It was announced in the Serowe Kgotla that the District Commissioner had been appointed Native Authority, to fill the vacuum created by the lack of a Kgosi. This was heard with angry resentment by the Bangwato and Fraenkel sent a letter of complaint to Nettelton:
We are instructed to protest very strongly against the step taken by the Government of appointing a DC as Native Authority without first consulting the people… Our clients resent the appointment of a Native Authority other than the rightful heir, Seretse Khama, and feel that they cannot cooperate with the DC in the administration of the Tribe.
He was further instructed, he went on, to point out
that the Tribe made its decision in June 1949. The Government’s Representative at that Kgotla meeting accepted the decision and had Tshekedi not applied for the appointment of the Commission, the Government would have immediately installed Seretse as chief.
The Inquiry was a farce, he added darkly, ‘unless use was being made by the Government of this Commission to placate Dr Malan or the Rhodesian Government’.6
For Baring, the Harragin Report had been a good result, because he was only concerned about its conclusion. But when it arrived at the CRO, it was read with dismay. The mandarins in London, too, were gratified with the conclusion. But they were conscious that ‘public opinion, if the Report is published, will surely find the reasons for the finding rather inadequate’:
The first is that, being prohibited from entry into the Union, he cannot visit the Resident Commissioner’s headquarters at Mafikeng and therefore cannot discharge adequately the functions of a chief; secondly we should forfeit the ‘beaux yeux’ of the Union and S. Rhodesia if we let him succeed; and thirdly, approval of his succession would cause disruption in the tribe.
These reasons seemed in fact to contradict the conclusion of the report – ‘it seems from the report that greater disruption will follow if he is not allowed to succeed… In fact, the Enquiry does find Seretse to be a very fit and proper person to be Chief if it were not for his wife…’7
Baring was recalled to London for urgent consultations and as soon as he arrived on 16 December, he hurried to the CRO for a meeting with Noel-Baker, Liesching, the colonial secretary, and other senior officials. Creech Jones opened the discussion by complaining that the Harragin Commission ‘seemed to have arrived at the right conclusions by the use of wrong arguments’. Noel-Baker agreed. He objected, as well, to the finding that Seretse’s prospects of success as a chief were ‘bright’, since Seretse was breaking tribal custom by drinking alcohol. The idea that Seretse could not adequately perform his duties as Chief, because he was a prohibited immigrant in South Africa and could not go to Mafikeng, struck Creech Jones as absurd. Noel-Baker thought they should consider at once transferring the capital to somewhere inside the territory of the Protectorate. But Sir Evelyn quickly intervened. He had discussed this idea with General Smuts, he said, who strongly opposed it. He argued that repercussions in South Africa would be highly unfavourable – it would be understood as a move to draw Bechuanaland and the High Commission Territories further away from the Union.8
No solution to the dilemma of the Harragin Report could be found. Then, after much discussion, the meeting agreed on a strategy to be presented to Cabinet – that Seretse and Ruth should be summoned to London. This had been advocated by Noel-Baker at the very start of the crisis, but had been rejected in favour of the Judicial Inquiry. Now it was seen to have some advantage: for it would introduce some further delay and would also avoid the need for any kind of announcement while the Khamas were still in Serowe. It was agreed that a paper setting out this strategy should be presented to the Cabinet, for discussion.
It fell to Noel-Baker, as Commonwealth Secretary, to tell the Prime Minister about the report of the Judicial Inquiry. Harragin had come down against recognition, he wrote in a minute for Attlee, and this was probably the right conclusion. But the reasons given – although admittedly the real ones – were the very reasons which the British government were trying to conceal. The report would not, he thought, be an easy document to defend. He had recalled Baring to London and had been discussing the matter with him for some days. They had sent for the full evidence and in the meantime he did not think there was any need to trouble the Prime Minister or the Cabinet with the report. He warned that it was
an inflammable document and I am afraid that, if any hint of its contents got out before we are ready to publish it and announce our considered decision, a position which is already difficult enough would be made even more difficult.9
Along with this minute for the Prime Minister, Noel-Baker sent a detailed assessment of the report, which emphasized the risk of giving any impression that the British Government’s policy had been dictated by the Union of South Africa.10
Attlee responded immediately. ‘I do not think we should be precipitate in this matter,’ he ruled, saying that he would look at the report before deciding what to do about circulation.11 This was a most inopportune time to be presented with such a difficult crisis. Not only was it just days before Christmas, but also – and far more importantly – a general election had been set for 23 February 1950, just two months away.
The details set out in Noel-Baker’s memorandum to Attlee had been drawn from information provided by Baring, which he had gathered before leaving Africa. He had gone to the office of the Bantu Press in Johannesburg, where he had spoken to B. G. Paver, the general manager, to Selope Thema, the editor of the Bantu World, and to Dr Alfred Xuma, the president of the ANC (who would shortly be defeated in his efforts to be re-elected, because of his opposition to the mass campaign of passive resistance to apartheid that had been advocated by Walter Sisulu, Oliver Tambo, and Nelson Mandela).12 Thema had repeated the views that he had offered at the Judicial Inquiry and Dr Xuma had agreed with them.13 Baring had also gone to Swaziland to consult Sobhuza, the Paramount Chief. Sobhuza had said he was keenly alive to the great dangers from South Africa of recognizing Seretse – dangers which would affect Swaziland as well as Bechuanaland, because they were both High Commission Territories. But, added Sobhuza, he ‘disliked the idea of Government overriding the decision of a customary meeting in a matter usually decided by custom’.14
To discover the views of white liberals, Baring had consulted Quintin Whyte, the Director of the South African Institute of Race Relations. Although the Institute opposed the South African Mixed Marriages Act on principle, said Whyte, the executive did not approve of mixed marriages; support among liberals, he added, would go to Tshekedi. But he also made the point – which did not appear in Baring’s notes for the Commonwealth Secretary – that it was a mistake to assume that a concession to South Africa on the issue of Seretse would help to avoid the consolidation of the Nationalists. On the contrary, he said, the Union Government ‘will go on as it intends to go on, its nationalism growing on what it feeds on. In this case a concession from UK.’15
On instructions from Baring in London, following the meeting of 16 December 1949, the British High Commission in South Africa started to make plans for getting Seretse and Ruth out of Bechuanaland. Clark wrote to Sir Godfrey Huggins in Salisbury to warn him that the Khamas might need to drive through Southern Rhodesia on their way to catch the flying-boat in Livingstone. This made Huggins uneasy. ‘I am rather perturbed about Seretse and Ruth travelling by car,’ he replied, ‘in case of an unpleasant incident should one of our lunatics hear of the journey.’ But the train, he realized, would be even worse. If they had to go by car, then the ‘only thing would be for them to have a European male in the car to camouflage things. As you will gather, I do not like the idea.’ As far as he was concerned, flying would be the safest option, although even that was risky – ‘What I fear is one of our Afrikaners hearing of the journey – they must refuel somewhere.’16 Clark came up with a solution. ‘If our tiresome couple are summoned to London,’ he said, ‘we will arrange for them to fly from Francistown to Livingstone direct. They will then have to traverse only a ti
ny bit of Southern Rhodesia to get to the flying boat landing stage on the south bank of the river.’17
Attlee had still not seen the Harragin Report: the affair had been put on hold when Noel-Baker went to Ceylon for a conference of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers. But Gordon Walker, his Parliamentary Secretary, decided it was time for action. He had been having lengthy discussions with Sir Evelyn Baring, who was still in London, but who would be leaving for Africa in a week’s time. On 21 January 1950, Gordon Walker sent a top-secret memorandum to the prime minister, with a copy of the Harragin Report. He explained that he had taken this initiative, even though the Commonwealth Secretary was abroad, because the Seretse problem had become pressing. Dr Malan, he said, was about to present another demand for the transfer of the High Commission Territories to South Africa, and Ruth’s pregnancy was an additional worry:
Seretse’s wife is due to give birth to a child in May or thereabouts. Seretse is unlikely to leave Serowe willingly without her; I am most reluctant to leave them both in Serowe for much longer. There may be some risk in inducing his wife to travel to London but I think we must face it, and the risk will be least if she can be brought to make the journey at once. An offer of the best medical attention in London in her confinement may prove a strong inducement.
The whole question must be put before Cabinet at an early date, argued Gordon Walker. This urgency was increased by the imminent general election, which meant that parliament would be dissolved on 3 February 1950.
Attlee agreed. ‘This matter must come to Cabinet,’ he scrawled at the bottom of Gordon Walker’s memorandum. Then he added a note about the Harragin Report:
The document is most disturbing. In effect we are invited to go contrary to the desires of the great majority of the Bamangwato tribe, solely because of the attitude of the governments of the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.
‘It is as if,’ he observed unhappily, ‘we had been obliged to agree to Edward VIII’s abdication so as not to annoy the Irish Free State and the United States of America.’18
The matter came to Cabinet very shortly afterwards. Members were circulated beforehand with a copy of the Harragin Report, as well as a draft White Paper. The White Paper was based on the information that had been collected by Baring in Africa and had been given by Noel-Baker to Attlee. It was designed to show that Seretse’s character was not, after all – despite the contrary finding in the Harragin Report – suitable for a man in the role of Chief. An earlier draft had been shown to senior officials at the Colonial Office, who read it with derision. They objected to the argument that ‘the weight of opinion among responsible Africans is against recognition’, because the only evidence offered for this was a single telegram about West Africans.19 It was also ludicrous to accuse Seretse of being a drinker:
I do not think that the fact that Seretse has been drinking liquor is a legitimate argument against his recognition… there are many Chiefs both in Bechuanaland and elsewhere who do this contrary to traditional custom. There is no suggestion that Seretse drinks to excess.20
When the Cabinet met on the last day of January, they were unsure how to deal with the problem of the Harragin Report; they were also critical of the White Paper, which was put on hold. But they agreed with the proposal of the CRO – which had been decided at the meeting on 16 December – that Noel-Baker should see Seretse while he was still in office, before the general election in late February. The Khamas should be brought as soon as possible to the UK. On arrival, Seretse should be invited to renounce the Chieftainship.21
10
Tricked by the British Government
As soon as the Cabinet had given a green light to the plan of bringing Seretse and Ruth to London, the High Commission in South Africa booked two seats on the flying-boat leaving Johannesburg on 9 February 1950. In fact, the Khamas were obliged to join the flyingboat at the Victoria Falls, because they were prohibited immigrants in the Union. But it was hoped that booking the extra leg would put journalists off the scent: ‘we are to warn BOAC as late as practicable that the passengers will embark at the Victoria Falls and that [the] seats must be kept empty’.1 Nicholas Monsarrat, the United Kingdom Information Officer in South Africa, was told to settle details and, most importantly, to keep them from the press. Monsarrat, a handsome man with piercing blue eyes, was well equipped for the job as he was acquainted with a wide circle of journalists and understood their world. He was a writer himself and was shortly to make his name with the publication of The Cruel Sea in 1951.
Sillery drove to Serowe to see Seretse and Ruth, to tell them of the plan to send them to London. They were astonished – and immediately suspicious. ‘Why should I be asked to London to discuss tribal affairs,’ wondered Ruth, ‘when women in Bechuanaland take no part in politics?’2 In any case, it seemed very peculiar to invite them to the UK just before a general election. On the morning of 5 February, Sillery and Nettelton met the Khamas at the office of the District Commissioner in Lobatse, to tell them of the arrangements that had been made – they would leave for Francistown on 8 February and catch the flying-boat at the Victoria Falls on the afternoon of the following day. Then they took them to lunch at the hospital. But although the Sisters had prepared an excellent meal, reported Sillery to Baring, Seretse had a poor appetite and ‘kept bringing the conversation round to his return journey. We skated fairly easily over this thin ice.’ Seretse wanted a guarantee that he and Ruth would be returning to Serowe. This stumbling block had been anticipated by the High Commissioner’s Office as early as 28 November, when the idea of calling Seretse to London had first come up. ‘The question which Seretse will almost inevitably ask, when presented with the summons to London,’ Clark had warned Sillery, was
‘Will I be allowed to return and will my return fare be paid?’ The only answer which we could presumably give is that this is entirely dependent on the outcome of his discussions with the Secretary of State and that, if the talks resulted that way, his return fare would certainly be paid. The implication of this reply would of course be very obvious to Seretse, but we can see no other way out of the difficulty.3
The Khamas went to see the Bradshaws in Palapye. As Doris wrote to her sister:
Ruth and Seretse called us out of bed at midnight last night to tell us that the Resident Commissioner has told them it is necessary for them to fly to England to consult with Noel Baker over their future. At the moment, all this is very hush hush in the B. P. and S. Africa. They will fly to the Victoria Falls on Thursday and leave by flying boat on Friday 10th, arriving in England on 13th… They are coming to say goodbye to us, before they leave, and I’m looking after her two kittens while they’re away. They expect to be in London a week.4
A Kgotla was called, so that Seretse could hear the opinion of the Bangwato elders.5 Many of them were suspicious that the invitation to London was a trick to remove Ruth from the Reserve, although they assumed that Seretse would be able to return. At first they said they did not want her to go, but after further discussion they decided to trust the Government. Next day, a delegation – twelve elders and Seretse – went to see Sillery to report on their decision. Sensing their hostility, Sillery felt reassured to know that 100 Bechuanaland Protectorate police had recently arrived in Serowe and that reinforcements from Basutoland were on their way.6
On 8 February – the day that Seretse and Ruth were expected to go to Francistown – Sillery sent a junior official to the Khamas’ house to make the final arrangements. But he soon came back, accompanied by Seretse, to report that the plan had collapsed. At a further Kgotla, to which Percy Fraenkel had been invited as adviser, it had been decided that Ruth should not leave unless Sillery provided a written guarantee that she would return. Sillery had not been able to give this guarantee, which confirmed the general fear that there was some trick in the invitation.7 The full discussion of the Kgotla was described in a press report:
An old grey-bearded Bamangwato tribesman stood up in a sun-baked clearing at Serow
e, Bechuanaland… and told his chief-designate, Seretse Khama, that the tribe would not allow his London-born wife Ruth to leave the country.
‘One after the other,’ added the report, ‘elders of the tribe heatedly urged Seretse to turn down the invitation… If he did decide to go he should leave Ruth behind.’ One of the senior men said he believed there was a plot between the South African and British Governments. It had therefore been decided not to let Ruth go: Seretse should go on his own. Seretse accepted their decision, saying he would be back within three weeks.8
Sillery told Seretse that he could not accept Ruth’s refusal unless she gave it herself, so Seretse went to fetch her. After about an hour Ruth appeared, ‘extremely nervous and apparently downcast’. She was now faced with the prospect of yet another – immediate – separation from her husband. But she was firm in her decision not to go.9
‘Top Secret,’ Sillery cabled Baring. ‘Ruth has jibbed at last minute. We all have impression that Ruth is prisoner of Seretse’s supporters.’ As soon as he had sent this message, he realized that it might be taken literally and swiftly sent another: ‘Reference Ruth’s refusal to move I did not make it clear that Ruth’s decision was conveyed personally by her to Nettelton and me. Word prisoner was of course metaphorical.’10 By this time, Sillery was thoroughly fed up with Mrs Khama. ‘Ruth wears the trousers,’ he complained, ‘and we think she has a carping disposition.’11
There was still a chance, hoped Sillery, that Ruth might play ball. Next morning, he and Nettelton went to Francistown, where an aircraft had been chartered to pick up Seretse and Ruth and take them to Livingstone. There they found the Khamas, with a number of friends, including Kgosi Mokgosi of the Balete. But Ruth was clearly not dressed for travel – she was wearing a summer dress and no hat.12 Even the wild elephants, observed Margaret Bourke-White, who had driven up to Francistown, seemed to oppose Seretse’s departure for London: the night before, ‘a herd of playful elephants tore up a grove of trees along the airport road just for the king-sized sport of it.’ Seretse had to stop repeatedly on the way to the airport, to chop the tree-trunks and scattered branches which blocked the road.13
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