by Mark Zuehlke
On May 11, Mountbatten met with the other Chiefs of Staff and submitted a simplified version of the outline plan for approval. In a covering letter, Mountbatten wrote, “Apart from the military objectives... this operation will be of great value as training for Operation Sledgehammer or any other major operation as far as the actual assault is concerned. It will not, however, throw light on the maintenance problem over the beaches.” This problem of how to keep a stream of supply and reinforcement flowing across beaches rather than through a port with all the inherent cranes, jetties, and other paraphernalia for off-loading ships was a problem that bedevilled the naval planners at COHQ. Although they knew it must be addressed, the Dieppe raid would—despite the large number of troops involved—be of too short duration for resupply to be necessary. Experience in that would have to be gained elsewhere.
The outline plan advised the Chiefs of Staff that the earliest launch date of the raid would be the night of June 20–21 or “any of the six nights following.” Buried in the details of the document—of considerable length in whatever form it was presented—was a suggested list of responsibilities to be imposed upon the three selected force commanders. The detailed plan and operation orders that the air, navy, and army force commanders developed were expected to conform to the outline plan. Further, the “approval of the Chief of Combined Operations, who will obtain the concurrence of the General Officer Commanding, South Eastern Command insofar as the Military Plan is concerned, and of the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, insofar as the Naval Plan is concerned, is to be obtained for your detailed plan.”6
Clearly lacking—a fact Montgomery later acknowledged but did not at the time attempt to rectify—was appointment of a task force commander, a “single operational commander who was solely responsible for the operation from start to finish.”7 Also missing was a single responsible headquarters through which the operation could be planned, administered, and then launched. Instead, there was a “Triumvirate,” as one later commentator called it, consisting of three officers of roughly equal rank and “each with his own remit” and headquarters staff.8 Major General Ham Roberts was required to clear his plans with Montgomery as South-Eastern Commander. The yet-to-be-named Naval Force officer would seek clearance from Admiral Sir William James, Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth. Neither Montgomery nor James was empowered to override the other. How the lines of authority for the still undetermined air commander would run was unstated. The result was a committee that lacked a chair and had endless potential for buck passing.
Not that the Dieppe planning structure was unique. At this time, such triumvirates were common when mounting Combined Operations. These operations involved each service arm, so it seemed logical that all three should participate in planning and provide what expertise and personnel were required. But this also meant that each commander had divided loyalties. The welfare of his arm of service tended to override that of the operation. This natural tendency was to have serious repercussions on the Dieppe planning.
For the Chiefs of Staff, the proposed Dieppe raid was but one of a number of issues Mountbatten brought forward on May 11. Brooke noted that the day was “mainly concerned with various combined operations which Chief of Combined Operations is planning.” Then, at noon, Churchill arrived to chair a meeting “to discuss the giving up of the attack on Alderney and raids planned as alternatives.” Dieppe was the paramount offering among those alternatives. Brooke recognized that this scheme was ambitious, but it would provide experience in landing modern technical equipment on open beaches and should force “the Germans to commit their air force to battle.” On May 13, the Chiefs gave approval. Brooke wrote: “Main interest of morning’s [Chiefs of Staff meeting] was examination of projected large-scale raid for vicinity of Dieppe. Little did I ever think in the old days of my regular journeys from Newhaven to Dieppe that I should have been planning as I was this morning.”9
Immediately after the meeting, Mountbatten notified the three force commanders of their appointments and told them that the outline plan had been accepted as the basis for detailed planning. Already aware of his selection as Military Force Commander, Roberts was sprung from the Mayfair Hotel and allowed to return to 2nd Division’s headquarters. Air Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, who commanded No. 11 Fighter Group, was named Air Force Commander. The Naval Force Commander was to be Rear Admiral Tom Baillie-Grohman, who had to be rushed back to Britain from Cairo.
Of the three, Baillie-Grohman was the most experienced in combined operations. After serving for two years at the helm of the battleship Ramillies, he had been promoted to rear admiral and had taken command of the combined operations naval base in the Middle East. He organized the largest ever combined operations exercise, off the Suez Canal, in which a New Zealand division engaged in a three-day rehearsal. Baillie-Grohman had been planning an assault on the island of Rhodes in 1941 but had to scuttle this in order to deal with the sudden evacuation of the 55,000-strong British army in Greece. In the face of the rapidly advancing German army, under the overhead guns of the Luftwaffe, and operating in a foreign and chaotic country, Baillie-Grohman oversaw a largely successful rescue. It was a performance that earned him a Distinguished Service Order. The fifty-four-year-old Baillie-Grohman had a reputation for being intolerant of inefficiency by subordinates and, like Roberts, believed it possible for anyone to achieve excellence.10
Born in 1892, Leigh-Mallory served in the British Army during the Great War until he was wounded in the Second Battle of Ypres in the spring of 1915. Upon recovery from his wounds in January 1916, he volunteered for the Royal Flying Corps and became a pilot. By war’s end he held a DSO and was promoted to vice air-marshal, one of the youngest. Noted as a quick-thinking and sound decision maker, Leigh-Mallory also had a reputation for using political connections to advance his career. During the Battle of Britain, he and Canadian acting squadron leader Douglas Bader advocated the so-called Big Wing approach to fighting the Luftwaffe. This entailed massed fighter formations attempting to bring German bomber groups to battle before they reached London or other targets. The tactic met with only limited success and received only lukewarm support from Air Chief-Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, who headed Fighter Command. After the Battle of Britain, Leigh-Mallory used his influence to convince the newly appointed chief of the air staff, Air Chief-Marshal Charles Portal, to sack Dowding. Despite his ruthless tendencies, Leigh-Mallory was generally well regarded within the RAF.11
It would be some time before these three “strong, capable personalities” would meet.12 Leigh-Mallory was busy running No. 11 Fighter Group from a headquarters in Uxbridge, near London. Baillie-Grohman must journey to Britain from the Middle East. He would not arrive and be formally appointed the Naval Force Commander until June 1. On May 13, meanwhile, Roberts was given a final briefing by Mountbatten at COHQ. He then left for 2nd Division’s Sussex headquarters.13
The same day Roberts departed London for Sussex, General Headquarters Home Forces authorized the transfer of the Canadian raiding force to the Isle of Wight. This two-day move would begin May 18. The new movement orders caught the division preparing for Exercise Tiger—a massive six-division mock “encounter battle” staged by South-Eastern Command that was to begin May 19 and run to May 30. All I Canadian Corps was to participate under Crerar’s command. Two brigades of 3rd British Infantry Division were quickly substituted for the Canadians pulled from the exercise.
May 13 also saw conclusion of Exercise Beaver IV, in which 2nd Division had played the invader against an area between Bexhill and Beachy Head defended by 3rd Canadian Infantry Division. As had been true of Beaver III, the amphibious landing was assumed rather than attempted.14 Beaver IV had started on May 10. The weather immediately broke. Heavy rains transformed the countryside into a muddy quagmire that hampered operations and left the troops sodden throughout an exercise that was “longer and more gruelling than its predecessors.” The Royal Regiment of Canada’s historian obs
erved, however, that “the troops... remained amazingly cheerful in spite of abominable conditions.” Late on May 13, the regiment returned to camp to find the area had been bombed by the Luftwaffe and reduced to a mess. It hardly mattered. On arrival, Lieutenant Colonel Hedley Basher was given “a warning order that [the regiment] would move to the Isle of Wight for intensive training in combined operations.”15
Not all of 2nd Canadian Division was required. The divisional troops selected consisted of 4th Infantry Brigade, 6th Infantry Brigade, some light anti-aircraft and field artillery detachments (intended to man captured guns), a good number of engineers, plus divisional administrative units. Tanks were provided by the Calgary Regiment from 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade. The regiments of 4th Brigade were the Royal Regiment of Canada, the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, and the Essex Scottish. Those of 6th Brigade were Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders, and the South Saskatchewan Regiment.16
Even these regiments would not move in their entirety to the Isle of Wight or be fully involved in the raid. The Royals left behind all transport personnel and certain other details.17 Not all the battalions received warning orders to move on the same day. The Essex Scottish got the news on May 16. They were to send only 570 men of all ranks. The remainder of the battalion would remain behind as a “rear party,” under administrative care of 5th Brigade.18 Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal was still recovering from Beaver IV when its warning order was delivered on May 16. Battalion adjutant Captain C. Camaraire and a small advance party departed immediately to prepare for the battalion’s arrival on the island.19
In all, about 4,900 divisional troops would be involved in the raiding force. All of 5th Brigade and—excepting the small field artillery detachment—the division’s artillery and various other units would remain in Sussex. The 5th Brigade would participate in Exercise Tiger under command of 3rd British Division. Code name for the move to the Isle of Wight was Simmer, which was also the name of the Canadian Operation Rutter training program.20
When Roberts returned to divisional headquarters on the evening of May 13, he found preparations for the move well in hand. Roberts considered his two designated infantry brigadiers highly competent, having brought them in to replace older officers. Brigadier William Southam was forty-one and a Toronto publisher. He had commanded 1st Division’s 48th Highlanders of Canada regiment. On January 16, 1942, he replaced Brigadier J.P. Mackenzie at 6th Brigade. Mackenzie’s removal was finessed by playing the upward promotion card. Promoted to major general, he was sent to serve as quartermaster general at National Defence Headquarters in Canada. Drawn from South Saskatchewan Regiment, Brigadier Sherwood Lett had taken the reins at 4th Brigade. The forty-seven-year-old had received a Military Cross in the Great War and a Rhodes scholarship in 1919. Most of his inter-war years were spent as a successful corporate and tax lawyer. He replaced Brigadier R.A. Fraser, who had requested a compassionate leave return to Canada. The leave was granted on the understanding that Fraser surrendered any return to brigade command.21
Three of the six battalions in the two brigades had also undergone command changes. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Grenier, who had commanded Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal since 1937, was promoted to full colonel and returned to Canada to lead a reserve brigade. His replacement, Lieutenant Colonel Dollard “Joe” Ménard, had been a major with the Royal 22e Régiment. The Fusiliers also got a new second-in-command, Major René Painchaud, a member of the regiment, succeeding Major Maurice Forget, who had held this position since the battalion mobilized in October 1939.
Painchaud was well regarded by the Fusiliers, but Ménard was a stranger. When he took over on April 3, the troops at first called him “l’outsider” and made it clear they reserved judgement as to whether this soldier, who did not even hail from Montreal, deserved respect. None, however, could help but be impressed by his appearance. Ménard stood six-foot-two and, in the words of the Fusiliers’ historian, had a “splendide physique,” broad shoulders, the muscles of an athlete, and a jutting jaw. His gaze was frank, and he soon won over his officers with a steady display of exceptional intelligence, concern for morale, and stubborn determination.22
Ménard loved action. After graduating from Royal Military College, he had been dismayed by the lack of it within the peacetime Canadian Army. Arranging a secondment to India in the late 1930s, he was commissioned into the 4/11 Sikh Regiment, then guarding the Khyber Pass. When war broke out, Ménard decided he must rejoin the Canadian Army. Resigning his commission, Ménard wrote the Defence Department in Ottawa requesting return to army strength. The government’s reply was that he had freely gone to India and it was not up to Canada to fund his return. Furious at this perceived “Anglo-Saxon insult to a loyal French Canadian,” Ménard set about making his own way back, despite being almost penniless. In Bombay, some British Army friends helped secure free passage to Hong Kong. There he found that the Commander of British Troops in China, headquartered in Hong Kong, was Major General Edward Grassett. Canadian-born and an RMC graduate, Grassett was also a personal friend of Ménard’s father. Grassett got Ménard taken aboard a Royal Navy destroyer as a common sailor. By finagling transfers from one ship to another during a voyage that traversed the Panama Canal to finally reach Halifax, Ménard made his way home. Presenting himself in Ottawa, immaculately turned out in a full uniform adorned with Indian service medals, Ménard was quickly returned to army strength.23
Like the Fusiliers, the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders also received a new and controversial commander. The thirty-nine-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Gostling had been a partner in a Winnipeg radio repair business before the war. Although the Camerons were a Winnipeg regiment, Gostling’s regimental connection was to the Winnipeg Grenadiers. He came to the Camerons from a posting as adjutant and quartermaster general of 1st Infantry Division.24
Before his arrival, the Camerons had undergone a particularly brutal purge of senior officers. Lieutenant Colonel G.F. “Gil” Dudley, who had won both the Military Cross and Military Medal in the Great War, was returned to Canada after suffering internal injuries in a training accident.25 Several majors, all over the age of forty-five, were sacked—including the battalion second-in-command. One beneficiary of this cull was Major Norman Ross, who gained a promotion and company command, while also emerging as one of the battalion’s most senior remaining officers. Ross thought the sacked officers “rightly should have gone. By this time the glamour of overseas service had worn off. They had out served their usefulness.”
Gostling’s imposition was of no concern to Ross. He believed none of the remaining officers were senior or experienced enough to warrant battalion command. Ross noted, however, that Gostling’s imposition “sat a little harshly” on a couple of them. The new second-in-command, Major A.T. “Andy” Law, “was one of those who resented it very much.”
Ross soon had his own causes for complaint. Gostling “might have been a brilliant staff officer,” he said later, “but he didn’t know how to command men.” In one incident, Ross was travelling in a jeep at night and happened on a camouflage net lying alongside the road. He had it loaded aboard and then turned over to the base stores. The following morning, during an exercise in the same jeep, the order came to cover it with a camouflage net. Ross discovered there was none aboard, the one designated for the jeep having been unloaded along with the other. When the battalion adjutant asked about the jeep’s camouflage net, Ross explained the accident. The adjutant soon returned, saying Gostling demanded a written explanation. Ross filed a written report. Gostling sent it back with a scribbled note attached: “Do not believe this.”
“I resented this. He called me a goddamned liar. I thought to hell with you, buster. I did my job after that, just kept cool.”26
Lieutenant Colonel Cecil Merritt was the new blood who took over the South Saskatchewan Regiment in March. Merritt was thirty-three. His maternal great-grandfather had been Prime Minister C
harles Tupper. Merritt’s father, Cecil Mack Merritt, had died on April 23, 1915, while serving as a captain in the 16th Battalion (Canadian Scottish). His uncle, Reggie Tucker, arranged for young Merritt to first attend University School in Victoria and then Royal Military College. He then took Merritt on as an apprentice in his law firm, resulting in his call to the bar in 1932. Merritt established a courtroom reputation for being direct and to the point.
Merritt was a big man—wide-shouldered, just over six feet, and weighing about two hundred pounds. He was an enthusiastic athlete, playing football at the Vancouver Athletic Club. Following in the footsteps of father and uncle, Merritt became a reservist in the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. When the Seaforths mobilized on September 1, 1939, Merritt was promoted to major. Merritt had two siblings, a brother and sister. All three enlisted and were sent overseas. Before Merritt left, he said to his mother, Sophie, “I want you to know, mother, that I realize what you must feel about losing your family again.”
“I don’t want you to go,” Sophie replied, “but I’d kick you out of the house if you didn’t.”27
Merritt was married and had two children. When the battalion entrained for Halifax on December 15, 1939, his wife, Grace’s, parting words were: “Don’t try to win medals, Cec. You just come home.”28
During the next two years, Merritt held various staff and regimental appointments in Britain before attending the War Staff Course at Camberley in June 1941. He then joined the general staff of 3rd Infantry Division and remained there until being given the South Saskatchewan Regiment.29