by Mark Zuehlke
These operations aside, COHQ planners were mostly eager to raid ports. Mountbatten stressed that “we really wanted to take a port because even if the invasion itself took place across open beaches, a sheltered port would be necessary immediately as weather statistics showed that one could not rely on more than four consecutive days fine enough to go on landing reinforcements, ammunition, vehicles and stores across open beaches. And if we could not do so the enemy could build up faster than us and fling us back into the sea.”6
During the January discussions, Captain A.H. Willetts, the COHQ Air Adviser, recommended targeting only ports at the eastern end of the Channel. Anything farther west was beyond the range of fighters stationed in southern England. Brigadier Anthony Head, at this time representing the army, agreed to this limit because the troops would need to be at sea only briefly. This, he hoped, would leave them not too seasick to fight.7 Boulogne and Calais were considered, but both towns were so large that a major multi-divisional raid would be required. Consensus at COHQ was that the first port raid should involve no more than an infantry division supported by some tanks and possibly several commando sections. There was also concern about inflicting excessive civilian casualties. A small port lessened civilian exposure.
After much consideration, Hughes-Hallett finally dropped a finger on Dieppe. “Right, let’s take the old peacetime route—Newhaven to Dieppe and back. It’s less than seventy miles away.”8 Hughes-Hallett later explained that Dieppe “was chosen for no particular reason originally except that it was a small seaport and we thought it would be interesting to do—to capture—a small seaport for a short time and then withdraw... It was not thought to be of any particular military importance... And it appeared... that it would be about the scale of objective that would be suitable for a divisional attack... But I must impress that we were raiding for the sake of raiding... There was no particular significance attachable to the places that were chosen.”9
Dieppe was to be raided in June and then again in July because “we felt that a repeat raid... would achieve surprise and lead to the slaughter of specialist German engineers likely to be at work repairing and strengthening the fortifications” damaged during the earlier assault.
On January 23, Hughes-Hallett presented the list of operational targets to Mountbatten. He “agreed in principle” to them all and “asked for outline plans to be prepared.”10
In short order Dieppe was described as “a worthwhile port in an opening in a long line of cliffs. It was near enough for air cover to be provided from airfields in the South of England, and to allow of the sea passage being made almost entirely under cover of the short summer darkness. It contained a small but first class port and facilities, and photo reconnaissance revealed many invasion barges and coastal craft, which could be removed and brought back to England by a ‘cutting out’ party, once the port had been captured.”11
Although Dieppe was to be raided in June, the actual schedule was not brought to the attention of the Chiefs of Staff. Mountbatten instead pulled each proposed raid like a rabbit from a hat in whatever order seemed most likely to gain favour or keep Combined Operations at the centre of attention. Possibly this was because he had begun advocating an even bolder plan hatched during the late winter of 1941. On March 9, during a particularly rancorous meeting of the chiefs, Churchill demanded to know “whether an operation could be mounted against France at an early date in the event of this rather desperate action becoming necessary in order to keep Russia in the war.” Everyone present, including Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, General Bernard Paget, “reported that this simply could not be done.” Mountbatten, however, said that he and his staff had concluded “it was possible... to mount an operation against the Cherbourg Peninsula.” Mountbatten had a draft plan—mostly drawing on earlier planning by COHQ and various Home Army commanders—which was duly presented. It was immediately after this meeting that Churchill, appearing “delighted to find one Service authority that was prepared to recommend action,” awarded Mountbatten his various promotions and cemented his presence as a full-fledged member of the Chiefs of Staff and Combined Chiefs of Staff committees.12
The scheme was incredibly ambitious. It envisioned not only invading and gaining control of the entire peninsula but holding it indefinitely. To foil German counterattacks, the marshes at the neck linking it to the bulk of Normandy would be flooded. Mountbatten threw most of his energy through the rest of March into the Cherbourg venture. Specifications were sent to the Admiralty for how to suitably equip a headquarters ship. A program for training landing craft crews was developed, as was one for RAF fighter squadrons in providing ground support to army units. A report was also drawn up on what was needed to ready ports in southern England for undertaking a major amphibious assault.13
Mountbatten’s enthusiasm flew directly in the face of opposition from the rest of the Chiefs of Staff. Brooke had earlier flirted with the idea to the point that he had asked each commander of a region of the Home Army to develop an operational plan for a tactical exercise held at Camberley on December 13, 1941. All the commanders, save one, advanced a limited plan calling for brief occupation followed by rapid withdrawal. The lone dissenting voice had been South-Eastern Command’s Major General Bernard Montgomery. He was also the only commander who presented his brief personally. Montgomery first pointed out the operation’s hazardous nature before arguing that it would be better not to withdraw the troops but instead to flood the marshes. In this way, Montgomery provided the unreservedly brash Mountbatten with the base elements of his Cherbourg plan.14
Despite having instigated examination of this project, Brooke had by March lost all enthusiasm for it. And although Mountbatten continued to argue its viability, he simultaneously advanced other propositions that diverted attention from the Cherbourg venture, leaving his true commitment to the operation unclear. Had he strongly advocated it in the knowledge that such a venture would appeal to Churchill’s love of a gamble? If so, it was a hand well played—as the rapid promotions proved.
Having gained the two coveted seats at the pinnacle of Allied decision making on the western front, Mountbatten was soon playing his self-appointed magician role to this august and largely captive audience. Brooke often quietly seethed during these sessions, in which Mountbatten “frequently wasted his own time and ours.”15 First out of the hat was a proposed raid on Bayonne in southwestern France. This was quickly set aside for the St. Nazaire raid, which won favour and was carried out. Spurred on by the success of this raid, Mountbatten directed Hughes-Hallett on April 4 to develop a detailed draft plan for the Dieppe raid.16 Mountbatten had decided he should soon take this idea to the Chiefs of Staff, as it had more promise for being actualized than the Cherbourg scheme.
By April 14, the Dieppe raid plan had gained an operational identity—Rutter. After Hughes-Hallett briefly outlined the plan on that day at a COHQ meeting, it was “agreed that the project was attractive and worthwhile.” The only refinement suggested was the possible use of “parachute troops in small groups for the purpose of cutting communications.” The next step was for further examination by COHQ advisers and a representative from Home Forces to “define the object of the raid, state approximately the forces required, explain the way in which the forces would be employed, [and] enumerate the limiting factors.” It was further agreed that “although the Advisers and Planners would have to go into considerable detail to test the practicability of the plan, the outline plan for submission to higher authority for approval should not be more than a broad outline.”17
Even as Mountbatten prepared to propose the Dieppe raid to the Chiefs of Staff, he was at pains to keep the plan secret. This was a serious challenge, as the Anglo-American debate over the timing and fate of both Sledgehammer and Roundup were concurrently under way and still the source of intense wrangling. On the British side, the various commands involved in operational planning for these were numerous, with hundreds of pers
onnel engaged. Mountbatten sought to keep the Dieppe raid tightly compartmentalized. No officers were allowed to attend planning meetings unless they possessed a special pass identifying them as having been cleared to know details of Operation Rutter.
But still the numbers in the know kept growing, and Hughes-Hallett considered “gossip... inevitable.” He was not surprised when a Home Forces brigadier approached “one day and said he would like to have a word about our proposed raid on Dieppe.” One plan the brigadier was examining involved initial, simultaneous attacks each of division strength on four or five small ports between Boulogne and St. Brieux. “He went on to say that each Divisional assault was to be based on identical tactics about which there was some division of opinion in the Home Forces Staff. However, the current idea was to deliver flank attacks, each of Brigade strength, while the third Brigade would be held back as a floating reserve ready to reinforce one of the flank attacks, or to deliver a frontal assault timed to synchronise with the approach of one or both of the flank brigades from the landward side of the seaport. ‘Would it be possible,’ he asked, ‘so to plan the Dieppe raid, which was, after all, intended primarily to gain experience, that these tactics could be tested?’”
Although startled by the brigadier’s level of knowledge regarding both the purpose and extent of the Dieppe raid, Hughes-Hallett said he was not in a position to make that decision. He would, however, take it to Charles Haydon—COHQ’s Military Adviser—for discussion at their next planning meeting.
Even more than Hughes-Hallett, Major General Haydon was alarmed that “Dieppe should already—in the first half of April—be a matter of common knowledge to the big Staffs of the Combined Commanders.” But both officers recognized that nothing could be done about it. Haydon, however, “felt that there were attractive features to putting the main weight of our assault on the flanks. The major problem and uncertainties of an invasion could be tested equally well by avoiding an initial frontal attack, and the risk to the troops if the landings were held up would be greatly lessened.”
Accordingly, the initial Dieppe plan was developed along these lines.18 Landings would take place at Quiberville to the west and Criel-sur-Mer to the east. Quiberville lay six miles from Dieppe, Criel-sur-Mer twelve miles distant. “These landings were to be supported by tanks,” stated one Combined Operations report, “and were to be carried out by six battalions of infantry. The tanks landing at Quiberville would have only a short distance to go to the aerodrome of St. Aubin and the high ground to the southeast and west of the town, of which the capture would mean the ability to dominate Dieppe. On the other hand, to get through the tanks would have to cross the Rivers Saane and Scie and the bridges would therefore have to be seized and held by infantry. In the summer neither of these rivers are wide enough or deep enough to prove an insuperable tank obstacle.
“Tanks landing at Criel-sur-Mer would have been able to move parallel to the coast two or three miles inland and reach Dieppe within three-quarters of an hour, provided they could cover some 12 to 14 miles during that time period. Their progress might be delayed by a battalion of German infantry known to be in that neighbourhood.”19
Although the operation centred on Dieppe, occupying the town was not a priority or even an objective. The emphasis instead was on seizing the airport—about two and a half miles inland from the beach fronting Dieppe—and heights overlooking the town. Damaging the airport and demonstrating that a landing force could isolate Dieppe was deemed sufficient experience in landing a force of divisional size, conducting limited operations against the Germans, and then spiriting the raiders safely back to sea.20
When Mountbatten presented the broad outline to the Chiefs of Staff, it was approved subject to vetting by a Home Force commander appointed by General Paget. As the operation would surely be staged from ports in South-Eastern Command, Montgomery was the obvious choice. Montgomery requested a preliminary informal meeting “so that he and his staff could clear their minds on one or two points.” The meeting convened in Hughes-Hallett’s office at COHQ, with about nine officers attending.
COHQ staff had expected Montgomery to send only a representative, as the discussion was to “be of an exploratory nature.” Consequently, Hughes-Hallett never considered asking Mountbatten to be present; Hughes-Hallett himself attended only because Charles Haydon suggested that he should chair, since it was the army part of the plan being scrutinized.
When Montgomery entered the room, therefore, everyone present was surprised. In 1942, Montgomery had not yet adopted his legendary outfit of tattered army sweater and black tanker beret. Instead, like any other British general, he wore the standard red cap and uniform of that rank. A lean whippet of a man, Montgomery was self-assured, possessing an acerbic tongue and a sharply critical nature. He had no use for Mountbatten and little more for Combined Operations. Mountbatten, he said once, was a “very gallant sailor. Had three ships sunk under him. Three ships sunk under him. [Pause.] Doesn’t know how to fight a battle.”21
“This is a COHQ plan,” Montgomery told Hughes-Hallett, “so please take the chair.” As this countered military protocol—whereby the senior officer present automatically has the chair—Hughes-Hallett politely demurred, while noting that Montgomery “needed little persuasion to take it himself.
“Coming directly to the point, he opened the meeting by saying that the Military part of the plan was ‘the work of an amateur.’ ”22 He then enquired as to whether the raid’s duration could run for forty-eight hours.23 Hughes-Hallett said the navy could support only fifteen hours ashore. Montgomery said that it would then be impossible for the flank brigades to work round and reach Dieppe from the landward side in time. This would still be true even if there was no German opposition. “He pointed out that the only way the town and seaport could be captured quickly was to deliver a frontal assault and take it by coup-de-main.”24
Montgomery then asked if it would “be possible for the Navy to land the major part of a Division simultaneously on the sea front of the town with two or three Battalions on the beach at Pourville, some two or three miles to the south[west], together with another Battalion at Puys, about a mile to the north[west].”
Hughes-Hallett said a simultaneous landing “would hardly be practicable as there would be insufficient sea room with so many landing craft to form up in the dark without great risk of confusion. If, however, it was acceptable to have a 20 minute delay between the landings at the centre and on the flanks, then this would be possible from a Naval point of view.”
Montgomery dismissed a twenty-minute interval as “too small to matter,” Hughes-Hallett later wrote, and then asked that “we should re-plan the raid on these lines in conjunction with one or two members of his own staff.”25 At no time did Montgomery argue that the raid was simply ill conceived and should not be mounted. Even his authorized biographer, Nigel Hamilton, would later confess bafflement at his “approval of the outline plan.” Did Montgomery, Hamilton asked, “seriously believe a Combined Operation using untried soldiers could successfully smash its way into the heart of Dieppe and beyond—to the airfield of Arques-la-Bataille—in a matter of hours, and then be successfully re-embarked on the following tide? Furthermore, [Montgomery’s] own instructions relating to the defence of the South-East Army’s coastline, with clear-cut orders on states of readiness of coastal batteries, the manning of radiolocation units, all-round wiring-in of strong points, and constant rehearsal of counter-attack operations, could hardly have left him in any doubt that his equally professional counterparts across the Channel would be similarly trained to repulse enemy raids.”
Montgomery, Hamilton observed, had a “far more impetuous personality at heart than was commonly supposed.” This was mitigated, even hidden, beneath the “self-imposed qualities of total professional discipline and the will to master all aspects of his profession.” When “innate character acted in conjunction with self-conscious vocation, there arose
a combination that would not only take him to the ‘top of his profession’ but bring him world-wide acclaim; but when such a conjunction did not occur—when rashness overtook studious mastery of tactical possibilities and impossibilities... the result was often failure.”26
Over the next few days, this planning syndicate produced two alternative plans. The first precisely replicated Montgomery’s proposal. There would be a frontal attack on Dieppe, supplemented by two flank attacks, at Puys and Pourville. Added into the mix were attacks by parachute and glider troops against two heavy batteries of coastal guns. One of these was situated near Petit Berneval, five miles east of Dieppe. The other battery was at Varengeville-sur-Mer, which lay four miles to the west of the port town.27
The second plan was an intervention attempt by Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett, both of whom feared disaster if it came to a frontal attack on Dieppe. A modification of the original COHQ concept, this plan called for an infantry battalion supported by a battalion manning the new Churchill tanks—as yet untried in combat—to land at Quiberville. “They would go flat out for the local airfield and the heights just west of Dieppe itself,” Mountbatten later wrote. “Whoever held those heights could command the Dieppe Front. Two battalions of infantry would land at Pourville, which was only two miles west of the harbour entrance at the mouth of a small river and support this pincer movement. Finally two battalions would be landed at Puys, a mile east of the harbour, leaving two more to remain afloat under the Land Force Commander’s hand as a reserve.”28