While Private Alan Parr’s M60 was useless, he had kept its ammunition belts. Now firing the Armalite that had been given to him by Kirby, he quickly emptied the 20-round magazine and reloaded it by taking time to prise the bullets out of his M60 belts. He also noted the enemy heavy machine gun: ‘Up the line of trees about 200 yards [180 metres] away I could see a machine gun with a rounded shield steel plate on its front, firing. The streams of tracers were going right over the top of D Company’s position. I fired quite a few rounds at that gun, but couldn’t tell whether I hit it.’46
As this was going on, Stanley was plotting new defensive-fire missions for the artillery, taking care to mark the former position of 11 Platoon to be avoided as it was possible Australian wounded were still out there. The lull continued and it enabled Major Smith to dart around among the men, checking their situation and the condition of the wounded, boosting their morale with words of encouragement.47
Meanwhile, the wounded Sergeant Todd was still crawling, trying to make his way to CHQ. Some feared he had been killed, or worse. There was no let-up in the rain – it was the heaviest he could remember. Even though he had done a couple of tours in Borneo and Malaya, he had never seen rain like it. ‘Down it came,’ recalled Todd, ‘and I was crawling through the mud. I kept on crawling, and I think I crawled about 100 yards [90 metres] when to my right I think a couple of Viet Cong troops were coming towards me. I don’t think they’d seen me, because by this stage with all the mud I would have just looked like a log or something. I killed these two. I’m sure I killed one and may have only wounded the other, but they both went down.’48
He continued to crawl towards where he estimated CHQ was located, and after another 15 or 20 minutes he could see the Australian perimeter. He started yelling all the Australian adjectives he could think of, and the wounded Corporal Buddy Lea, at great personal risk, scrambled out of the perimeter to help him in. However, the Australians were not the only ones who had heard him, and Todd looked over to his left and saw a couple of Vietnamese coming straight towards them, about 50 metres away. ‘I said to Buddy, “Look out!” and Buddy said, “It must be our blokes from B Company coming back to us.” I said, “You’d better have another look.” Buddy stepped behind a tree, and I got down behind this big log, and when they were about 10 yards away Buddy stepped out, but the other fellow was too quick, and Buddy got hit in the shoulder. Somebody off behind us had seen what happened and killed both of them.’49
With the help of Sergeant Neil Rankin and Private Billy Roche, both wounded men were brought in, but it was now that Lance Corporal Jack Jewry was killed while trying to put a dressing on Lea, his section commander.50 Both Lea and Todd were very quickly with the medics in the slight hollow where the wounded were located. Both were given a shot of morphine to ease their pain, but all they could do was lie there and wait, recalled Todd.51 He was the last to come into CHQ position.
The lull in fighting continued – the Vietnamese commanders were obviously assessing the situation and manoeuvring their forces for a final assault, as word had reached them that the entire enemy force was bottled up in a shallow defensive position. The Viet Cong were no longer facing three desperate forces but one Australian force judged to represent just a single company that had already taken significant casualties. All that was needed was one coordinated all-out assault to destroy the Australian force in detail. Even so, the rain and the ongoing Anzac artillery were disrupting communications and the Vietnamese were sustaining significant casualties with little to show for it. The senior commanders surely also knew that an Australian relief force would be on the way and they were in no position to take on another enemy force, given the current confusion and dispersal of Viet Cong units within the plantation. Time was slipping away.
To the west, Roberts’ APC force was following a bullock track down to the edge of the Suoi Da Bang. Lieutenant Peter Dinham of A Company, along with his radio operator and platoon sergeant Frank Alcorta, was sitting on the edge of the open hatch. Dinham looked into the APC where the men of one of his sections were positioned. They all seemed to be looking up at him, so he ‘had to be fairly cool and calm. At that time I realised I had their responsibility on my hands.’52 Alcorta recounted that they had absolutely no information on D Company’s position or casualties sustained, but he reckoned something serious was up due to the hurriedness of everything. He had no real idea just how serious the situation was, and wouldn’t until he reached the battlefield.53 Sergeant Jim Myles looked on as they reached the stream crossing, which was now, with the torrential downpour, flowing fast. It had swollen to about 30 metres wide with the increased quantity of water flowing into it, and the carriers fanned out into formation, stopping at the river bank.54
Roberts began ‘swimming’ the carriers across the swollen stream, which here had a small dam. As each moved into the water, the current took hold and it swung around unyieldingly, colliding with the dam. However, each made its way across, gaining traction on the eastern bank, and pulled up waiting for the next carrier. All the time the plight of D Company could be heard on the radio. They sounded desperate, doubting whether they could hold on for much longer.55 Roberts, now on the eastern side of the stream, knew the urgency of the situation and had no time for a reconnaissance of the immediate area. He pushed forward through the paddy fields heading for Long Tan Plantation, leaving one APC behind under the command of Corporal John ‘Tiny’ O’Shea, with its infantry section, to protect the stream crossing and act as a guide to Lieutenant Colonel Townsend; 3 Troop was down to just seven carriers, and was effectively an infantry platoon short, but they pressed on towards the sound of the fighting.56
Roberts then received a message from Townsend that he was to halt and wait for Townsend’s party, in the other two APCs, to catch up. Roberts must have been flabbergasted, to say the least. Not only had he been forced to send back two of his precious carriers (and their infantry) to pick up the battalion commander; now, with the men of D Company fighting for their lives just a few kilometres away and seemingly about to be overrun, Townsend wanted him to wait at the Suoi Da Bang so he could catch up and take command. Roberts recalled shouting the message down to Captain Charles Mollison but having the intention of pressing on regardless of his reply. Mollison did not argue the point with Roberts and used a hand gesture to tell him to keep moving forward.57 The seven APCs proceeded towards the sound of battle.
Unknown to the survivors of D Company, the two wounded men from 11 Platoon were still alive, trapped forward of their position. Private Barry Meller had taken up a position with his Vietnamese groundsheet and ‘settled’ into the scrub for the night, while Private Jim Richmond, with the live hand grenade next to him, was slipping in and out of consciousness among the dead mates of his section.
23
‘Got that bastard, sir’
1820–1830 hours
At 6.20 p.m., Major Smith radioed in that the enemy appeared to be massing just east of their position, likely reorganising for an attack. He reported that ‘2 platoons are about 75% effective [10 and 12 platoons]. 1 platoon has been almost completely destroyed. [11 Platoon] . . . reorganising for all-round defence.’1
It was then that his position was targeted by concentrated enemy heavy machine-gun fire, sweeping the company with streams of bullets and tracers. Most of the fire originated from the east and south-east – the enemy were re-engaging for an all-out assault, just as Smith had feared. The Australians could see them moving through the trees at a range of 150–200 metres to their front. The men opened fire but soon stopped, as they were wasting ammunition – the range and conditions made it pointless. Even so, the enemy veered to the north for a short distance.2 Then another large enemy force was observed massing to their front; the Viet Cong quickly fanned out and prepared for an advance along a broad front that would sweep around the Australian position. Bugles were blowing and the enemy concentration advanced. Smith and his men watched as the human waves to their left and front prepared to b
reak over them. It was about this time that Private Stan Hodder heard Major Smith yell into the radio handset something like: ‘I’ve got quarter of an hour and if the APCs are not here, we won’t be here!’3 Private Tony Stepney also recalled hearing something similar: ‘If you don’t send someone out in ten minutes, forget us – we’ll be gone!’4
Lieutenant Sabben recalled seeing the Viet Cong forming up and moving around down the avenue of trees. Their officers and NCOs were using the same tactics used by the Australians: the spacing, the rate of movement. It was all so similar to their own training back in Australia, but then they would hear the bugles and whistle and the enemy troops would move off.5 Many of the survivors of D Company believed they had little hope of repelling this enemy attack – their time was apparently up.
Not far from Sabben was Private Alan Parr, who recalled seeing a line of Viet Cong with ‘tree branches for camouflage advancing towards our position. They would move 20 or 30 yards and hit the deck, then repeat it again. When it looked like they were getting fairly close, I called out to Sabben for some artillery to our front (I think it was “Get some fucking artillery!”)’ Whether Sabben heard or not is unknown, but within seconds artillery came ‘screaming in overhead, right in amongst the VC’.6
Smith reported back to Nui Dat that a continuous assault of human waves at battalion strength was falling against his perimeter. He requested that the guns ‘drop 50 metres’ – drop the shells 50 metres in front of his eastern perimeter. However, there was a great reluctance to do so as this could result in casualties to Smith’s company from ‘friendly fire’. Smith was not having a bar of it. He was the commander of the ground, he needed it close and he needed it now. He recalled grabbing the radio handset from his signaller, Corporal Graham Smith, and telling 6 RAR to instruct the gunners to fire the ‘bloody guns where I want them or they will lose the lot of us!’7
At 6.17 p.m. B Company radioed that they were approaching the plantation.8 At about 6.25 p.m., 1 ATF radioed B Company urging them to ‘press on 476676 – Loc D Coy’ while telling the APCs with A Company to ‘press on 500 metres NE’.9 Lance Corporal Phil Buttigieg of B Company recalled hearing a radio message from Major Smith calling for the immediate relief of D Company, as they were about to be overrun: ‘We stopped moving via our covered creek-line approach and turned directly towards the main firing.’10 Corporal Robin Jones of B Company was on the right flank and recalled that ‘it was now raining heavily. We moved back across the paddy, and waded across the Suoi Da Bang. It was rising fast, being fed by the downpour.’11
As they scrambled onto the other side, they followed tracks back to the western edge of the plantation, near where they had earlier found the enemy rocket-launcher position. They had the grid reference of D Company’s position, although, as recalled by Jones, they didn’t really need it with the sound of the firing. When they got into the rubber they moved with two sections forward and one behind. The tropical downpour had increased and it was getting dark very quickly.12
The men of this composite platoon were soaked and their uniforms looked black in the shadow of the rubber – even so the enemy knew of their approach, as indicated by the earlier mortar fire against them as they headed back east towards the plantation. Visibility would have been down to about 50 metres at best, and they came under heavy small-arms fire with a lot of tracer from a Viet Cong force that was forming up between them and the rear of D Company.13 This was likely scouting elements of D445 VC Battalion. It was now that 1 ATF received a radio message from Major Noel Ford that they were approaching the western edge of the plantation and would soon be in a position to offer direct fire support to D Company. Ford drew his empty pistol, organised his composite platoon into assault formation and pressed on towards D Company, which was somewhere east of their position.14
It was also at this point that another radio message from A Company in the APCs reached Brigadier David Jackson that they were 1000 metres south-west from D Company and could see ‘firefight to right moving now’.15 The seven APCs under the command of Lieutenant Adrian Roberts had reached the junction of the east–west Route 52 to Long Tan and the main north–south bullock-cart track that led into the plantation, directly to the battle area. Private Peter Bennett of A Company, in one of the APCs, began to hear the sound of battle even above the noisy engines of the carriers. He and his mates started to psych themselves up, with Bennett thinking of his mates in D Company whom he was desperately wanting to help.
Not far behind was Lieutenant Ian Savage carrying Lieutenant Colonel Townsend and his staff. He had tuned his radio to Roberts and back to squadron HQ while Townsend was on the air to D Company and issuing instructions through Savage to Roberts.16 In one of these APCs was Lieutenant Trevor Gardiner, who recalled crashing through banana plantations as they pushed on towards Long Tan when one of the aerials on the carrier dislodged a nest of angry green ants, which fell into the APC. Private Bill Reynolds remembered ‘heaps of ants dropping into the APC . . . and they were biting the shit out of everyone’.17
Townsend radioed back to 6 RAR headquarters at Nui Dat to inform Lieutenant Gordon Steinbrook of some unwelcome news: ‘Inform American OP [observation post] officer that his sergeant is with us.’ The young US officer was more than a little startled: ‘I couldn’t believe it! In all the excitement my FO [forward observation] team reconnaissance sergeant had gotten his equipment together and gone with the APCs and A Company reinforcements. I swore, assuring Major [Harry] Honnor that my sergeant was acting on his own and that when I got my hands on him, if he survived the battle, I’d court-martial him.’18
Meanwhile, up ahead, Roberts had halted the column and, using the bullock track as the centre of his line, deployed the three carriers of 32 Section, commanded by Sergeant Ron Richards, to his right (east) two carriers up, and the three carriers of 23 Section in the same formation under the command of Sergeant John O’Reilly to his left (west). Each section commander’s carrier was between the two other carriers in the section for control purposes, while the troop leader, Roberts, was in the centre of the two sections.19 Within minutes, the carriers were advancing north in a broad frontage of about 300 metres into the heart of the plantation. To the left of them thundered the artillery at Nui Dat about 5 km away – it was common for the enemy to set up an ambush along the likely routes any relief force would take. All were tense as they waited for the likely opening shots of RPGs and machine-gun enfilade to tear into their small force of seven APCs.
Sergeant Frank Alcorta, still sitting exposed on the back of one of the APCs, was drenched and looking down at his men in the semi-darkness of the M113 carrier. He noticed they were silent. ‘Usually there was a lot of bantering and jokes between the diggers who rode on the APCs, but not this time. They were silent, as if they suspected a test of some kind, perhaps even on their lives, might be imminent.’20
Roberts recounted: ‘I had a board across the hatch, and sat on that. A silly thing to do, but that’s how I was, head and shoulders up. I had to be like that, I had to be able to see what was going on. My troop sergeant was behind me, with the infantry company commander. It wasn’t written down then, but in those days we were in command while we had the infantry aboard.’21 That certainly was not how Captain Mollison, commanding A Company, understood it: as far as he was concerned he was in charge of the troop. He was continually ordering the APCs to go faster, but it just wasn’t possible – they were already going as fast as they could, given the appalling conditions and the danger of a Viet Cong ambush.
As the APCs moved out into formation before heading into the plantation, Roberts got another message from Townsend: he was to halt and wait for the battalion commander before going any further. Roberts again ignored the message and ordered his driver, Trooper Bill O’Rourke, to push on. It was now 6.25 p.m., almost 90 minutes since 3 Troop had arrived at 6 RAR headquarters. Mollison confirmed their position with Roberts (GR 473659) and radioed back to 6 RAR headquarters. In response he was advised that D Company
was located at 476676.22 There was about 30 minutes of daylight left, but the heavy rain and black clouds gave the impression it was already night, favouring the enemy, who were now in large numbers surrounding D Company. Indeed, Roberts and his men would soon collide with the enemy troops of D445 VC Battalion, who were trying to swing around D Company from the south to attack them in strength from the rear, sealing the fate of the Australians.23
The lead elements of D445 VC Battalion were heading east, just south of D Company’s position, with the intent of cutting off any line of retreat. This would completely encircle the beleaguered enemy position and result in its total destruction. Even so, things were not going well for the troops of D445 VC Battalion. The ongoing Anzac artillery missions were devastating, as recalled in the battalion’s official history:
The battle became close combat, fought in groups and by areas – it was difficult for our infantry and artillery [mortars] to support one another . . . our forward position [held by 275 Regiment, 3rd Battalion] was able to force the enemy into the killing zone. Our rear element began to storm into the killing zone [and] our flank-attacking group advanced. The enemy regrouped . . . we were unable to move even a half-metre to finish off the enemy because of their rain of artillery.24
In the thick of this devastating artillery barrage, Viet Cong company commander Chin Phuong and her 80 or so medical staff of the Civil Labour Company, mostly female, along with a transportation unit, continually ran through the ‘rain of artillery’ explosions to bring in the wounded and dead from the battlefield.25
By now Major Smith had gotten his way with his request for the artillery to drop 50. He and his men were holding their fire waiting for the human avalanche that was about to fall upon them. Lieutenant Geoff Kendall recalled that the enemy came straight down the same line that 12 Platoon and the survivors of 11 Platoon had taken to get back to CHQ, which was right towards the centre of his two forward sections. He could see the Viet Cong forming up in a large assault line, which soon advanced at a slow walk. As they advanced about 100 metres, another assault line formed up behind them.26 He recalled:
The Battle of Long Tan Page 22