by Larry Minear
U.S. military operations against Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001. Air attacks were followed by ground action designed to capture self-confessed 9/11 mastermind Osama bin Laden, destroy his Al Qaeda organization, and remove from power the Taliban regime that provided sanctuary in Afghanistan. On the day following 9/11, NATO declared the attacks to be an assault against all of its members.
On December 20, 2001, the UN Security Council endorsed the creation of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), over which NATO assumed leadership in April 2003. ISAF during its lifetime had support from some forty NATO and non-NATO member nations. Under American command, ISAF troops as of January 2009 numbered about 50,000, including 24,000 from the United States, supported by about 100,000 members of Afghan army and police forces. An additional 10,000 troops were deployed to Afghanistan under sole U.S. command as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.3 Most of the interviews upon which this study draws regarding Afghanistan are with troops involved in Operation Enduring Freedom; there is little commentary by U.S. soldiers in ISAF or by soldiers in Afghanistan from other nations.
The Global War on Terror was broadened on March 19, 2003, with a U.S. attack on Iraq. Invoking the authorization of force provided by Congress in October 2002, President Bush sought to disarm Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, end the regime’s support for terrorism, and free the Iraqi people from the rule of Saddam Hussein.4 Iraq quickly became the second major theater in the Global War on Terror, with the conflict there soon overshadowing military operations in Afghanistan. Seeking but failing to receive the imprimatur of the UN Security Council, the United States assembled a “coalition of the willing” to support the war in Iraq. Twenty-one nations provided military, logistical, and other support to U.S. military efforts there.
On May 1, 2003, following the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein, President Bush declared major combat operations completed. “In the battle of Iraq,” he said in a ceremony aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, “the United States and our allies have prevailed.”5 Although the United States sought to turn attention to reconstruction, fighting continued and involved a widening array of actors, described by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in June 2003 as including “looters, criminals, remnants of the Baathist regime, foreign terrorists, and those influenced by Iran.”6
“After a brief period of relative quiet following [the end of] major combat operations, forms of violent expression grew in variety, intensity, and frequency, hitting peaks in 2005 and 2006. By 2008, indicators of violence had tapered off to markedly lower levels.”7 The justification for the war was the subject of heated public debate from the outset, fueled by the discovery of no weapons of mass destruction and by the lack of a confirmed connection between the regime of Saddam Hussein and the Al Qaeda terrorist network. The objectives and legitimacy of the war against Iraq are a recurring topic of comment among those interviewed for this book.
In November 2008 following months of negotiations, the United States and Iraqi authorities signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) committing the United States to withdraw combat troops by the end of 2011. Coming into force at the expiration of the applicable UN Security Council resolution on December 31, 2008, the agreement placed foreign troops under the authority of the Iraqi government, effective January 1, 2009.8 American troops, while remaining under U.S. command, would carry out operations approved by a joint Iraq-U.S. committee.9 Earlier UN Security Council resolutions had reaffirmed the territorial integrity of Iraq, called upon the occupying powers to obey international law, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949,10 and authorized creation of a multinational force.11
As of December 2008 there were about 142,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, along with some 5,000 from other countries, working in collaboration with Iraqi security forces. During 2008, a number of U.S. partners, including Australia, Georgia, Poland, and Korea, reduced their forces in Iraq or redeployed them within the country. In 2008 the United Kingdom, the major U.S. partner, announced its intention to reduce the number of troops in 2009 and change the mission of those remaining.12 As of early 2009, only the U.K., Australia, Estonia, and Romania were providing troops.13 A number of U.S. soldiers interviewed mention interactions with military personnel of other coalition members.
Beginning in late 2007 and continuing throughout 2008, the focus of the United States began to shift from Iraq back to Afghanistan. The “surge” in the levels of American troops deployed to Iraq, begun in February 2007, was widely credited with reducing the numbers of American and coalition casualties. Meanwhile, however, the levels of violence in Afghanistan were escalating, with the numbers of casualties per month by late 2008 overtaking comparable figures for Iraq.
In the Afghanistan theater during the latter part of 2008, major frictions emerged between U.S. and ISAF forces on the one side, and the government of President Hamid Karzai on the other. Tensions were exacerbated by several high-profile incidents in which substantial numbers of Afghan civilians were killed or wounded in situations implicating international troops. Frictions also existed with the government of Pakistan, which was seen as providing sanctuary for hostile elements in its regions bordering Afghanistan. During the Bush administration and in the early days of the Obama administration, the United States launched occasional attacks against suspected Al Qaeda operatives within territorial Pakistan. In February 2009, the new Obama administration announced its intention to commit 17,000 additional troops to the war in Afghanistan.14 This number was soon augmented by the commitment of another 4,000 U.S. troops.
The third major theater in the Global War on Terror was the United States itself, where the Bush administration mounted a cluster of activities under Operation Noble Eagle. The U.S. military carried out operations designed to defend the homeland (for example, improving port and airport security) and to support the work of federal, state, and local agencies. Three days after the September 11 attacks, President Bush committed up to 50,000 troops, of which 35,000 were eventually mobilized, including about 10,000 from the National Guard. In a separate undertaking called Operation Jump Start, some 6,000 National Guard personnel were deployed along the Mexican border to help deter illegal immigration and enhance border security.
The Global War on Terror was framed by the Bush administration from the outset in terms of doing battle not just against Al Qaeda, but against “terrorism of global reach.” Beginning in 2002, administration requests to Congress for foreign assistance funds highlighted the importance of twenty-eight “front-line” states cooperating with the United States in the Global War on Terror or themselves facing terrorist threats.15 In October 2002, the administration extended Operation Enduring Freedom from Afghanistan into the Horn of Africa, with a taskforce based in Djibouti, in order to disrupt terrorist activities in that region. In October 2008, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced establishment of an Africa Command to coordinate counterterrorism activities across the continent.16
To manage the Global War on Terror, the president introduced a number of policy, organizational, and administrative changes. The U.S.A. PATRIOT Act (the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001), which became law on October 26, 2001, and has since been extended, gave the president broad authority to protect the country from future attacks. Early administration priorities included strengthening U.S. intelligence-gathering and implementing new airline security measures. Under the PATRIOT Act, the president created the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate U.S. policies and programs across a wide range of executive branch agencies.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) places the three-theater costs of appropriations by Congress for Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Noble Eagle from the time of the 9/11 attacks through early 2009 at $864 billion. These funds underwrite “military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ healthcare” for all three operations. Of the $8
64 billion, CRS estimates that Iraq has received about $657 billion (76 percent) and Afghanistan about $173 billion (20 percent). “About 94 percent of the funds are for the DOD, 6 percent for foreign aid programs and embassy operation, and less than 1 percent for medical care for veterans.”17
Estimates of war-related costs vary according to what items they include, how far into the future they are projected, and what other assumptions are made. Estimates advanced by some independent analysts run considerably higher than the $864 billion CRS figure. One estimate from early 2008 envisioned total costs of some $3 trillion.18
U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ
The veterans whose voices are heard in this book are members of U.S. military forces that, since the end of conscription in 1973, have been composed entirely of volunteers. In the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq from their inception in October 2001 and March 2003, respectively, through November 30, 2008, a total of 1,834,760 members of the U.S. armed forces have been deployed. Of these, 725,668 have been deployed more than once. As indicated in Figure 1, the total number of deployments, as distinct from the total number of individuals deployed, stands at 2,881,783 for this period. (A single individual who has deployed four times appears in the “total deployment actions” column as four.)19
The narrative includes considerable discussion about linkages observed between the frequency of deployment and the incidence of mental health problems. More vulnerable than their counterparts in earlier wars, the chances of veterans returning with PTSD with psychological symptoms is estimated by one government study at 38 percent for members of the Army, 31 percent for Marines, and 49 percent for the National Guard. As discussed in Chapter 10, the vulnerability to PTSD of a given individual reflects, broadly speaking, the duration and intensity of the conflict to which a veteran is exposed.20
The Introduction includes a discussion of the relationship between the several hundred veterans whose experience has been consulted and the much larger universe of veterans who have served in either Afghanistan or Iraq. No attempt has been made to identify a scientific sample of individuals from the larger population. The narrative draws upon selected interviews from the Library of Congress’s Veterans History Project, supplemented by interviews with veterans, families, community leaders, and policymakers conducted by the author. It also reflects the experiences of veterans who in various venues have offered their own accounts of service in these theaters. For those individual veterans who comment on their experiences in this narrative, an index at the back of the book indicates the location of service of each, whether Afghanistan, Iraq, or within the United States as part of Operation Noble Eagle. Individual entries in the index also indicate a given veteran’s rank, branch of service, and unit, where this is known. Veterans consulted in the process, but whose experience is not referenced in the text, are not listed.
FIGURE 1
U.S. Military Deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq through November 2008
U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center. Contingency Tracking System
The troops involved in these two conflicts represent a significant portion of total U.S. military manpower globally. As of late 2008, approximately two thirds (264,961) of currently active U.S. armed forces strength was committed to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.21 In fact, by 2009, policymakers were expressing growing concern that “the wars have left troops and equipment severely strained [making] it difficult to carry out any kind of significant operation elsewhere.”22
U.S. military personnel serving in Afghanistan and Iraq are drawn from the three components of the country’s armed forces: active-duty forces, the National Guard, and the Reserves. As of late 2008, active-duty personnel represent 74 percent of total U.S. forces in the two theaters, with personnel from the National Guard and the Reserves contributing about 13 percent each.23
Active-duty forces are comprised of members of the Army, Navy, Coast Guard, Marines, and Air Force. National Guard forces are made up of fifty-four separate National Guard units, one from each of the fifty states plus individual units for the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the territories of Guam and the Virgin Islands. Each unit reports to its respective governor and is utilized primarily within its own geographical area. However, the president may activate Guard units to respond to needs in other states (for example, Hurricane Katrina) or abroad.
National Guard personnel represent an unusually large proportion of total forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, have been activated for more lengthy and more frequent tours, and have been more heavily engaged in combat than has normally been the case for the Guard. The fact that Guard contingents are attached to active-duty units when deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq has made for some similarities between the experiences of these two categories of soldiers, despite their otherwise different make-up and roles. The experiences of the National Guard personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq were the subject of an earlier study by the author.24
U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq also include members activated from the Reserves. The Reserves are comprised of service members who have completed active-duty tours but have time remaining before they have fully met their commitment. While personnel normally enlist in the armed forces for three to six years, of which at least two are spent in active-duty status, “all soldiers have a statutory eight-year military service obligation which is established at the time of entry into military service (active or reserve).”25 A significant number of those returning from Afghanistan and Iraq become attached to the Reserves, from which they can be activated as needed. The narrative comments on the particular challenge of meeting the needs of returning veterans in National Guard and Reserve units, a more difficult task than assisting those who upon returning congregate on active-duty bases and in communities of military families.
Figure 2 charts the number of casualties sustained by U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan from the inception of the conflict on October 7, 2001, through January 3, 2009.26 The data are for Operation Enduring Freedom as a whole, which includes areas “in/around Afghanistan, the Republic of the Philippines, Southwest Asia, and other locations.” Figure 3 provides comparable figures for U.S. casualties in Iraq during the period March 19, 2003, through January 3, 2009.27 Figure 4 combines the two sets of casualty figures in order to show the total numbers of U.S. military personnel killed and wounded in both operations as of that same date.28 Casualties as defined by DOD include those killed in action (in both non-hostile and hostile circumstances) and those wounded in action.
Of the casualties sustained by U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq through January 3, 2009, 79.8 percent were active-duty personnel, 7.4 percent members of National Guard units, and 12.8 percent from the Reserves.29 A higher percentage of casualties has been sustained by active-duty forces than their share of the total number of troops provided. The experiences of members of each of the three components are reflected in the narrative. The narrative draws on interviews with commissioned officers and enlisted personnel. The latter are more numerous in the narrative, as of course they were also in theater.
Of the total number of casualties through January 3, 2009, 70.5 percent of those killed or wounded in action were members of the Army; 25.9 percent, Marines; 2.1 percent, Navy; and 1.5 percent, Air Force.30 The majority of those whose voices are heard in this book are members of the Army or the Marines. The Navy, Coast Guard, and Air Force have the smallest numbers of members serving, and also the fewest whose experiences are reflected in the book.
Of the casualties sustained through January 3, 2009 by veterans in all components whose ages were known, 28.8 percent of those killed and wounded were under the age of twenty-two, 25.9 percent were between the ages of twenty-two and twenty-four, 25.2 percent between the ages of twenty-five and thirty, 10.2 percent between the ages of thirty-one and thirty-five, and 9.9 percent age thirty-six or older.31 The composite narrative draws on the experience of persons across the age span.
About 82 p
ercent of approximately 80,000 men and women who joined the Army in 2008 were high school graduates. In 2008, in the interest of boosting lagging recruitment, “The Army provided waivers to 18 percent of active-duty recruits in the final months, allowing them to enlist despite medical conditions or criminal records.”32
Regarding the makeup of U.S. military forces globally with respect to gender, the proportions of men and women are 90 percent and 10 percent, respectively. The narrative draws extensively on the experience of women in Afghanistan and Iraq, commenting on the presence of women in significant numbers among the deployed and on the wide-ranging roles they played. More than 100,000 women and 16,000 single parents have served in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some 55 percent of military personnel serving in these two theaters are married.33 Of total casualties sustained through January 3, 2009, about 2 percent were women, 98 percent men. As of that date, 14 women had lost their lives in Afghanistan, 101 in Iraq.34 Globally, U.S. military losses are 10 percent female.
FIGURE 2
Casualties among U.S. Military Personnel in Afghanistan through December 2008
U.s. Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center. Contingency Tracking System
FIGURE 3
Casualties among U.S. Military Personnel in Iraq through December 2008
U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center. Contingency Tracking System
FIGURE 4
Total Casualties of U.S. Military Personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq through December 2008
U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center. Contingency Tracking System