Finkel, Caroline. Osman’s Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire. New York: Basic Books, 2005.

  Imber, Colin. The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The Structure of Power. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

  Inalcik, Halil. The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300–1600. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973.

  Jelavich, Barbara. History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

  McCarthy, Justin. The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History to 1923. London and New York: Wesley Longman Limited, 1997.

  Quataert, Donald. The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

  Șakul, Kahraman. “Selim III.” In Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire, edited by Gábor Ágoston and Bruce Masters, 514–515. New York: Facts On File, 2009

  Shaw, Stanford J. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Vol. 2. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

  Somel, Selçuk Akșin. Historical Dictionary of the Ottoman Empire. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2003.

  Sugar, Peter. Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354–1805. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977.

  Zürcher, Erik-Jan. Turkey: A Modern History. London: I. B. Tauris, 2004.

  Süleyman I (the Magnificent) (1494–1566)

  Süleyman I, also known as Süleyman Kānuni (Lawgiver) or Süleyman the Magnificent, was the sultan of the Ottoman Empire from 1520 to 1566. During his reign the Ottoman Empire reached the zenith of its power. Süleyman captured Belgrade in present-day Serbia and inflicted a devastating defeat on the Hungarians, putting an end to the Kingdom of Hungary. In 1529 the Ottoman forces laid siege to Vienna. To the east, Süleyman waged several military campaigns against Iran, capturing the city of Baghdad in present-day Iraq and Tabriz in Azerbaijan. Ottoman forces also seized parts of the southern Caucasus, including Georgia. Süleyman’s foreign policy was based on an alliance with France, which would pressure and isolate the Habsburgs. In the east, the Ottomans enjoyed a close alliance with the Uzbeks in Central Asia, who carried out devastating raids against Iran’s eastern provinces. During Süleyman’s reign, the Ottomans established their naval superiority in the Mediterranean under the command of Hayreddin Pasha, also known as Barbarossa or Barbaros, who was appointed kapudan-i derya or grand admiral. Süleyman also intended to invade and conquer India by attacking the Portuguese navy and establishing Ottoman hegemony over the Persian Gulf. His long wars with the Habsburgs in Europe and the Safavids in Iran, as well as long distances and the enormous cost of such an undertaking, prevented him from realizing this project.

  Süleyman I was born in 1494. He was the son of the Ottoman sultan Selim I, who ruled the Ottoman Empire from 1512 to 1520. Süleyman began his reign by planning an invasion of Belgrade, which controlled the road to the southern plains of Hungary. The Ottomans were determined to take advantage of the opportunities that the internally divided Hungarian state offered. They also were fully aware that the developing conflict between France and the Habsburgs would allow them to play an important role in European politics. In forming an alliance with France, Süleyman increased the pressure on the Habsburgs, forcing them to retreat from Hungary. The Ottoman forces under the leadership of their sultan attacked and captured Belgrade on August 29, 1521 (Clot: 36–39). Before pushing farther north, Süleyman turned his attention to the island of Rhodes, where he defeated the Knights Hospitallers of St. John and forced them to withdraw after a prolonged siege on January 21, 1522 (Clot: 39–44). By 1525 the rivalry between the Habsburg Charles V and Francis I of France had culminated in open warfare between the two European monarchs. Only six years before, when they were candidates for the crown of the Holy Roman Empire, both monarchs had declared their commitment to mobilizing all the Christian forces of Europe against the Ottoman Turks (Inalcik: 35). When Charles was elected as the emperor in 1521, however, the two Christian monarchs split the Catholic world into two warring factions and provided Süleyman with a golden opportunity to attack and occupy Belgrade. The conflict between the Holy Roman Emperor and France reached a new height when Francis was captured and imprisoned in 1525, forcing the French to seek Ottoman assistance and support. Exploiting the opportunity that the conflict between France and the Holy Roman Emperor provided, Süleyman struck, pushing his army into a divided Hungary fighting a civil war over the role of the Habsburgs. Lacking unity and cohesion, the Hungarian army under the leadership of King Louis suffered a devastating defeat at the hands of the Ottomans at the Battle of Mohács on August 29, 1526 (Clot: 56–61). The death of King Louis and thousands of his men on the battlefield sealed the fate of the Hungarian state. The road was now open to Buda, which was sacked by Süleyman’s army on September 10. When the Ottoman army returned to Hungary in 1529, Süleyman focused his campaign on recapturing Buda and conquering Vienna. The long journey and heavy rain, which made the roads impassable and the transportation of men and artillery impossible, and the arrival of winter, which deprived the horses of forage and rendered the Ottoman cavalry useless, forced Süleyman to lift the siege on the Habsburg capital after three weeks, on October 16 (Finkel: 124).

  The reign of Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–1566) marked the zenith of Ottoman power. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)

  Süleyman also was determined to establish Ottoman supremacy on the Mediterranean Sea, where Venice and Genoa historically had dominated. Having appointed the famed Hayreddin Pasha, also known as Barbarossa or Barbaros, as the grand admiral of Ottoman naval forces (kapudan-i derya), Süleyman expanded Ottoman domains into North Africa, capturing Tunis in August 1533 and threatening the Venetian islands of the Ionian Sea. The Ottomans were sending a signal to Venice, Genoa, Spain, and Portugal that their empire was no longer just a land power, but now also a powerful sea power with which they would have to contend. In 1537 the Ottoman fleet attacked Vene
tian positions, laying siege to Corfu and threatening Italy. The growing supremacy of the Ottoman navy on the Aegean and the Mediterranean Seas forced Venice to sue for peace in October 1540.

  In late summer 1533 Ottoman forces invaded Iran. The death of the charismatic Shah Ismail at the age of 37 in 1524 had weakened the power of the Iranian throne significantly. The new Iranian shah, Tahmasp I, was only 10 years old when he ascended the Safavid throne. The new Iranian monarch did not enjoy the prestige and authority of his father and was frequently used as a pawn in the internecine conflicts between rival Qizilbash (Kizilbaș) chiefs and commanders, who dominated the Safavid cavalry. Aware that Süleyman intended to invade his empire, Tahmasp and his advisers had dispatched several embassies to European courts, seeking an alliance against the Ottoman Empire. Habsburg and Venetian emissaries arrived at the court of Tahmasp to plan a joint attack on Ottoman territory from the east and the west. Learning from their mistakes at Chaldiran, the Safavids also adopted a new strategy, which emphasized avoiding open warfare and engaging in a scorched earth policy. Thus, as the Ottoman forces under the personal command of Süleyman invaded their territory in 1534, the Safavid troops began to retreat, burning and destroying towns and villages and thereby denying food and shelter to the Sunni invaders. The Safavids were convinced that with the arrival of the harsh Iranian winter and increasing shortages of food and supplies, the Ottoman forces would withdraw, while the shah’s army would follow the invaders in their retreat and recover the lost territory. Despite these calculations, Süleyman’s first campaign against the Safavid state proved to be a huge success as Ottoman forces captured Iraq and Azerbaijan. The city of Tabriz fell into Ottoman hands in July 1534. To outdo his father, Süleyman pushed his army farther east to Sultaniyya, before he turned west, crossing the Zagros mountain range and arriving at the gates of Baghdad, which surrendered to the Ottoman forces after a short siege in November (Clot: 89–94).

 

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