The burden of supplying infantry for the wars was not equally distributed. It was obviously much easier to recruit men from the areas nearest to the point where the campaigns began. For the Welsh wars demands were made of Gloucestershire, Herefordshire, Shropshire, Staffordshire, Cheshire and Lancashire. The shift of the scene of fighting to Scotland moved the main burden of providing troops to Yorkshire, Cumberland, Northumberland and Westmorland. The men of Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire had been regularly called upon for the Welsh wars, and they attended the Scotch wars as consistently, their virtue being experience rather than proximity to the muster point.[336] The rest of England was hardly affected by Edward’s need for manpower. Some infantry were raised in Lincolnshire to go to Wales in 1294,[337] and an undated portion of a pay roll, which probably refers to the army collected to go to Gascony in the following year, has payments to just over 1,400 men collected from the counties of Wiltshire, Kent, Oxford, Buckingham, Leicester, Warwick and Northampton.[338] In 1296 the coastal shires of the south-east were organized to provide infantry to meet the threat of a possible French invasion,[339] but during the rest of the reign there was hardly any recruiting in the south.
There was surprisingly little resistance to the commissioners of array. On one occasion the men of the Durham village of Pittington were each fined two shillings for refusing to do their service,[340] but the great majority of cases that came to court concerned abuses of the system, notably financial extortion, rather than refusal to accept its workings. The arrayers clearly did not arouse the same degree of resentment as the purveyors of foodstuffs.[341] It was not until the later years of Edward II that grievances about their activities became a political issue, and this was after unpopular innovations had been made in the system.[342]
One expedient for recruiting infantry adopted by the crown in 1294 indicates the lengths to which Edward was prepared to go in order to obtain the troops he needed. Claiming hypocritically to be moved by feelings of clemency, he announced that he was prepared to grant pardons to felons in return for service. Two justices, Brabazon and Bereford, were appointed to issue such pardons, and over three hundred were granted to men going to Gascony. The expedient was repeated in subsequent years: a commission was set up to recruit prisoners and outlaws for the Scotch campaign of 1296, and many pardons were issued in return for service in Flanders. The practice was continued in the later campaigns in Scotland. The accounts for the infantry in 1303 only specify nine men as outlaws, but from the fact that a special order was sent to the bailiff of Holderness to recruit criminals who had fled to sanctuary in the liberty of Beverley, it seems likely that many more were present on the campaign of that year. It is not possible to calculate with any accuracy the total number of criminals recruited by Edward I, for many of the pardons were probably not enrolled. However, recorded pardons for homicide alone total about 1,700. It is clear that this method of recruitment provided substantial numbers of men, and it is not surprising to find that protests about the practice were made early in the reign of Edward II.[343]
The crown did not greatly concern itself with the way in which the infantry were armed. The writs appointing the commissions of array did not go into more detail than asking for ‘footsoldiers skilled in arms’, save for rare occasions, as when archers or cross-bowmen were specified in 1295.[344] The account roll for the first Welsh war shows that while the majority of the foot were bowmen, some were armed with pikes or lances.[345] But by the time of the Scotch wars the infantry are termed archers in virtually all the cases where their arms are specified. Though classed as archers, the infantry of Edward I’s reign were not supplied with weapons in the same way that their successors were to be under Edward III. During the Hundred Years War huge quantities of bows, arrows and arrowheads were supplied to the government by sheriffs, and stored in the Tower of London.[346] In contrast, Edward I’s soldiers rarely received weapons from the government, but had to remain content with those provided by their localities. An archer would have no more than one quiver of two dozen arrows with him, which helps to explain why the infantry hurled stones at the battle of Falkirk. Normally the only weapons that the government concerned itself with were the crossbows and heavy machines used for siege work and the defence of castles. The issue of 20s. on one occasion during the Welsh wars to enable Thomas Turberville to buy arrows for his infantry was highly exceptional.[347] The one incident that created a substantial need for bows and arrows, compelling the crown to take steps to provide them, was the siege of Stirling in 1304. This was partly because the infantry had been in Scotland a long time, and so had probably exhausted the ammunition they brought with them, and also because this was by far the longest drawn-out engagement the English were involved in during the reign, so creating an unprecedented need for arms. The sheriffs of London provided 130 bows and 200 quivers of arrows. From Lincolnshire came 286 bows and 1,200 arrows. Fifty-nine bows were sent from Newcastle, while Simon de Kyme, sheriff of Yorkshire, provided 320, along with other equipment. During June and July four men in the siege army were employed to make arrows.[348] On no other occasion did the crown make such efforts to see that the infantry were properly equipped, although obviously when the men mustered before the commissioners of array some form of inspection took place. The most surprisingly armed contingent of infantry to fight for Edward I was a select corps from Sherwood Forest, which appeared in 1303 equipped not with bows, but with slings.[349]
Once in the field the infantry were organized in units of twenty men, the ordinary soldiers being paid two pence a day, and their commander, the vintenar, twice as much. Five such sections of twenty men were combined under the command of a centenar, who was a fully-equipped cavalryman with a barded horse. In Wales in 1282 and 1294 a still larger unit of 1,000 men was used,[350] but later pay rolls give no indication that such arrangements were repeated. The men were usually grouped together according to the county they came from, while some infantrymen might serve together as they all came from a single estate. In 1300 the foot-soldiers drawn from the earl of Lincoln’s estates of Pontefract and and Blackburnshire formed one body.[351] As desertion thinned the ranks, the units would be combined together and reformed.
Discipline in the field was the ultimate responsibility of the Marshal, who might of course exercise his rights by means of a deputy. The severity of Ralph Gorges’ judgements when acting as marshal in Gascony in 1295 caused the mutiny of the infantry at Rioms, as a result of which several English knights, including the treacherous Thomas Turberville, were captured by the French.[352] One army plea roll survives, that of John Lovel, the deputy marshal, for 1296. Cases heard included one where six men were fined for insubordination toward their constable, and several fined for brawling.[353] The chain of command in the field is not clear, but it seems likely that the Marshal and Constable may have had much to do with the organization of the infantry in battle. Certainly in 1301 it was the Constable, Bohun, who was sent across to recall the infantry when they had engaged the enemy on the opposite side of an estuary in Galloway.[354]
The evidence of the numbers of infantry employed in the wars suggests that although it was possible to assemble substantial forces, the king and his advisers had by the end of the reign abandoned their belief in the value of very large armies. And the evidence of the methods of recruitment that were used does not suggest that the infantry that were assembled were of a high calibre. The persistent problem of desertion, never effectively solved, also demonstrates the poor quality of the troops. But it remains to be asked whether these indications of the inadequacy of the infantry are borne out by their performance on campaign.
Edward fought few battles in his wars, and those that were fought were not well reported by the chroniclers. One incident that has received a great deal of attention is the battle of Maes Moydog in 1295. Nicholas Trivet states that Warwick’s army was composed of cavalry, crossbowmen and archers, and that in the battle the horse were combined in one line with the crossbowmen.[355] However, the accoun
t for the army indicates that there were only thirteen crossbowmen and archers present,[356] and in order to make sense of Trivet’s account it is necessary to assume that some of the other infantry, armed with longbows, were combined with the cavalry as well, and that the chronicler was mistaken in singling out the crossbowmen. A much more authoritative account of the battle makes no mention of unusual tactics. A newsletter reports the casualties as one squire of Robert FitzWalter’s, and six infantrymen, adding that ten horses were lost. Far from the Welsh having taken up a defensive position throughout, the author noted that they ‘attacked our men from the front, and they were the finest and quite the bravest Welsh that had ever been seen’.[357] What intermingling of infantry and cavalry did take place was more probably the result of the confusion of battle than of deliberate tactics. This is also true of the earlier battle of Orewin Bridge, when during the ascent of the English to the Welsh position the archers and cavalry were mixed up, although it was the latter who reached the top first.[358]
The most effective fighting force of infantry employed in Edward’s Welsh wars was the contingent of Gascons who served in Wales in 1282. At one time their total strength was 210 horse and 1,313 foot. Armed with crossbows, they suffered considerable casualties. They were singled out for praise by the chronicler Langtoft, who likened them to lions. Perhaps because of the cost of this force, £7,618,[359] Gascons were not employed again in such numbers, although there was always a Gascon element among the household knights on all the campaigns.
In Gascony itself the infantry do not appear to have distinguished themselves. The disaster at Rioms was the result of the mutiny of the foot. In an engagement in 1296, when the English were ambushed, it was the infantry who suffered heavy casualties, while the more mobile cavalry escaped.[360] When the English suffered their second major defeat of the war early in 1297 at Belle-garde, the infantry took no part in the battle, but remained under cover of the woods.[361] In Flanders there was no fighting with the enemy, only skirmishes between the unruly Welsh and Edward’s Flemish allies. The only occasion on which the footsoldiers proved worth the money spent on them was when they were sent forward carrying banners to deceive the French into thinking that the inadequate English army was an immense host;[362] a practical though unchivalrous trick reminiscent of Edward’s use of the captured banners at Evesham. It does not seem likely that the ‘French had learnt by experience a wholesome fear of the English and Welsh archers’, as Tout thought.[363] That lesson was to be taught them by Edward III and the Black Prince.
In Scotland the only battle of the 1296 campaign, Dunbar, was won by Warenne’s cavalry with swords and lances, not by infantry with arrows. And in the next year at Irvine a Scotch army under Stewart and Douglas surrendered to an English force with fewer infantry than their own, but stronger in cavalry, which suggests that it was the English knights that they feared, rather than the English bowmen.[364] Nevertheless, in his account of the battle of Falkirk in 1298, Walter of Guisborough gave the infantry the credit for breaking the strong Scotch defensive formations, the schiltroms. The Scotch cavalry had mostly fled at the approach of the English army, but the schiltroms remained, and the English horsemen were unable to scatter the rings of pikemen. It was the infantry with a hail of arrows and stones who achieved the breakthrough, which was then exploited to the full by the cavalry.[365] However, another, briefer version of the events of the battle does not suggest that the infantry played a prominent role, and instead credits the breaking of the schiltroms to a flanking movement, presumably executed by the cavalry.[366] Not all of the available infantry were used in the battle, for a few days earlier the Welsh had been given wine on empty stomachs. In the inevitable brawl that followed, several men were killed before the cavalry drove the Welsh off. When it was pointed out to Edward that they might choose to join up with the Scots, the king declared his indifference: both were his enemies, and both could be defeated. But the Welsh did not desert. They remained at a discreet distance from the main army, and once it became clear that the English were victorious, joined in the rout.[367] The pay rolls suggest that the English foot suffered casualties of some 2,000, while Welsh losses were minimal.[368]
Falkirk was the one major engagement of the Scotch wars. The only occasion in the later campaigns when the infantry played a notable part was in 1300, early in August, when in Galloway the foot crossed an estuary and engaged the Scots on the other side, showing more courage than the king, who wished to avoid battle. Hereford was sent to order them to withdraw, whereupon the English knights thought that the earl was going to the assistance of the foot, and charged. Edward was forced to follow, and the Scots were driven back in confusion. But as there were no Welsh troops, experienced in guerilla warfare in rough country, Edward was unable to pursue the fleeing enemy.[369] For the later campaigns, those of 1301, 1303-4, and 1306-7, there is not enough evidence to show what use was made of the infantry in battle. However, the indications are that it was found more effective to employ smaller concentrations than had been the custom in the past.[370]
It was not only in battle that footsoldiers might be of value. Perhaps the most useful infantry in the Welsh wars were those equipped with axes, rather than those armed with pikes or bows. Edward’s success depended on the maintenance of good communications, and much time and money was spent in cutting roads through the dense forests of Wales. In 1277 household knights were used to supervise the workmen, and in August as many as 1,800 axemen were cutting a road through to Rhuddlan.[371] In 1287 over 600 such workmen, probably recruited in Shropshire and Staffordshire, were employed under Gloucester to cut a road from Morlais to Brecon. This crossed land claimed by Hereford, and appears to have led to the famous dispute between the earls.[372] No road-cutting operations took place on this scale in Scotland. Geographical conditions were different, and with the shortage of funds in the last years of the reign Edward had other priorities.
In addition to the great field armies that were used in Wales and Scotland, the English needed to deploy troops in the castles with which they held down conquered territory. These garrisons were the most regular of the troops employed by Edward I: the accounts reveal that some men served for very long stretches of time in them. There is no evidence to show how garrison troops were recruited. Presumably many of them initially came into royal service as members of the county levies, and were subsequently persuaded to remain in pay. It would be a tedious task to enumerate all the garrisons in detail: a few examples will suffice to give an impression of this very important section of the armed forces. In 1283, after the defeat of the Welsh, it was ordained that Conway, Criccieth and Harlech should have thirty men, while at Bere and Caernarvon there were to be forty. Roughly a third of these were to be crossbowmen.[373] In times of open hostilities numbers might well be much higher. In 1287 there was at Dryslwyn a force of two knights, twenty-two men-at-arms, twenty crossbowmen and eighty archers,[374] while in 1294 Reginald de Grey raised the number of men in Flint to twenty-four horse, twenty-four crossbowmen and 120 archers.[375]
Although the English did not build castles in Scotland on the majestic scale of those in Wales, they did hold an appreciable number of strongholds there, and many troops were engaged on garrison duty. In 1300 there were as many as 325 men in Edinburgh, of whom sixty-four were cavalry. Dirleton, a castle of minor importance in comparison, was guarded by twenty men-at-arms and fifty footsoldiers.[376] A little earlier, in October 1298, the king and council ordained that there should be a permanent force of sixty men-at-arms and 1,000 foot at Berwick.[377] This level was almost reached in the next year when the foot in the town numbered 984.[378] Ordinances made in the winter of 1303-4 were much less lavish. In the four castles of Berwick, Roxburgh, Jedburgh and Edinburgh there were to be only thirty-four cavalrymen and 131 footsoldiers.[379] A list of garrisons made a little later, in May 1304, shows surprisingly large forces in Linlithgow and Kirkintilloch, with thirty-eight cavalry, the same number of archers, and sixty crossbowmen in the two cas
tles. Roxburgh, Jedburgh and Edinburgh only mustered thirty-two cavalry, forty crossbowmen and nineteen archers between them.[380] The scale of the investment of English manpower in castles in Scotland at the end of the reign was considerable. In July 1306, a reasonably typical month, there were some 200 cavalry, twenty-two hobelars, or lightly-armed horsemen, 180 crossbowmen and 425 archers in royal pay serving in castles.[381]
The overall picture of the infantry forces in Edward I’s armies is not particularly impressive. The evidence for the much-vaunted tactics of combining infantry and cavalry in one line of battle is unconvincing. Sophisticated tactics were not possible with large and ill-equipped levies, and after Falkirk they never succeeded in bringing the enemy to fight a decisive battle at close quarters. The Welsh were used extensively by Edward, who regretted their absence from the 1300 campaign, but they gave trouble at times, being as willing on occasion to fight their English comrades as the enemy. No effective solution was found to the problem of desertion, and for much of the reign the commissions of array were appointed to raise large numbers of men in such wide areas that proper supervision of recruitment was scarcely possible. Much remained to be done before the armies that were to win such great victories in the Hundred Years War could emerge. It was the mounted archers who were to play the decisive rôle then, and the only precedent for such men in Edward I’s armies was the Irish hobelar.[382] The tactics that were to win the battles of Crécy and Poitiers were worked out in the Scotch wars of the early years of Edward III’s reign, not in the campaigns of Edward I.
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