17 Commission “required”: Public Law 107–306, 11/27/02, www.archives.gov;
18 delays/obstruction/tapes withheld/recalcitrant: Kean & Hamilton, 83–, 258–, Shenon, 203–;
19 “incomplete”: corr. Miles Kara, 2011;
20 Scott timeline/“9:24”/“awful decision”/In one breath, etc.: Testimonies of Larry Arnold & Alan Scott, 5/23/03, CO, Farmer, 262–;
21 leery/proof/subpoena: Shenon, 203–, Kean & Hamilton, 88, 260;
22 “Whiskey tango foxtrot”: Farmer, 265.
23 NORAD/more than 100 squadrons/14 “alert”/intercepts: CR, 16–, Spencer, 286–;
24 planes as weapons: Staff Monograph “The Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security,” 55–, CF, Farmer, 98–;
25 hijacking protocol: CR, 17–, Farmer, 117;
26 multiple Centers: e.g., Miles Kara, “Archive of the ‘Transponders and Ghosts’ Category,” www.oredigger61.org—Centers involved were Boston, New York, D.C., Indianapolis, and Cleveland;
27 “primary target”: MFR 04016798, 9/22/03, “Aeronautical Information Manual,” 2/11/10, www.faa.gov;
28 “coast mode”/coastline: Avionics, 6/1/05, Farmer, 135, 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD, NEADS Transcripts Channel 4,” B3, NYC files, CF, MFR 04016774, 10/27/03;
29 not know NORAD: MFR 04017316, 10/2/03;
30 units different training: MFR 04020720, 3/11/04;
31 unable to communicate/frequencies/none worked: MFR 040176171, 10/2/03;
32 Transcripts/In that book, etc.: Farmer, 215–;
33 “Washington [Center] has no clue”: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Transcripts Channel 7,” B3, NYC files, CF;
34 “It’s chaos”/“The challenge”/Kara: Miles Kara, “Chaos Theory and 9–11, Some Preliminary Thoughts,” 6/12/09, www.oredigger61.org, & see Archives, 911 Revisited, www.oredigger61.org, Kara Career Summary, 12/12/02, “Commission Meeting 4/10/03, Tab 7,” B1, Front Office files, CF.
35 evidence of tapes and logs: In writing this account of the FAA/military response to the attacks, the authors relied—as did the 9/11 Commission—on the tapes and transcripts of conversations between the various FAA and NORAD sites. As the Commission’s Miles Kara wrote in 2009, the “complete set of information needed to attempt any analysis of the events [of that morning] includes the radar files and the software to run them, time-stamped tapes, and any transcripts that were made” (Commission account: Miles Kara, “Archive for the NEADS files category,” www.oredigger61.org; NORAD audio files are available at the National Archives, B82 & B110, GSA Files, CF, but—for ready availability—at http://911depository.info).
36 nerve center: Vanity Fair, 9/06, Spencer, 2.
37 Marr/hijacking/Vigilant Guardian: Vanity Fair, 9/06, CR, 458n116. The military exercise scheduled for September 11, and several others that took place earlier in the year, have been the source of speculation. Some thought aspects of the exercises indicated U.S. government foreknowledge of the manner and timing of the 9/11 attacks. Others suggested that September’s Vigilant Guardian exercise had a negative effect on NORAD’s ability to react to the attacks. The 9/11 Commission found that the timing of the drill may have had a positive impact, because more personnel were on duty that day. The tapes and transcripts, though, reflect temporary confusion within NORAD as to whether the attacks were part of the war game or were real-world (Miles Kara, “9–11 Training, Exercises, and War Games, Some Collected Thoughts,” 9/11 Revisited, www.oredigger61.org, “Exclusive Report: Did Military Exercises Facilitate the 9/11 Pentagon Attack?,” by Mathew Everett, 7/06, www.911truth.org, Aviation Weeks & Space Technology, 6/3/02, “NORAD Exercises Summary,” Team 8 files, posted on www.scribd.com, CR, 458n116).
38 “on the shitter”: NEADS audiotape, DRM1, CH2, www.oredigger61.org;
39 Arnold in FL: MFR 04016749, 2/3/04;
40 Dooley et al.: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 4,” B3, NYC files, CF;
41 “Real World Unknown”: Memorandum for CC et al. from NEADS Sector/CVX, 8/23/01, “RDOD 03013146, Entire Contents, Vigilant Guardian,” B116, GSA files, CF.
42 Cooper call: MFR 04016791 & 04016790, 9/22/03, CR, 20. Disregarding the official FAA/military protocol, Boston Center had made two earlier attempts to contact the military on a “freelance” basis. The first such call, which went to the New Jersey Air National Guard’s 177th Fighter Wing at Atlantic City, got nowhere because the wing was not on alert status. Boston’s second early attempt to reach the military—through the FAA’s Cape Cod facility—did eventually lead to an alert being passed to NEADS, but only after the call made by the FAA’s Cooper. These calls were made at the initiative of Boston Center’s traffic management supervisor, Dan Bueno. Bueno—who was aware of the protocols in place—told the Commission that his actions were based on the “urgency of the situation.” Cooper’s use of “F-16” was a misspeak for “F-15” (CR, 20, Position 15, pts. 2 & 3, “ATCSCC Tape Transcription,” B1, T8, CF, Bergen Record [N.J.], 12/5/03, MFR 04016791, 9/22/03, MFR 04016790, 9/22/03, MFR 03012969, 9/30/03, CF, Spencer, 22–).
43 “Cool”/all business/Boston could say: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 4,” B3, NYC files, CF, Vanity Fair, 9/06;
44 8:41 battle stations: CR, 20, Farmer, 123;
45 conferred Arnold/ordered: “Conversation with Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold,” www.codeonemagazine.com, 1/02, CR, 20;
46 without direction/assigned: CR, 20;
47 “Oh, God”: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 4,” B3, NYC files, CF;
48 Mulligan: Full Transcript: Command Center; NOM Operational Position, Sept. 11, 2001, 10/14/03, “NOM Operation Position (5),” B1, NYC files, CF, CR 22.
49 Air Force knew nothing: Some skeptics have seized on an early NORAD chronology that appeared to suggest that the FAA notified the military of the hijacking of Flight 175 at 8:43 A.M., claiming that this was evidence that U.S. forces failed to react promptly—even “stood down”—as the attacks unfolded. The contention is spurious—the 8:43 notification time in the NORAD chronology was simply incorrect. Although 8:43 A.M. does approximate the time the plane was hijacked, that fact was not at the time known to the FAA (critics: Griffin, The New Pearl Harbor Revisited, 8–; 8:43 notification: Chronology of the September 11 Attacks & Subsequent Events Through Oct. 24, 2001, “Timelines, 1 of 2,” B20, T7, CF, “FAA Believed Second 9/11 Plane Heading Towards New York for Emergency Landing,” & linked FAA document 4, 9/5/05; time incorrect: www.gwu.edu, Miles Kara, “Chaos Theory & 9/11,” 9/11 Revisited, www.oredigger61.org, corr. Miles Kara, 2010).
50 Otis pilots holding: Cape Cod News, 8/21/02, BG, 9/11/05, Vanity Fair, 9/06. The speed at which the fighters traveled and their exact route to New York has been the subject of some debate. Available tapes, and Commission interviews with the pilots and the mission commander, make clear that when they were first launched the flights headed for military-controlled airspace where they stayed in a holding pattern until after NEADS learned the second tower had been hit. The fighters then proceeded to New York, where they established a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) over the city at 9:25. The F-15 fighter, when new and stripped of its armament, is capable of doing a speed of Mach 2.5—some 1,650 miles per hour. Pilot Nash told the Commission that he and Duffy never exceeded Mach 1.1 (727 mph) as they flew toward New York. Duffy estimated that the fighters had reached between Mach 1.1 and 1.3, but said the pair “throttled back” on learning of the second strike—to conserve fuel. While it is possible that the Otis fighters went supersonic on the final leg of the journey to New York, radar data showed that the pair averaged a less-than-supersonic speed of Mach.86 (debate: see refs, “Complete 9/11 Timeline,” www.historycommons.org; record scanty: CR, 459n120; available tapes/interviews: transcripts from Voice Recorder, 11/9/01 1227Z-1417Z, Channel 24, “Trip 2 of 3, NEADS Transcript Color Coded,” B20, T8, CF,
9/11 ATCSCC Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 5,” B3, NYC files, CF, MFR 04016778, 1/22 & 1/23/04, MFR 03012972, 10/14/03, MFR 04016756, CF, CR, 21–, 23–, corr. Kris Wilhelm, Miles Kara, 2010).
51 Long Island: Full Transcript: Command Center; NOM Operational Position, Sept. 11, 2001, 10/14/03, “NOM Operation Position (5),” B1, NYC files, CF, CR 22;
52 Five minutes after: CR, 23–;
53 “I thought”: Cape Cod Times, 8/21/02;
54 “We don’t know”/“We need”/urged/Marr at first: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 2,” B3, NYC files, CF & re Boston, authors’ check of audiotape, CR, 460n137;
55 “Listen”: Position 15, Parts 2 & 3, “ATCSCC Tape Transcript, Position 15,” B1, T8, CF.
56 9:21 call/Scoggins/checked D.C./“First I heard”/Scoggins insisted: MFR 04016798, 9/22/03, 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 7,” B3, NYC files, CF. Scoggins has said he is “99% certain the person who made that call on the Telcon [about Flight 11 still being airborne] was Dave Cannoles.” The FAA’s Cannoles told 9/11 Commission staff that he did not recall doubt as to whether Flight 11 had crashed into the Trade Center. Another staff member, Doug Davis, thought the chief of staff for the director of air traffic at FAA headquarters, Mary Ellen Kraus, said Flight 11 was still airborne. Kraus denied it (“Losing Flight 77,” www.911myths.com, handwritten notes of Dave Canoles interview, 3/25/04, “Dave Canoles, FAA WOC,” B2, Dana Hyde files, CF, MFR of int. Mary Ellen Kraus, 4/27/04, “FAA HQ—Mary Ellen Kraus,” B6, T8, CF).
57 new “track”: Miles Kara, “Archive for the ‘Transponder & Ghosts’ Category,” 9/11 Revisited, www.oredigger61.org, Traffic Situation Display (TSD) Demo, 4/13/04, “FAA HQ Floor Position Maps—Herndon,” B19, T8, CF;
58 “listening on a Telcon”: int. of Colin Scoggins at www.911myths.com;
59 “Shit!”: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 2,” B3, NYC files, CF, CR, 461n149.
60 9:30 fighters into air: CR, 27. Two planes on alert duty were ready and loaded with live missiles, while the third—the “spare”—had only its 20mm gun. The pilots were Major Lou Derrig, Captain Dean Eckmann, and—piloting the spare—Captain Craig Borgstrom (Spencer, 115–, 142–).
61 Nasypany figured: MFR 04016778, 1/22 & 23/04, MFR 04016771, 10/27/03.
62 NEADS ordered/tower sent: “Staff Statement 17,” CO, MFR 04016771, 10/27/03. The Commission Report offers three explanations for the change of course. One, that the scramble order had given no distance to the target, nor where it was. Two, that the pilots followed a “generic” flight plan designed to get them out of local airspace. Three, that the lead pilot and the local FAA controller assumed that the Langley tower’s instruction superseded the order received from NEADS. According to author Lynn Spencer, who interviewed members of the unit involved, Captain Dean Eckmann assumed the fighters were “being vectored eastward in order to fly around the traffic in their way. He doesn’t second-guess the instructions.… The jet’s targets are customarily out over the ocean.” There is, however, no mention of traffic on the Air Traffic Control tapes (CR, 27, Spencer, 143–; corr. Miles Kara, 2011).
63 NEADS finally learned: American Airlines executive vice president Gerard Arpey had been told at 9:00 A.M. that communications with American 77 had been lost. As reported in Ch. 4, the FAA controller at Indianapolis Center had his last routine contact with Flight 77 as early as 8:54 (CR, 8–);
64 “Let me tell”: 9/11 ATCSCC Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 5,” B3, NYC files, CF;
65 “Latest report”/“not sure”/“rumor”: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 7,” B3, NYC files, CF;
66 “Get your fighters”: “Transcripts from Voice Recorder, Channel 14,” B20, T8, “NEADS Transcripts color-coded,” CF;
67 asked where fighters/“I don’t care”: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 2,” B3, NYC files, CF;
68 Scoggins back/“Delta 1989”/“And is this one?”: Chronology of Events at Mission Coodinator Position, 9/24/03, “Boston Center—Colin Scoggins,” B3, T8, CF, 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 7,” B3, NYC files, CF. Based on a Commission staff timeline, the authors have taken 9:39 as the time Scoggins warned NEADS about Delta 1989—even though the Commission Report uses a time of 9:41. (“Timeline of the Events of the Day,” www.scribd.com, & see MCC log, “Miles Kara trips,” B19, T8, CF, Farmer, 193– v. CR, 28).
69 Boston speculated: Miles Kara, “Archive for the Delta 1989 category,” 9/11 Revisited, www.oredigger61.org, & see Position 15, Parts 2 & 3, “ATCSCC Tape Transcription,” B1, T8, CF. In a chronology he gave the Commission of the day’s events, Scoggins noted that an “Open Telcon reports that DAL1889 [sic] is NORDO [no radio]” and described his own subsequent action as “call NEADS to advise” suggesting that his concern about 1989 was piqued only after hearing of it from others. In an interview much later, Scoggins said he thought Delta 1989 might have become suspect because it “missed a frequency transfer” or “didn’t make a transmission back” when given a frequency change (“Open Telcon”: Chronology of Events at Mission Coordinator Position, 9/24/03, “Boston Center—Colin Scoggins,” B3, T8, CF, & see Position 15, Parts 2 & 3, “ATCSCC Tape Transcription,” B1, T8, CF; later interview: “Q & A with 9/11 Boston Air Traffic Controller,” http://sites.google.com).
70 NEADS tracked: MFR 04016777, 10/28/03, Miles Kara, “Archive to the ‘Transponders & Ghosts’ Category, 9/11 Revisited,” www.oredigger61.org, Kara to Brinkley, 1/26/04, “Misc. Loose Documents re. Delta 1989,” B5, T8, CF, UA93 & Andrews Timeline, “Andrews AFB Logs—Timelines, UA93 & Andrews,” B4, Dana Hyde files, CF.
71 only plane able to tail: NEADS had also been able briefly to pinpoint and track Flight 77, even though the FAA alerted it to the problem with the airliner only at 9:34, only some three minutes before it struck the Pentagon (Miles Kara, “Archive for the ‘Transponders & Ghosts’ Category, 9/11 Revisited, www.oredigger61.com);
72 “land immediately”/“Confirm”/“unreliable”/Cleveland panic/pilots feared/“you’re a trip”/assured/“bomb area”/“bad movie”: Dave Dunlap (copilot) memoir, “September 11, 2001,” www.3dlanguage.net, DAL 1989 Order of Events, “FAA Subpoena Compendium, Delta 1989 Timeline,” B15, T8, CF, int. John Werth, MFR 04017313, 10/2/03;
73 Scoggins, “might not be”: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 7,” B3, NYC files, CF, Summary [slugged as Timeline of Events of the Day], “Boston Center—Colin Scoggins,” B3, T8, CF, Farmer, 211.
74 trying to get fighters: MFR 04016778, 1/22 & 23/04, MFR 04016771, 10/27/03, 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 2,” & ATCSCC Tape Transcription, “Channel 5,” B3, NYC files, CF, Staff Report, “The Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security,” 8/26/04, CF, 101n391. NEADS asked two additional bases to provide fighters—Selfridge, in Michigan, and Toledo, in Ohio. Contrary to reports at the time, it appears that they were unable to help during the Delta episode. The Selfridge Air National Guard fighters were in the air, but had expended all their ammunition on a training exercise. They did not land until 10:29. Two Toledo F-16s were to take off, but—according to Colonel Marr—only after the Delta 1989 episode was over and after United 93 had been shot down (“The Unthinkable Had Happened,” 2007, www.candgnews.com, The Wolverine, Fall 2006, Spencer, 178–, Toledo Blade, 12/9/01, MFR 03012970, 10/27/03).
75 I believe: ATCSCC Tape Transcription, “Channel 5”;
76 NEADS told nothing: ibid., 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 2,” B3, NYC files, CF, MCC Log, “Miles Kara Trips,” B19, T8, CF, CR, 30;
77 controller heard/reported promptly: int. John Werth, CR, 28, FAA Memo, “Full Transcription: Air Traffic Control S
ystem Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position, 9/11/01,” B1, NYC files, CF;
78 Uh, do we want to think?/FAA staffer reported/“does not believe”: ibid., MFR 04018154, 11/24/03, CR, 461n167.
79 132 NEADS knew nothing: MCC/T Log, “Miles Kara Trips—MCC Log,” B19, T8, CF. Ironically, this was the one time during the morning that U.S. forces might have been in a position to intercept one of the hijacked flights. In the words of Commission staffer Kara, “it was only because of a proactive error by Boston air traffic controller Colin Scoggins [suggesting that Flight 11 might still be aloft] … that the nation’s air defenders had any real chance to defend against Flight 93.” The flap over the nonexistent Flight 11 got fighters from Langley in the air, where they established a Combat Air Patrol over Washington by 10:00. It was a patrol at that stage, however—an impotent patrol. It had no rules of engagement, no knowledge of the real flight that was missing, United 93 (“Archive for the Andrews Fighters Category,” www.oredigger61.org);
80 “we were always”: int. of Colin Scoggins (under his Internet name of Cheap Shot), “Q&A with Boston Center Air Traffic Controller,” http://sites.google.com.
81 “We believe”: Spencer, 286;
82 “watching United”: “Conversation with Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold,” www.codeonemagazine.com, 1/02.
The Eleventh Day Page 55