by Gary J. Bass
50. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 174, Haksar to Jha, 11 December 1971. NSC Files, Box 572, Indo-Pak War, Bush to Rogers, 12 December 1971, USUN 4965. See NSC Files, Box 572, Indo-Pak War, Irwin to Rogers, 12 December 1971, State 223704. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 174, Haksar to Jha, 11 December 1971.
51. NSC Files, Box 572, Indo-Pak War, State Department situation report, 12 December 1971. See NSC Files, Box 572, Indo-Pak War, Farland to Rogers, 12 December 1971, Islamabad 12414. NSC Files, Box 572, Indo-Pak War, Kissinger to Nixon, 9 December 1971. See NSC Files, Box 572, Indo-Pak War, Keating to Rogers, 8 December 1971, New Delhi 18944. NSC Files, Box 572, Indo-Pak War, CIA situation report, 9 December 1971. This report has substantial redactions. See NSC Files, Box 572, Indo-Pak War, CIA situation report, 8 December 1971; NSC Files, Box 572, Indo-Pak War, CIA situation report, 7 December 1971; NSC Files, Box 572, Indo-Pak War, DIA intelligence appraisal, 7 December 1971; NSC Files, Box 572, Indo-Pak War, State Department situation report, 9 December 1971. NSC Files, Box 572, Indo-Pak War, CIA analysis, “Pakistan’s Capability to Capture and Hold Sections of Indian Kashmir,” 9 December 1971.
52. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 173, Gandhi to Kosygin (Haksar draft), 10 December 1971. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 173, Haksar to Gandhi, 10 December 1971. MEA, HI/1012/57/71, Shelvankar to Kaul, 30 January 1972. MEA, HI/1012/57/71, Sethi to army staff, monthly military digest, 5 January 1972. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War. Jack Anderson, “U.S. Task Force Didn’t Frighten India,” Washington Post, 21 December 1971. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 173, Haksar to ambassadors, 10 December 1971. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 173, Gandhi to heads of state, 10 December 1971.
53. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 909. Kissinger admits the likelihood of conflict: “Had things developed as we anticipated, we would have had no choice but to assist China in some manner against the probable opposition of much of the government, the media, and the Congress. And we were still in the middle of the Vietnam war.” (White House Years, p. 911.)
54. FRUS, vol. E-7, White House tapes, Oval Office 637-3, 12 December 1971, 8:45–9:42 a.m. Kissinger offered another harsh analogy: “If South Africa gobbled up Basutoland and we said, ‘Well, there are 7 million South Africans.… ’ ” Kissinger scorned “these bastards with this high-sounding morality … —we don’t even pretend high-sounding morality on some of these issues, except in the deepest sense.” See NSC Files, Box 572, Indo-Pak War, Kissinger background briefing, 7 December 1971, 4:40 p.m.
55. FRUS, vol. E-7, White House tapes, Oval Office 637-3, 12 December 1971, 8:45–9:42 a.m. Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, The Final Days (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1976), p. 188; see Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 145.
56. FRUS, vol. E-7, White House tapes, Oval Office 637-3, 12 December 1971, 8:45–9:42 a.m. On Haiphong, see Isaacson, Kissinger, pp. 415–24. In his memoirs, Kissinger wrongly claims that the message about Huang Hua came after 11:30 a.m., when the United States sent a tough hotline message to the Soviet Union (White House Years, pp. 909–10). Kissinger does not mention that he asked the Chinese to move their troops. And he presents the decision to confront the Soviet Union as if it were Nixon pushing him, whereas in fact it was often the other way around (White House Years, p. 910).
57. NSA, Kissinger-Vorontsov telcon, 12 December 1971, 10:05 a.m.
58. FRUS, vol. E-7, White House tapes, Oval Office 637-6, 12 December 1971, 10:27–10:37 a.m. Nixon said, “But World War II, Henry, was a direct result, a direct result—I mean we can talk all we want to about Hitler doing in the Jews and all that. Sure, it caused all that. But it was a direct result of the Allies backing the pusillanimous”—here the tape is garbled.
59. FRUS, vol. E-7, White House tapes, Oval Office 637-6, 12 December 1971, 10:27–10:37 a.m. See FRUS, vol. E-7, House tapes, Oval Office 637-6, 12 December 1971, 11:04–11:14 a.m. In his memoirs, Kissinger writes that they sent a tough hotline message to the Soviet Union at 11:30 a.m., and had the White House issue a harsh statement, because the Soviets had not given a reassurance about Indian intentions in Kashmir (White House Years, pp. 909–11). But the White House tapes show that both Nixon and Kissinger thought that the Soviet Union had already backed down by then. In other words, they seemingly sent the hotline message to press their advantage after what they saw as victory, not, as Kissinger presents it in his memoirs, to forestall defeat.
60. Tyler, Great Wall, pp. 123-24. FRUS: China, 1969–1972, vol. 17, Huang-Haig memcon, 12 December 1971, 3:50–4:20 p.m., pp. 621–24.
61. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 235, Manekshaw-Kulikov talks, 24–25 February 1972. See Oriana Fallaci, Interviews with History and Conversations with Power (New York: Rizzoli, 2011), p. 266. MEA, HI/121/13/71, vol. II, “Most Preposterous Logic, Flagrant Aggression,” People’s Daily, 6 December 1971, in Iyer to Singh, 8 December 1971; MEA, HI/121/13/71, vol. II, Xinhua, 7 December 1971, in Iyer to Singh, 9 December 1971; MEA, HI/121/13/71, vol. II, Radio Peking broadcast, 5 December 1971; NSC Files, Box 571, Indo-Pak War, Dean to Rogers, 6 December 1971, Hong Kong 8102; MEA, WII/109/31/71, vol. II, Iyer to Singh, 22 December 1971; MEA, WII/109/31/71, vol. II, Li speech, 26 December 1971. MEA, HI/1012/14/71, Mishra to Kaul, 7 January 1972. See NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 174, Gandhi to Zhou, 11 December 1971; NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 173, Haksar to Gandhi, 11 December 1971; NSC Files, Box 571, Indo-Pak War, Ji statement, 4 December 1971. Raman, Kaoboys of R&AW, pp. 15–20. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, p. 216. See FRUS, vol. E-7, CIA cable, 13 December 1971.
62. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, p. 216. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, Osborn to Rogers, 17 December 1971, Hong Kong 8355. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, CIA situation report, 16 December 1971. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, Kissinger to Nixon, 16 December 1971. MEA, HI/1012/14/71, Mishra to Kaul, 7 January 1972. See MEA, HI/1012/57/71, Sethi to army staff, monthly military digest, 5 January 1972. MEA, HI/1012/14/71, Mishra to Kaul, 7 January 1972.
63. NSA, Ford-Deng memcon, 3 December 1975, 9:25–11:55 a.m. See Pran Chopra, India’s Second Liberation (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974), pp. 210–12.
64. NSA, Kissinger-Vorontsov telcon, 12 December 1971, 11:45 a.m. See NSA, Kissinger-Vorontsov telcon, 12 December 1971, 12:30 p.m.; NSA, Nixon-Kissinger telcon, 14 December 1971, 8:15 p.m.
65. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 173, Haksar to Gandhi, 7 December 1971. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 911. MEA, WII/109/31/71, vol. I, Singh statement to UN Security Council, 13 December 1971. For Bhutto’s speeches, see Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Politics of the People: A Collection of Articles, Statements and Speeches, ed. Hamid Jalal and Khalid Hasan (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), vol. 3, pp. 231–76. MEA, WII/109/31/71, vol. I, Singh statement to UN Security Council, 12 December 1971. Recycling almost verbatim a line he had used on September 27 before the UN General Assembly, he said, “Pakistan’s military action and the snuffing-out of all human rights and the reign of terror which continues, have shocked the conscience of mankind.” He also invoked the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the articles in the UN Charter that promoted human rights.
66. FRUS, p. 790n3. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 912.
67. FRUS, vol. E-7, White House tapes, Oval Office 634-19, 9 December 1971, 5:57-6:34 p.m. FRUS, vol. E-7, White House tapes, Oval Office 635-8, 10 December 1971, 10:51–11:12 a.m. FRUS, WSAG meeting, 12 December 1971, 11:15 a.m., pp. 789–91. On the evacuation cover story, see NSA, Kissinger-Laird telcon, 11 December 1971, 3:35 p.m.; Kissinger, White House Years, p. 905. NSA, Kissinger-Bhutto telcon, 11 December 1971. NSA, Kissinger-Laird telcon, 11 December 1971, 3:35 p.m. NSA, Nixon-Kissinger telcon, 11 December 1971, 5:20 p.m.
68. MEA, WII/109/31/71, vol. I, Verma to Menon, UPI story, 22 December 1971. MEA, WII/109/31/71, vol. II, Banerji to Haksar, 14 December 1971.
69. MEA, WII/125/44/72, Supplementaries for Rajya Sabha question, 7 April 1972. N. Krishnan, No Way but Surrender: An Account of the
Indo-Pakistan War in the Bay of Bengal, 1971 (New Delhi: Vikas, 1980), pp. 52–56.
70. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, Kissinger to Nixon, 14 December 1971. Sukhwant Singh, India’s Wars Since Independence: The Liberation of Bangladesh (New Delhi: Vikas, 1980), vol. 1, p. 202–21. Malcolm W. Browne, “Military Situation in East Termed ‘Grim’ by Pakistan,” New York Times, 12 December 1971, pp. A1, A26. Pupul Jayakar, Indira Gandhi: An Intimate Biography (New York: Pantheon, 1992), p. 179. Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency,” and Indian Democracy, p. 183.
71. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, Keating to Rogers, 14 December 1971, New Delhi 19127. MEA, WII/109/31/71, vol. I, Indian government press information bureau, Gandhi speech, 12 December 1971.
72. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, CIA situation report, 17 December 1971. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 174, Haksar to Gandhi, 13 December 1971.
73. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 174, Haksar to Gandhi, 13 December 1971.
74. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 174, Haksar to Gandhi, 13 December 1971. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 174, Haksar to cabinet’s political affairs committee, 13 December 1971.
75. FRUS, vol. E-7, CIA cable, 13 December 1971. The mole got at least one fact wrong: claiming that P. N. Dhar was in Moscow, when it was actually D. P. Dhar.
76. See V. K. Singh, Leadership in the Indian Army: Biographies of Twelve Soldiers (New Delhi: Sage, 2005), pp. 208–9.
77. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 173, Manekshaw to Farman Ali, 13 December 1971; NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 173, Haksar to Kaul, 13 December 1971.
78. FRUS, Spivack to Rogers, 14 December 1971, Dacca 5637, pp. 808–10. FRUS, Farland to Rogers, 14 December 1971, Islamabad 12537, pp. 810–12.
79. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 174, Haksar to Lall and Dutt, 14 December 1971.
80. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, CIA situation report, 20 December 1971. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, State Department situation report, 20 December 1971. For more pro-Pakistan accounts, see White House tapes, White House telephone 17-100, 26 December 1971, 11:45–11:52 a.m.; Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report, pp. 511–12; Sarmila Bose, Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. 149–56.
81. FRUS, Yahya to Nixon, 14 December 1971, pp. 806–7. Daniel Patrick Moynihan introduction to Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies: India and the United States, 1941–1991 (New Delhi: Sage, 1993), p. xxii. Joseph Farland, the U.S. ambassador in Islamabad, later said, “We were about to go to World War III over this.” (Library of Congress, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Farland interview, 31 January 2000.) Kissinger, White House Years, p. 912. NSA, Nixon-Kissinger telcon, 6 December 1971, 11:10 p.m. NSC Files, Box 643, Country Files—Middle East, India/Pakistan, Kissinger to Haig, 13 December 1971. FRUS, vol. E-7, White House tapes, Oval Office 633-11, 9 December 1971, 12:44–1:27 p.m.
82. Krishnan, No Way but Surrender, pp. 56–58, 65.
83. Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency,” and Indian Democracy, pp. 182–83. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 277, Jha to Haksar, 11 September 1972. Fallaci, Interviews with History, p. 265.
84. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 174, Haksar to Singh, 14 December 1971. See MEA, HI/1012/57/71, Shelvankar to Kaul, 30 January 1972. MEA, HI/1012/57/71, Sethi to army staff, monthly military digest, 5 January 1972. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, Jack Anderson, “U.S. Task Force Didn’t Frighten India,” Washington Post, 21 December 1971.
85. MEA, WII/109/31/71, vol. II, Saxena to Haksar, 15 December 1971. MEA, WII/125/44/72, supplementaries for Rajya Sabha question, 7 April 1972.
86. MEA, WII/125/44/72, supplementaries for Rajya Sabha question, 7 April 1972. Tharoor, Reasons of State, p. 126. See FRUS, Sisco to Keating, 14 December 1971, State 224566, pp. 816–17. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 277, Jha to Haksar, 11 September 1972. MEA, WII/125/44/72, supplementaries for Rajya Sabha question, 7 April 1972. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 277, Jha to Haksar, 11 September 1972.
87. FRUS, vol. E-7, White House tapes, Oval Office 638-4, 15 December 1971, 8:45–11:30 a.m.
88. MEA, WII/109/31/71, vol. I, Verma to Menon, UPI story, 22 December 1971; NSC Files, Box 572, Indo-Pak War, DIA analysis, 8 December 1971. Four Americans were killed when a helicopter from the Tripoli crashed in a routine flight. MEA, WII/125/44/72, supplementaries for Rajya Sabha question, 7 April 1972. See MEA, HI/1012/57/71, Sethi to army staff, monthly military digest, 5 January 1972; NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 173, Gandhi to Kosygin, 17 December 1971.
89. NSC Files, Box 572, Indo-Pak War, CIA situation report, 8 December 1971. NSC Files, Box 572, Indo-Pak War, Keating to Rogers, 11 December 1971, New Delhi 19110. Fox Butterfield, “Pakistani Jets Bring the War and Death to Indian Village,” New York Times, 10 December 1971, p. A16.
90. NSC Files, Box 643, Country Files—Middle East, India/Pakistan, Spivack to Rogers, 13 December 1971, Dacca 5622. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, Gordon to Rogers, 14 December 1971, Calcutta 3035. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, Sisco to Keating, 14 December 1971, State 224566. MEA, WII/125/44/72, supplementaries for Rajya Sabha question, 7 April 1972.
91. MEA, WII/125/44/72, supplementaries for Rajya Sabha question, 7 April 1972. Narayan statement, 16 December 1971, Jayaprakash Narayan, Selected Works, ed. Bimal Prasad (New Delhi: Manohar, 2008), vol. 9, pp. 700–701.
92. NSA, Kissinger-Schecter telcon, 16 December 1971, 2:58 p.m.
93. NSC Files, Box 571, Indo-Pak War, Keating to Rogers, 5 December 1971, New Delhi 18755. NSC Files, Box 572, Indo-Pak War, Keating to Rogers, 8 December 1971, New Delhi 18950. Kissinger called Keating “a bastard,” while Nixon called the ambassador a “soft, son-of-a-bitch.” (FRUS, vol. E-7, White House tapes, Oval Office 630-20, 6 December 1971, 6:14–6:38 p.m.)
94. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, Keating to Irwin, 14 December 1971, New Delhi 19203. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, Keating to Rogers, 15 December 1971, New Delhi 19243. When Kissinger came up with the idea of deploying a carrier group, he said, “Keating will have a heart attack.” (FRUS, vol. E-7, White House tapes, EOB 307-27, 8 December 1971, 4:20–5:01 p.m. See FRUS, WSAG meeting, 9 December 1971, 10:09–11 a.m., pp. 711–21; White House tapes, Oval Office 631-1, 7 December 1971, 12:57–1:58 p.m.)
95. NSC Files, Box 643, Country Files—Middle East, India/Pakistan, U.S. naval forces note, n.d. December 1971. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 173, Gandhi to Pompidou, 15 December 1971. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 173, Manekshaw to Niazi, 15 December 1971. NSA, Kissinger-Bhutto telcon, 15 December 1971, 1:25 p.m. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, Bush to Rogers, 15 December 1971, USUN 5064. This account of war termination relies on Gideon Rose, How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010); H. E. Goemans, War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Elizabeth A. Stanley, Paths to Peace: Domestic Coalition Shifts, War Termination and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009); and Fred Charles Iklé, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).
96. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 173, Haksar to Gandhi, 15 December 1971. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, Stone to Rogers, 15 December 1971, New Delhi 19254.
97. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 173, Haksar to Gandhi, 15 December 1971. See NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 173, Haksar to Jha, 17 December 1971. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 173, Gandhi to Nixon, 15 December 1971. NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence File, Gandhi to Nixon, 15 December 1971. NSC Files, Box H-084, WSAG Meetings, Gandhi to Nixon, 15 December 1971.
98. NSA, Kissinger-Schecter telcon, 16 December 1971, 2:58 p.m. FRUS, vol. E-7, White House tapes, Oval Office 638-4, 15 December 1971, 8:45– 11:30 a.m. See NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, Saunders
to Kissinger, 15 December 1971.
99. FRUS, vol. E-7, White House tapes, Oval Office 638-4, 15 December 1971, 8:45–11:30 a.m. Nixon actually said Calcutta, but he clearly meant Karachi; Gandhi was not bombing her own city.
100. FRUS, vol. E-7, White House tapes, Oval Office 638-4, 15 December 1971, 8:45–11:30 a.m.
101. Habibul Alam, Brave of Heart: The Urban Guerilla Warfare of Sector-2, During the Liberation War of Bangladesh (Dacca: Academic Press and Publishers Library, 2006), pp. 293–94. Singh, Liberation of Bangladesh, p. 213. Dom Moraes, Mrs Gandhi (London: Jonathan Cape, 1980), p. 192.
102. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 173, Niazi to Manekshaw, 16 December 1971. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 173, Manekshaw to Niazi, 16 December 1971.
103. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, State Department situation report, 16 December 1971. Sydney H. Schanberg, “2 Men at a Table,” New York Times, 17 December 1971, pp. A1, A16. Niazi, Betrayal of East Pakistan, p. 235.
104. Jayakar, Indira Gandhi, pp. 180–81. MEA, WII/109/31/71, vol. I, Gandhi statement to Parliament, 16 December 1971.
105. MEA, WII/109/31/71, vol. I, Gandhi statement to Parliament, 16 December 1971. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, Keating to Rogers, 16 December 1971, New Delhi 19337. For Haksar’s draft speech, see NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 173, Haksar to Gandhi, 16 December 1971. Jayakar, Indira Gandhi, pp. 180–81. See Narayan statement, 17 December 1971, Narayan, Selected Works, pp. 701–2.
106. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, CIA situation report, 16 December 1971. Sydney H. Schanberg, “2 Men at a Table,” New York Times, 17 December 1971, pp. A1, A16. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, CIA situation report, 17 December 1971.
107. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, CIA situation report, 17 December 1971. NMML, Haksar Papers, Subject File 173, Gandhi to Pompidou, 15 December 1971. William Drummond, “Dacca Scene Stirring, Horrifying,” Los Angeles Times, 20 December 1971, p. A7. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, CIA situation report, 21 December 1971. NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, CIA situation report, 20 December 1971. Kissinger told Nixon, about the Indians, “There are more verified cases of atrocities under their rule than there were under the Pakistan rule” (White House tapes, White House telephone 17-100, 26 December 1971, 11:45–11:52 a.m.).