Cover
Title Page
Copyright
Dedication
Map
Foreword
Preface
List of Abbreviations
Prologue
Chapter 1
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Chapter 7
Chapter 8
Chapter 9
Chapter 10
Chapter 11
Chapter 12
Chapter 13
Chapter 14
Chapter 15
Chapter 16
Chapter 17
Chapter 18
Chapter 19
Epilogue
Copyright © 2012 Robert Semrau
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Names have been changed to protect allies and sources, and others in the field whose combat role may extend beyond Afghanistan.
Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication
Semrau, Robert
The Taliban don't wave / Robert Semrau.
ISBN 978-1-11826-118-7 (print); 978-1-118-26160-6 (ebk); 978-1-118-26155-2 (ebk); 978-1-118-26147-7 (ebk)
1. Semrau, Robert. 2. Afghan War, 2001—Personal narratives, Canadian. 3. Afghan War, 2001—Participation, Canadian. 4. Canada—Armed Forces—Afghanistan. 5. Soldiers—Canada—Biography. I. Title.
DS371.413.S44 2012 958.104'7092 C2012-904132-7
Production Credits
Cover design: Adrian So
Cover images: Robert Semrau
Interior design: Mike Chan
Managing Editor: Alison Maclean
Production Editor: Lindsay Humphreys
Composition: Thomson Digital
John Wiley & Sons Canada, Ltd.
6045 Freemont Blvd.
Mississauga, Ontario
L5R 4J3
For Amélie, Caméa, and Chloé; and to the men and women, both living and the honoured dead, who served in Afghanistan.
Foreword
With the exception of members of our elite JTF2 special forces, who were inserted earlier, Canadian soldiers deployed to Afghanistan some five months after the attacks of 9/11. This tardy deployment was the result of an embarrassing lack of Canadian strategic airlift, which chronically required us to beg a lift with the US Air Force or charter exorbitantly expensive Russian or Ukrainian resources. During this painful wait for a ride, the 3 PPCLI battle group had to cool its heels at its base in Edmonton.
The mission for the first allied units that arrived in Afghanistan was to take down al Qaeda and to assist the indigenous Afghan forces as they replaced the repressive Islamist Taliban regime, which had taken over the country in 1998 following the withdrawal of the Russian military in 1989 and the ensuing civil war. This mission was achieved within months in 2002.
When a dog chases a school bus, it's really fun—until he catches it. That's when the hard part begins, as he must decide what to do with it. The initially US-led deployment of allied forces to Afghanistan faced the same dilemma in 2002. Their mission had been accomplished, but they had “caught” Afghanistan, one of the poorest and most war-ravaged countries on the face of the earth. High-level international meetings were convened to determine, or at least assist with, Afghanistan's future, and terms like governance, education, healthcare, female rights, poppy eradication, and any number of additional projects related to nation building became part of the new strategy. The allied militaries involved in the operation immediately recognized the inevitable “mission-creep.”
While those focusing on nation building got on with their part of the pie, the military was forced to take on an increasingly capable Taliban insurgency. It didn't take a rocket scientist to determine that international military forces wouldn't, and couldn't, stick around forever fighting someone else's war. As a result, part of the military's effort was deflected to numerous Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), building roads, schools, police stations, and the like. Recognizing the need to create an Afghan army capable of containing the insurgency once the inevitable allied withdrawal took place, the concept of allied mentoring of fledgling Afghan army units was introduced, along with the somewhat humorous acronym OMLT (pronounced omelette), standing for Operational Mentor and Liaison Team.
The OMLT teams were small, averaging only four or five members each and usually consisting of an officer, a warrant officer, and two non-commissioned members. Their contribution to the Afghan campaign was kept low-key because the media realized the unpredictable nature of their work and the inherent danger, so they wisely rarely accompanied them into battle. The OMLT teams themselves were limited to advising their Afghan counterparts, no matter how incompetent they might be, and, bearing in mind cultural sensitivities, could not take charge of a failing mission no matter how disastrous the situation. On the positive side, they could request allied resources, including fast air and attack helicopters, artillery and mortars, and unmanned aerial vehicles to support their counterparts' mission, although there was no guarantee of availability.
It is one thing to be an advisor to an Afghan unit in support or, to use the accepted term, “inside the wire,” but quite another to accompany a unit regularly tasked to make contact with the Taliban. You would be acutely aware that your life was in the hands of someone who, if he had the necessary skills to lead in combat, wouldn't need you along as an advisor.
In August of 2008, Captain Robert Semrau found himself in charge of such a team attached to a unit of the Afghan army. During one particularly risky patrol, his Afghan unit was ambushed by a superior Taliban force. A NATO attack helicopter gunship was called in to provide support, and bursts of 30mm rounds (the length of a beer can and the diameter of a large carrot) delivered at a rate of over ten rounds a second, 625 per minute, devastated a significant component of the Taliban opposition. When Captain Semrau and his team arrived on the scene, the partial remains of Taliban victims littered the area. At one particular moment Captain Semrau wondered why a string of sausages was hanging from the limb of a tree, until he realized it was someone's intestines. Nearby was a mortally wounded Taliban who was, for all intents and purposes, cut in half with a hole, by some accounts the size of a dinner plate, through his midsection. Blood and what was left of his internal organs were splattered on the ground around him. To add to the man's agony, another round had shattered one of his legs. Afghan soldiers passing th
e scene commented that “Allah will look after him” and moved on; some were later accused of kicking the victim.
Captain Semrau's description of what happened next takes less than ten seconds to read and, interestingly, that was probably the amount of time he had to decide what to do before catching up to his Afghan counterpart. Witnesses indicated that he fired two rounds into the dying—or dead—Taliban fighter, the act subsequently described by the media as a “mercy killing.” Some seventeen months later, it took a court martial seven months to investigate, dissect, and analyze those ten seconds, and to determine that this officer with a sterling reputation as a soldier and a leader should no longer be allowed to serve in the Canadian Forces.
The high-profile court martial of Captain Semrau highlighted, in the eyes of many, including yours truly, a deficiency in the court martial procedures within the Canadian Forces.
Until the late 1980s, in general army officers conducted courts martial for army officers, air force officers tried their own, and the navy did the same, usually with a member of one of the other services included as a jury member, an “honest broker.” In order to withstand Charter challenges regarding the independence of military courts, a Court Martial Administrative Office was established. While it was a positive move to preclude such challenges, there was a serious downside. The new pool of eligible personnel for court martial duty was massive. As an example, if two lieutenant colonels were needed for a court martial panel, every commander (equivalent to lieutenant colonel) in the navy and every lieutenant colonel in both the army and the air force was eligible. In order to select members, a random selection process was necessary.
In the case of Captain Robert Semrau, the panel initially consisted of a navy commodore (equivalent to brigadier-general), an army lieutenant-colonel, two air force majors, and an army captain. For reasons known only to himself, the army lieutenant colonel withdrew from the panel as all members were about to depart for Afghanistan for deliberations at the site of the incident.
What follows is in no way a criticism of the individual panel members, but rather of a system that needs to recognize and deal with a serious shortcoming.
No one on Semrau's panel had any background in combat operations—and I'm not just referring to combat itself. I include the study of combat and basic training for land combat. During their deliberations it would have been extremely helpful and dare I say, essential, to have at least one individual who could attempt to explain the context of those ten seconds they were dealing with.
The findings of not guilty of second-degree murder, attempted murder, and negligent performance of duty were well founded. The finding of disgraceful conduct as a catch-all can be understood to appease those who didn't understand the context and wanted some form of punishment; however, release from the Canadian Forces was inappropriate. Many, including friends of mine currently holding senior positions within the Canadian Forces, opined that the release was necessary to deter future incidents and send a message to serving soldiers. I strongly disagree. When a soldier is faced with a similar situation in some far-flung battlefield in the future and has those ten seconds to reach a decision, no regulation nor memory or knowledge of Captain Rob Semrau's court martial will spring to mind. It will be his or her own moral code that will dictate their response—nothing more, nothing less.
By the way, you might wonder where the title The Taliban Don't Wave came from. I was going to tell you but changed my mind—keep reading.
Lewis W. MacKenzie, CM, OOnt, MSC and Bar, CD
Major-General (Ret'd)
Preface
The first time I laid eyes on Robert Semrau (not counting the front-page photographs) he was sitting in a military courtroom in Gatineau, Quebec, his shoes shined to a polish, his dress uniform green and crisp. In so many ways, the 36-year-old captain was just a typical soldier in today's Canadian Forces, one of thousands of courageous men and women who have risked their lives on the front lines of Afghanistan. But inside that courtroom, nothing was typical. Every step was unprecedented.
Semrau was on trial for second-degree murder—the first time a Canadian soldier had ever been accused of homicide on the battlefield. According to investigators, the captain was on patrol in October 2008 when he encountered a gravely wounded insurgent lying on a dirt path. (The man, shot in the stomach, was bleeding so profusely that one eyewitness said he was “98 per cent dead.”)
Under oath, two eyewitnesses said they were with Semrau when he pulled the trigger. “He felt it was the humane thing to do,” one of them testified. “He couldn't live with himself if he left a wounded insurgent, a wounded human, to suffer like that.” In the end, though, the jury found Semrau guilty of a lesser charge: disgraceful conduct. They fully believed that he shot the injured man, but with no corpse and no forensic evidence, they couldn't be sure, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the man actually died.
Yet in the eyes of so many Canadians—both in the ranks and outside—Semrau was a hero, not a criminal. His trial sparked a fierce national debate about the ethics of mercy killing in a combat zone, and what happens to the law of war when it comes face to face with the reality of war. Whatever your opinion, the optics were difficult to stomach: if convicted, Semrau faced a mandatory sentence of life behind bars with no chance of parole for ten years. In other words, a brave and articulate soldier who was willing to die for his country—and was forced to make an impossible decision along the way—could be left watching his two young daughters grow up from behind bars.
Before the judge delivered his sentence, he heard powerful testimony and read dozens of emotional letters from some of the soldiers who served with Robert Semrau. One described how the captain saved his life during an enemy mortar attack. Another, Semrau's commanding officer, said he would welcome him back to the battalion “without reservation” if he were allowed to continue serving. One friend and fellow officer said he respects Semrau so much that he would “follow Rob through the gates of hell.”
This book—a rare battlefield memoir from a Canadian soldier—helps explain why. It is Semrau's chance to tell the other side of his historic story, the one that began long before his fateful encounter with that wounded, unnamed man.
Michael Friscolanti
Senior Writer, Maclean's
List of Abbreviations
'geers combat engineers
2 I/C second-in-command
2 Para elite British Army airborne light infantry unit, the best of the best
421/422/429 different types of authorization to engage anyone who may not be posing an immediate threat
72A Seven two Alpha
72C Seven two Charlie
ack acknowledge
ANA Afghan National Army
ANP Afghan National Police
AO area of operations
Backblast the extremely hot and dangerous propellant that exits out the end of a rocket launcher when it's fired
BFG big f-ing gun
BIP blow in place; blown up in place
boom-stick Canadian M777 artillery gun, or any type of large cannon/rocket launcher
BUB battle update briefing
CF Canadian Forces
CFB Pet Canadian Forces Base Petawawa
comms radio communications
COP combat outpost
CP command post
CSM company sergeant major
DEWS donkey early-warning system
FAM fighting age male
fives and twenties five- and twenty-metre checks for IEDs
FMP field message pad
FOB Forward Operating Base
FOO/FAC forward observation officer/forward air controller
GAFF “give a fuck” factor
go firm halt
GSR gunshot residue
Icom two-way radio, used by the Taliban
IED improvised explosive device
int intelligence
Int O intelligence officer
in the shit in a life-and-death situation, usu
ally in combat
IR infrared
KAF Kandahar Airfield
KIA killed in action
LAV light armoured vehicle
LCMR lightweight counter-mortar radar
LD line of departure
leaguer vehicle camp
LN local national
LO liaison officer
locstat location and status
loggy; loggies logistics personnel
MBITR multiband inter/intra team radio
mikes minutes
MIST method of injury, injury, signs, treatment given
NCO non-commissioned officer
NDS National Directorate of Security (Afghanistan's version of the CIA)
Neil Diamond negligent discharge (accidentally shooting one's weapon)
net radio network
nine-liner a nine-line radio report for wounded personnel
NIS National Investigation Service, a special branch of the CF Military Police
NVG night-vision goggles
OC officer commanding
O-group orders briefing
OMLT Operational Mentor and Liaison Team
op operation
OPSEC operational security
OTR on the run
PKM Russian belt-fed light machine gun
PPCLI Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
PPE personal protective equipment
PRR personal role radio, used by the OMLT small teams and CF platoons to talk to each other
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Teams
PT physical training
PX post exchange (US army base store)
QRF quick reaction force
R&R rest and relaxation
RAF Royal Air Force
Ranger Ford pickup truck
RCR Royal Canadian Regiment
recce reconnaissance
RG-31/RG mine-protected armoured personnel carrier, usually outfitted with a remote-controlled weapon system on the roof
RPG rocket-propelled grenade
RRB radio re-broadcast
RV rendezvous
sec-for security force
SIGACTS significant actions/activities
sitrep situation report
The Taliban Don't Wave Page 1