by John Boyko
Those wondering about the administration’s stand were perhaps instructed by Navy Secretary Gideon Wells, who gushed to Wilkes: “Your conduct in seizing these public enemies was marked by intelligence, ability, decision and firmness and has the emphatic approval of this department.”69 Seward and Lincoln hold their tongues in public, worried about the legality of Wilkes’s actions, but were nonetheless swept up in the euphoria of the rare victory.70
It was November 27 before the Trent finally made it across the Atlantic, conveying its captain and passengers to London. They were hailed and feted as heroes while Wilkes and the Americans were branded as pirates. Stories were told of “brutish American marines” rushing at a terrified Mrs. Slidell, and Yankee bayonets being thrust at women and children.
The London Times said of Captain Wilkes: “He is an ideal Yankee. Swagger and ferocity, built on a foundation of vulgarity and cowardice, these are his characteristics, and these are the most prominent marks by which his countrymen, generally speaking, are known throughout the world.”71 The Halifax Morning Chronicle was even harsher: “Abraham Lincoln … has proved himself a feeble, confused, and little-minded mediocrity. Mr. Seward, the firebrand at his elbow, is exerting himself to provoke a quarrel with all Europe, in that spirit of senseless egotism that induces the Americans, with their dwarf fleet and shapeless mass of incoherent squads they call an army.”72 These and other papers reflected the overwhelming British opinion that its honour had been insulted by an irresponsible captain on behalf of incompetent leaders of a disintegrating rogue state.
The next day, the Times joined other papers in placing blame for the insult to Britain and international law upon the shoulders of the man it loved to hate. Its November 28 editorial expressed no doubt that Seward had been behind the whole crisis, for he had been aching for a reason to go to war with Britain, in order to claim Canada in compensation for losing Southern states. 73
Palmerston called his cabinet together. The discussion began with some members downplaying the incident. International law of the seas was still being written and so was open to broad interpretation, but the views brought to the table that day were presented as facts. It was agreed without reservation that Wilkes should have respected the British flag. If he had suspicions regarding the movement of contraband goods, then he should have escorted the Trent to a belligerent port where a tribunal would have ruled on his suspicions. Wilkes had broken international law and, if he had acted on the orders of the American government, then Britain had the legitimate right to demand the immediate release of Mason and Slidell. If the United States refused, then Britain had the right to declare war.
Palmerston listened to the discussion and then, according to a story that became popular and may have been true, finally thundered, “You may stand for this but damned if I will.”74 The decision was made to act with firmness. First came a limited trade sanction. In the fall of 1861, Seward had sent DuPont Company representatives to England to buy up all the saltpetre they could. It was an essential ingredient in gunpowder. Just as the British cabinet was debating the Trent Crisis, 2,300 tons of saltpetre were being loaded onto five ships. The loading was stopped. The cabinet office cabled to the shipyards that all saltpetre sales to the United States were henceforth banned, and the shipment was moved back into warehouses.75
There was more. A letter was composed to American minister Charles Adams, demanding that the two prisoners be released and that an official apology be issued from the American government to the British. If the men were not released and the apology announced within seven days, then all diplomatic relations would be severed and a state of war would exist. The letter went through several drafts and was finally sent to the Queen for her signature. At that point Prince Albert, Victoria’s beloved consort, despite suffering from the typhoid fever that would take his life only two weeks later, suggested amendments that offered the Americans an honourable way out. Albert’s softened draft expressed hope that Wilkes had acted without orders, confidence that the United States wanted to adhere to international law, and certainty that it had never intended to insult Britain or violate the security of British mails and transportation. The changes were accepted by cabinet and the letter sent aboard the ship Europa on the first of December.
Foreign Secretary Russell sent instructions to Lyons in Washington that reflected his belief that Seward had been directly involved in the Trent crisis from the outset. The best thing that could happen at that point, he wrote, would be for Seward to be fired.76 Russell met unofficially with Benjamin Moran of the American legation on November 27 and told him to expect war. Moran recorded in his journal that Palmerston had something of a “boyish passion” about having been insulted by the Americans.77 Russell also met with Adams, who then wrote of Britain’s determination in a letter to his son: “This nation means to make war. Do not doubt it.”78
Uncertain as to how the Americans would react to the sanctions and the ultimatum, Palmerston ordered more reinforcements to Canada. Eighteen hundred British regulars with artillery pieces and all the food, supplies and war matériel they would need were dispatched with orders to bolster border defences and prepare for invasion.
A new governor general had arrived in Canada just the week before. Charles Stanley, 4th Viscount Monck, would play a hugely positive role in the current crisis and in the turbulent years ahead. Like Head before him, he was in the delicate position of needing to liaise between Lyons in Washington, Russell in London, and Macdonald out his back door in Quebec City. As he was constitutionally responsible for military and defence matters, he and Macdonald spoke often, and seldom would one move without the other. He also oversaw often-troublesome and bull-headed lieutenant-governors in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Although he arrived with little experience, his intelligence, genial manner and stoicism in the face of difficulties served him exceptionally well.
Monck did not wait for instructions from London. Upon hearing the news of the Trent, he had sensed the seriousness of the event and its implication for Canada. He ordered Lt. General Williams to move men and matériel to the border. He asked that the preparations be done as quietly as possible, not to keep them secret from the Americans but rather to avoid creating panic among Canadians. Troops began securing the harbours and canals where the British military commander predicted an American attack was most likely. New batteries were still under construction in Montreal and Toronto, and Monck had the work expedited.
News of the military preparations along the border reached Washington. Seward then received a letter from Thurlow Weed, his old and trusted friend and political partner, who had been acting as his unofficial agent in Europe. Weed informed him that if it was discovered that Wilkes had acted under official orders, then it would be war. He reported that British dockyards were alive with war supplies being gathered and shipped to Canada and that ships were being specially outfitted with the goal of once and for all sweeping the American navy not only from the Confederate coast but from the Atlantic. He assured the secretary of state that there was a growing consensus both in the British press and in official circles that he had been behind it all and that Wilkes had been sent to provoke a war that would allow the United States to pivot and take Canada.79
In London, preparations for war continued. Palmerston created and chaired a special war council of cabinet that drew on the expertise of men who had served in Canada and knew it well. It was noted that from the Bay of Fundy to southwestern Canada the border was 1,500 miles long, and settlement patterns meant that it was only about 50 miles deep. It was suggested that a force of 10,000 British regulars supported by 10,000 Canadian militia would be needed to mount a credible defence. Even these numbers would not guarantee success, however. The Americans had more roads, canals and railroads that would allow a quick and easy shifting of troops to counter any British-Canadian tactical moves or to simply carry the American forces around any new Canadian fortification.80
Another major problem in defence planning was that with only
one road running from the Maritimes to Canada—and that dangerously close to the Maine border—the only safe way to move troops and equipment was on water. That fact presented many problems. First, the Beauharnois Canal allowed transport down the St. Lawrence River to Canada West, but it was on the river’s south shore, rendering it easy pickings for even a small American force. The canal’s size also meant that only the smallest of British military craft could be moved to the Great Lakes. Second, after the War of 1812, the Rush-Bagot Agreement had dictated that each side could only have three armed ships on the Great Lakes and that they must weigh less than 100 tons and be armed with no more than an 18-pound cannon. The British and Canadians had adhered to the treaty but the Americans had not. The American Michigan was too heavy and too well armed, and another schooner that acted as a revenue ship was also rigged for military action. These ships and others that could be quickly gathered and prepared could easily make mischief for British troop movements on the lakes. The third problem with water transport was that from December to April the St. Lawrence and shorelines of the Great Lakes were frozen.
Macdonald considered these problems and more, and set out to do all he could to prepare for invasion. He called out existing militia units with a request that 2,000 more men be assembled and trained. The Active Militia Force had been bolstered so that it comprised 5,500 trained men. He ordered the reorganized of militia units into battalions and companies. Soon, 454 militia battalions reported to be ready to fight, but Macdonald found that 20 companies still had either antiquated smoothbore rifles or no weapons at all. Working with Lt. General Williams, he ordered new British-made Enfield rifles.81
The threat of American invasion, spoken of for so long but now looking imminent, united Canadians and Maritimers in common cause. Member of the Legislature Thomas D’Arcy McGee of Montreal made a number of speeches to Irish communities in Canada East and West. He exhorted them to forget old grievances and join in the defence of Canada. In a number of cities, benefit concerts and other fundraisers were held to gather money to purchase uniforms and weapons. Montreal businessmen agreed to close their establishments three afternoons a week so that their employees could drill. At the University of Toronto, students and faculty formed a rifle corps and took time from classes each day to prepare for war.
With talk of war everywhere, a Union officer visiting his wife in Toronto made the mistake of wearing his neat blue uniform into a tavern. He ordered a beer, but before it arrived the patrons served up a round of blistering insults and mocking laughter. Some broke into a coarse rendition of “Dixie.” He fled through howls of laughter and a chant: “Bull Run! Bull Run!”
The vicious partisanship of newspaper editors seemed to evaporate as papers on both sides agreed that Britain was right to be outraged and that war with the United States was inevitable. The Globe called the Trent crisis unfortunate but supported efforts to prepare for war.82 The Toronto Leader called directly for war but then couldn’t resist the opportunity to call George Brown a spokesman for the Union.83 Brown responded in kind with a Globe column calling the Leader’s editor, James Beatty, an agent for Jefferson Davis.84
Meanwhile, American papers entered the fray with the New York Herald, as usual, most inflammatory in its rhetoric. A December editorial predicted that Britain would be happy to be rid of Canada and that, if asked, would gladly hand it over.85 In another editorial, the Herald called Canadians “a toothless pack of yelping dogs.”86 A Buffalo Express editorial was more measured but equally scathing: “Out of this Trent affair has come one permanent good … ‘our Canadian brethren,’ these suckling Britons to whom, like fools we have opened our ports … these reciprocal brethren of ours have been ready to fly at our throats from the moment when they felt it safe to be indolent.”87
By mid-December Macdonald had 38,556 militia men armed, trained and ready. He ordered yet another 7,500, making just over 46,000 prepared to face the American invaders. He also approved $12,000 to augment defences at the Welland Canal. He was following the American press carefully and trying to discern what Lincoln and Seward would do. He was pleased to read that the New York Herald reported on December 23 that the administration was, in his words to a friend, “about to cave in.”88 But he did not stop his preparations. Anticipating the need for more men, he ordered 100,000 tunics, trousers, caps and great coats.89
After conferring with Monck, Macdonald dispatched Finance Minister Alexander Galt to Washington. Galt met with Seward’s Canadian agent, George Ashmun, who could tell him little, and then with Seward, who would tell him nothing. Galt did not think much of Seward, writing to his wife, “he did not impress me much; seemed fidgety, and out of temper.”90 Galt had dinner with Lyons twice and met with several congressmen. He also attended Lincoln’s State of the Union Address, during which the president deliberately ignored specifics related to the Trent crisis but mentioned his support for military preparations underway on the Atlantic coast and the Canadian border.
On December 4, Galt met with Lincoln at the White House. Ashmun was present. Galt began by telling the president that the current tension, coupled with Seward’s belligerent circulars and other actions that put troops on the Canadian border, and the bellicose tone of much of the Northern press, was disconcerting for Canadians. Lincoln replied that Galt should never think that the press accurately reflected the views of his administration. He ducked the main issue, saying that he had supported increased military preparations at the border, but had expressed concern at the time that Canadians would react negatively. There lurked a dagger within his reassuring words, however, for he added that he had been disappointed when Britain had named the rebellious states as a belligerent.91
Ashmun raised the Trent crisis. Lincoln told Galt that for him the issue had both domestic and international ramifications. He said that he wanted to avoid war and did not want to invade Canada but, leaving the door open, continued, “We must do something to satisfy the people.”92 Galt pressed and asked what would be done with Mason and Slidell. Lincoln replied vaguely, “That will be got along with.”93
Galt wrote to his wife that he was impressed by Lincoln: “He is very tall, thin, and with marked features, appears fond of anecdote, of which he has a fund. I liked him for his straight forward strong common sense.”94 In a memo to Macdonald, Galt indicated that Lincoln was as charming and reassuring as he was unconvincing: “The impression left on my mind is that the President has … no hostile designs upon Canada.… I cannot, however, divest my mind of the impression that the policy of the Govt is so subject to popular impulses that no assurance can be, or ought to be relied upon under present circumstances … the idea is universal that Canada is most desirable for the north, which its unprepared state would render it an easy prize.”95
Lord Lyons and Governor General Monck were briefed on Galt’s visit with Lincoln and shared his misgivings. Lyons maintained his hope that war would not come, but he urged both Monck and Foreign Secretary Russell to prepare for it. Lyons added that preparations for war concerned more than Canada; it was to be a global mobilization involving British ships from the Pacific and the West Indies.96 Concerned, Monck wrote to Britain’s secretary of state for the colonies Newcastle, “I am afraid however this dispute may end, we will have to fight them sooner or later.”97
From Washington, Lyons set up a code with Monck. If the invasion was underway, or if he believed it to be imminent, Lyons would telegraph the following: “Is Mr. Charles Pelham still with you?” If it was received and understood, then Monck was to respond: “Mr. Charles Pelham started for England.” If a particular point on the border was under attack or menaced, Lyons would write: “Forward these letters to (the place under threat)” and Monck would respond, “Unlikely your letters were forwarded to …”98
Jefferson Davis had seen Britain and the North talking themselves into war and, of course, recognized the opportunity for the Confederacy. He fanned the embers, hoping to turn them into flames. On November 18, Davis delivered a message to the Con
federate Congress and, referring to Mason and Slidell, said: “These gentlemen were as much under the jurisdiction of the British Government upon that ship and beneath its flag as if they had been on its soil; and a claim on the part of the United States to seize them in the streets of London would have been as well founded as that to apprehend them where they were taken.”99
Lincoln was balancing conflicting advice and reading the fiery newspaper editorials calling for war. He saw that the New York stock market had dropped 7 percent since the crisis began—a significant fluctuation in nineteenth-century terms. Ohio financier Jay Cooke, who had been successfully leading efforts to raise money for the North through the sale of government bonds in Europe, urged a quick solution to the crisis if he was to have any chance of raising additional capital.100 Meanwhile, daily military reports brought no news of victories or even much activity from General McClellan, who seemed almost smug in reporting that all remained quiet along the Potomac day after infuriating day. Lincoln did not want quiet. He wanted action and victory, while his young general McClellan seemed content to prepare and then prepare some more.