"I have to do the right thing," he said.
"Yeah, I know that," she said. "But what we've got to do is, we've got to find a way to bring as many people as we can along." The surge was not going to be popular. The country and Congress were expecting a drawdown. So it was going to be important how he explained it. She told him that he couldn't say, "I've made this decision, and to hell with all of you who disagree." That simply wouldn't work. It would have to be "This was hard. And people have good reason to be concerned. This has been harder than we ever thought, and we've done a lot of things wrong, but we cannot lose in Iraq. And I don't think Americans want to lose in Iraq."
He would have to be conciliatory, she said. He would have to acknowledge that those who disagreed with him had valid arguments. He indicated that he agreed.
"What if it doesn't work?" she asked. "What do we do then?"
Bush didn't answer.
Such an addition of forces, she said, depends heavily on Maliki. Did the president have a feel for whether Maliki was really up to this?
Bush said he would talk to Maliki again.
There is a very specific set of things, Rice said, that we could ask him to do that would be measurable and visible.
She returned to what plan B might be. "If we do it and it doesn't work," she said, "it'll be the last bullet. The last card." This is our ace, she said. She figured the total surge would be about 30,000, when support troops were included. "If you play 30,000 American forces, put out 30,000 American forces and things don't change, what do you do then?" If the violence doesn't come down, she said, and the fabric of the society doesn't stop tearing, then what would be the argument for the continuation of the war in Iraq?
Bush didn't answer, and they headed inside for dinner.
"I'm not sure I bought the last card concept," Bush told me later. "First of all, to me the last card would be to pull out and hope for the best. Hope the thing, you know, fizzled out, the enflamed sectarianism just petered out on its own energy as opposed to exploding inside the capital and we sat there and watched it happen. To me, that's the last card."
"Does the president ever have a last card?" I asked.
"That's a really interesting question," Bush replied. He paused for a few seconds. "No. There's always another card."
* * *
At about five the next morning, the rest of the national security team flew to Texas for the 9:30 A.M. NSC meeting. General Pace said he had been consulting the Army's counterinsurgency expert, Dave Petraeus, as well as Ray Odierno, Casey's deputy and the tactical ground commander in Iraq. They wanted the maximum force available.
Casey's recommendation was still two additional brigades to Baghdad and two Marine battalions to Anbar province.
"Do we have an accomplishable mission here?" Bush asked. "What's the test of success, of accomplishing the mission?"
They seemed to agree that the test was the level of violence. The chart in Hadley's "GWB" file that month was showing still more than 1,200 weekly attacks in Iraq.
"We have to have the right measure of violence," the president said.
"The goal is that the Iraqis are able to establish control over their capital," Rice said. She was still worried that the Iraqis might not step up and U.S. troops would be held responsible. "The measure is not that America has to get the violence down. Iraqis need to get the violence down. They need to do it."
Several others suggested that the measure was still political reconciliation. Only true reconciliation would lower violence.
Then the president had a surprise. He said the surge could not be a onetime action. Otherwise, there was "a risk that they'll wait us out."
Having follow-up forces to the first five-brigade surge would require many more brigades in the pipeline, even more than General Schoomaker had said would be required. Nonetheless, he wanted Gates to begin to identify follow-on units so that the surge could be sustained.
Sustaining the surge would be impossible without a larger Army.
"Will Maliki give the Iraqis and the U.S. forces freedom of action?" the president asked. Would a new Iraqi commander in Baghdad have the freedom "to go after death squads and into all the neighborhoods?"
Hadley wrote a note to himself: "We need to confirm with Maliki and have Maliki say this in a speech."
The discussion turned to new personnel. The president, Gates and Hadley wanted Petraeus. Casey would be promoted to Army chief of staff. Khalilzad would be promoted to U.N. ambassador. Soft landings for both. Abizaid would retire and be replaced early the next year.
Finally, at the end of a long, meandering meeting, the president said, "I'm going to talk to Maliki" in a few days, "and before I finally decide on the Baghdad plan, there are some questions Maliki will need to answer. And I'm willing to provide an increased commitment, but I need to know if Maliki is committed and willing to perform. It needs to be a strong military presence that's going to take over security without political interference. And it's going to look different to both Iraqis and AmericansÖ. And Maliki needs to make clear he wants coalition forces and help."
Bush also said that he was not going to commit to a timetable on how long the surge would last. But he was going to send more brigades.
"Yes, sir," General Pace said. "Yes, sir."
Rice realized that Bush was aware that he had decided on too few troops for the initial invasion and occupation and was determined not to come up short again.
* * *
Just after Christmas, Casey returned to the United States and was with his wife in Phoenix when he got an e-mail from one of his contacts. "Hey, you need to know that the White House is throwing you under the bus," it read.
A couple days later, Abizaid gave Casey a warning. "Look," he said over the phone, "the surge is coming. Get out of the way."
* * *
General Pace told Gates that Petraeus was the unanimous first choice of the Joint Chiefs as the next Iraq commander. Gates passed along the recommendation to the president but said some people in the Army had voiced concern that Petraeus was too outspoken and welcoming of media attention.
Bush, however, found that appealing. Casey and Abizaid had been too reticent and reluctant to engage the press. The president saw Petraeus's willingness to speak out as positive, and he approved the appointment.
Gates also faced another immediate personnel problem. Who would replace General Abizaid at Central Command?
Who had enough experience and seniority to be Petraeus's boss? Gates and Pace examined the candidates, and Admiral William J. "Fox" Fallon, the current combatant commander in the Pacific whom Keane had recommended, rose to the top of the list.
Fallon, 61, was a blustery, hard-charging career naval aviator. Aside from Pace, he was the most experienced four-star in the U.S. military. He had flown combat missions in Vietnam, commanded an aircraft carrier wing in the 1991
Gulf War and a Navy battle group during Bosnia. He had played the role of viceroy in the Pacific skillfully, hopping from one Asian capital to the next, meeting with top political and military leaders and preserving American interests.
Fallon embodied the Top Gun swagger and self-confidence of the "brown shoe" Navy, so called because aviators often wore khakis and brown shoes. Prior to the Pacific Command, he had had two other four-star postsófirst as vice chief of naval operations and then as Atlantic Fleet commander.
Fallon was on leave from the Pacific at his family getaway in Big Sky, Montana, when Pace called. Gates wants to see you, Pace said. How fast can you get to Washington?
Fallon was soon back at the Pentagon.
I'd like you to take CentCom, Gates said. "I need you to do this. You're the best guy in uniform for the job."
Why me? Fallon asked. Central Command was overseeing two ground wars, Iraq and Afghanistan, and the post had always gone to an Army or Marine general.
Gates said he wanted someone with experience, and Fallon had a reputation for speaking his mind. "And you know,"
the
secretary said, "they've made the decision to put General Petraeus on the ground in Iraq." By they, he implied the White House. Petraeus was a done deal. Gates liked that Fallon was very senior because he didn't want someone who would be overwhelmed by Petraeus.
On top of that, everyone knew the administration was reviewing the Iraq strategy, and a new course would be announced soonóa decision Fallon would not participate in.
Let me think about it, Fallon said. It was a big deal, not just for him but for his wife, Mary. Over nearly four decades, she'd stuck with him through tours in Vietnam, the Gulf War and other assignments around the world, from Hawaii to Saudi Arabia.
Fallon went to dinner with his three adult daughters, all of whom lived in the Washington area. They unanimously told him to reject the offer. Too much had been or was about to be decided without his input. But they said they knew he would wind up accepting. After consulting with Mary, he did just that.
He had two main reasons, he told her. First, over the years he had traveled a great deal in the Middle East and knew lots of the foreign leaders and other players there. "The problem isn't going to be solved unless it is worked two ways: inside the country and outside," he said. "And the regional commander's job, of course, is outside." Second, as Pacific commander, he had sent thousands of troops from his command to Iraq and Afghanistan. "For two years I've been feeding people into this problem, and so I'm going to say no? The kids can go, but I can't?"
Fallon told Gates he would take the job.
* * *
On Tuesday, January 2, 2007, Petraeus was driving in Los Angeles, on his way to the assisted living home where his 90-year-old father lived, when his cell phone rang. "I just want to confirm that you are willing" to take over in Iraq, Gates said. "I'd like you to take it. Are you willing to do that?"
Petraeus had been all but certain that the job offer was coming. He briefly wondered whether he should insist on one condition: that Gates ask Jack Keane, the mentor who had helped save his life, to come back from retirement to be Abizaid's replacement at Central Command. Petraeus believed Keane deserved to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs, but that job was taken. Petraeus wavered on whether he could or should impose conditions and in the end decided against such a request.
So there on a cell phone on a Los Angeles freeway, two days into the new year, the 54-year-old general accepted history's invitation. He knew he was taking on the responsibility of a lifetime as the commanding general in a major war that most of his country had lost faith in.
* * *
Pace called Petraeus to ask how many brigades he might need. "Sir, I've got to call Ray," Petraeus said, referring to Casey's deputy, Ray Odierno. "Is it okay for me to call Ray?"
"Yeah, of course," Pace said.
The number of brigades was a decision Petraeus was going to have to live with, and it would be made before he took over in Iraq.
Petraeus phoned Odierno on a secure line.
"We need all five," Odierno said. "We've got to flow them all."
"Okay, great, I've got it," Petraeus said.
* * *
On an earlier visit to Iraq, Senator John McCain had also learned that Odierno wanted five more brigades, even though Casey did not.
McCain, who believed a significant surge was in order, was upset with Casey. When General Pace learned of his frustration, he called Casey in Baghdad.
"McCain is saying that you're being a toad in the road and blocking all these policies," Pace said.
"That's bullshit," Casey replied. Yes, he was opposed to the surge of five brigades, as were most commanders on the ground. But he insisted that he was trying to posture Petraeus for success.
After Pace's call, Casey spoke to Odierno.
"Hey, Ray, where the heck would McCain be getting this impression?"
"Well, it wasn't from me, because I haven't talked to anybody," Odierno said, adding, "But Petraeus did call me to talk about some things."
Casey saw that Odierno was sheepish. The incoming commander was not supposed to start poking around, talking to the outgoing commander's subordinates. It was a violation of Army protocol. Casey immediately directed his executive officer to get in touch with Petraeus's executive officer: "Call," he said, and "make sure to knock this shit off."
But he decided he'd also better deliver the message himself. So he called Petraeus.
"Look," Casey said, "we've got a transition plan set up here for you. I'm personally working on it myself. We're going to make sure you get the information that you need. But you can't be calling the subordinate commanders."
"Yeah, I know," Petraeus replied.
"Hang on there, guy," Casey said. "You'll come in here soon enough. But Ray's working on my directions right now."
"I am in a really awkward position here," Petraeus said. "I'm being asked my views. And I'm the one who's going to have to execute what is eventually decided, so I really need to talk to the operational level commander on the ground"óOdiernoó"who I know has made a recommendation, and talk through the rationale that he has for that."
Petraeus also said he would need additional information. "Could I start getting some briefings and things like that?"
Casey said no.
* * *
Petraeus spoke with General Pace again. "Sir, I believe you should announce and make plans to flow all five," he said. "If you don't do that, then what's going to happen is every time you have to ask for an additional brigade, it's an admission that you haven't succeeded with what you said you'd succeed with in the beginning. By the way, Ray Odierno's told me he's asked for five. If that's what he requires, then announce all five."
* * *
On January 4, 2007, word of the Fallon and Petraeus appointments leaked. Fallon, who had been a four-star for six years, called his new subordinate, who would soon become the newest four-star in the Army. They exchanged congratulations and voiced high expectations for working together. Petraeus soon sent over his new counterinsurgency manual, which Fallon read cover to cover. Interesting, Fallon thought, but definitely OBEóovertaken by events. He considered it an update of counterinsurgency practices in Southeast Asia. Iraq was very different, in his view, with its sectarian strife and religious overtones. But that would be Petraeus's business as the commander in Iraq.
Fallon later insisted that he had shared his view directly with Petraeus, who with equal insistence said that Fallon had never conveyed such conclusions to him.
* * *
Also on January 4, Bush spoke with Prime Minister Maliki by secure video.
"I want to talk to the prime minister one-on-one," Bush said. He kicked everyone out of the rooms on both sides, except the translators. He made it clear to Maliki that he needed an unequivocal, public welcome for at least two additional U.S. brigades, and that this time there could be no hedging. He wanted a promise, and if the promise was made, Maliki had to deliver.
* * *
That same Thursday, the new Congress was sworn in, and Nancy Pelosi, 66, took the oath as the first female speaker of the House. She now sat two heartbeats from the presidency, behind only Vice President Dick Cheney, which made her the highest-ranking woman in the history of the U.S. government. For nearly 20 years, Pelosi had represented a heavily Democratic district that encompassed much of San Francisco.
She had waited until 1987, after raising five children, to run for office.
Pelosi believed the American people had sent a message by electing the Democratic majority. They wanted an end to the war, a war she herself had called a "grotesque mistake" and an "epic catastrophe." She felt her first priority was to bring it to a close.
"The election of 2006 was a call to change," Pelosi said in the House chamber after she was sworn in. "Not merely to change the control of Congress, but for a new direction for our country. Nowhere were the American people more clear about the need for a new direction than in the war in Iraq. The American people rejected an open-ended obligation to a war without end."
Chapter 31
On January 6, 2007, Maliki said in a speech in Baghdad, "The army must be a model for everyoneÖand it must not side with any political or sectarian group." The Iraqi army would carry out a new Baghdad security plan, he said, adding, "The multinational forces will extend support and backing for our armed forces." Maliki then made one of his strongest nonsectarian declarations to date, saying, "The Baghdad security plan will deny all outlaws a safe haven, irrespective of their sectarian or political affiliation."
Bush and Hadley felt it was enough of an opening for the president to announce a surge of whatever number of U.S.
forces he chose. Drafts of Bush's upcoming address were undergoing revision after revision. Pace again consulted Petraeus, who wanted the president to make clear that the primary mission of U.S. forces had changed from training Iraqis to population security. Petraeus also wanted Bush to commit the maximum number of brigades.
Bush wanted to give the new commander what he wanted and finally decided on the maximum available of five brigades. In addition, he would send 4,000 more Marines to Anbar province. That, he said, would send a stronger message of his commitment to the Iraqi people, al Qaeda, insurgents, extremists and friends in the region.
Senator McCain had been advocating more troops for years. But he had always had a strained relationship with the Bush White House. I recall running into McCain in the West Wing lobby three months before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. He told me he was disturbed that the White House had said that a recent dinner he had with the president had been "awkward." He thought the dinner had been quite friendly. With his arms at his sides and his fists clenched tightly, he looked around the room. "Everything is fucking spin," he said.
The War Within Page 32