by Gary J. Bass
55. FRUS, Jha-Kissinger memcon, 25 August 1971, p. 369. FRUS, Jha-Kissinger memcon, 11 September 1971, pp. 407–8. NSA, Nixon-Kissinger telcon, 6 October 1971. NSC Files, Box 643, Country Files—Middle East, India/Pakistan, Jha-Kissinger memcon, 8 October 1971. White House tapes, Oval Office 611-3, 2 November 1971, 12:47–1:13 p.m.
56. White House tapes, Oval Office 612-4, conversation G, 3 November 1971, 4:31–5:31 p.m. See NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files—Middle East, Pakistan, vol. VIII, Rogers to Nixon, 28 October 1971.
57. MEA, HI/121/13/71, vol. II, Dixit to ambassadors, 22 November 1971. White House tapes, Oval Office 612-4, conversation G, 3 November 1971, 4:31–5:31 p.m. Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, White House Photo Office, roll 7724, frame 19.
58. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 879.
59. Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, White House Photo Office, roll 7736, frames 02A–07A. White House tapes, Oval Office 615-4, 5 November 1971, between 7:50 and 9:10 a.m. See H. R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1994), 4 November 1971, p. 370.
60. NSC Files, Box 134, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files—Middle East, Nixon and Gandhi toasts, 4 November 1971. See MEA, HI/121/13/71, vol. II, Dixit to ambassadors, 22 November 1971.
61. The ballerina was Patricia McBride, from the New York City Ballet, a guest at the dinner. NSC Files, Box 134, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files—Middle East, Nixon and Gandhi toasts, 4 November 1971. White House tapes, Oval Office 615-4, 5 November 1971, between 7:50 and 9:10 a.m.
62. White House tapes, Oval Office 613-12, 4 November 1971, 9:40 a.m. For Kissinger’s briefing and talking points for Nixon, see NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files—Middle East, Pakistan, vol. VIII, Kissinger to Nixon, 3 November 1971. NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files—Middle East, Pakistan, vol. VIII, Kissinger to Nixon, “Strategy with Prime Minister Gandhi,” 3 November 1971. Rogers offered gentler talking points, in NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files—Middle East, Pakistan, vol. VIII, Rogers to Nixon, 28 October 1971. Nixon was presumably reading NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files—Middle East, Pakistan, vol. VIII, Kissinger to Nixon, “Relief and Economic Assistance,” 3 November 1971. Nixon drew from NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files—Middle East, Pakistan, vol. VIII, Kissinger to Nixon, “Achievement of US Influence in Pakistan,” 3 November 1971. NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files—Middle East, Pakistan, vol. VIII, Kissinger to Nixon, “Military Supply Policy,” 3 November 1971. See Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, 4 November 1971, p. 370; NSC Files, Box 570, Indo-Pak War, Van Hollen to Keating, 8 November 1971, State 203187.
63. White House tapes, Oval Office 613-12, 4 November 1971, 9:40 a.m.
64. NSC Files, Box 643, Country Files—Middle East, India/Pakistan, Nixon-Gandhi memcon, 4 November 1971, 10:30 a.m. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 277, Nixon-Gandhi memcon, 4 November 1971, 10:30 a.m. See FRUS, Nixon-Gandhi memcon, 4 November 1971, 10:29 a.m.–12:35 p.m., pp. 493–99. It is not clear how Haksar got a copy of this document, which is classified “Top Secret—Sensitive—Eyes Only.” Most of the taped conversation is inaudible, and much of it is bleeped out on the grounds of “National Security”—which is sometimes legitimate, and sometimes used (as in White House tapes, Oval Office 615-4, 5 November 1971, 8:51–9 a.m.) to cover up Nixon’s and Kissinger’s obscenities about Gandhi. Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 878, 880–81. MEA, HI/1012/30/71, Kumar memorandum, refugee statistics, 5 November 1971. The total that day was 9,608,901. See MEA, HI/1012/30/71, Kumar memorandum, refugee statistics, 7 October 1971; MEA, HI/1012/30/71, Kumar memorandum, refugee statistics, 15 October 1971; MEA, HI/1012/30/71, Kumar memorandum, refugee statistics, 22 October 1971; MEA, HI/1012/30/71, Kumar memorandum, refugee statistics, 28 October 1971; MEA, HI/1012/30/71, refugee statistics, 15 November 1971. Gandhi’s seeming reference to the Bay of Pigs actually undermined India’s denials: the United States had supported that ill-starred proxy invasion.
65. FRUS, vol. E-7, White House tapes, Oval Office 615-4, 5 November 1971, 8:51–9 a.m. The audio of this tape is still bleeped out on ostensible grounds of national security, even though the State Department has released a transcript. See Kissinger, White House Years, p. 882.
66. For a corroborating version of this snub, see Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York: Summit, 1983), p. 456.
67. FRUS, WSAG minutes, 12 November 1971, 11:09 a.m., p. 508.
68. NSC Files, Box 643, Country Files—Middle East, India/Pakistan, Nixon-Gandhi memcon, 5 November 1971, 11:20 a.m. Frank, Indira, pp. 336–37.
69. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 878. FRUS, Van Hollen to Keating, 8 November 1971, State 203187, pp. 500–503. MEA, HI/121/13/71, vol. II, Dixit to ambassadors, 22 November 1971. See T. N. Kaul, The Kissinger Years: Indo-American Relations (New Delhi: Arnold-Heinemann, 1980), pp. 71–80. Fallaci, Interviews with History, p. 265.
CHAPTER 17: THE GUNS OF NOVEMBER
1. NSA, Nixon-Kissinger telcon, 8 November 1971, 7:50 p.m. Soon after, Nixon asked Kissinger, “There certainly was no misunderstanding with the Paks on this, was there?” Kissinger assured him there was not, and then the rest of their conversation is bleeped out (White House tapes, White House telephone 13-156, 8 November 1971, 8:47–8:54 p.m.).
2. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 209. Inder Malhotra, “Liberation of Bangladesh,” in Pranab Mukherjee, ed., A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress (1964–1984) (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2011), vol. 5, p. 175. NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files—Middle East, Pakistan, vol. VIII, “Talking Points and Issues,” 15 November 1971. See NSC Files, Box H-082, WSAG Meetings, Hoskinson and Kennedy to Kissinger, 11 November 1971; FRUS, WSAG minutes, 12 November 1971, 11:09 a.m., pp. 505, 511. MEA, HI/121/13/71, vol. II, Sen statement to UN Security Council, 5 December 1971.
3. Sydney H. Schanberg, “New Delhi Sources Admit Troops Entered Pakistan,” New York Times, 8 November 1971, pp. A1, A11. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 235, Haksar to Lall, 8 November 1971.
4. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 235, Lall to Haksar, 11 November 1971.
5. NSA, Nixon-Kissinger telcon, 8 November 1971, 7:50 p.m.
6. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 220, Prakash Kaul to Kaul, 12 November 1971. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 220, Mishra to Kaul, 9 November 1971. MEA, HI/1012/14/71, Mishra to Kaul, 17 December 1971. This is corroborated by Pakistan’s postwar judicial commission (Government of Pakistan, The Report of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission of Inquiry into the 1971 War [Lahore: Vanguard, 2001], p. 181). NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 220, Mishra to Kaul, 9 November 1971. FRUS, WSAG minutes, 12 November 1971, 11:09 a.m., p. 505.
7. FRUS, WSAG minutes, 12 November 1971, 11:09 a.m., pp. 508. See FRUS, WSAG meeting, 22 November 1971, 2:39–3:14 p.m., p. 553; FRUS, WSAG meeting, 29 November 1971, 2:36–3:36 p.m., p. 575; Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 881. FRUS, WSAG minutes, 12 November 1971, 11:09 a.m., pp. 505–14. See FRUS, WSAG meeting, 22 November 1971, 2:39–3:14 p.m., pp. 529–36; White House tapes, White House telephone 14-27, 10 November 1971, 8:07-8:20 p.m.
8. NSC Files, Box H-082, WSAG Meetings, Hoskinson and Kennedy to Kissinger, 11 November 1971. See FRUS, WSAG meeting, 7 October 1971, pp. 436–45; NSC Files, Box H-082, WSAG Meetings, Hoskinson and Kennedy to Kissinger, 7 October 1971. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 879. MEA, HI/121/13/71, vol. II, Gandhi speech to Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha, 15 November 1971. NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence File, Gandhi to Nixon, 16 November 1971.
9. White House tapes, Oval Office 617-17, 15 November 1971, 4:31–4:39 p.m. See NSC Files, Box 643, Country Files—Middle East, India/Pakistan, Sultan Khan-Kissinger memcon, 15 November 1971, 4 p.m., pp. 514–17; NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files—Middle East, Pakistan, vol. VIII, n.d. November 1971.
10. Scott D. Sagan and Jeremi Suri, “The Madman Nucl
ear Alert,” International Security, vol. 27, no. 4 (spring 2003), pp. 150-83. Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 212–24. Philip Taubman, The Partnership: Five Cold Warriors and Their Quest to Ban the Bomb (New York: Harper, 2012), pp. 165–66. Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (New York: Little, Brown, 1982), pp. 575–99. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 226–88. NSC Files, Box H-082, WSAG Meetings, McCain to Moorer, 12 November 1971. NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files—Middle East, Pakistan, vol. VIII, Welander to Haig, 15 November 1971. NSC Files, Box 570, Indo-Pak War, Welander to Haig, 15 November 1971. NSC Files, Box H-082, WSAG Meetings, Kennedy and Saunders to Kissinger, 12 November 1971.
11. White House tapes, Oval Office 561-4, 11 August 1971, 9:10–11:40 a.m.
12. NSC Files, Box H-082, WSAG Meetings, Saunders to Kissinger, 12 November 1971. NSC Files, Box H-082, WSAG Meetings, Williams to Rogers, 5 November 1971. NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files—Middle East, Pakistan, vol. VIII, Williams to Rogers, 5 November 1971. See NMML, Kaul Papers, Subject File 19, part II, Rogers-Gandhi talk, n.d. October 1971. White House tapes, Oval Office 617-17, 15 November 1971, 4:31–4:39 p.m. NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files—Middle East, Pakistan, vol. VIII, Kissinger to Nixon, 16 November 1971. See NSC Files, Box H-082, WSAG Meetings, Saunders to Kissinger, 12 November 1971.
13. J. F. R. Jacob, Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a Nation (New Delhi: Manohar, 1997), pp. 71–77.
14. Jacob, Surrender at Dacca, p. 73. Malhotra, “Liberation of Bangladesh,” p. 175. MEA, WII/109/31/71, vol. I, Singh statement to UN Security Council, 12 December 1971. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 173, Haksar to Gandhi, 11 December 1971.
15. Malhotra, “Liberation of Bangladesh,” p. 175. MEA, WII/109/31/71, vol. I, Singh statement to UN Security Council, 12 December 1971. MEA, HI/121/13/71, vol. II, Sen statement to UN Security Council, 4 December 1971. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 173, Haksar to Gandhi, 11 December 1971. For Gandhi’s public version, see NSC Files, Box H-082, WSAG Meetings, Keating to Rogers, 24 November 1971, New Delhi 18187; NSC Files, Box 571, Indo-Pak War, Keating to Rogers, 24 November 1971, New Delhi 18221. See K. F. Rustamji, The British, the Bandits and the Bordermen: From the Diaries of K. F. Rustamji, ed. P. V. Rajgopal (New Delhi: Wisdom Tree, 2009), p. 324; and P. N. Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency,” and Indian Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 177–78.
16. Jacob, Surrender at Dacca, p. 72. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 89, Dhar to Haksar, n.d. 1971. Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency,” and Indian Democracy, pp. 178–79.
17. See NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 225, Sen to Gandhi, 9 June 1971. Jacob to Gill, 15 November 1971, Jacob, Surrender at Dacca, p. 179.
18. H. R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1994), 22 November 1971, p. 377. NSC Files, Box H-082, WSAG Meetings, Kissinger to Nixon, “Indo-Pak Fighting,” 22 November 1971. See NSA, Kissinger-Raza telcons, 22 November 1971, 12 p.m. and 3:23 p.m.; NSC Files, Box 570, Indo-Pak War, Saunders to Kissinger, 22 November 1971; NSC Files, Box 570, Indo-Pak War, Farland to Rogers, 22 November 1971, Islamabad 11534. NSA, Nixon-Kissinger telcon, 22 November 1971, 12:45 p.m. See NSA, Kissinger-Bush telcon, 22 November 1971, 3:47 p.m.
19. White House tapes, Oval Office 622-1, 22 November 1971, 3:51–3:58 p.m.
20. NSA, Kissinger-Rogers telcon, 23 November 1971, 10:55 a.m. See NSA, Kissinger-Brandt telcon, 23 November 1971, 9:51 a.m., and NSA, Kissinger-Raza telcon, 27 November 1971, 10:15 a.m. White House tapes, Oval Office 626-10, 30 November 1971, 11:23 a.m.–12:03 p.m. NSA, Kissinger-Rogers telcon, 23 November 1971, 10:55 a.m. See NSA, Kissinger-Brandt telcon, 23 November 1971, 9:51 a.m., and NSA, Kissinger-Raza telcon, 27 November 1971, 10:15 a.m. See also NSC Files, Box 571, Indo-Pak War, Yahya to Nixon, 23 November 1971; NSC Files, Box 571, Indo-Pak War, Nixon to Gandhi, 25 November 1971; White House tapes, Oval Office 624-10, 24 November 1971, 8:49–9:49 a.m.
21. Jacob, Surrender at Dacca, p. 73. See A. A. K. Niazi, The Betrayal of East Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 118–31. FRUS, WSAG meeting, 23 November 1971, 9:12–10:10 a.m., pp. 538–47. See NSA, Kissinger-Chandler telcon, 29 November 1971, 8:05 p.m. FRUS, WSAG meeting, 24 November 1971, 9:29–10:05 a.m., pp. 548–54. FRUS, WSAG meeting, 29 November 1971, 2:36–3:36 p.m., pp. 571–80. Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 891, 893. FRUS, WSAG meeting, 23 November 1971, 9:12–10:10 a.m., pp. 538–47. See NSA, Kissinger-Chandler telcon, 29 November 1971, 8:05 p.m. See Kissinger, White House Years, p. 885.
22. NSC Files, Box 571, Indo-Pak War, Keating to Rogers, 4 December 1971, New Delhi 18739. MEA, WII/109/31/71, vol. I, Singh statement to UN Security Council, 12 December 1971 (India wrongly said it was a Newsweek reporter). See NSC Files, Box H-082, WSAG Meetings, Keating to Rogers, 24 November 1971, New Delhi 18187. Sydney H. Schanberg, “India Admits an Incursion, Says It Was Self-Defense,” New York Times, 25 November 1971, pp. A1, A16. FRUS, WSAG meeting, 24 November 1971, 9:29– 10:05 a.m., pp. 548–54.
23. NSA, Huang-Kissinger memcon, 23 November 1971, 10–11:55 p.m. See NSA, Kissinger to Nixon, 26 November 1971. For a sanitized account, see Kissinger, White House Years, p. 889. Kissinger puts the house in the East Thirties, and later in the East Seventies, but Huang Hua says it was on Forty-third Street (Memoirs [Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2008], p. 236). White House tapes, Oval Office 624-10, 24 November 1971, 8:49–9:49 a.m. The same day, Kissinger said, “What will be the effect if, the first time something like this happens where China is involved, the U.S. doesn’t make some move” (FRUS, WSAG meeting, 24 November 1971, 9:29–10:05 a.m., pp. 548–54).
24. Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), pp. 374–75. See NSC Files, Box 572, Indo-Pak War, Keating to Rogers, 7 December 1971, New Delhi 18877. White House tapes, Oval Office 624-10, 24 November 1971, 8:49–9:49 a.m. FRUS, vol. E-7, White House tapes, Oval Office 624-21, 24 November 1971, 12:27–1:12 p.m. Later, once full-scale war started, Kissinger said that the reporter Helen Thomas had told him that the administration should have been making its case three weeks earlier, after the battle of Boyra but before Pakistan’s airstrikes. Nixon tellingly replied that “we weren’t in a position to claim Indian aggression, basically”—suggesting that even he, on some level, thought that India had not started the war. (White House tapes, White House telephone 16-37, 16-39, 16-40, 7 December 1971, 11:31–11:54 p.m.)
25. FRUS, vol. E-7, White House tapes, Oval Office 624-21, 24 November 1971, 12:27–1:12 p.m. Several weeks earlier, Nixon had admitted that Pakistan would fall apart and Yahya might well launch a “suicidal” attack on India, but still could not bring himself to fault Yahya for anything worse than “stupid” behavior. Nixon doggedly stood by his friend: “He’s a very decent man, but it’s just been handled badly.” When Kissinger said, “He’s not very bright, but he has tried,” Nixon stoutly defended virtues other than intelligence: “He’s a decent man, an honorable man.” (FRUS, vol. E-7, White House tapes, Oval Office 582-9, 30 September 1971, 4:10–5:31 p.m.) When Nixon was not around, Kissinger showed his contempt for Yahya’s stupidity, lapsing into stereotyping. “Yahya is a slow learner,” he said. “He is very deliberate, but if you force him to make a decision, his Moslem instinct may assert itself, and perhaps he will start taking rapid action.” (FRUS, WSAG meeting, 7 October 1971, pp. 436–45.)
26. Sydney H. Schanberg, “Big Indian Force Reported Going into East Pakistan,” New York Times, 24 November 1971, pp. A1, A10.
27. Sydney H. Schanberg, “India Admits an Incursion, Says It Was Self-Defense,” New York Times, 25 November 1971, pp. A1, A16. Sydney H. Schanberg, “India Sets Range for Retaliations in East Pakistan,” New York Times, 29 November 1971, pp. A1, A14. NSC Files, Box H-082, WSAG Meetings, Gordon to Rogers, 24 November 1971, Calcutta 2891.
28. NSA, Kissinge
r-Rogers telcon, 30 November 1971, 6:30 p.m. White House tapes, Oval Office 626-10, 30 November 1971, 11:23 a.m.–12:03 p.m. Specifically, Kissinger wanted to cut off new export licenses but not cancel the old licenses. White House tapes, Oval Office 624-14, 30 November 1971, 5:21–6:09 p.m. See FRUS, vol. E-7, White House tapes, Oval Office 624-21, 24 November 1971, 12:27–1:12 p.m.; FRUS, WSAG meeting, 23 November 1971, 9:12–10:10 a.m., pp. 538–47; NSC Files, Box H-082, WSAG Meetings, Saunders to Kissinger, 22 November 1971; NSC Files, Box 571, Indo-Pak War, Irwin to Nixon, 25 November 1971. By another accounting, if the United States cut off new export licenses, that would deprive India of about $16 million worth of military supplies; if the United States totally closed off its arms pipeline, that would leave India without a total of about $30 million worth of military supplies from the Pentagon or from U.S. commercial suppliers (FRUS, WSAG meeting, 29 November 1971, 2:36–3:36 p.m., pp. 571–80). This included $2.2 million worth of spares directly from the Pentagon, $8.1 million toward communication links that went with India’s Star Sapphire radar system aimed at China, a $2.8 million grant for building a highway in Nepal, a $300,000 grant for training in the fiscal year 1972, and some $20 million on order with U.S. commercial suppliers (NSC Files, Box H-082, WSAG Meetings, Saunders and Hoskinson to Kissinger, 25 November 1971; NSC Files, Box H-082, WSAG Meetings, Laird to Kissinger, 24 November 1971; NSC Files, Box H-083, WSAG Meetings, Saunders to Kissinger, 29 November 1971). For India’s somewhat different accounting, see MEA, WII/125/112/71, Kholsa to Menon, 2 December 1971.
29. NSA, Kissinger-Rogers telcon, 30 November 1971, 6:30 p.m. MEA, WII/109/19/71, Jain to Menon, 2 December 1971. MEA, WII/125/112/71, Kholsa to Menon, 2 December 1971. See NSC Files, Box 571, Indo-Pak War, Keating to Rogers, 2 December 1971, New Delhi 18595. The defense ministry reckoned that India was actually losing about $1.5 million for ammunition and related materials, not $2 million, as U.S. officials had said. As for military items from U.S. commercial firms, India had $8.2 million on order, as well as an additional $6.7 million for that air defense system aimed at China. MEA, WII/109/31/71, vol. I, Kaul to Singh, 2 December 1971. MEA, WII/125/112/71, Kaul to Singh, 2 December 1971. MEA, WII/109/19/71, Singh statement to Lok Sabha, 3 December 1971. FRUS, WSAG meeting, 1 December 1971, 4:17–4:50 p.m., pp. 585–90. NSC Files, Box H-082, WSAG Meetings, Saunders to Kissinger, 24 November 1971. See NSC Files, Box 134, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files—Middle East, “Economic Assistance to India,” 7 January 1972.