Henry III, in Paris, heard disquieting reports about his son, notably that he was plotting with de Montfort to seize power by force and usurp the throne. A special envoy was sent to check on the veracity of the letters that the young man was sending to his father, and it does not seem that his report was reassuring. Early in April 1260 Henry sent orders to prevent Edward from entering London, where the king had heard that he was intending to stay in the bishop of London’s palace at St. Paul’s while a parliament was held contrary to royal instructions. Some of Edward’s retinue who did occupy the palace behaved there with their customary callousness and brutality. Trouble between them and the followers of the earl of Gloucester was feared, but Edward and the earl were refused entry to the city, and the crisis was averted. When his father returned to England Edward publicly denied that he had ever participated in hostilities against Henry. He refused to submit to the judgement of the magnates on the grounds that they were not his peers, but agreed to accept the decision of his father and his uncle, Richard of Cornwall. A reconciliation duly took place.
So ended Edward’s first independent political venture: one which can have done nothing to enhance what little reputation he possessed at this stage of his career. He had overestimated the power of Simon de Montfort, and had failed to appreciate the authority that Henry III still possessed. His persistent quarrels with Gloucester contributed to the decline of the reform movement to a state in which personal ambitions and rivalries were more important than questions of principle. His denials that he was involved in opposition to his father, and his refusal to stand trial before the magnates, must have thrown doubt upon his honesty. After his reconciliation with Henry III he was wisely allowed no further opportunity that year to meddle in politics, and was sent abroad to engage in what was at this period of his life his favourite sport, the tournament. According to one account he did not distinguish himself, but suffered a series of defeats, losing almost all the horses and armour that he had set out with. He also incurred a substantial debt to the king of France.[16]
In 1261 Henry III made a systematic effort to reverse all that had been achieved by the reformers. Edward, who was in England during the early summer, did not support him in this. He refused to accept papal absolution from the oath he had sworn in 1259 to observe the Provisions of Oxford, and once again allied himself with de Montfort. But his determination was no greater than in 1260, and the persuasions of his mother soon brought him back to the royalist cause. He speedily returned to Gascony and indulged in no more flirtations with the baronial party.
Events in Wales necessitated Edward’s return from the continent early in 1263. He brought with him a band of foreign mercenaries to assist in the defence of his lands against Llywelyn, an act which hardly enhanced his popularity. Even with their aid his campaign was not a success, and before Whitsun he was recalled to England. In June he went to London, where his parents had taken refuge in the Tower. With typical impetuosity he and his men broke into the New Temple and seized money and jewels. These may have helped to finance the struggle against de Montfort, but the incident had the unfortunate effect of turning the Londoners firmly against the king and his supporters. The queen, going up river by boat, was pelted with refuse by the citizens: a deed for which her son never forgave them.
After this, Edward marched rapidly to Bristol, presumably hoping to make a stand in his castle there, but the townspeople rose against him and his foreign troops. On the intervention of the bishop of Worcester Edward surrendered. As the bishop was conducting him towards London he escaped to Windsor, although he had agreed to a truce. Superior baronial strength, however, compelled him to surrender and disband his mercenaries. Nevertheless, de Montfort’s apparent success did not last long. Personal quarrels and rivalries split the baronial movement in the autumn, at the October parliament in particular, and Edward profited, most significantly by winning over the majority of the Marchers who suspected that de Montfort had come to an amicable agreement with Llywelyn. The most notable of Edward’s new allies was Roger Mortimer, and by the end of the year the only major Marcher lords not supporting him were Humphrey de Bohun and Peter de Montfort. Edward now reconciled himself with Roger Clifford, his former bailiff of the Three Castles, and with Roger Leyburn, who had been his steward until Edward, on a brief visit to England in the previous year, 1262, had accused him of misappropriating £1,820.[17] De Montfort’s position was drastically weakened by the defection of the Marchers, and he was forced to agree to Henry III’s plan of submitting the whole dispute to Louis IX for arbitration. Edward had contributed more than any other single person to this new turn of events. When early in the next year Louis’ verdict was predictably pronounced firmly in Henry’s favour, the earl of Leicester was left with no alternative save a full-scale recourse to arms if he wished to maintain his position of predominance in England.
Edward’s early moves in the civil war that resulted from Louis’ arbitration in the Mise of Amiens did him little credit. He seized the castle at Gloucester, but was soon threatened by a large baronial force, and agreed to a truce. Once his opponents had withdrawn, Edward ignored the promises he had made, and punished the citizens of Gloucester viciously for the support they had given his enemies. He then joined his father in Oxford, and the royal forces moved on Northampton where de Montfort’s son Simon and many important baronial leaders were captured. This victory was followed up by Edward with great energy if little prudence: the excesses of the royalist troops lost them popularity, and the speed of his advance, combined with the absence of proper victualling arrangements, exhausted the army by the time of the crucial engagement with Simon de Montfort at Lewes. At that battle Edward commanded the right wing and routed the Londoners who opposed him. With headlong impetuosity he drove them from the field, but returning to the battlefield at the end of the day, he found that his father’s cause was lost.
Reckless and over-confident as he had shown himself to be, Edward learnt from his mistakes. In March 1265 he was released from close custody on harsh conditions: remaining under restraint, he had to swear to maintain the form of government established by de Montfort, and to grant his castle, town and lands of Chester to the baronial leader. Edward was not a man to be bound by such an agreement; at the end of May he made a dramatic escape and, with the aid of the young Gloucester, son of his old enemy, soon built up a powerful force in the Welsh Marches. The renewal of war culminated in Edward’s victory at Evesham, a battle won as much by the exercise of low cunning as by military skill, for the baronial banners recently captured when the young Simon de Montfort was surprised at Kenilworth were used to disguise his advance.
Although de Montfort was killed at Evesham, and the royalist victory had plainly been decisive, resistance continued for the next two years. The leading part in the pacification of England was taken by the Lord Edward, while a significant contribution was made by Roger Leyburn. The settlement of England after Evesham called for the exercise of considerable statesmanship, and Edward was in the strongest position to control the course of events. It cannot be said, however, that he used that position to the best advantage. The bitter resistance of men like John d’Eyville was provoked by the royal policy of taking all rebel lands into the king’s hands, and de Montfort’s supporters found little satisfaction in the modification of this policy in the Dictum of Kenilworth of 1266 which allowed redemption of their lands at seven times, five times or twice their annual value, according to the extent of their involvement in the rebellion. Even the earl of Gloucester, who had done so much to ensure Edward’s triumph in 1265, marched to London in April 1267 and joined forces with d’Eyville in opposing the government’s policies. His action did something to compel moderation, but the process of redemption was a complex one. Many of the Disinherited did not have the funds to buy back their lands, and the processes of law involved were often bitter and protracted.[18]
There is little evidence to suggest that Edward exercised his influence in the direction of moderation. Be
fore Evesham he had allowed some rebels to make their peace, and shortly afterwards he offered the garrison of Kenilworth the opportunity of surrendering themselves. But once it was clear that the royalists were in a position of overwhelming strength his attitude changed. Edward was not one of those responsible for the Dictum of Kenilworth, and harsh as that settlement was, he seems to have desired a harsher one. Certainly his active connivance in the treatment of Robert Ferrers, earl of Derby, indicated scant respect for the Dictum. This unfortunate young man was compelled under duress to enter into an obligation to pay the impossible sum of £50,000 to Edmund of Cornwall for the redemption of his lands, as a result of which he lost most of his estates and his title.[19] Considerable vindictiveness was shown towards London, fined 20,000 marks. The citizens were refused the right of redeeming their lands according to the Dictum, and it was the friends and dependants of the Lord Edward who profited most from the confiscation of London property. Leading London rebels were handed over to Edward, and it was to him that they paid their fines to obtain their freedom. In 1269 the whole city was handed over to Edward, and only because he needed to raise money for his crusade were the citizens allowed to buy back their liberties in 1270.[20] It is ironical that in 1239 the Londoners had greeted the news of Edward’s birth with special delight, since it took place at Westminster.[21]
It has been said that ‘in a sense’ Edward ‘began to reign in the summer of 1265’,[22] but the extent of his influence on the government should not be exaggerated. The policy adopted towards the important question of Wales was contrary to his interests. The Peace of Montgomery, which accepted most of the gains made by Llywelyn, was largely the work of the papal legate Ottobuono. Edward had begun to abdicate his position in Wales late in 1265, when Carmarthen and Cardigan were transferred to his younger brother Edmund. By the time of the peace treaty of 1267 he retained only Montgomery of his once vast estates in the Marches.[23] Edward’s policy in the Marches in the late 1260s was directed not so much against the Welsh as against Gilbert de Clare, earl of Gloucester. The earl revived his family claim to Edward’s town of Bristol, while Edward gave support to the Welsh in an attempt to limit the earl’s power in South Wales. There was a strong personal element in the quarrel: one rumour had it that Edward was taking too much interest in Gilbert’s wife. Arbitration by Richard of Cornwall did something to ease matters, though it was probably only Edward’s departure on crusade that prevented the quarrel from developing into armed conflict.[24]
The auspices for the future at the time of Henry III’s death in 1272 were not very encouraging. Edward was abroad, winning himself a considerable reputation for chivalry, determination and energy in what was becoming recognized as a futile cause. He had served an extremely arduous apprenticeship in politics and war before setting out on crusade. By the late 1260s it was becoming clear that he had learnt much from his earlier impetuous mistakes, but his behaviour during the crisis that began in 1258 had given him a reputation for deceit and trickery that he had not overcome. He had made an enemy of the most important lay magnate in the country, Gilbert de Clare, and the citizens of London had no cause to love him. The country as a whole had barely recovered from the civil wars by 1272; the conflicts had left a legacy of bitterness which it would take long to obliterate. However, one great advantage Edward did have. He returned from crusade to begin his effective rule in 1274: his long absence from the country had temporarily isolated him from the political scene, and he was in a position to make a fresh start.
Edward I proved to be a king of great ambition. His experiences before his accession had made him aware of the necessity of establishing the crown in a position of clear and undisputed authority. This can be seen in many facets of his domestic policies — in his relations with the magnates, with the church, and with the towns — but the most striking expression of the king’s determination and aggressiveness was of course in his wars. The requirements of war, the need for men, money and materials, increasingly dominated the actions of the government, and exercised an immense influence over the political events of the reign. The aim of this book is to provide an analytical study of the way in which the country was mobilized for war, the means used to recruit men the size of the armies, the methods used to supply them with victuals, and the consequences, both financial and political, of the measures adopted. As the arrangement is not chronological, it is necessary to provide a brief account of the wars, so as to indicate the sequence and scale of Edward’s campaigns in Wales, Gascony, Flanders and Scotland.
The first part of the reign, following the king’s return from crusade, was dominated by affairs in Wales.[25] The Lord Edward may have been prepared to abandon his Welsh estates, and to accept the Peace of Montgomery, but King Edward was not the man to assent to the continued disorder in the Marches, the projected marriage of Llywelyn with Eleanor, Simon de Montfort’s daughter, and above all the refusal of the Welsh prince to perform homage. Nor was Llywelyn willing to stand aside while Edward sheltered his brother Dafydd who had revolted against him in 1274. War was inevitable, and Edward conducted his first campaign in Wales as king in 1277. In July he advanced from Chester, employing large numbers of woodcutters to prepare a road for the army. By the end of August forces had reached Deganwy, and from there troops were sent by sea to Anglesey, where they reaped the harvest, thus threatening the Welsh in Snowdonia with starvation. This was enough for Llywelyn, and negotiations began. By the end of September, the first Welsh war was effectively over.
The peace terms were surprisingly reasonable. A massive war indemnity of £50,000 was imposed, and two of the Four Cantrefs were acquired by Edward, together with Cardigan and Carmarthen. Dafydd was reinstated in his lands, and Llywelyn allowed to marry Eleanor. But problems soon arose once more. Edward was determined to force an interpretation of the treaty as favourable as possible to himself, one which would allow him the widest possible scope for intervention in Welsh affairs. Arguments centred on the question of jurisdiction, and the king was in no way deterred by the fact that precedents carefully collected from the records of Henry III’s reign and inquests held by his own officials did not justify the position he adopted. As in the 1250s, Edward and his officials displayed an intolerance of Welsh traditions and Welsh law. Only in one case was a definite instruction given that it should be heard by Welsh law, and only one case was referred to Llywelyn’s court. The prince was himself involved in a dispute with Gruffydd ap Gwenwynwyn over the cantref of Arwystli in Powys; the one claiming by Welsh law, the other by Marcher custom. Adjournments were innumerable and frustrating, even insulting, to Llywelyn, and — despite the precedents — Edward ruled, for obvious political reasons, that the case should be heard according to the customs of the March.[26] Before the case was completed, however, the Welsh were in revolt once more.
The war of 1282 was sparked off by Dafydd, Edward I’s former ally. Probably he felt that he had been insufficiently rewarded, and, like Llywelyn, he had become involved in the tangled complexities of English law, being summoned to appear before the Justiciar of Chester to prove his rights to some of his lands. The revolt spread rapidly. Llywelyn could hardly stand by while his brother championed the Welsh cause against the English oppressors, and with Dafydd’s success in enlisting the aid of the rulers of South Wales, the rising became general.
The campaign took longer and was more expensive than that of 1277. The main royal army again advanced from Chester round the coast of North Wales, while Gloucester commanded a separate army in the south, and Roger Mortimer and Roger l’Estrange were active at Montgomery and Builth respectively. Once more it was intended to cross to Anglesey, and a bridge of boats was constructed for the purpose. But before arrangements for the crossing had been completed, an English force under Luke de Tany was ambushed and routed, many of the soldiers being drowned. A winter campaign seemed necessary. However, while the king had not yet made any decisive move, news came of a striking success at Orewin Bridge early in December. A small English force, pro
bably commanded by John Giffard, made a surprise attack on the Welsh, and in the engagement Llywelyn was killed. The campaign of the new year, 1283, went smoothly. In April the last important Welsh castle, Bere, surrendered and in June Dafydd was captured. The war was over.
The victory of 1283 was consolidated by a massive programme of castle building; Snowdonia was ringed round on the coast by Conway, Caernarvon, Criccieth and Harlech. Edward continued his policy of extending the English system of justice and administration into Wales by issuing the Statute of Wales of 1284. The counties of Flint, Merioneth, Caernarvon and Anglesey were created, and the criminal law was anglicized as far as possible. The king’s son Edward, born at Caernarvon, was made prince of Wales. Welsh independence was at an end.
But if the settlement of 1284 marked the conquest of Wales by Edward, it did not end Welsh resistance. In 1287, seizing the opportunity of the king’s absence in Gascony, Rhys ap Maredudd revolted. He had formerly been a consistent ally of the English, and clearly felt aggrieved that he had not been shown greater favours by Edward. The rising appeared serious, but the regent, Edmund of Cornwall, swiftly raised an army and defeated the rebels. Far more dangerous was the last rising that Edward had to face, which took place in 1294. Once again the Welsh took advantage of the fact that the English were preparing a lavish expedition to Gascony, and although the leaders were not members of the former princely family and do not appear to have been men of great standing, the rising spread with great rapidity throughout Wales.
The troops intended for Gascony were diverted to Wales, and a major expedition was organized. The king advanced from Chester, while the earl of Warwick commanded an army based at Montgomery. The earl of Pembroke had forces at Carmarthen, and the earl of Hereford in the south-east. The Welsh won one success, capturing the royal baggage train, and so leaving the king and his troops in Conway with insufficient food and drink. But while Edward was at Conway, Warwick defeated a Welsh force on 5 March 1295 at Maes Moydog. Edward himself soon moved into Anglesey, and the Welsh abandoned the struggle.
Edward I Page 2