However, this is not the only possible interpretation of the strong integration between meditation and its sociocultural context. As we saw, Shulman and Stroumsa suggest that meditative transformation involves more, not less, active agency than the passive recipiency of sudden religious conversion. Even in communal settings, meditation is often seen as primarily an individual endeavor, as argued above. In traditions of meditation, the increased effect believed to arise from communal practice is only partly attributed to straightforward social factors such as motivation and encouragement; more often it is interpreted as the effect of spiritual energies released during meditation. In most traditions, guided meditations, in which practice takes place in direct response to continual instructions from a meditation guide (or a tape or compact disc, as in some of the Sikh practices described by Myrvold in this volume), are at best peripheral to the field of meditation. The focus on individual agency is shared by modern scientific definitions, which typically describe meditation as a “self-regulation practice”42 making use of a “self-focus skill”43 or a “self-observation attitude”44 to bring about a “self-induced state.”45 Furthermore, there often exists a strong tension between meditative traditions and the expectations and ideals induced by their general religious or cultural contexts, which meditation is often understood to transcend. In the “recorded sayings” (yǔ-lù) of Chinese Zen, meditators are encouraged to “kill the Buddha when you see him, and kill the patriarchs when you see them,”46 expressing the need to let go of all inner adherence to sacred authority. In Catholicism, the relationship between the organized church and its various contemplative orders has been uneasy, largely because the contemplatives have insisted on their personal visions of truths that the church has felt a need to control. In more subtle ways, the technical and nonsemantic nature of some meditation objects—as in body and breath practices, “objectless” attention training, meaningless mantras, aniconic yantras, desemanticized Zen kōans, and the blurring of the recitative content in some Sufi dhikr practices—indicates that meditation may transcend the webs of meaning provided by the cultural and religious context. All of this points in the direction of increased autonomy rather than a pure adaptation to social expectations.
The importance of social contexts may go beyond the provision of external cultural norms, spiritual ideals, and interpretive webs of meaning. The motivation and encouragement received from the environment do not necessarily stimulate conformism, but may rather provide the sense of safety needed for the individual exploration of existential issues. Similarly, the guidance of teachers or masters may not always be geared toward the exertion of power, but may equally well seek to provide the student or disciple with opportunities for technical or existential clarification. In this view, meditative transformation is not only about the interiorization of external expectations or webs of meaning, but just as much about the triggering of internal and individual processes that may be physiological, psychological, or spiritual in nature, or all at once. Again, this view is compatible with perennialism but does not presuppose it, since the inner elements activated may or may not belong to what is considered the perennial “core” of meditation, mysticism, or religion. The next chapter in this collection will further discuss the interplay between outside-in and inside-out changes in various forms of meditative practice.
Some forms of what Shulman and Stroumsa call self-transformation do not usually imply the conceived long-term anchoring of a person in the more fundamental aspects of existence that both meditative transformation and religious conversion are understood to do. Demonic possession and spirit mediumship may refer to long-or short-term contact with beings that fall outside the everyday experience of most people but are seldom thought of as belonging to more fundamental layers of existence in the sense discussed above. In the case of spirit mediumship, the most obvious long-term transformation involved is not on the part of the spirit medium him- or herself but of the community or individual that the medium is serving. Finally, while madness may be long- or short-term, it is usually thought of as making the individual lose his or her grounding in the basics of everyday reality rather than become rooted in more fundamental aspects of existence. Nevertheless, a number of societies have had currents of thought treating certain forms of madness as gateways to or expressions of wisdom or insight that are sometimes even tied to meditative practice.47 While none of these alterations—religious conversion, demonic possession, spirit mediumship, or madness—is typical of meditation, they do occur, such exceptions serving to prove the wide range of the changes associated with meditative practice.
In the term “inner transformation,” the qualifying adjective “inner” indicates that the changes are implied to go beyond purely physical effects on the body. This contrasts with both gymnastic and some medical traditions, in which mental training regimes are subordinated to concerns with physical achievement or well-being. In between the two lies the traditional use of physical training for character building. In meditation, both body and mind are usually involved, but the “embodied” nature of meditation is not part of its definition. The body does play an important role in many meditative traditions, through postures and movements and bodily meditation objects, as well as various attempts to “liberate” the mind or spirit from the body. Most obviously, meditative practice is often connected to seated (and often cross-legged) posture, and in Chinese the verb zuò “to sit” is a constituent element in many terms for meditation: jìng-zuò (sit in quietude), dǎ-zuò (hit-sit), chán-zuò (sit in zen), zuò-chán (sit in zen), jiā-fū-zuò (sit cross-legged), duān-zuò (sit straight), and zhèng-zuò (sit straight). Nevertheless, while seated posture may be a prototypical element of meditation, a number of lying, standing, walking, and even dancing meditations also exist. Similarly, while closed eyes are part of the prototypical image of meditation, half-closed or open eyes are also quite common. And whatever role the body plays in the practice and process of meditation, the transformative changes it effects go beyond the narrow concerns of the physical body.
States of Mind
As we have seen in the case of seated position and closed eyes, some features often associated with meditation are not part of our definition. This most notably applies to so-called meditative states of mind. These play no role in the definition, which focuses on long-term changes of trait48 rather than short-term changes of state.
In this respect, our technical usage of the term “meditation” contrasts with English everyday usage, which often refers to short-term changes of state, sometimes as a result of practice, and at other times as a spontaneous shift with no reference to practice whatsoever. This semantic ambiguity between practice and state of mind is found in terms for meditation in a number of languages across the Eurasian continent, such as Arabic muraqaba, mushāhada, and mu’āyana; Sanskrit yoga, dhyāna, and samādhi; and Chinese chán (borrowed from Sanskrit dhyāna). Transitory states of mind play an important role in quite a few meditative traditions, and the transient experiences referred to in the meditative literature are often understood to be transformative in the sense of redefining a person’s relation to himself and his surroundings. This also applies to several practices discussed in this volume, such as the seven forms of samādhi in the Yoga tradition presented by Bryant. Meditation is often linked to specific states of mind, and is sometimes distinguished from other practices by the nature of such transitory states. Such states are also more easily defined and identified than long-term changes of trait, and most meditative traditions have terms that designate states or stages along the way.
The suggested definition does not exclude state-oriented practices but requires that they are intended to bring about long-term changes as well. Sufism, for instance, recognizes a number of typical transient states (ahwāl) but links them to various enduring stages (maqāmāt). Many traditions warn practitioners against the temptation posed by transient states that might lure them away from actual transformative change. In his contribution to this volume, Sch
lütter describes how the Chinese Zen master Dà-huì (1089–1163) criticizes those who try to attain quietness instead of “break[ing] [their] mind of birth and death.” Another Chinese Zen master, Xū-yún (1840?–1959), warns against “greedily chasing after the realm of purity” and calls this “a Zen illness to be shunned by every practitioner.”49 In the Christian tradition, “The Cloud of Unknowing” warns against the experience of “a spurious warmth, engendered by the fiend” that the practitioner may falsely “imagine … to be the fire of love, lighted and fanned by the grace and goodness of the Holy Ghost,”50 and “The Epistle of Prayer” advises the practitioner to “neither care nor consider whether you are in pain or in bliss.”51 In the modern context, the most prominent proponent of mindfulness meditation, Jon Kabat-Zinn, states plainly that “any state of mind is a meditative state,”52 while the free mental attitude of Acem Meditation is described as “neither a feeling, nor a particular experience, nor a state of mind.”53
The widespread focus on meditative states of mind also reflects the strong concern with “experience” that has dominated religious thought since the late eighteenth century, and modern religious studies since William James’s classic book The Varieties of Religious Experience. The “experience” orientation of religious studies in general and studies of Asian religion in particular has been strongly denounced as a modern Western idea imposed on premodern and Asian religion. Modern exponents and scholars of Hinduism as well as Buddhism have been criticized for projecting the Western notion of “religious experience” onto texts that are in fact more often prescriptive and performative than descriptive and experience-oriented.54
Nevertheless, both the modern and the traditional discourse on meditation is often concerned not only with long-term inner transformation but also with the more immediate changes in mental state that meditation is often thought to bring about. Certain changes of state are prototypical elements of meditation, even if they are not universally present or part of the definition. The following list is an attempt at providing a summarized overview of physiological, mental, and spiritual states that are typically considered meditative:
arousal reduction
mental absorption
mental clarity
sense of contact with fundamental aspects of reality
The first point covers the traditional emphasis on silence, calmness, stillness, quietude, and tranquility, as well as the modern scientific interest in mental and physical relaxation.55 Some scholars distinguish meditative from ecstatic and shamanic states on the basis of the degree of arousal, with ecstasy and shamanism implying an increase, and meditation a decrease.56 The scientific focus on the temporary easing of logic and preconceived assumptions, called “logic relaxation,” where “ego-related concerns and critical evaluations are suspended,” also belongs here.57
The second point refers to the high degree of mental focus associated with meditative states. In the terminology used here, absorption is distinguished from concentration in being spontaneous rather than active, though the terms often overlap, so that, for instance, Sanskrit dhyāna and samādhi sometimes refer to the act of concentrating, and at other times to spontaneous mental absorption, which may or may not be the effect of meditation. The increase in mental absorption is often understood to imply a reduction or even absence of random thought activity, so-called mind wandering.
The third point refers to the subtle awareness and mindful presence often linked to meditation. In Buddhism, sleep, drowsiness, or sloth are looked upon as one of the five obstacles to meditative progress. Note, however, that this kind of awareness and presence is typically combined with relaxation and thus differs from the vigilance and watchfulness often associated with adjectives such as “alert” and “wakeful.” In the scientific literature, this combination has been called a “wakeful hypometabolic physiologic state.”58
The fourth point refers to transient experiences that are more clearly linked to our concern with the long-term anchoring of the person in more fundamental aspects of existence. The experiences in question are hardly available for intersubjective inquiry, and they are typically couched in metaphorical and strongly culture-dependent language, sometimes referring to a personified god, at other times to the self, and at yet other times to a way or path, or to more abstract notions such as emptiness or timelessness, or, in Kohn’s definition of meditation, “a deeper, subtler, and possibly divine flow of consciousness.”59 Whether different accounts of such experiences refer to the same ultimate reality, as in the perennial view, is highly controversial, not only because of the oft-cited cultural situatedness of such descriptions, but also because the terms themselves are so ambiguous. Even within the same culture, descriptive similarities may conceal great experiential differences, ranging from the subtle visions of a transcendent reality to intoxicated hallucinations induced by psychedelic drugs.60
In the idealized image, arousal reduction paves the way for mental absorption, as the thoughts calm down, leading to increased mental clarity and ultimately closer contact with fundamental aspects of reality:
This sense of contact becomes transformative when it redefines the person’s long-term relation to himself and his surroundings. However, the simple beauty of this image is deceptive, and this is not only because of the obvious difficulties of defining the fundamental aspects of reality referred to in the fourth point. The first, second, and third points are also quite problematic.
As to the first point, some traditions link meditation to ecstatic states rather than any form of arousal reduction,61 and Mircea Eliade’s famous distinction between (high-arousal) ecstasy and (low-arousal) enstasy has been criticized by religious historians. One tradition within Zen Buddhism repeatedly refers to the frustrating and not particularly relaxing experience of doubt as a precondition for meditative progress.62
As to the second point, attempts at ridding the mind of random thoughts have been highly controversial throughout the history of meditation. In the Buddhist tradition, a separate category covers meditative practices that do not aim at mental absorption (vipaśyanā, often translated as “insight meditation”). The Chinese Zen master Hānshān Déqīng changed his original emphasis on ridding the mind of thoughts to a focus on seeing the illusory nature of the thoughts and thus no longer being attached to them.63 Moreover, while modern science seems to corroborate the first point, about arousal reduction, the data concerning this second point are much more confusing. On the one hand, in two scientific studies,64 self-reported mind wandering during meditation is reduced in experienced practitioners of breathing meditation, loving-kindness meditation, and “choiceless awareness,” and in a third study,65 self-reported time on task during breathing meditation increased, all seeming to confirm this point. On the other hand, yet another study,66 which detected the occurrence of mind wandering during meditation by asking the participants to press a button every time they discovered that their mind had drifted, showed no difference between experienced and inexperienced meditators, the mind wandering occurring on average every eighty seconds over a twenty-minute session in both groups. Some effects of meditation have been shown to be more prominent in methods that allow mind wandering than in concentrative practices.67
As to the third point, some modern forms of meditation, such as Transcendental Meditation and Acem Meditation, look upon sleep as just one of many different states of mind that may appear during meditation. Mental clarity may feature among the effects of meditation, but sleep and drowsiness may also be important parts of the process. A monk with whom I spoke during a stay at a Chinese Zen monastery complained about his tendency to fall asleep as soon as he started meditating, but added that his mind became much clearer after such periods of meditation-engendered sleep. In the Yoga tradition, the kind of lucid sleep called Yoga Nidra is looked upon as a meditative state.
In conclusion, meditation is not always about specific states of mind, but is just as often about processes that may include a number of different moods or em
otions. Thus, none of the physiological, psychological, or spiritual states commonly associated with meditative practice has been included in our definition of meditation.
Meditation and Other Practices
To sum up, our definition stipulates that meditation is a technique in the sense of a deliberately undertaken and systematic practice involving continuous (i.e., repetitive or durative) activity aimed at producing certain effects at least partly by means of universal mechanisms. It is attention-based, whether the use of attention is characterized by a narrow concentrative focus or an open and inclusive awareness. Its intended effects include long-term and fundamental inner transformation affecting many facets of the person, such as perceptual, emotional, intellectual, and behavioral patterns, and entailing a movement toward the more fundamental aspects of existence.
In addition, a number of other characteristics are often considered typical of meditation, without having found their way into our definition. We have seen that the popular view considers closed eyes and a seated posture as typical of meditation. With regard to effects, we have seen how short-term changes of state are often associated with meditation, in particular various forms of arousal reduction, mental absorption, mental clarity, and a sense of contact with fundamental aspects of reality. None of these characteristics has been included in our definition, but they are still prototypical features of meditation.
Thus defined, meditation may be distinguished from many other types of practice with which it shares certain features. However, the borderlines are often gradient rather than absolute, and there is considerable room for overlap. The following is only a provisional and rough sketch of some such distinctions.
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